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AN INQUIRY

INTO THE

COLONIAL POLICY

OF THE

EUROPEAN POWERS.

IN TWO VOLUMES.

By HENRY BROUGHAM Jun. Esq. F. R. S.

VOL. II.

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AN INQUIRY

INTO

THE COLONIAL POLICY OF THE *EUROPEAN POWERS.*

BOOK II.

OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS OF COLONIES.

INTRODUCTION.

The external relations of any independent ſtate, that is to ſay, its influence upon its neighbours, and its intereſt in their affairs, muſt always be regulated by its relative importance, and its relative poſition. When a ſtate is not independent, but inſeparably connected with another country, or attached to it as a ſubordinate branch of its empire; in a word, when the ſtate in queſtion is a colony, or a diſtant province, its relations to other colonies or independent ſtates in the neighbourhood, muſt be influenced chiefly by the external relations of the

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metropolis. * There are, however, certain circumſtances in the ſituation of different contiguous colonies, which may be conſidered apart from the foreign relations of the mother countries, and which influence the mutual relations of thoſe colonies. Thus, independent of any foreign conſideration, a ſudden increaſe of power in the colonial dominions of any one nation, or an alliance between the colonial forces of two powers, would materially affect the ſecurity of the neighbouring colonies. In a word, colonies may be conſidered as ranged together in ſeparate communities or claſſes, mutually related to each other, and to the neighbouring ſtates, in the ſame manner as if they were independent powers. Thus, we may talk of the great Colonial Republic, in the ſame manner as we talk of the great European Republic. Within certain limits, too, we may ſpeak of the Colonial balance, as we ſpeak of the European balance of power, although the various relations of the parent ſtates muſt conſtantly enter into every calculation which we make concerning the equilibrium of the colonial ſyſtem. In this point of view, we may conſider the different claſſes of European colonies, as forming ſo many different

* Book I. Sect. I.

ferent ſyſtems of federal power, analogous to the great political machine of Europe. Thus, there is one ſuch ſyſtem in the Aſiatic, and another in the American ſettlements of the European powers. The trifling eſtabliſhments in Africa, are at preſent altogether ſubordinate and ſubſervient to the two great colonial communities of the Eaſt and Weſt.

The foreign relations of any one member of thoſe ſyſtems, are, either its relation to the other colonial eſtabliſhments in the ſame part of the world, or its relation to the independent ſtates which exiſt there, including what are commonly called the native powers. In the Aſiatic eſtabliſhments, the weight of the native powers is very great. In the New World, the independent ſtates form a very ſmall and inſignificant portion of the political ſyſtem. The events of late years, however, may furniſh juſt grounds for apprehending that a very formidable addition to their number will, at no diſtant period, be the conſequence of the blind policy of thoſe nations which have poured into the Antilles the ſavage tribes of Africa.

I purpoſe to confine myſelf, in the following Book, chiefly to the mutual relations of the American colonies, and that principally for two reaſons. In the firſt place, becauſe, for many years, all colonial balance appears to have been

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utterly deſtroyed in the Eaſt Indies, by the decided preponderance of the Britiſh power, and the almoſt total annihilation of its natural enemy. And, in the ſecond place, becauſe the diſcuſſion is thus reduced to the relations between the Britiſh colonies and the native powers; a ſubject of infinite difficulty, and almoſt boundleſs extent, where the materials are very ſcanty, and where our concluſions muſt be regulated, not ſo much by general principles, as by the caprice of individuals, from the fluctuating and deſpotic nature of the Eaſtern governments. It will, however, be found, that our general concluſions apply to all colonies, although our particular details are confined to thoſe of the New World. In this Book, therefore, I ſhall conſider the mutual relations chiefly of the American colonies; and thoſe relations depend, in a great meaſure, upon ſome circumſtances which have already been explained in detail. So that the preſent Inquiry would be limited to an application of the concluſions formerly eſtabliſhed with reſpect to the relative importance of the different ſettlements, if ſome peculiarities in colonial affairs did not occur to diverſify this ſubject, and to introduce new diſcuſſions, altogether unconnected with any of thoſe in the Firſt Book.

The

The circumſtances to which I allude, are chiefly of two kinds—the tendency of colonies, in certain circumſtances, to ſeparate from their mother countries; and the diſtinguiſhing ſingularity in the ſituation of the American colonies, ariſing from the introduction of a race of men, differing equally from the original natives of thoſe countries, and from the Europeans, who partly extirpated, partly enſlaved them. The former of thoſe circumſtances is of a general nature, applicable to all colonial ſyſtems; but, from various peculiarities, which we have already deſcribed, and which are particularly applicable to the American eſtabliſhments, we ſhall find that it is one of the moſt powerful deranging cauſes which can operate upon the modern colonial ſyſtem. The other circumſtance is almoſt entirely peculiar to the colonies of America. Its effects are ſtill more powerful and univerſal; the frequent recurrence of its dangerous influence is much more to be apprehended; and at no period was it ever ſo juſtly the cauſe of alarm as at the preſent. But although, for this reaſon, we may look upon the times in which we live as a great colonial criſis, yet it is evident that the intermixture of races is a fundamental part of the colonial ſyſtem, and ſo eſſentially interwoven with the whole fabric, as to preſent us with general conſiderations and

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concluſions, not of a temporary nature, but applicable at all times to colonial affairs, ſo long as the bulk of the American population ſhall conſiſt of perſons in a ſervile condition, and of a different race from their maſters. Thus, any principles which we may deduce from our experience of paſt years, will be applicable, not only to the preſent poſture of affairs, but to all future times, while Europeans ſhall poſſeſs territories in the New World, and ſhall remain ſeparated from the inferior claſſes of the people, by phyſical differences and political privileges. The inferences, too, which we ſhall draw from the ſtate of things in the Weſt Indian ſettlements, (the moſt intereſting object of attention, at the preſent moment), will be applicable to thoſe continental territories, alſo, where ſlavery is permitted, and the difference of race exiſts, ſince thoſe communities are all haſtening towards the ſame criſis to which ſuperior wealth and induſtry have already brought the iſlands. Nay, many of our concluſions, although ſtated for the particular caſe of the African negroes, will be applicable to the ſtate of all communities compoſed in a great meaſure of oppreſſed and uncivilized men, unconnected, by natural ties or ſimilarity of circumſtances, with their oppreſſors. The ſubject, then, to which we are now to proceed is, in fact, neither of a local,

local, nor temporary nature; although our ſpeculations, from a conſtant reference to practice, may often aſſume the appearance of minute detail.

The two great circumſtances of diſmemberment, by a rebellion of the colonies, or the eſtabliſhment of civilized and independent ſtates in the colonial territories—and the ſeparation of the colonies by a rebellion of the inferior races, or the eſtabliſhment of uncivilized and independent communities in the colonial ſyſtem, are now to be conſidered, not with reſpect to their effects upon the intereſts of the mother country, or upon the internal ſtate of the ſyſtem (compoſed of colonies and mother country) in which the circumſtances operate; but with reſpect to their effects upon the intereſts of the neighbouring colonies, or upon the internal arrangements and ſtructure of the colonial ſyſtem, that is, the mutual relations of the different colonies viewed independently of their parent ſtates. Thus, we are to conſider the effects of ſucceſsful revolt, or ſucceſsful negro rebellion, in the French ſettlements, not upon the intereſts of France, but upon thoſe of her neighbours in America; and we are to inquire, what the probable conſequence of ſuch changes would be to the colonial intereſts of thoſe neighbours.

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Beſides the two leading circumſtances which I have ſtated, there are ſome others, unconnected with them, and of more eaſy conſideration, which will properly come under our obſervation in the next Book. The preſent Inquiry, therefore, divides itſelf into three parts, which I ſhall conſider in their order.

In the *firſt* place, I ſhall endeavour to explain the effects of colonial independence being eſtabliſhed in any part of the colonial ſyſtem.

In the *ſecond* place, I ſhall conſider, more particularly, the probable effects of independence being eſtabliſhed in the Weſt Indian colonies, and the probable conſequences of tranquillity being reſtored in the revolted iſlands, either by the re-eſtabliſhment of the ancient order of things, or by the ſubmiſſion of the negroes to the authority of the laws under a ſyſtem of freedom.

And, in the *third* place, I ſhall examine the natural conſequences of the French iſlands remaining in a ſtate of revolt, and of negro independence.

SEC-

SECTION I.

OF THE MUTUAL RELATIONS OF COLONIES WITH RESPECT TO THEIR DEPENDENCE ON THE MOTHER COUNTRIES.

SECT. I.

It may be obſerved, in general, that a colony is much weaker, and leſs fitted for vigorous meaſures, either of defenſive or offenſive warfare, than an independent ſtate, of the ſame natural reſources.

The diſtant poſſeſſions of a deſpotic ſovereign are never ruled with that energy which is characteriſtic of abſolute government in the parts near the centre of the ſyſtem. An unlimited monarch is always afraid of arming his deputies with the ſame power which he himſelf enjoys, leſt they ſhould turn it againſt his ſupremacy; and never entruſts them with the delegated authority for a length of time ſufficient to render it ſolid and effective. The ſame regulations which would ſecure the vigorous adminiſtration of the colony or remote province, would endanger its dependence upon the parent ſtate. Theſe muſt, of neceſſity, conſiſt in ſuch arrangements as tend to render each ſubordinate agent dependent wholly on his immediate ſuperior, in order to preſerve complete diſcipline,

BOOK II.

diſcipline, regularity and promptitude in every part of the ſyſtem; and to prevent the inevitable dangers that reſult from delay, from the jealouſy of office-bearers, and from the opportunity of an appeal or complaint to the government at home. A vigorous government can only be inſured, by entruſting ſome one with diſcretionary powers, and keeping as much as poſſible out of view, the fountain from which this delegated authority is derived. But theſe are the very circumſtances moſt dangerous to the maintenance of dependence, and moſt repugnant to the views of all rulers. In every government there muſt exiſt abſolute authority ſomewhere. In colonial or provincial governments, this power reſides at a diſtance. In every vigorous ſyſtem of adminiſtration, the executive power muſt be concentrated within the feweſt hands poſſible. In whatever manner it is veſted in the mother country, the executive power in the colonial government muſt be divided between two claſſes of rulers, one in the colonies, the other at home. In fact, the former are ſubordinate and dependent; the latter eſſentially poſſeſs the ſupreme power.

In all the deſpotiſms of the Eaſt, it has been obſerved, that the farther any part of the empire is removed from the capital, the more do its inhabitants enjoy ſome ſort of rights and privileges;

privileges; the more inefficacious is the power of the monarch, and the more feeble and eaſily deranged is the organization of the government. Monteſquieu has fancifully compared the condition of the people, under ſuch a ſyſtem, to the ſtratification of the earth according to the geological theories of the ancients. Whilſt the centre is devoured by perpetual fire, and the middle regions are the ſcene of barrenneſs, the ſurface is bleſt with ſalubrity, and clothed with verdure.

The authority of the Viceroy in Spaniſh America, though far more unbounded than that of any governor of the New World, is, nevertheleſs, limited, according to the maxim *divide et impera*, by the right of appeal, and the independent judicial powers veſted in the Audiences by the legiſlative and inquiſitorial ſupremacy of the great council of the Indies; but chiefly by the ſhortneſs of the period during which any one is allowed to hold ſo magnificent a ſtation. In this reſpect, the Spaniſh government has imitated the jealous policy of ſome republics and ariſtocratic commonwealths towards thoſe domeſtic office-bearers whom, contrary to their general ſyſtem of ſuſpicion, they thought proper to entruſt with conſiderable privileges and powers. The extent of the authority was always in an inverſe

BOOK II.

verſe proportion to its duration. The Doge of Venice, whoſe office laſted for life, had ſcarcely the ſhadow of power. '*Rex in pura*' (ſays the Venetian proverb, ſo admirably deſcriptive of this office); '*ſenator in curia; in urbe captivus; extra urbem privatus.*' In Genoa, the Doge had more influence, from his right of exerciſing a *veto*, before as well as after diſcuſſion; but he only remained two years in office. The ſmaller republics in Italy were ſtill more jealous of the executive power; partly becauſe the members of ſmall communities are naturally more careful of their liberties; partly becauſe, in thoſe ſtates, abuſes of power are more felt. They deprived their chief magiſtrate of all real power, and limited, at the ſame time, the duration of his office. The Capitani of St Marino were choſen for ſix months only. The Gonfaloniere of Lucca was changed every two months. The Rector of Raguſa held his place for a ſingle month; and the Governor of the Citadel was changed every day. It is from a jealouſy, much more natural, of their colonial adminiſtration, but no leſs fatal to all energy and vigour of government, that the Spaniſh Monarchs have endeavoured to counterbalance the effects of that extenſive delegated power which the diſtance and magnitude

tude of their colonial dominions render abſolutely neceſſary, partly by ſowing the ſeeds of diſſenſion among the different conſtituted authorities, partly by limiting the duration of the moſt ſplendid appointment which any ſubject in the world enjoys. They have endeavoured to unite energy of government with a ſyſtem of checks and counterpoiſes; to reconcile a vigorous adminiſtration with the very circumſtances which weaken and paralyze all the movements of delegated authority.

The powers of the governor in the French colonies, under the ancient ſyſtem, were much more limited, and his means of acquiring influence far more confined. His office was ſeldom allowed to continue for more than three years. His conduct was carefully watched at home by the Council of Commerce, who had branches in every ſeaport town, to examine all perſons returning from the colonies, and to encourage, ſyſtematically, all manner of complaints againſt his adminiſtration. His prerogative in the colonies was limited by the rights of the ſuperior councils, and the influence of the colonial aſſemblies. His moſt important functions were ſhared by the intendant, who, on the other hand, was ſupreme in his own department of finance. From this ſyſtem of divided power reſulted an adminiſtration equally vexatious

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vexatious to the inhabitants, and deſtructive of all efficacy and vigour, and, in the end, ruinous alſo to the intereſts of the Crown.

In all thoſe ſyſtems of colonial government, the undivided energy and quickneſs of execution which characteriſes the primary operations of abſolute power, has been ſacrificed to that jealous timidity ſo conſpicuous in its conduct towards ſubordinate agents, and ſo deſtructive of its beſt intereſts in all ſchemes of delegated authority. The problem which Velaſquez ſo often attempted to ſolve, will always preſent the ſame difficulties to thoſe who, by deputy, would perform great actions, or govern extenſive and diſtant territories. After a Cortez has been found, the moſt difficult part of the enterprize remains to be achieved: the neceſſary contradiction muſt be reconciled, of retaining in ſubjection him who is fit to conquer or to rule; and of calling forth, at the ſame time, all thoſe powers which lead to victory, or command obedience.

Monteſquieu * has obſerved, that a republic governs its conquered provinces with more abſolute and intolerable ſway than a monarchy: that its remote poſſeſſions ſuffer all the evils, without enjoying any of the advantages of monarchical government:

* Eſprit de Loix, Liv. X. chap. 7, 8, & 9.

SECT. I.

government: and that the diſtant provinces of an ariſtocratic commonwealth are, in this reſpect, in the ſame ſituation with thoſe of a republic. Here, as in many other ſpeculations, the love of conceit and paradox appears to have miſled this witty and ingenious author. That the government which a commonwealth eſtabliſhes in its colonies and provinces muſt of neceſſity be extremely different from its domeſtic adminiſtration, and that the ſubjects of the diſtant territories will always enjoy very different portions of liberty from thoſe in the capital and the neighbouring provinces, cannot be diſputed. It is, indeed, a propoſition ſo extremely evident, as ſcarcely to acquire corroboration from the uniform example of all the republics which have ever plundered and infeſted the world. But it is rather ſingular, that Monteſquieu ſhould diſcover any thing in the nature of this form of government more friendly to the prerogatives of deputies and governors of provinces, than in the monarchical conſtitution; more eſpecially as, in the very chapter before, he had explained the dangerous tendency of intruſting extenſive powers to ſubordinate agents in a commonwealth, and accounted, upon this principle, for the apparent unwillingneſs of the Carthaginians that Hanibal ſhould ſucceed in his enterpriſe againſt Rome.

BOOK II.

Rome. The Roman proconſuls, indeed, (whom, in another part of his work,* he deſcribes with great animation as the baſhaws of the republic) exerciſed over the provinces a power unknown in Latium during the free days of the ſtate. But their office only laſted for a year; they were ſubjected to various checks and controuls; and they owed the maintenance of their authority, during that ſhort period, not to any influence which they had an opportunity of acquiring over the people, but to the terror of the Roman name, of which they were the repreſentatives, and to the legions of which they received the command when they ſet out for their government. It may be worth while to attend a little more minutely to the ſtructure of the Roman provincial governments, as this ſubject, ſo full of political inſtruction, has been very much miſunderſtood.

While Rome continued under a republican form of government, the conquered countries were in general converted into provinces, and committed to the care of the conſuls or prætors, but more commonly to proconſuls and proprætors—magiſtrates whoſe ſole occupation was the provincial adminiſtration. They were choſen by the Senate; clothed with extenſive

* Liv. XI. chap. 12.

SECT. I.

tenſive powers of civil government and juriſdiction; and inveſted by the people, in the *comitia curiata*, with the chief military command. But this high authority was limited in two ways:—they received their appointment only for a year; and they were accompanied by a quæſtor, likewiſe choſen by the Senate, whoſe department was that of the finances, and who was always an officer of high authority and ſplendid rank. Under the republic, the governor was ſometimes accompanied alſo by an officer called *Legatus*, the lieutenant, or ſecond in command. We are told, indeed, that the cloſeſt connexion ſubſiſted between the governor and his quæſtor: '*Ea neceſſitudo*,' to uſe the words of Cicero, '*ut illi proconſul pa-*' *rentis loco eſſet.*' But as the quæſtor's appointment was altogether independent of the governor, as his ſeparate functions were of great importance, and as his own private ſtation was always one of great dignity in the republic, it is ſcarcely to be imagined that the power of the governor ſhould receive no modification from the privileges of this aſſociate. That a great familiarity ſhould ſubſiſt between them, and a mutual complaiſance ſhould be cultivated by both, was certainly neceſſary for the management of the public buſineſs; and would, in general, be conducive to their own intereſt and eaſe.

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But if the preſence of the quæſtor was not intended as a controul upon the proconſul or proprætor, it is not eaſy to ſee the uſe of his appointment. The whole buſineſs might have been entruſted to the governor himſelf. He was commiſſioned to adminiſter civil and criminal juſtice, as well as to command the forces; and his powers might have eaſily been extended to the management of the revenue, and the arrangement of the accounts of provincial expenditure, for the inſpection of the Senate. We may therefore conclude, that, beſides the limitation of the governor's power by the ſhort duration of his office, he was farther checked by the quæſtor, whoſe office ſeems, in many points, to have reſembled that of the Intendant in the government of the French colonies.

Auguſtus introduced a new arrangement into the provincial adminiſtration. He took upon himſelf the management of a great part of the provinces, and left the reſt to the care of the Senate. The former were called *provinciæ Cæſaris*; the latter *provinciæ populares*. The imperial provinces were committed to magiſtrates called *præſides*, and ſometimes *rectores*, inveſted with as full powers as had ever been enjoyed by the proconſuls or proprætors, but accompanied by *rationales*, or *procuratores principis*, who reſembled the quæſtor in the nature

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nature of their offices, and exerciſed, it is probable, a ſimilar controul over the governors. The popular provinces continued under the government of proconſuls and proprætors: but Auguſtus no longer allowed thoſe magiſtrates, choſen by the Senate, to command the forces of the republic.* One province, Egypt, ſeems to have been reſerved by the Emperor excluſively, and with peculiar concern. It was governed by a *Præfectus Auguſtalis*, whoſe powers were apparently of a ſtill more extenſive nature than thoſe of any provincial governor during the republic; for no ſenator was allowed to enter the province without ſpecial permiſſion; and Tacitus, talking of Egypt under the new form of government, ſays—'*Ægyptum copiaſque quibus exercetur, jam inde* '*a Divo Auguſto equites Romani obtinent loco* '*Regum.*'† But though not accompanied either by a quæſtor or procurator, his powers were controuled by a magiſtrate of high judicial authority, called, *Juridicus civitatis Alexandrini*—'*qui præfecti actiones ſpeculatus vide-* '*tur, ne res novas moliretur.*'

All theſe officers, then, *quæſtores*, *procuratores principis*, *rationales Cæſaris*, and *juri-*

* Heineccii Antiq. Rom. lib. I. Append.—Tit. ff. de off. Proconſ.—Ibidem, de off. Præfidis.

† Hiſtor. lib. I. cap. 11.

BOOK II.

dici, appear to have ſerved the purpoſe of the French intendant; the two firſt by the management of the finances, and by their perſonal dignity; the laſt by the excluſive adminiſtration of juſtice.

Under ſome of the emperors, however, there is reaſon to believe, that the prerogatives of the *præſes* or *rector* were extended, and thoſe of the aſſociated offices curtailed. Indeed, the neceſſity of that ſuperior energy which belonged to the imperial adminiſtration, for the government of countries not completely ſubdued, was the pretext upon which Auguſtus obtained the new arrangement of the provinces, and their diviſion into ſenatorial or popular, and imperial. In both, the aſſociated officer remained in his place during the Emperor's pleaſure. *

From a paſſage in Tacitus, † we learn, that Claudius (A. U. C. 806.) reſolved to make the deciſions of his *procuratores* of as much effect as his own, and obtained a decree of the Senate, inveſting them with powers, '*plenius et uberius* '*quam antea.*' It is true, that Heineccius, in his Commentary on the Pandects, ‡ makes the term *procurator*, in this paſſage, apply to the *rationalis*; and conceives that Claudius intended, by his

* Dion. Caſſ. lib. LIII. cap. 13.

† Annal. lib. XII. cap. 60.

‡ Tom. I. p. 19.

his new law, to beſtow the juriſdiction of fiſcal cauſes upon that officer. But this is quite inconſiſtent with the context. ‘ *Nam* ’ (continues Tacitus) ‘ *divus Auguſtus apud equeſtres* ‘ *qui Ægypto præſiderent lege agi, decretaque eo-* ‘ *rum proinde haberi juſſerat, ac ſi magiſtratus* ‘ *Romani conſtituiſſent : mox alias per provin-* ‘ *cias, et in urbe pleraque conceſſa ſunt, quæ* ‘ *olim à prætoribus noſcebantur. Claudius omne* ‘ *jus tradidit, de quo toties ſeditione aut armis* ‘ *certatum, cùm Sempronii rogationibus equeſter* ‘ *ordo in poſſeſſione judiciorum locaretur, aut rur-* ‘ *ſum Serviliæ leges ſenatui judicia redderent.* ’ SECT. I.

This is a diſtinct aſſertion, that Claudius extended to the governors of provinces, though of equeſtrian rank, thoſe powers of juriſdiction which the Servilian law had reſtored to the Senate. Neither the ſeditions of the Gracchi, nor the laws of Servilius, had any particular reference to fiſcal cauſes. The term, *procurator*, is often uſed to ſignify the Emperor's delegate or preſident in the provinces. Many of the leſſer provinces were governed altogether by magiſtrates bearing this title ; as Judea, * Corſica, † and Thrace. ‡ The powers of the provincial governors were ſtill farther extended by the Emperor Alexander in the year 225, and

* Tacit. Annal. lib. XV. cap. 44.

† Id. Hiſt. lib. II. cap. 16.

‡ Id. Hiſt. lib. I. cap. 11.

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Conſtantine in the year 322. § The Emperor Conſtantine gave the *rationales* the ſole juriſdiction in fiſcal cauſes. † But it appears, from various authorities, that they poſſeſſed this before his time. Ulpian ſays of the proconſul, 'Majus 'imperium in ea provincia habet omnibus, poſt 'principem. Nec quicquam eſt in provincia, quod 'non per ipſum expediatur. Sane, ſi fiſcalis pecu- 'niaria cauſa ſit, quæ ad procuratorem principis 'reſpicit; melius fecerit, ſi abſtineat.' ‡ And afterwards, 'Quæ etiam omnium præſidum com- 'munia ſunt: et debent ab his obſervari.' ‖ A ſhort time after Conſtantine had made the law above mentioned, the Emperors Valentinius and Valens ordained, that the *rationalis* ſhould, for oppreſſive conduct in his adminiſtration, be tried by the *præſes*, and, upon ſufficient proof, be publicly burnt alive. * A clear demonſtration, at once, of the evils experienced by the people under the provincial government of the emperors, and of the marked inferiority of the *rationalis* to the governor. The Emperor Conſtantine gave the governors alſo certain powers over the chief men in the provinces who might prove unmanageable or formidable. ¶

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§ L. 1. & 2. Cod. de off. Rect. Prov.
† L. 5. Cod. Ubi cauſæ fiſcales, &c.
‡ Ibid. § 6. ‖ Id. ibid.
¶ Note A a.—L. 2. Cod. de off. Rect. Prov.
* L. 9. Cod. Ubi cauſæ fiſcales, &c.

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It would appear, then, that the adminiſtration of the imperial provinces was moſt arbitrary; that the popular provinces, ſo long as the diſtinction remained, were ruled by divided authority, centred partly in the proconſul choſen by the Senate, partly in the commander of the forces, and partly in the financial adminiſtrator, both delegated by the Emperor: that the government of the provinces under the republic was much more tyrannical than the government of Rome and the contiguous territory, but not ſo abſolute as the provincial governments of the emperors: and that, in every inſtance, it was leſs deſpotic, effective, and vigorous, than the adminiſtration of the Emperors, or of a Dictator in the metropolis.

It is manifeſt, therefore, that the proconſular tyranny in the provinces, muſt have been more grievous, in various reſpects, than the limited dominion of the Conſul and Senate at home, perhaps even more odious than the ſhort-lived power of the dictator, watched as it was by a people habituated to freedom, and terminating with the emergency for which it was created. But, at all events, there can be no reaſon to imagine that the proconſuls of the republic enjoyed a more limited ſway than thoſe of the empire; or that Rome, ſo jealous of her powerful citizens, ſhould have been more liberal in clothing her provincial magiſtrates with

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authority, than the monarchs of the Eaſt were in their commiſſions to commanders and ſatraps. It is probable that both received the ſame ſhare of delegated power, becauſe they received their appointments from Sovereigns equally jealous of agents placed beyond the immediate ſphere of their controul, and had to exerciſe their functions upon theatres where the ſame exertions of authority were required.

In modern times, we find, that ariſtocratical and republican commonwealths, and limited monarchies, have inveſted their deputies with powers ſimilarly reſtricted.

The governors of the Venetian podeſtas were not indeed fettered by the various reſtraints which reduced the authority of the Doge to a mere name; becauſe the provinces were governed without the complicated ſyſtem of ariſtocratic tyranny which prevailed in the city. Yet the ſubjects of the republic in the *terra firma* were ruled by ſo gentle a ſway, as made the inhabitants of thoſe provinces which were conquered in the war that followed the league of Cambray, lament their ſeparation from the dominion of Venice, whilſt this relaxation of the provincial government certainly contributed not a little to the unfortunate iſſue of that conqueſt. *

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* The collection of Venetian laws, entitled, ‘ *Parti è* ‘ *bandi Veneti*, ’ contains various edicts limiting the powers of the governors of provinces.

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It was not to be expected that the States-General, whoſe extreme jealouſy of all ſubordinate authority cramped the operations of their generals with the prepoſterous invention of field deputies in the campaigns on the Rhine, ſhould entruſt their commanders in South America with that unlimited power, without which the poſſeſſion of diſtant ſettlements can ſcarcely be acquired, and can never be long retained. Accordingly, the rapid conqueſts in Brazil, which the Republic owed entirely to the enterprizing genius of Prince Maurice, and the patriotic zeal of the whole nation againſt Spain, were ſacrificed to that cautious and timid policy which ſubjected his meaſures to the controul of a mercantile board appointed to watch his operations, and to prevent him from counteracting the vigour ſuddenly acquired by the Portugueſe government, under the newly eſtabliſhed dynaſty of the houſe of Braganza.

The conſtitutions of the Britiſh colonial governments in North America were formed upon the model of that admirable ſyſtem of domeſtic policy, which has ſecured the happineſs of the mother country, raiſed her to an unexampled height of proſperity, and, notwithſtanding its theoretical defects, left her in a ſituation of envied tranquillity, and ſolid practical freedom, amidſt all the political experiments and convulſions that have ſhaken

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ſhaken the other nations of Europe. The governments of the Britiſh Weſt Indies are ſtill conſtructed upon the ſame excellent plan. But it is impoſſible to deny, that this form of government, of which we are ſo juſtly proud at home, has communicated to our fellow ſubjects in the New World, few of thoſe advantages that we ourſelves enjoy under it. The author of the '*Wealth of Nations*' ſeems not to have conſidered this matter with his uſual accuracy *, when he ſays, that the Engliſh coloniſts had their rights ſecured to them, in the ſame degree, and by the ſame means, with their fellow citizens in Britain; and that the colonial forms of government approached ſtill more nearly to the perfection of liberty, than the model upon which they were originally conſtructed. In theory, indeed, this is the caſe. They had, almoſt all of them, two Houſes of Legiſlature, and a governor entruſted with the executive power. The conſent of theſe three branches of the conſtitution was required in every public act of legiſlation. But it appears very clear, that the relation of dependency which a colonial eſtabliſhment ſuppoſes, could never be enſured by a delegation of that authority to the governor, or an extenſion of thoſe rights to the people, which give energy to the executive power, and ſecure complete liberty to the ſubjects

* Book IV. chap. 7.

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ſubjects on this ſide of the Atlantic. To take one example, only, of the radical difference between the two ſyſtems. The influence of the Commons, from their power of withholding ſupplies, which almoſt always prevents the negative of the Crown from being exerted in Great Britain, and is indeed the great corner ſtone of the Britiſh conſtitution, has, evidently, almoſt no exiſtence in the Colonial ſyſtem. Accordingly, every meaſure propoſed by the Colonial Legiſlatures, that did not meet with the entire concurrence of the Britiſh Cabinet, was ſure to be rejected, in the laſt inſtance, by the Crown. So that, whilſt the directing influence of the people of Great Britain prevents the Crown from exerting its conſtitutional prerogative, and in a great degree regulates all the operations of the Royal authority; in the colonies, the direct power of the Crown, backed by all the reſources of the mother country, prevents any meaſure obnoxious to the Crown from being carried into effect, even by the unanimous efforts of the Colonial Legiſlature; and indirectly obtains from it all the meaſures that are deſired.

If examples were required, we might refer to the hiſtory of the abolition of the ſlave trade in Virginia. A duty on the importation of negroes had been impoſed, amounting to a prohibition. One Aſſembly, induced by a temporary peculiarity of circumſtances, repealed this law by a bill which received

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received the immediate ſanction of the Crown. But never afterwards could the Royal aſſent be obtained to a renewal of the duty, although, as we are told by Mr Jefferſon, * all manner of expedients were conſtantly tried for this purpoſe, by almoſt every ſubſequent Aſſembly that met under the Colonial government. The very firſt Aſſembly that met under the new conſtitution, finally prohibited the traffic.

Nor is this political arrangement, which altogether reverſes the balance of the powers in the government of the colonies, the conſequence of any arbitrary or accidental part of the ſyſtem. It is eſſential to the dependence of the colonies, and a neceſſary part of the ſubordinate conſtitution. It is the legal mode of enforcing ſubjection, conſiſtently with the forms of the Britiſh government. It can only be counteracted by ſuch a growth of reſources, as may prepare the independence of the colonies, and muſt, in the end, produce a complete ſeparation. This event will of courſe be more ſpeedily brought about in the colonies of free ſtates; but, even in them, we have had fatal experience of the obſtinate ſtruggle with which ſuch a conſummation is always likely to be attended.

We may conclude, then, that the provincial or colonial government eſtabliſhed in the diſtant dominions of commonwealths and mixed

* Notes on Virginia, Qu. 8.

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ed monarchies, although more free than that with which an abſolute ſovereign rules his diſtant territories, is nevertheleſs extremely different, in its principles, from the conſtitution of the parent ſtates; and that, as the delegates of the abſolute monarch, though armed with power ſufficient to annihilate all freedom, yet rule with far leſs ſway and energy than their maſters at home: ſo, the ſubordinate ſyſtems of free governments ſecure, in a very inferior degree, the rights and privileges of the colonial or provincial ſubjects, without falling into the oppoſite extreme of deſpotic government. Hence, one conſequence muſt inevitably follow;—neither of the two ſyſtems of delegated power will poſſeſs the advantages, either of a deſpotic or of a free conſtitution, in thoſe ſituations which call for the exertions of national force. While the one is deſtitute of that undivided energy, and appropriate promptitude in all military operations, with which a deſpotic government is always armed, the other, poſſeſſed in a ſtill leſs degree of this advantage, muſt likewiſe want all that force which a popular form of government excluſively derives from the united exertions of a free people. In the conduct of military operations, therefore, whether defenſive or offenſive, all colonial governments muſt be extremely imperfect; and the colonial governments of free

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free ſtates more imperfect than thoſe of deſpotic or abſolute monarchies.

But it is not merely from the neceſſary ſtructure of their governments, that colonial eſtabliſhments are ill adapted to the meaſures of vigorous warfare. The very circumſtance of their dependence on another ſtate at a vaſt diſtance, muſt be productive of conſequences the moſt fatal to promptitude of counſel, and activity of exertion. Suppoſing that an abſolute Monarch may ſafely delegate undivided power to his repreſentative, and that a free ſtate may organize the government of its colonies, ſo as to communicate to the inhabitants the moſt ample privileges; ſtill, ſuch diſtant poſſeſſions, of whatever kind, are in a very different ſituation from primary ſtates. In them, it is not to be imagined that the influence of the government upon the internal adminiſtration, can operate ſo ſtrongly as in the mother country. The principle of fear, or loyalty, or religion, or whatever it is that renders the people thoughtleſsly ſubmiſſive to abſolute power, exiſts in a much leſs degree, where the Monarch appears in the perſon of his deputy, than where he ſhines himſelf in the magnificent fulneſs of deſpotic glory. The feelings of patriotiſm, or virtue, or political expediency, or whatever it is that inclines a free people to obey its rulers, can have very little

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tle force in a ſmall part of a ſtate, cut off from the reſt by phyſical boundaries, connected with the whole by no common intereſt, and regulated by a government which is itſelf dependent on a diſtant power.

Indeed, if we conſider the kind of men by whom colonies are always peopled, we ſhall be convinced that they are neither fit for ſubmitting to the diſcipline of abſolute monarchy, nor for being animated by the ſpirit of a free conſtitution. They are either ſettled, for a time, with the view of increaſing their fortunes, and then returning to their native country; in which caſe, it muſt be a matter of indifference to them in whoſe hands the poſſeſſion of the province is placed, provided they are not themſelves moleſted: or they have taken up their reſidence in the province, and made it their abode for life; in which caſe, they are much more likely to feel the deſire of ſeparating from the parent ſtate, than of eſpouſing its quarrels.

Whenever, then, a free ſtate would carry on war from its diſtant provinces, it has not only to attack the enemy, but to retain its own ſubjects in tranquillity and ſubordination. To look for vigorous aſſiſtance from thoſe ſubjects, is abſurd. They cannot be expected to fight and to toil, that others may wear the laurels, or divide the ſpoil. To them, it is much the ſame thing what nation

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nation receives the taxes and contributions which they muſt pay; and if their exertions are to turn the fate of campaigns in the planning of which they had no ſhare, it ſeems but reaſonable that they ſhould continue thoſe exertions a little longer, in order to render themſelves independent, ſo that they may reap the fruits of their own dangers and toils.

But, beſides the nature of colonial governments, and the ſituation of the inhabitants over whom they are eſtabliſhed, other circumſtances eſſential to diſtant and dependent ſettlements, muſt always weaken and diſtract the operations of provincial warfare. It is ſeldom that a cabinet ought, in prudence, to entruſt a general with full command, unfettered by any reſtrictions; and more rarely ſtill, that a cabinet can be found willing to grant ſuch diſcretionary powers, when circumſtances render it neceſſary or prudent. When plans are to be formed by a council or prince on one ſide of the globe, and executed by their delegates on the other, all the bad conſequences may be expected to oppoſe the ſucceſs of each meaſure, which can ariſe from local ignorance, and from conſtant delay. If a general has been found worthy of bearing the moſt unlimited commiſſion, and a cabinet wiſe and liberal enough to grant it, ſtill the fate of the conteſt is periled on a ſingle

gle ſtake—his perſonal ſafety and good conduct: for it is ſcarcely to be expected, that one army will contain two ſuch men: and, before time has been given to form them, or to ſelect them from the bulk of the forces, their ſervices are indiſpenſably required. As to the middle expedient of councils of war, they ſeldom or never produce any good effect. If they are appointed as a check, they muſt hamper the general, and do nothing but miſchief. If they are confined to the office of giving advice, they may ſtill have the effect of controuling him; and, at all events, they muſt ſhare that reſponſibility, which can never fall with too undivided a force upon the ſingle head of the leader.

On the other hand, when the government is near its military agents, they may ſafely be entruſted with ample authority, and can be directed by continual inſtructions. Their conduct is cloſely watched—their deficiencies eaſily ſupplied—their places ſoon filled up. No great plan of operations can, in ſuch a caſe, be fruſtrated by a random ſhot. The ſtate which has the beſt troops, and moſt ample reſources, will, in general, find a ſucceſſion of able men to command the one, and direct the other. Had Cortes been cut off in any of thoſe enterprizes which ſo rapidly ſucceeded each other

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during the whole of his vaſt and hazardous career, the Mexican empire was ſaved, at leaſt for a ſeaſon. But when Montezuma was ſlain, a Quetlavaca was eaſily found to meet the increaſed difficulties of the emergency; and, on his accidental death, in the courſe of a few weeks, there was no difficulty in finding a Guatimozin, who diſplayed talents that would have ſaved his country againſt any ordinary combination of dangers.

But, further; troops may always be expected to fight better in preſence of their countrymen, in ſcenes with which they are acquainted, and under climates to which they have been habituated from their birth. With how many additional diſadvantages have thoſe forces to ſtruggle, which are ſent into diſtant regions;—where the people with whoſe defence they are entruſted, and the enemies whom they have to combat, are almoſt equally ſtrange and foreign to them;—where they may languiſh in an unwholeſome air, after ſpilling their blood in the field; and muſt ſubmit to all the riſks and delays of a tedious return, before they can receive the meed of their country's applauſe, for the victories which their ſcars and their toils have won? Nor are the leaders themſelves on equal terms. They have not the ſame eyes watching their conduct; they do not

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not take the field with the ſame local knowledge; they are called upon to act in a ſtrange country, at a vaſt diſtance from their ſupplies; and having in their rear, ſhould they be forced to retreat, if not an enemy's territory, at leaſt one which belongs to a lukewarm friend. In ſhort, the nation that carries on war in its colonies, either for their defence or extenſion, acts under the principal diſadvantages to which every power is ſubject, when it engages in offenſive warfare, and which, other circumſtances being equal, muſt always turn the fortune of war in favour of an enemy who fights on his own ground.

The hiſtory of the Greek and Roman colonies will probably occur to my readers, as furniſhing exceptions to the propoſition which I have been endeavouring to eſtabliſh. The ſubjection of the moſt flouriſhing of the former, although independent of the mother country, and the great aſſiſtance which the Romans derived from their colonial ſettlements, in extending and ſecuring their conqueſts, may at firſt ſight appear to preclude the application of the foregoing remarks, at leaſt to the policy of ancient ſtates. But, a little attention to the real nature of thoſe eſtabliſhments will ſhow us, that their hiſtory preſents, in fact, nothing anomalous to our view.

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The Greek and Roman colonies, as we have already ſhown, * were eſſentially different in their conſtitution and origin. The former aroſe from emigrations cauſed by an overgrown population, and ſeldom retained any dependence on the parent ſtates. The latter owed their eſtabliſhment principally to the ambition of Rome; and they remained in ſtrict ſubordination to her power. But another difference between the two ſorts of colonies has not been ſo much regarded. The colonial ſettlements of the Greeks were planted in diſtant countries, and amongſt barbarous tribes. They were eſtabliſhed, not in Greece, or in the ſtates immediately in the neighbourhood which had already been well peopled, but in Gaul, Sicily, and the ſouth of Italy; in Cyrene, and Egypt; in Illyria, and Aſia Minor. The Roman colonies, on the other hand, were planted in the immediate vicinity of Rome. During the ſecond Punic war, the city was ſurrounded by no fewer than thirty eſtabliſhments of this kind, † which ſerved as ſo many garriſons or advanced poſts, for her defence. Ancient authors mention no leſs than one hundred and ſixty-four colonies ſettled in Italy, from the foundation of Rome to the death of Auguſtus. ‡

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* Book I. Sect. I. † Livy, lib. XXVII.

‡ Onuphrius Panvinius; Imper. Rom. cap. VI.—Note B b.

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It was not until after a neighbouring ſtate had been completely conquered, that the Romans thought of colonizing its territories. In laying the plan of a new acquiſition, their firſt ſtep was, to ſecure the alliance of ſome ſtate in the vicinity of the power marked out for plunder or deſtruction, and, if poſſible, to excite diſſenſions in the interior of the country itſelf. Having ſucceeded in this enterprize, they faithleſsly involved their allies in the ſame ſubjection An advantageous treaty of peace, ſecuring the payment of tribute, and preſcribing a change in the form of the government or the perſons of the rulers, generally terminated the firſt war. This treaty was then treacherouſly broken, and hoſtilities recommenced, for the complete ſubjugation of the country, with circumſtances of barbarity and oppreſſion, which at once deſtroyed the ſpirit and the force of the vanquiſhed.

It was now that theſe ſavage plunderers of the world poured into the conquered territory a band of hungry adventurers, leagued by a conſtitution ſimilar to that of the parent city. Syſtematically regardleſs of the rights of property, they uniformly introduced thoſe ſettlements by an Agrarian law, which transferred part of the ſubjugated territory to the allied

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powers who were not yet ſwallowed up, and divided another portion among the Roman ſoldiers. The vanquiſhed people eaſily incorporated with their new maſters, whom they nearly reſembled in manners and in warlike habits; and the colonies, by which Rome was ſurrounded, became, in fact, neither more nor leſs than an integral part of her own territory, lying contiguous to the centre of the ſtate, governed by ſimilar laws, and peopled by the ſame ſort of mixed and warlike breed. The Social war was thus, as we formerly remarked, a civil war, in the ſtricteſt ſenſe of the word. It was a conteſt between the inhabitants of the country, and thoſe of the city, for the poſſeſſion of certain political privileges, formerly diſregarded, becauſe they conferred no advantageous diſtinction; but now more highly prized, becauſe they ſerved to mark the ſuperiority of the Romans over the inhabitants of the provinces or remote territories. It muſt, however, be obſerved, that the tranſmarine and tranſalpine poſſeſſions of the republic were in a very different predicament from its Italian dominions. They were indeed ſubdued by force of arms and intrigue, by baſeneſs and political profligacy of every ſort, juſt as the body of the ſtate had been more ſlowly added to the city; but they were not retained and ſecured by

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by the ſyſtem of colonizing and incorporating. They continued to form diſtinct ſtates, though governed by Roman magiſtrates and laws; and they were kept in ſubjection by Roman armies. They did not contribute to the farther conqueſts of the republic, unleſs by the tribute which they paid, and the paſſage which they afforded to the republican forces. After the ſecond Punic war, in which the enemy was reduced to the loweſt ſtate of humiliation compatible with the preſervation of nominal independence, no lands were ſeized, no colonies planted, no provincial government eſtabliſhed, in Carthage. But the jealouſy of Maſiniſſa was excited againſt that neighbour, whom common danger ſhould have taught him to conſider as his beſt ally: and full ſcope being given to that ſyſtem of policy which conquers by dividing, and by fomenting wars, the arms of Maſiniſſa were employed to ſmooth the way for the total deſtruction of the Carthaginian name, and, ultimately, for the accompliſhment of his own ruin alſo; while the forces of both, ſo long as they retained any power, were directed againſt the independence of Macedonia and Greece.

When the Romans would avail themſelves of one conqueſt, in order to make another, they adopted a middle line of policy. They did not at once complete any part of their work,

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however eaſy. Inſtead of reducing a ſubjugated ſtate to the form of a Roman province, they allowed it to remain under its own laws; and, by means of its conquered rulers, who were permitted to retain their places, they ſwayed its ſceptre, and appropriated its reſources: a method of proceeding, not peculiar to thoſe crafty warriors, but adopted by military communities, in all ages, and in every part of the world; by the Tartar hordes, by the conquerors of the Mogul empire, by the Princes of Abyſſinia, and, ſtill more recently, by the French chiefs, who have ſurrounded their dominions with directories, and vice-preſidents, and landamtmans, and petty monarchs; as the conquerors of the Eaſt did with cawns, and nawaubs, and ſultauns.

It appears then, firſt, that the Roman colonies were, in moſt material reſpects, totally different from thoſe of every other country: and, ſecondly, that the Romans never extended the policy of conquering, or ruling, by means of colonies, to their diſtant ſettlements. But the hiſtory of the Roman policy, rich in every ſpecies of inſtruction, furniſhes us alſo with poſitive proofs of the weakneſs of colonial eſtabliſhments, when attacked by the conſolidated power, and energetic adminiſtration peculiar to independent ſtates.

The

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The firſt conqueſt that the Roman arms made beyond the bounds of Italy, was the iſland of Sicily, and, ſoon after, thoſe of Corſica and Sardinia. The greater part of the firſt, and the whole of the two laſt, were ſubject to the provincial government of Carthage: they were all ceded to Rome by the treaty which terminated the firſt Punic war. Spain, the firſt country on the continent of Europe in which the Romans obtained a footing, had, immediately before the invaſion of Scipio, been conquered by the troops of Carthage.

The rapid progreſs of the Punic arms under Hannibal, and the wonders which that ſingular man performed, chiefly with a force collected from the conquered countries, may rather appear an inſtance againſt our general principle. But before drawing ſuch a concluſion, we ſhall do well to conſider the chance which any nation has of producing ſo great a captain as Hannibal. The events of the ſecond Punic war, and the victories of Epaminondas, form, perhaps, the only inſtances in the hiſtory of the world, wherein great changes of affairs have, for a time, been brought about entirely by the accidental appearance of extraordinary men upon the theatre of human affairs. It is, in fact, the aſtoniſhing part of Hannibal's ſtory, that, even according to the accounts of his enemies, he ſucceeded, to a certain degree, in overcoming

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vercoming thoſe phyſical and moral obſtacles which all other men have found inſurmountable. ‘ *Ac neſcio, an mirabilior adverſis, quàm* ‘ *ſecundis rebus, fuerit. quippe qui, quum et in ho-* ‘ *ſtium terra per annos tredecim, tam procul ab* ‘ *domo, variâ fortunâ bellum gereret, exercitu non* ‘ *ſuo civili, ſed mixto ex colluvione omnium gentium,* ‘ *quibus non lex, non mos, non lingua communis ;* ‘ *alius habitus, alia veſtis, alia arma, alii ritus,* ‘ *alia ſacra, alii propè Dei eſſent : ita quodam uno* ‘ *vinculo copulaverit eos, ut nulla nec inter ipſos,* ‘ *nec adverſus ducem ſeditio exſtiterit ; quum et* ‘ *pecunia ſæpe in ſtipendium, et commeatus in ho-* ‘ *ſtium agro deeſſent.* ’ * Such were the circumſtances natural to a war carried on againſt an independent ſtate, from the remote provinces of the invading power. They were circumſtances which may be expected with certainty to recur in ſimilar ſituations, and inevitably to baffle ſimilar attempts, unleſs carried on under the auſpices of ſuch a leader as Hannibal. In modern times, indeed, the more complicated ſyſtem of warfare, and the more combined operations of foreign policy, which regulate the intercourſe of ſtates, render it ſtill more unlikely, than formerly, that the appearance of a ſingular genius, or any other fortuitous occurrence, ſhould again produce conſequences of importance

* Livy, lib. XXVIII. cap. 12.

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importance ſufficient to make them be conſidered as exceptions to the general poſition I have maintained.

And, after all, it ſhould be remembered, that even in the caſe before us, Hannibal was not completely ſucceſsful. The Roman colonies and provinces in Italy, as yet but partially conſolidated, readily joined the invaders. * The jealouſy, and weakneſs of the motives which ruled the Carthaginian councils, as well as the great diſtance of the ſcene of action, and the length of the war, prevented proper ſupplies from being ſent to Hannibal. The Romans, fighting on their own ground, refuſed, after their uſual manner, to hear of any terms, until the enemy ſhould, as a preliminary, evacuate Italy. Every defeat rendered them more obſtinate; concentrated their forces; and inflamed them with the valour of deſpair. The talents of Hannibal himſelf, could not inſpire his troops with thoſe ſentiments; becauſe they were a mixed and diſunited race, debauched by ſucceſs, fighting chiefly for plunder, at a vaſt diſtance from their homes. All theſe circumſtances were neceſſary to the relative ſituation of the parties, and might fairly be taken into the calculation, as ſure to influence the ultimate fate of the conteſt. They are among the

* Livy, lib. XXI. cap. 38. & lib. XXII. cap. 61.

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the neceſſary obſtacles to a warfare, carried on from colonies or provinces againſt primary and independent ſtates; and in the end, they overpowered even the wonder-working genius of the Punic commander.

Nor is the hiſtory of the Greek colonies in Aſia Minor, any exception to the propoſition which I have been attempting to illuſtrate. They were indeed conquered, as many other ſtates have been, by powerful neighbours. The Aſiatic Greeks occupied a narrow ſtripe of territory, ſurrounded on all ſides, excepting the weſt, by the great empire of Lydia. Like many other communities of men as well as of nations, in ſimilar circumſtances, although oppoſed by a common enemy, they did not lay aſide their hereditary antipathy, derived from diverſity of origin, and the ancient rivalry of their European anceſtors. The federal conſtitution of each ſtate was ill adapted to promote the union dictated by their obvious intereſts; and, ſo far from the two nations agreeing in any military combination, it was ſeldom that the different cities of either, could be brought to act in one way. While the ariſtocratic government prevailed in Sweden and Poland, it was not wonderful that Ruſſia ſhould acquire an abſolute preponderance in their affairs, and ſeize upon part of the latter. The mutual animoſity

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animoſity of the Northern Powers has, for the laſt century, rapidly augmented the influence of their natural enemy over them both; and the diviſions of the Germanic Empire have enabled France to dictate at Vienna, Berlin, and Ratiſbon. Divided councils are fatal; becauſe they are weak and irreſolute, and never effective but in ſome tranſient fit of a ſtill more dangerous raſhneſs and precipitancy. Diſtant councils have the ſame imperfections in a degree little inferior; and the difference is more than compenſated by the diviſion of ſupplies, and the various delays eſſential even to the moſt active and energetic ſecondary government. If the ſcheme entertained by the cabinet of Verſailles upon the Poliſh crown, previous to the Auſtrian alliance in 1756, had ſucceeded, and a French prince had been eſtabliſhed in ſubordinate authority at Warſaw, the events of 1794 and 1795, would in all likelihood have taken place in 1774, after a ſhort and ineffectual ſtruggle. If Philip II. had ſucceeded in reſtoring the Spaniſh dominion over the Dutch Netherlands, the armies of Lewis XIV. would not have been forced to retreat from the gates of Amſterdam, and we ſhould never have heard of the family compact.

The hiſtory of America preſents us with a variety of examples, all ſtrongly confirming the ſame

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ſame poſitions. It was from colonies, indeed, and from colonies recently eſtabliſhed in the iſlands, that the firſt conqueſts of the Spaniards on the continent were made with a rapidity which aſtoniſhed all mankind. But although the Crown of Caſtile reaped the whole benefits of thoſe brilliant exploits, they were almoſt entirely the achievement of private adventurers, and reſembled, in their energy and ſucceſs, rather the ſpeculations of mercantile adventure, than the operations of a diſtant cabinet. The ſettlements in Cuba, Jamaica, and St Domingo, ſerved only as ſo many convenient points of attack—ſo many ports where the adventurers were collected, and from which the voyages were fitted out. The enemy, though numerous, was greatly inferior in all the arts of policy, as well as in military ſcience; and, though his force was concentrated, he was not in a ſituation to make repriſals, or attempt a diverſion. Yet, with all thoſe advantages, it is manifeſt that the Spaniards muſt have failed, had they not followed the maxims of the Roman conquerors, and paved the way to each ſucceſs, by forming alliances, and fomenting diviſions. The Peruvian empire was ſubdued entirely by perfidy and intrigue. The invaſion of Chili was fruſtrated, partly by diſſenſions among the plunderers, partly by the better policy of the native tribes; and it is worthy

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worthy of remark, that the ſubjection of Mexico was effected by conquering, in detail, the remoteſt provinces in the kingdom, and acquiring at the ſame time the firm alliance of the Tlaſcalans, a powerful and diſtant appendage of the empire, without whoſe aſſiſtance Cortes could never have reached the capital, and whoſe antipathy to their former maſters ſaved him from utter deſtruction in his retreat.

We have already taken notice of the effects which the Dutch policy produced upon the operations of Prince Maurice, and the power of the States-General in South America. The comparative trial of force, indeed, between an independent nation, and a province or colony in the new world, has never yet been fairly made. The European power in that quarter of the globe, has never, till very lately, received any check, either from the growth of the white population, or the increaſed number of the African labourers; and the wiſe policy of the United States has kept them at peace with all their neighbours, ſince they became independent of the mother country. But, in the very firſt year of the unhappy conqueſt which brought about that event, a ſtriking proof was exhibited, of the dangers to which the beſt regulated colonial eſtabliſhment is expoſed, by the neighbourhood of an

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an independent community, even during its early infancy, and its ſtruggles for exiſtence. My readers will immediately perceive, that I allude to the celebrated expeditions of Allen, Montgomery, and Arnold. While the moſt ſanguine friends of American independence ſcarcely ventured to hope that the coloniſts would be able to maintain their ground againſt the forces of the mother country, they aſtoniſhed the world, by commencing offenſive operations. The very firſt campaign of that unhappy war, was ſignalized by a ſucceſsful expedition of the revolters againſt the ſtations of the Britiſh forces on the frontiers of Canada; and the gates of that province were thus thrown open to a moſt formidable invaſion, which threatened the total conqueſt of the country before the end of the ſame year. The gallant leaders to whom thoſe operations were entruſted, actually reduced the whole of Upper Canada, and were only foiled in their attempts on Quebec, by the ill choice of the ſeaſon, owing chiefly to the diviſions of opinion that conſtantly attend the offenſive meaſures of governments newly formed upon a popular model; the union of the beſieged in defence of their large property, which they were taught to believe would be expoſed to the plunder of the rebels; and the extenſive powers wiſely confided by the Britiſh government to General

General Carleton—powers formerly unknown in any of the colonies, and utterly inconſiſtent with a government bearing the fainteſt reſemblance to a popular form. Thus had the infant republic of America, immediately at the commencement of ſeparate operations, and above half a year previous to the formal declaration of independence, almoſt ſucceeded in the conqueſt of a Britiſh colony, ſtrong by its natural poſition, by the vigour of its internal adminiſtration, by the experience of the veteran troops who defended it, and by the ſkill of the gallant officer who commanded thoſe forces; while the only advantages of the aſſailants conſiſted in the romantic valour of their leaders, the enthuſiaſm of men fighting in their own cauſe, and the vigorous councils of an independent community.

Let us now ſuppoſe, that in any other part of the American colonies, a free ſtate was eſtabliſhed, either with the conſent of the mother country, or by forcibly diſclaiming her authority. Let us conceive, that this new community is placed in the neighbourhood of colonies not connected with the new ſtate by the ties of blood, or habits of ſubjection to the ſame government, but inhabited by a people whoſe proximity of ſituation, diverſity of origin, and ſimilarity of purſuits, as is uniformly the caſe, rendered them a rival or hoſtile nation; and that, of

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conſequence, in any conteſt that may take place between the two communities, neither of them can labour under the diſadvantage of a diſputed title to independence, as was the caſe in the American war. Let us, for inſtance, ſuppoſe that the cabinet of Liſbon, weary of the dependent ſituation in which it is placed by every political difference among the European powers, ſhall abandon ſo trifling a portion of its territory as Portugal, and transfer the ſeat of government to the great body of its dominions, the Brazils. In its preſent ſtate, Portugal can neither preſerve her independence in Europe, againſt the united force of that power which, ſince the acceſſion of John IV. in 1640, has been her natural enemy, and of France, the natural ally of Spain; nor can ſhe, by a diverſion in South America, ſecure the ſafety of her European poſſeſſions; nor can ſhe again look for ſuch a ſeries of good fortune, as that which, in the war of 1762, enabled England to ſave her from the power of the Bourbons, by the brilliant campaigns in North America and the Weſt Indies. But if the Court of Liſbon, with the military and naval force of the kingdom, and the nonreſident proprietors of American eſtates, remove to St Salvador, and adopt ſuch reforms in the adminiſtration, as a complete change of any kind may be ſuppoſed to render leſs terrific than innovation generally

nerally is to abſolute governments; then the colonies of France and Spain in South America, will have to contend with a people poſſeſſed of a fertile, extenſive, and compact territory, more populous in Europeans and Creole whites, than any other portion of that vaſt continent; and, above all, forming an independent ſtate, governed by a cabinet in the centre of its dominions. Diſputes have even already ariſen between the Spaniards and other nations, about the limits of poſſeſſions which, under the Spaniſh government, ſeem fated to remain a wide deſert; and the Portugueſe ſettlers have repeatedly endeavoured to injure their neighbours in America, and to increaſe a territory already too extenſive. But, in the caſe which we have ſuppoſed, it is not neceſſary to aſſume, that views of ambition in the new world ſhall actuate the tranſplanted cabinet. The ſafety of the territories which it will retain in Europe, forms a more legitimate and more probable object of anxiety. While the court of Madrid, then, continues to prefer the rich colonies of Peru and Grenada, to the undivided poſſeſſion of the Spaniſh peninſula; while France is unwilling to increaſe the dominions of Spain in Europe, at the expence of thoſe territories in Guiana which have coſt her ſo many millions; at the expence, too, of a great diminution of the Spaniſh empire in America;

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and while Portugal retains a wiſh to figure as a European power, to poſſeſs ports in the neighbourhood of her beſt markets, and to retain the territories to which ſhe owes her name and origin: ſo long we may expect to ſee, in conſequence of the propoſed change, the preſent arrangement of dominion maintained in America, as well as in Europe; but with this difference, that Portugal will have become independent of all foreign aſſiſtance, and will have greatly increaſed the value and ſtrength of her South American poſſeſſions; ſhe will owe the ſafety and aggrandizement of every branch of her empire to the vaſt ſuperiority which all primary ſtates poſſeſs over colonies in ſimilar circumſtances. This ſuperiority, although the ſituation of her European poſſeſſions may prevent it from actually increaſing her American territories, will, nevertheleſs, raiſe her to a far more exalted rank than ſhe at preſent holds, and will, in every ſenſe of the word, augment her reſources, and extend her power. *

The ſame conſequences will follow, if any of the European ſettlements in the Weſt Indian Archipelago ſhall, by whatever means, become independent of the mother country. The power of France to attack the neighbouring iſlands of Jamaica, Cuba, and Porto-Rico, from St Domingo,

* Note C c.

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mingo, is much more limited than the power of St Domingo would be, were an independent government, and a primary nation, either of whites, mulattoes, or negroes, or of a mixture of the three races, eſtabliſhed there, by whatever means; always ſuppoſing that the population and natural ſtrength of the iſland is ſufficient to enable it to ſtand without the ſupport of the mother country. Now, as any revolution of this nature muſt, in all probability, take place directly againſt the will of the mother country, it is manifeſt, that the colonies will never be emancipated before they can exiſt independent of her aid.

In general, then, it appears that the emancipation of any colony, or its eſtabliſhment as a primary ſtate independent of the mother country, is dangerous to the neighbouring colonies which retain their dependence, although we ſhould not conſider the very powerful effects of example, and the contagious nature of revolt, in all communities ſimilarly circumſtanced. Such an event will be dreaded by all the powers having colonies in that quarter, as directly ſubverſive of the colonial balance, and the firſt ſtep towards the ruin of their own colonial ſyſtem.

We have ſeen, during the eventful hiſtory of the laſt twelve years, how fatal to the balance of Europe the ſudden changes in the internal

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affairs of one great nation have been. Although various opinions have been entertained with reſpect to the merits of that revolution, conſidered in itſelf; although many have doubted the juſtice and expediency of interfering with its progreſs; although ſome have even maintained that its conſequences, in the end, will be favourable to the intereſts of other ſtates: no one has ever denied, that the great ſyſtem of European power has, in the mean time, been deranged, and that the cauſe of the derangement muſt be looked for in the new energies which the French revolution has developed, and in the views of policy which have regulated the actors in the great drama. Beſides all thoſe diſturbing cauſes which a colonial emancipation would immediately introduce into the ſyſtem, others which we have pointed out, of no leſs importance, are peculiar to the colonies; and the nature of ſubordinate governments would deprive thoſe ſettlements which ſtill remain dependent, of the energy and vigour ſo neceſſary for meeting the new criſis of affairs.

It may be remarked, in general, that where a number of nations are placed in ſimilar circumſtances, no change of importance can ever happen in one, without inducing a ſimilar change in the reſt alſo. This ariſes chiefly from three cauſes;—from the force of example upon nations

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tions united by conſtant intercourſe, and placed in ſimilar degrees of refinement; from the direct neceſſity which every increaſe of power in one member of the national community impoſes on all the other members, of providing for their ſecurity by ſimilar means, or from the power which any diminution of reſources in one member affords to the others, of diminiſhing their preparations for ſelf-defence; and, laſtly, from the circumſtance, that every great change in one part of the ſyſtem which is not wholly accidental, muſt be prepared and brought about by a certain combination of events common to the other parts, and may conſequently be expected to take place nearly about the ſame time, and in a ſimilar manner, in thoſe other parts alſo.

The whole hiſtory of that collection of ſmall ſtates which occupied the territory of ancient Greece, as well as of the petty ſtates into which the North of Europe was formerly divided, furniſhes us with conſtant illuſtrations of this general fact, that changes, but more particularly ſlowly progreſſive changes, are always equable and regular over the whole members of ſuch national ſyſtems as we are at preſent contemplating. But the hiſtory of modern Europe affords ſtill more ſtriking and recent examples of the ſame truth. Conſoli-

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dated into one ſyſtem of provincial government under the empire of Rome, the different ſtates, of which Europe is now compoſed, were ſeparated from their unnatural union, by the ſame cauſes, and nearly at the ſame time. Reduced by a people whoſe character and manners were never effaced by the moſt rapid conqueſts, or moſt remote emigrations; they were formed into diviſions, under conſtitutions of the ſame nature, peculiarly calculated to preſerve that uniformity of cuſtoms which originally marked the whole. The progreſs of political government has been ſimilar in all, from the dominion of the nobles to the tyranny of the prince, and, in theſe later times, to the freedom of the people. That ſpirit of commercial intercourſe, which produces a perpetual connexion, little known in the ancient world, has conſpired with ſimilarity of ſituation, and the reſemblance of manners, to render Europe a united whole within itſelf, almoſt ſeparated from the reſt of the world; a great federacy, acknowledging indeed no common chief, but united by certain common principles, and obeying one ſyſtem of international law; a vaſt ſyſtem, compoſed of parts ſimilarly conſtituted, liable to be affected in the ſame manner, and nearly in the ſame degree, by every external event, mutually influencing each other, and keeping pace with each

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each other's improvements, in ſcience, in liberty, and in national reſources. Thus, to take a more particular inſtance, as ſoon as the grand improvement of ſtanding armies was introduced into one part of Europe, by the riſe of the more peaceful arts, and the diminution of the power of the barons, the ſame important change was effected about the ſame time, and by ſimilar ſteps, in all the nations of Europe. The progreſs of this improvement, and its remote effects, were likewiſe ſimilar in all. It was extended, by the ambition of princes, to the keeping of a large force, for the purpoſe of enſlaving their ſubjects, and enlarging their dominions. This improvement was firſt introduced into France; and the example was followed by the neighbouring ſtates, both as a uſeful invention of policy for ſecuring the prince's power, and as a meaſure neceſſary for the ſafety of nations expoſed to the new reſources with which this important change had armed the French king.

A circumſtance, not ſo obvious, appears to have regulated the formation of moſt of the European ſtates, and preſents an illuſtration, equally ſtriking, of the principle which I have explained. There can be no doubt, that the conſolidation of the ſmaller dynaſties into which the different European empires were once

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once divided, took place, in all, about the ſame period. The united empire of the Franks under Charlemagne, was too formidable a neighbour to the heterogeneous maſſes of divided power, which were then preſented, on all ſides, by Britain, Spain, Italy, and the Northern kingdoms. Accordingly, we find that, in the ſpace of little more than half a century, all the great unions took place, of which the preſent nations of Europe are compoſed. The empire of Charlemagne was completed in the beginning of the eighth century; the Saxon Heptarchy was united under Egbert the firſt King of England, in 827; the Picts and Scots by Kenneth II. King of Scotland, in 838; the Norwegian petty lordſhips into one kingdom by Harold Hafager, in 875. The more contiguous of thoſe ſtates were conſolidated at the very ſame time; the reſt within a few years afterwards.

A number of colonies, ſituated in the ſame quarter of the globe, planted about the ſame time, by the ſame people, and placed in almoſt every material reſpect in ſimilar circumſtances, will always form a national ſyſtem, the members of which are mutually affected by each other's fortunes. Any great change of circumſtances in one important colony, will be followed by a correſponding revolution in the reſt. The ſudden

ſudden emancipation, for inſtance, of the ſlaves, or abolition of the ſlave traffic in one ſettlement, will ſoon be followed by a general ceſſation of the ſlave ſyſtem in all the Weſt Indian colonies. In like manner, a ſudden ſeparation of one important colony from the mother country, will, ere long, be followed by a general deſtruction of the colonial ſyſtem.

Hitherto, we have only viewed the mutual relations of the American ſettlements from a point whence their appearance is uniform in itſelf, and the ſame with that of all colonies. The deductions to which we have been led, are accordingly of a very general nature, and apply to every colonial or provincial ſyſtem dependent on diſtant governments. But the ſame concluſions will derive additional force, as applied to the following Inquiry, if we attend to thoſe peculiarities in the ſituation of the Weſt Indian iſlands, which diſtinguiſh them from all other provincial and colonial ſettlements. This forms, in part, the ſubject of the next Section.

SEC-

SECTION II.

OF THE INTERESTS OF THE EUROPEAN COLONIES, AS CONNECTED WITH THE RE-ESTABLISHMENT OF THE FRENCH POWER IN THE WEST INDIES.

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I have explained, in the laſt Section, the reaſons why a colonial eſtabliſhment is always, other things being equal, a more harmleſs neighbour than a primary ſtate; and why the ſeparation of any one important member of the colonial ſyſtem, from its relations of dependence upon the mother country, would be moſt probably followed by a univerſal ſeparation of the colonies. I now proceed to examine, *firſt*, The peculiar circumſtances which render the application of this concluſion to the ſtate of the Weſt Indian ſettlements particularly ſtriking; and *next*, the peculiar circumſtances in the ſituation of the French ſettlements, which render the concluſion moſt particularly applicable to them.

The reſult of this inquiry will enable us to determine the probable conſequences of a total re-eſtabliſhment of the French colonial ſyſtem, and to compare the effects of this event, with thoſe of a total ſeparation of the French colonies,

nies, to the other powers who have dominions in thoſe parts of the world.

SECT. II.

I. The Weſt Indian colonies differ from colonial eſtabliſhments in general, chiefly in the following particulars—

1. They are not peopled by ſeparate nations, like the countries of Europe, or the larger colonies upon the two continents of America.

The fate of war has frequently transferred the dominion of almoſt all the iſlands from one power to another. Sometimes the permanent ſovereignty of the conquered iſlands has been transferred by treaty; ſometimes a ceſſion of territory has taken place by purchaſe or exchange. In the Seven-years war, Britain was in poſſeſſion of all the French Windward iſlands. In the American war, ſhe loſt, to France, almoſt all her own: and during a great part of the late war, ſhe poſſeſſed ſeveral of the Dutch and French ſettlements. In the treaties which concluded each of thoſe wars, indemnities and equivalents were ſought for, by the belligerent powers, among the Weſt Indian iſlands. The Dutch owe their whole continental colonies to an exchange with England: and the Swedes, having long ago loſt their continental

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continental territories, are indebted to a bargain with France for their only ſettlement in the new world. The conſequence of all thoſe changes of poſſeſſion, whether temporary or permanent, is, an intermixture of the different races of Europeans, who inhabit the Weſt Indian Archipelago.

But the ſpirit of commercial intercourſe has produced the ſame effect, perhaps, in as great a degree, even in thoſe ſettlements which have conſtantly remained under the ſame maſters. The temptation of cheap and fertile land, large profits of ſtock, and high wages of labour, have been found ſufficiently powerful to overcome the attractions of home; and adventurers, after leaving their native country, have often found it eaſy to make a ſecond change, from the ſame inducements, and to remove to foreign iſlands. The policy of almoſt all the ſtates of Europe towards foreigners, in their colonies, has been ſuch as to render their privileges and ſecurity equal to thoſe of the natives: And, as a reſidence in any of the Weſt Indian iſlands, is commonly a temporary exile, ſubmitted to for the acquiſition of wealth *, the comparative advantages of the different colonial governments, are objects only of ſecondary

* Book I. Sect. I.

ary conſideration, as each conſtitution ſufficiently confers ſecurity of perſon and property.

Thus, the mixture of inhabitants in the different iſlands, co-operates with the identity of the climate and other phyſical circumſtances, the ſimilarity of purſuits and of complexion (an important conſideration in countries where colour is the grand mark of diſtinction) to coaleſce the white inhabitants of the different iſlands into one people, united by a common origin and common intereſts. Although nominally diſtributed into different political ſocieties, and participating in the views of their reſpective mother countries, only in ſo far as their immediate intereſt ſeems to be concerned, colonies and provinces never can feel, in any ſtrength, thoſe national antipathies which divide primary ſtates, and draw their fuel from independence, whilſt they excite or blow up the flames of war. But leaſt of all can we expect to ſee principles of this ſort ariſe in ſocieties formed after the manner which we have juſt deſcribed, ſo long as they remain in the ſtate of colonial or provincial dependance. If, however, a ſeparation from the parent ſtate takes place, the newly formed community is placed in the ſituation of all nations at their firſt eſtabliſhment. With the new political inſtitutions, a diſtinction of manners, characters and habits, begins to appear in its members,

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bers, and to divide them from the neighbouring colonies, unleſs they, too, have followed the ſame courſe, and joined themſelves in one community with the reſt.

2. In another point of view, the circumſtances of the Weſt Indian colonies are peculiar. The attachment of the white inhabitants to the ſoil, is perhaps weaker there than in any other part of the world. I have already traced the great outlines of the Weſt Indian character, and contraſted it with that of the North American coloniſts. * I have enumerated the circumſtances which tend to form that character; and have particularly remarked, as a leading feature in their ſituation, the temporary nature of their connexion with the iſlands, and the want of wives and families. The prevalence of the negro ſlavery, too, and its effects on the manners of the whites, have alſo been noticed. † It is eaſy to perceive how little a ſociety, thus conſtituted, partakes of that compact and ſolid form in which national ſtrength conſiſts, and how deſtitute it muſt be of the great bulwark of nations—that animated zeal and warm intereſt which men take in the ſafety and honour of a particular country,

* Book I. Sect. I. † Ibid.

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try, becauſe it contains their property, the place of their birth, the habitation of their fathers, the ſcenes of their childhood, the perſons of their friends, their wives and their children.

Theſe views can ſcarcely acquire additional ſtrength, from the recollection of that extreme unwillingneſs which Weſt Indians have ever ſhown to take a part in military ſervice, unleſs for the immediate purpoſe of repreſſing inſurrection. The hiſtory of St Domingo during the adminiſtration of the Prince de Rohan, is well known to every one who is converſant with colonial affairs; and the opinions of ſome of the moſt enlightened planters upon this point demonſtrate, that their repugnance is defended by them on principle, as well as manifeſted in practice. *

Now, it is not difficult to perceive the magnitude of the change which will immediately be operated upon the ſtructure of ſociety in the Weſt Indian colonies, by any political revolution which ſhall deſtroy their connexion with the European powers. The peculiarities in the ſtate of the population, muſt indeed render the abolition of colonial ſubordination a difficult taſk. But if the Weſt Indian dominions of

* Laborie, Coffee-planter of St Domingo, Appendix.—Malouet, Mem. ſur les Colonies.

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one of the European powers ſhould become independent, by any of thoſe revolutions in the affairs of nations, which all the events of the laſt thirty years forbid us to conſider as chimerical, or be abandoned in conſequence of ſome change of views, not impoſſible, on the part of the European ſtates, then we may ſafely conclude, that the face of things will undergo a rapid alteration in the new community, and that a ſtate of ſociety will be introduced widely different from that which we have been contemplating as one of the diſtinguiſhing features of the Weſt Indian colonies. The iſlands which remain in their preſent circumſtances will then be expoſed, in all the imbecility of their unnatural ſituation, to the ſtrength of a neighbour, animated with the ardour of ſpirit, and armed with the newborn energies of an infant ſtate poſſeſſing the ordinary reſources of an independent community, inhabited by a race of men connected with the place of their reſidence, as the conquerors of Xerxes and Darius were with Greece, and the warriors of Stockach and the Nile were with Auſtria and England.

3. But the grand feature, which, more than all the reſt, diſtinguiſhes the Weſt Indian iſlands from other colonial eſtabliſhments, and chiefly merits our attention in this inquiry, is the proportion

portion of ſlaves to free men—of ſlaves, too, whoſe race is totally different from that of their maſters, who are diſtinguiſhed from them as much by their habits and their character, and by the extent of their progreſs in civilization, as by the formation of their bodies, and the colour of their ſkin.

If even colonies of free men, connected with their mother country by a common origin and ſimilar habits, mingled in the ſame body, ſo as to form homogeneous communities, and united to each other by a ſimilarity of intereſt and character; if ſuch eſtabliſhments are inferior to independent ſtates in ſolidity and political ſtrength: how vaſtly is the difference augmented, by the exiſtence of a foreign nation in the heart of the colony, held, by force and intrigue, in ſubjection to the handful of white inhabitants, who, by violence or fraud, have tranſported them from their native country? Military operations muſt increaſe beyond all calculation the danger and inſecurity of this unnatural ſtate of ſociety. It is not the free ſubjects only whom a diſtant government has to keep in ſubordination, and animate to activity and vigour. The ſlaves, in number and force far more formidable than any European enemy, muſt be held in obedience, whilſt their maſters are engaged in the field, or divided by

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the factious disputes so natural to a colonial government. Under whatever system of policy the islands are administered, it is evident that their capacity for the operations of warfare is extremely weakened by the mixture of their inhabitants.

Those who are delighted to contemplate the grandeur of ancient commonwealths, or the romantic exploits of conquerors in the dark ages, may perhaps be inclined to doubt, whether the external security and glory of a community is so incompatible with domestic slavery as we have maintained.

With respect to the bondmen or villeins of the Gothic nations, they were evidently of the same race with their liege lords; and they appear to have been most peaceable subjects, degraded indeed by their situation, but contented with their lot; entirely ignorant of any higher condition, and in a great measure destitute of the capacity for enjoying it. It is a fact, known to such as have visited those parts of Europe, where the institution of villenage still subsists, that the peasantry have no desire for emancipation. After the Austrian law had been introduced into that part of Poland which fell to the Emperor's share by the partition of 1773, it was found necessary to surround many parts of the new frontier with imperial troops, to prevent

prevent the eſcape of peaſants into thoſe parts of Poland where they might ſtill be received into the poſſeſſion of a maſter. *

But in the Greek and Roman republics, it will be ſaid, the influence of domeſtic ſlavery, in its ſevereſt form, neither deſtroyed the ſecurity of the ſtate, nor embarraſſed the operations of war. I will not inſiſt on the radical difference between the character and compoſition of the free population in thoſe countries and in the Weſt Indian colonies, nor expatiate on the ſtructure of their laws, and the tenor of their cuſtoms, by which every citizen was made a ſoldier, while the ſlaves were devoted to the meaneſt and moſt enervating occupations. It will be ſufficient to remark, that in two particulars, a difference ſtill more eſſential to the compariſon, exiſted between the ſlave ſyſtem of ancient, and that of modern times—the diſtinction of race, and the relative proportion of the numbers. The captives taken in war, and ſtill more their deſcendants; the home-born ſlaves, although of foreign extraction, and therefore denominated '*Barbari;*' were men of the ſame complexion, and in the ſame ſtate of ſociety with their maſters. When liberated, they immediately amalgamated with the maſs

* Voyage de deux François, tom. V. p. 106.—Note D d.

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of the free population; and whilſt in a ſtate of ſlavery, they differed as much from each other as from their maſters. It was once propoſed at Rome to diſtinguiſh the ſlaves by a particular habit; but this idea was ſoon abandoned, for fear of the conſequences which might reſult—'*ſi*' (as Seneca ſays) '*nos ſervi noſtri numerare poſſent.*' In Attica, they were obliged to diſtinguiſh themſelves from the citizens; but in practice, partly, we may preſume, from the vanity of the ſlave, and partly from the policy of the maſter, theſe diſtinctions were ſo much neglected, that ſevere penalties were inflicted upon him who ſtruck another man's ſlave, 'leſt,' (ſays Xenophon) 'he ſhould, by miſtake, injure the ſacred perſon of a citizen.' * In the colonies where negroes are employed, the marks of ſlavery are plain and indelible. '*Nos ſervi noſtri numerare poſſunt.*'

The number of ſlaves in the capital of the Roman empire, at the period of its greateſt luxury, is reckoned by Mr Gibbon to have been equal to that of the free citizens. † We are told, that the citizens of Attica, including ten thouſand freed men and foreigners of free condition, amounted to ninety thouſand; and, the ſlaves to

* Rep. Athen. p. 693.

† Decline and Fall, chap. ii. (vol. I. p. 68. 8vo. edit.)

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to four hundred thouſand; which is about the proportion of one to four and one half. It is probable, that this number of ſlaves is exaggerated, otherwiſe the Athenians would ſcarcely have enacted the laws above mentioned, to diſtinguiſh the two claſſes of inhabitants. * However, that refined people treated their ſlaves with the greateſt indulgence; and to this we may aſcribe their uniformly peaceable behaviour. The ſlaves in Laconia are ſaid to have been ſomewhat more numerous; but the poverty of the Lacedemonians induces one to ſuſpect an error in the calculation. The helotes, for inſtance, may have been confounded with the ſlaves. The helotes were an intermediate claſs between the δουλοι and the ελευθεροι; but they had always the chance of obtaining the right of citizenſhip by their ſervices and good behaviour. They were engaged in agriculture, and allowed to farm the lands at a very low rent. However, the cruel treatment and injuſtice of the Spartans frequently excited revolts, both among them and the ſlaves, particularly after the conqueſt of Meſſenia had increaſed their numbers. Nor could any thing have kept thoſe inferior claſſes in ſubjection, but the perpetual ſtate of diſcipline, and the martial

* Note E e.

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habits which peculiarly diſtinguiſhed the free barbarians who inhabited Laconia. In Theſſaly, the great ſlave market of Greece, there was a claſs of ſerfs, reſembling the helotes, occupied like them in agriculture, and renting the land from the free citizens, on very moderate terms. In that country, rebellion among the ſlaves was very frequent, which muſt have ariſen from the large proportion of imported and unſeaſoned hands, as it is not probable that a great ſtock of ſlaves would be kept up for ſale.

The proportion of ſlaves to free men in the colonies and provinces of Rome, muſt have been much ſmaller than in the city, from the inferior wealth and luxury of the inhabitants, and their greater diſtance from the great ſlave market. In Sicily, where the fertility of the ſoil, and the near neighbourhood of Rome, may be ſuppoſed to have encouraged agricultural ſpeculations, and diffuſed greater riches among the inhabitants, the ſlaves appear to have been very numerous. Accordingly, that iſland was the ſcene of the moſt formidable ſervile inſurrection recorded in ancient hiſtory. In the cruelty of the ſlaves; the influence of fanaticiſm and ſorcery over their conduct; the extent of the infection, which ſeems to have ſpread over the whole iſland, and to have broken out repeatedly after being quelled:—in the ſucceſſes of the rebels

bels againſt the Roman commanders, who, after many defeats, only ſubdued them at laſt by famine,—this ſervile war ſeems to have borne a cloſe reſemblance to the rebellions of later times.

When the Roman empire was tottering by its own weight, or verging to decay amidſt the various dangers that beſet it; among the cauſes of its internal debility, we certainly cannot reckon the mixture of ſlaves. Long before this period, the ceſſation of conqueſts had prevented the poſſibility of importing new ſlaves, and had turned the attention of maſters to breeding, and conſequently to gentle treatment, as the only means of keeping up their ſtocks. The public law, and the policy of the emperors, concurred with, or aroſe out of the intereſts of the citizens, and reſtrained the maſter's powers within narrow limits. The reſtrictions on emancipation were removed, and the privileges of ſlaves were increaſed, while their treatment became milder. By degrees, they came to form a ſubordinate claſs of men, in the ſame community with their maſters, and attached to the ſame country; neither formidable by their numbers, nor ſeparated by their character and conſtitution, nor alienated by the hardneſs of their lot.

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The proportion of negroes to whites in the Weſt Indies, is extremely different from that of the ſlaves to their maſters in the worſt times, and in the moſt wealthy parts of the ancient ſtates. The average in the Britiſh colonies was, in 1790, about ten to one, excluſive of Barbadoes, the Bermudas, and the Bahamas. In the French colonies, the proportion was nearly that of fourteen to one; and in the Dutch colonies, it was that of twenty-three to one. The average of the whole Weſt Indies, was about ten to one. This average varies from the proportion of twenty-three to one, to the proportion of four to one. Inſtead of abounding in the towns where the free men are moſt numerous, and the government moſt vigorous, as was the caſe in the ancient ſtates, the negroes are chiefly diſtributed over the country. The capital of Jamaica contains between one fourth and one fifth of the whole white population of the iſland, and not above one fifteenth of the negroes. In Italy or Greece, theſe proportions would have been juſt reverſed.

The proportions of ſlaves to free men, in the Spaniſh and Portugueſe colonies, on the continent, and in the ſouthern ſtates of North America, more nearly reſemble thoſe of the ancient nations. In the Portugueſe colonies, too, and in

in moſt of the Spaniſh ſettlements, the employment and diſtribution of the negroes, are ſomewhat ſimilar to thoſe of the ſlaves in ancient times.

To the wide diſtinction of race, and the difference in the relative proportions of the numbers, we have to add the various advantages of the Weſt Indian ſlaves over the citizens, in bodily ſtrength, activity, and fitneſs for the climate, none of which diſtinguiſhed the ancient ſlaves from their maſters; and we ſhall be convinced, that in this, as well as many other points, the ſituation of ancient ſtates differed widely indeed from that of nations in the preſent times, and that the greateſt caution is neceſſary in applying the examples of their policy and hiſtory to the affairs of modern communities.

We may reſt aſſured, then, that the ſtructure of ſociety in the Weſt Indian colonies, is in an eminent degree unfavourable to internal ſecurity at all times, and ſtill more ſo to ſecurity or ſtrength in a ſtate of warfare.

But, on the other hand, there can be as little doubt, that the fatal diſproportion of the two claſſes, the great proportion of imported negroes, and the cruel treatment of the ſlaves in general, would be all materially altered by any revolution that ſhould ſeparate the colonies from the parent ſtates, whilſt the more vigorous adminiſtration

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miniſtration of an independent community would leſſen the danger ariſing from ſuch a mixture of negroes, or ſuch abuſes of the ſlave ſyſtem as might ſtill remain.

We have frequently had occaſion to obſerve, that the cultivation of the Weſt Indies, or, what is the ſame thing, the importation of African labourers, is carried on in a great meaſure by credit obtained in the mother country, and by the funds of mercantile houſes, which embark in Weſt Indian ſpeculations, but are chiefly engaged in the European trade, or at leaſt in the trade of importing or carrying Weſt Indian commodities. Now, the greateſt part, if not the whole, of the capital thus employed in loans to planters, will be withdrawn as ſoon as the government of any iſland ceaſes to be dependent. Men are never fond of riſking their money in the hands of foreign merchants, out of their ſight, ſubject to the rapacity of a different government, and only recoverable by the laws of another ſtate. How little of the monied capital of individuals in Great Britian has ever been drawn to Hindoſtan, by the temptation of enormous intereſt, although recoverable by action in an Engliſh court of law! How much leſs has been lent to traders in Batavia! Nay, how ſeldom does any Britiſh capital find its way acroſs the channel to countries ſuch as France and Holland, the mercantile

tranſactions

tranſactions of which are as well known on the 'Change of London, as in Paris or Amſterdam! If any traders continue to riſk their ſtock in plantation loans, the intereſt muſt be raiſed as a temptation; and this will have the immediate effect of retarding improvement, and diminiſhing the importation of negroes. As the planters of one iſland, or confederacy of iſlands, will not have it in their power to lay the increaſed rate of intereſt upon their commodities, and as the produce of their grounds will not be augmented, the net produce will be diminiſhed by the riſe in the demands of creditors. The planters who employ a ſmall borrowed capital, and they who add a borrowed capital to their own ſtock, in order to make up a ſufficient ſtock for carrying on the buſineſs, will be unable to continue in the planting trade; and a number of ſmall capitals, both real and borrowed, will thus be thrown out of the plantation employment. But the demands of European creditors, who reſolve to withdraw their capitals; the riſe of intereſt required by others, as the price of the increaſed riſk and inconvenience; and the impoſſibility of ſmall traders now continuing in the buſineſs; muſt immediately cauſe a number of planters to diſpoſe of their whole ſtock, and many others to ſell a part of theirs. The conſequence of their neceſſities will be, that their lands,

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lands, buildings and negroes, will be ſold much under their real value. This cheapneſs will tempt the rich planters to lay out their ſurplus capital in ſuch purchaſes, inſtead of engaging in the leſs profitable and more hazardous ſpeculation of clearing new land, by importing, or purchaſing imported negroes. Or if, inſtead of purchaſing lands, they aſſiſt the debtors with money to ſatisfy the European claims, the rate of intereſt will be increaſed, by the amount of the bonus: ſo that the lenders will be ſatisfied, without embarking their money in new ſpeculations of clearing and importing. This cheapneſs will at the ſame time attract ſettlers from other countries; and the old planters, reduced in their circumſtances by the change, will probably, from their knowledge of the buſineſs, be employed on the eſtates, and in the warehouſes of the new owners.

Thoſe capitaliſts, then, who, under the colonial ſyſtem, would have employed their ſtock in importing negroes, will now employ it in ſupplying the place of the capital withdrawn by the merchants in the mother country, while the old ſyſtem of credit, being almoſt wholly at an end, every proprietor will reſide upon his lands, inſtead of employing a factor or attorney. Great care will be taken of the ſtock of negroes in hand. The proportion of creole to imported

imported negroes will be much increaſed; and humane treatment of the ſlaves will produce its natural and conſtant effect—fidelity and attachment on their part. The condition of the whole body of negroes being greatly ameliorated, they will gradually improve in habits of ſobriety and voluntary induſtry; they will become more civilized and ſafer inmates of the community. In the mean time, the diminiſhed demand for negroes will not occaſion much capital to be withdrawn from the Guinea trade, at leaſt for ſome years; but its profits will be lowered; and nearly the ſame quantity of ſlaves being imported to the Weſt Indies as before, the planters of the iſlands remaining under colonial government, will buy them cheaper than formerly; they will be tempted to engage in more extenſive ſpeculations, and to manage their ſtock with much greater careleſſneſs. While the dangers of the independent iſlands are diminiſhed, and their internal weakneſs is corrected, the ſettlements that remain in the ſtate of colonies will be placed in circumſtances of increaſing danger and weakneſs.

But, in the new communities, a rapid change will alſo take place upon the numbers and characters of the whites. We have formerly had occaſion to remark the difference between the conduct of thoſe whoſe reſidence in a country is only temporary—whoſe object is to accumulate

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late wealth in order to return home, and thoſe who live at home and ſpend their money where they make it. * The ſtock of whites in the new ſtate will not be kept up by emigration, but increaſed by marriage. The connexions with mulattoes and negreſſes will be abandoned, or, if they are continued, their fruits will be conſidered as lawful children, and the people of colour will thus be blended with the whites. In a ſhort time, the diſproportion of females will ceaſe, and the augmentation of population will be carried on by natural means. Additional good treatment of the negroes may be expected to reſult from the improvement of manners, and the greater ſtake which maſters will have in the country that contains their wives and families, even if the admixture of women in the compoſition of the ſociety ſhould fail to humanize the manners of the people, and ameliorate directly the condition of the ſubordinate race.

It is thus, that the change which we are ſuppoſing to take place in the political condition of any one of the iſlands, muſt abſolutely, as well as relatively, increaſe its reſources and internal ſecurity, and counteract the evil effects which the negro ſlavery produces upon the military ſtrength of the ſtate.

4.

* Book I. Sect. I.

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4. But, in another point of view, the Weſt Indian colonies, and the other provincial ſettlements of the European ſtates, are placed in peculiar circumſtances; namely, by the ſyſtem of foreign policy which has ariſen out of the relative ſituation of the European powers in modern times.

When a ſtate, whoſe territories are of moderate extent, and whoſe dominion is not eſtabliſhed over diſtant provinces, engages in warfare, its reſources may all be called forth in one effort; its attention is not diſtracted by remote and oppoſing intereſts. A ſingle victory may permanently increaſe its dominions, or a ſhort reverſe of fortune reduce its power. A ſtate, on the other hand, whoſe poſſeſſions are widely diffuſed over different parts of the globe, expoſes, in every contention, a variety of points to the attacks of the enemy. In reſolving upon hoſtilities, all thoſe dangers muſt be taken into account. The weakneſs of a particular ſettlement belonging to a rival power, is not more to be conſidered than your own defenceleſs ſituation at ſome diſtant point. While the inducements to maintain a peaceable demeanour are increaſed, the chances of various ſucceſs in war are multiplied. As complete good fortune in all quarters can ſcarcely be expected: ſo, neither need total diſcomfi-

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ture in every part be apprehended. The chances of ſucceſs and failure during a war between nations placed in ſuch circumſtances, are always much more likely to balance each other, than in any ſingle and narrow conteſt between ſtates poſſeſſing ſmall and compact dominions. If an unlucky campaign forces one of them from part of its poſſeſſions in the eaſt, a contrary event may turn the ſcale in the weſt. The obvious convenience of retaining each its ancient territories, founds the treaty of peace, in general, upon a mutual reſtitution of conqueſts, and commonly leaves the territorial extent of the two powers nearly the ſame as before the war.

But the policy of modern times has ſtill farther diminiſhed the probability of ſudden changes in the diſtribution of national dominion. The ſimilarity in the ſituation of the European powers; the reſemblance of their languages, manners, and laws; the extenſion of their intercourſe by travelling and foreign reſidence; their union by the relations of ſcientific and commercial purſuits—have given birth to an intimate connexion in times of peace, and a common feeling of intereſt in maintaining the exiſtence of the preſent ſtate of affairs. Each power, then, views with ſolicitude the dangers which beſet the reſt, and feels itſelf attacked when

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when any of the weaker ſtates are expoſed to the inſults or oppreſſions of their more formidable neighbours—in the ſame manner that each nation watches over the ſecurity of its diſtant poſſeſſions, and prepares to put all its forces in motion, when any aggreſſion in thoſe remote quarters calls for revenge. As the power which would ſeize on a defenceleſs province or diſtant colony of another ſtate, muſt be prepared to meet the whole force of the mother country, and defend all its own remote ſettlements: ſo, the power that would encroach upon the territories of any one feeble neighbour, muſt lay its account with preſerving the uſurpation, by expoſing its whole dominions and colonies to the combined attacks of the other ſtates, who will immediately unite to reſtore the former balance of power. Such, at leaſt, is the theory of political equilibrium; and we have only to lament, that an impolitic ambition, or thoughtleſs ſecurity, ſhould have ſo frequently prevented its full application to the affairs of modern Europe. Yet we may eaſily perceive how great the influence of the ſyſtem has been in maintaining the independence of the different ſtates, if we only conſider the very trifling extent of the changes which have taken place in the relative ſituations of the European powers, and in the diſtribution of the Continent, un-

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der ſeparate governments, during the long and ſplendid period of modern hiſtory.

In like manner, we may remark, how few alterations have taken place upon the poſition of the European ſtates in the Weſt Indies, and the diſtribution of thoſe valuable iſlands, unequally as the ſtrength of the different ſtates in that quarter is proportioned. During the five long and eventful conteſts of the eighteenth century, the only change which took place owing to the fate of war (if we except the expulſion of the French inhabitants of St Kitts), was the ceſſion of Tobago by Britain, of Grenada by France, and of Trinidad by Spain. The firſt of thoſe iſlands had only been annexed to the Britiſh Crown for twenty years, and the laſt had juſt begun to be planted by the Spaniards. The ſurrender of St Bartholomew to Sweden, and of the eaſtern diviſion of St Domingo to France, can in no degree be imputed to the fortune of colonial war. The former of thoſe changes was the reſult of a tranſaction between two powers, who had remained during the whole century in conſtant alliance; and the latter was an acquiſition made by France, through her preponderance in Europe, at a time when ſhe had more territory in the Weſt Indies than ſhe could govern. So few have been the permanent transferences of colonial poſſeſſions in that

that part of the world where war has reigned the moſt conſtantly; where every campaign has been attended with ſome important conqueſt; and where every iſland, except Jamaica, Barbadoes, and Porto-Rico, has experienced a temporary change of maſters.

But if any of thoſe European ſettlements were to become independent of the mother country, and to remain unconnected with the other parts of the globe, it is evident, that the fate of Weſt Indian warfare would be inſulated on the part of the new ſtate, and would be productive of conſtant changes, which oppoſite events in different quarters could not modify or correct. If, for example, the French Weſt Indies had, during the American war, been unconnected with Europe immediately, and mediately with Aſia and North America, the peace of Verſailles could never have reſtored the conquered iſlands to the Britiſh crown. Britain muſt have loſt them for ever, and with them, moſt probably, her larger ſettlements alſo, unleſs ſhe could recover each conqueſt directly by force of arms. The ſame may be ſaid of the Britiſh conqueſts during the Seven-years war, and during the late war, reſtored on account of the North American colonies in the one caſe, and of the Aſiatic ſettlements in the other. In the Spaniſh war of 1740, the reſtoration of Cape Bre-

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ton affords a ſtriking illuſtration of the poſition for which we are contending. That important ſettlement was taken almoſt entirely by the exertions of the North American coloniſts; and it was reſtored by the peace of Aix-la-Chapelle, in order to procure the reſtoration of our principal Eaſt Indian ſettlement taken by France. If Pondicherry and Cape Breton had not belonged to the ſame European power, it is evident, that the events of that war would have transferred the poſſeſſion both of Calcutta and Cape Breton.

In all ſuch circumſtances as we are now ſuppoſing to be combined, the fortune of Weſt Indian warfare alone would decide the poſſeſſion of Weſt Indian territory. We ſhould no longer hear of America being conquered in Germany; nor of balances or ſets-off; nor of treaties on the footing of the *ſtatus quo ante bellum*. The chance of war, in a few campaigns, confined to the Charaibean Sea, would determine the permanent ſovereignty of the iſlands. The right of property would be veſted by the mere act of occupancy, without the neceſſity of confirmation by convention, or acknowledgment by the other nations; and the *uti poſſidetis* would of courſe be the baſis of each pacification.

Now,

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Now, it may be ſaid, that the independent ſtate which we are ſuppoſing to ariſe in the Weſt Indies, will be deprived of the ſecurity ariſing from a power of making repriſals upon an enemy in diſtant quarters; that, of conſequence, though more unembarraſſed in its offenſive operations, it will be expoſed to hoſtile neighbours, likewiſe leſs hampered; and that its defeats will be as irretrievable as its victories will be ſecure.

To a certain degree, indeed, this muſt be the caſe. The new community cannot unite all the advantages of compactneſs and inſulation with the benefits ariſing from extended and remote dominions. But we muſt remember, in the *firſt* place, that while it is placed at a diſtance from the great commonwealth of Europe, it cannot be an object of ſo much jealouſy and apprehenſion to the ſtates compoſing that body, as any of the European powers poſſeſſing colonies in the Weſt Indies muſt always be. Suppoſe St Domingo to be the independent ſettlement, and that it is conquered by the Spaniſh government in the neighbouring iſland of Cuba: Great Britain, we may be aſſured, would view with greater alarm this aggrandizement of Spain by the conqueſt of St Domingo, than the aggrandizement of St Domingo by the conqueſt of Cuba. We have indeed

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proved, that an independent community in thoſe parts, would be a more dangerous neighbour, than a colonial ſettlement to thoſe colonies which ſhould remain dependent. But this danger would only affect the colonial intereſts of Great Britain; the acceſſion of wealth and power to any of her European neighbours, brings the danger nearer home; and Spain, the natural ally of France, would not be allowed to retain her conqueſt without a war in Europe or Aſia. I do not aſſert that this policy would be the moſt enlightened; but I maintain that it would be the moſt conſiſtent with that ſpirit of national rivalry which divides the European powers, which is the great corner-ſtone of the balancing ſyſtem, and which, notwithſtanding its many evil conſequences, has certainly done more to preſerve the independent exiſtence of nations, than all the refinements of abſtract politicians, their treaties of guarantee, and their codes of public law.

In the *ſecond* place, whatever might be the wiſh of European powers, their opportunity of checking the growth of the independent ſtate, and of preventing it from being conquered by a neighbour, is extremely different. In order to check its growth, they can only interfere by direct attack on the ſpot; in attempting to prevent it from being conquered, they have all the

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the opportunities of attack which extended and severed possessions present. To revert to the supposition which we have just now made—The permanent conquest of Cuba by St Domingo could only be prevented by a recapture of the one, or an invasion of the other. But the permanent conquest of St Domingo by Spain, could be opposed in Florida, in Cuba, in Mexico and South America, in the Mediterranean, and in the Philippine islands. All the powers of Europe must be averse to any change, either at home, or in the neighbourhood of their distant settlements. If their interference can prevent or correct one kind of revolution or change of power; and if this interference cannot be effectual in opposing another: we may be assured, that without completely weighing the comparative evils of these events, or inquiring how far the prevention of the one may tend to bring about the other, they will intermeddle, as soon as the occasion presents itself in which their interference is likely to be attended with effect.

Lastly, we may remark, that the powers of Europe possessing territories in the West Indies, are, from their relative position at home, always ranged on opposite sides of the great European balance. Such a change of international policy, as should unite France, Spain and Holland,

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Holland, with Britain and Portugal, is not to be ſuppoſed in any practical queſtion.

However clearly, then, the colonial intereſts of thoſe powers may point out to them the policy of a combination againſt any one of the colonies which ſhall have thrown off its dependence on the mother country, ſuch a coalition can ſcarcely be expected to be vigorous and ſincere. Notwithſtanding the guidance of the moſt enlightened ſtateſmen, the councils of nations are often impelled by paſſion and prejudice, as well as thoſe of leſs abſtract beings. A more immediate and more urgent danger than the neighbourhood of the new ſtate, whoſe exiſtence we have been figuring, would probably be neceſſary to induce Great Britain to riſk a direct increaſe of the French power, by uniting with the councils of the Thuilleries, or the court of Verſailles, in an offenſive Weſt Indian league; and if the rulers of the nation were guided by thoſe wiſe and temperate views, they would have to encounter the ſtrongeſt prejudices of the people, whom the ſpirit of our free conſtitution arms with a power ſufficient to ſway even the foreign policy of our national councils. We have not forgotten the part that France, Holland and Spain, took in our own colonial diſputes againſt their moſt obvious tranſatlantic intereſts, which they ſacrificed, perhaps with ſufficient wiſdom, to the deſire

deſire of curbing our more formidable maritime ſuperiority in Europe. Upon ſome occaſions, the right and prudent line of public conduct may be adopted. We ſhall afterwards endeavour to prove, that a policy is recommended by the preſent colonial criſis, ſimilar to that which we at preſent maintain is the one always leaſt likely to be adopted. But ſurely it is very fair to argue upon any meaſure, from the probability that, in many caſes, perhaps in a great plurality of inſtances, the unwiſe and popular views of foreign policy will predominate in the councils of ſeveral ſtates.

The new Weſt Indian power, then, will probably find allies even among the ſtates whoſe American ſettlements lye expoſed to its attacks. But, admitting that a community of intereſts in thoſe parts may unite all the rival ſtates againſt the new nation; it will find warm and powerful allies among the other commercial countries of Europe, which have no nearer intereſt in American affairs, than that of obtaining a market for their goods, and attracting to their dominions a ſhare of the rich produce of the Weſt Indian territories. Ruſſia, Auſtria and Pruſſia, not to mention the Italian States, are perfectly unconcerned in the diſtribution of the colonies, unleſs indeed that they would profit by any change which might overthrow

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overthrow the whole ſyſtem of colonial ſovereignty. It is not eaſy to conceive a ſtronger inducement to either of thoſe ambitious powers, than the proſpect of obtaining a footing in the Weſt Indies, or the advantages of a favourable commercial treaty, which the new power would readily grant them in any criſis of its affairs. * Things are widely changed ſince the time when the proud ſpirit of Katharine refuſed to acknowledge the independence of the United States. That thirſt of dominion and territory which has guided the Houſe of Brandenburgh ſince the days of the Great Elector, and which neither the neighbourhood of Ruſſia, or of France, have been able to ſubdue, is only equalled by the deſire of the Pruſſian monarchs to extend their mercantile reſources; and the nineteenth century has opened with the foundation of maritime policy in the extended Imperial dominions. It is manifeſt, that the union of the Germanic powers with the ſtates immediately concerned in the affairs of America, could only be occaſioned by a rapid extenſion of Ruſſia over the Northern and Eaſtern parts of Europe; an event which would, on the other hand, render the alliance of the great Baltic ſtate no very difficult achievement of policy to the new power, whoſe independent exiſtence in the Weſt Indies we have figured.

We

* Note F f.

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We may conclude, then, that beſides the reſources of internal ſtrength, this ſtate will not be deficient in thoſe of a federal nature, and that, while it expoſes no diſtant territories to the arms of its natural enemies or its rivals, it may avail itſelf of diviſions ariſing from their relative poſition in all parts of the globe, and of alliances with their natural enemies and rivals in Europe.

It is ſurely no ſpeculative inference, from all the facts and principles which have been ſtated, that ſo long as the European powers ſhall perſevere in the ſyſtem of colonial policy, the eſtabliſhment of any independent dynaſty in the Weſt Indies muſt be immediately and directly hoſtile to their intereſts.

II. Hitherto we have compared the relative ſtrength of a colony and an independent ſtate in general, and of a colony and an independent ſtate in the Weſt Indies, without entering into the circumſtances of the particular ſettlements in that quarter. It remains to be conſidered, whether the different colonies are not diſtinguiſhed by diverſity of circumſtances, and whether the French dominions in the Weſt Indies are not placed in a ſtate of ſingular weakneſs by the peculiarities of their ſituation, by the events which have lately happened, and by thoſe which muſt accompany the reſtoration of tranquillity.

The

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The ſtate to which the whole Archipelago, as well as the ſurrounding continent, once belonged, ſtill poſſeſſes the beſt eſtabliſhed, though far from the moſt valuable empire in the new world. Vaſt extent of territory, towns and ſettlements thinly ſcattered chiefly over thoſe parts which are fartheſt from the other colonies, a policy ſingularly adapted to preſerve internal tranquillity, and a free population to which the negroes bear but a ſmall proportion; theſe important circumſtances concur to render the continental poſſeſſions of Spain as ſecure as provinces ſo remote can well be. The inſalubrious nature of the climate on the eaſt ſide of South America and Mexico, while it has kept the ſettlements on that coaſt in the ſtate of a deſert, except at particular ſeaſons of commercial reſort, effectually prevents any ſucceſsful invaſion from the Weſt Indies, and takes away the inducement to invade, by deſtroying all the immediate objects of attack. In no part of the South American colonies are ſo few negroes employed as in the Spaniſh ſettlements; and their treatment is better there, than in any other of the European colonies. Both in the Spaniſh and Portugueze dominions on the Continent, the white population is much more flouriſhing than in the Weſt Indies. Vaſt bodies of emigrants have been conſtantly ſettling there ſince the conqueſt, as in the North American ſtates. The Creoles form a large part of the community; and

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and their numbers increaſe with conſiderable rapidity, though not ſo quickly as they would under a better form of government, a leſs corrupted religion, and a leſs indolent ſtate of manners. The whites in the Spaniſh colonies amounted in 1550 to ſixty thouſand; at preſent they are not under a million. Yet the ſtructure of the ſociety does not endanger the dependence of theſe colonies. So much of the national importance, both of Spain and Portugal, has always been thought to depend upon their American poſſeſſions; and ſuch large ſupplies have been received from thence, in the form by which governments are moſt apt to be tempted, that a very large ſhare of attention has uniformly been paid to colonial affairs in both theſe countries. Particular councils and miniſters have been appointed to ſuperintend them. A regular ſyſtem of colonial government has been formed, and every thing hurtful to the ſupremacy of the mother country has been carefully prevented from finding admittance. In the Spaniſh colonies, particularly, the Papal juriſdiction, ſo abſolute over the mother country, has never been allowed to acquire a footing; and the tithes, the diſcipline, and the patronage of the Church (the inheritance of the Triple Crown all over the Pontifical dominions) have been monopolized by the temporal monarchs of Caſtile.

There

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There has reſulted, from this attention conſtantly paid to American affairs by both the powers of the Spaniſh peninſula, a ſyſtem of diviſion highly favourable to the ſecurity of permanent rights. A ſpirit of diſunion is carefully fomented between the Spaniards and Creoles; and a ſuperiority is given to the former, which greatly diminiſhes the dangers of a ſeparation, encourages the habit of temporary reſidence, and thus corrects the tendency of the increaſing Creole population to promote the independence of the ſettlements. A ſimilar ſuperiority is beſtowed upon the negroes over the Indians; and a diviſion is cheriſhed between thoſe two claſſes, which gives the whites an opportunity of uniting with either againſt the other, and generally attaches to their intereſts the leaſt numerous though moſt warlike of the two races. A policy of the ſame nature has connected the Europeans with the Indians in the French and Dutch ſettlements of Guiana, where the negroes are by far the moſt formidable both in numbers and in ſtrength. In thoſe continental colonies of Spain and Portugal, then, as well from their poſition and extent, as from the ſtate of their populalation and their ſyſtems of policy, there is leſs danger of a ſeparation, and leſs riſk from foreign attempts, than in the ſettlements of Guiana; and leſs danger and riſk in all thoſe continental ſettlements, than in the Weſt Indian iſlands.

We

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We have before remarked, that the indolence and want of adventurous ſpirit, ſo conſpicuous in the Spaniſh character, as well as the reſtrictive ſpirit of the colonial laws of Spain, has prevented the iſlands of Cuba and Porto-Rico from being cultivated, like the other colonies, by the rapid importation of African labourers; but, of late years, this difference has been ſenſibly diminiſhing. The mercantile company under the Aſſiento which laſted from 1769 to 1779, carried to the Havanna, yearly, from two thouſand five hundred to three thouſand negroes, for the uſe of Cuba and Trinidad, and only carried half that number to Carthagena and Portobello, for the uſe of the northern and weſtern parts of the continent. * The field negroes of Cuba were found, by actual enumeration in 1787, to be fifty thouſand in number. Since that time, the ordinance of 1789 permitting the free importation of ſlaves, granting a bounty on field negroes, and impoſing a yearly poll-tax on houſe negroes, muſt have greatly increaſed the numbers of the former. But, ſtill, the mild treatment of the ſlaves, provided for by new laws which keep pace with the increaſed importation, the great proportion of whites, and the numbers of free blacks (eſtimated at twenty thouſand in the Ha-

* Report of Committee 1789, part VI.

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vanna alone), who are always attached to the Europeans, and ſerve with diſtinguiſhed zeal in their regiments, muſt render the poſſeſſions of Spain in the Weſt Indies more ſecure, in thoſe particulars which we have been conſidering, than the colonies of the other European powers.

The Dutch iſlands are in a ſituation very different from their colonies on the continent, as we have formerly ſhown, * and equally different from the other Weſt Indian iſlands. But, whatever may be their internal ſituation, their trifling extent muſt always render them an eaſy prey to any neighbouring Weſt Indian power, which may be tempted to attack them by the hopes of mercantile plunder. The Daniſh and Swediſh iſlands are in the ſame ſituation with the French and Britiſh iſlands; ſo that our attention is now confined to a ſurvey of the predicament in which the latter would be placed ſhould the tranquillity of the former be reſtored.

It is impoſſible to deny, that the dominions of France in the Weſt Indies, are more extenſive and more fertile in natural reſources, than thoſe of any other power except Spain; neither can it be diſſembled, that the reſtoration of tranquillity will put her in poſſeſſion of a much more extenſive and ſcatterred territory than any independent power in thoſe parts can be expected to conſolidate

* Book I. Sect. III. Part I.

date under its dominion for ſome time after its emancipation. But the example of Spain, both in the Old and New World, and of France herſelf, in Europe, may convince us, that political importance and national ſtrength, are not ſo much proportioned to the natural reſources and capability of a country, as to the ſtate of its ſociety and the nature of its inſtitutions. The relative influence of France and of Great Britain, in Europe, is not leſs proportioned to their natural reſources, than their relative power in the Weſt Indies is to their colonial reſources. Whatever may be the fertility and extent of any colony peopled by a mixture of whites and negroes, the inhabitants cannot avail themſelves of their advantages according to the ſlave ſyſtem, without diminiſhing, at the ſame time, their ſecurity and military ſtrength; and this exactly in proportion to the rapidity with which they increaſe their wealth. Every hundred hogſheads of ſugar or rum, whereby their annual produce is augmented, muſt be purchaſed at the expence of that ſecurity which is deſtroyed by a proportional addition to the ſtock of negroes, and an augmentation in the proportion of the imported to the Creole ſlaves. A colony which continues to raiſe the ſame quantity of produce, will ſend home fewer overgrown fortunes, and augment, in a ſmaller degree, the mercantile opulence of the mother country; but it will enjoy greater

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ſecurity, and have leſs to fear from its powerful neighbours, than if it had been conſtantly increaſing in point of wealth.

It muſt indeed be admitted, as we formerly ſtated, that the ſame number of negroes in the French iſlands, from the ſuperior fertility of the ſoil, yield a greater quantity of produce. * But the tendency of this ſuperiority, is by no means to ſave either the labour or the importation of ſlaves: It operates, on the contrary, as an encouragement to extravagant ſpeculations, and careleſs management of the ſtock. The treatment of the ſlaves in the French iſlands has been alleged by ſome † to be gentler than that of the Britiſh ſlaves; and Dr Smith, in particular, ſeems to take this for granted, as a matter of common notoriety. ‡ Others have aſſerted, that this claſs of men are nearly upon a level, in point of comforts, in the colonies of both nations ‖. But, from the inquiries of the committee of 1789, it appears clearly, that the mortality among the negroes in the French iſlands, is much greater than in the Britiſh. It was computed, that of thoſe imported, one third died in three years, and of the Creoles, one fifth

* Book I. Sect. III. Part IV.

† Laborie's Coffee Planter, Appendix.

‡ Wealth of Nations, book IV. chap. VII.—Note Gg.

‖ Edwards' Hiſtory of St Domingo, chap. i.

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fifth yearly more than the number born; * while the annual diminution in Jamaica was only one fortieth *per cent.*; and, in ſeveral of the iſlands, the ſtock was kept up, and even increaſed, without any importation. I have frequently had occaſion to notice the vaſt importation of ſlaves annually made into the French iſlands, and the conſequently rapid increaſe of the numbers during the ten years immediately previous to the revolution. It is manifeſt, however, that the total increaſe was far from being in proportion to the number imported, either before or during that period, admitting that the births had been nearly ſufficient to fill up the blanks occaſioned by the deaths, and allowing for the diſproportion of females in the numbers imported. †

It would appear, therefore, that the natural advantages of St Domingo will never be turned to account without a very dangerous increaſe in the negro population. But, in another point of view, this iſland, and indeed all the French colonies, are in a ſituation much leſs favourable to ſolid power than the Britiſh poſſeſſions, and more apt to render their independence a cauſe of comparative ſtrength.

I have already had occaſion to notice the extenſive ſyſtem of commercial credit, in-

 terwoven

* Report 1789, part V. † Note H h.

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terwoven with the cultivation of all the Weſt Indian iſlands, and to point out the probable effects of their independence upon this ſyſtem. But there are ſeveral other circumſtances connected with it which well deſerve our attention. The credit upon which planters ſpeculate, and in many caſes exiſt, is not of a ſolid and permanent deſcription, like the credit interpoſed by commercial confidence in the tranſactions of European merchants and manufacturers. The riſk is much greater, the profits of conſequence higher, and the ſpirit of gambling more intimately connected with it. A rapacity of gain, and, in many inſtances, an eagerneſs of ſpeculation approaching to the deſperation of the gaming-houſe, influences both the creditor and the planter. The fair idea of reciprocal advantage does not always preſide over ſuch tranſactions; and a capitaliſt frequently riſks his money to a planter in circumſtances nearly deſperate, in order to have a claim upon his eſtate, and to obtain it at a price preſcribed by the neceſſities of the debtor. The complicated difficulties under which a great proportion of the planters labour from theſe cauſes, has been admitted by writers on both ſides of the great queſtion that has divided political inquirers into colonial affairs. The facts which the advocates of each opinion have brought forward, with the moſt oppoſite

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poſite views, are extremely important. The immediate conſequence of the difficulties which thus oppreſs the planters, is an eagerneſs for quick returns upon their ſtock of negroes, and a conſtant demand of new ſupplies from the Guinea trader. The ſlaves are worked out; breeding is of courſe neglected; and the numbers are kept up or increaſed by importation. Accordingly, the demands of creditors, and the neceſſities of debtors, have been uniformly pleaded by the ſupporters of the African trade, as arguments demonſtrating the neceſſity of its continuance; while the advocates of the abolition have urged the very ſame facts to ſhow the evil effects of the trade, as well upon the happineſs of the maſter, as upon the condition of the ſlave. * The new actions, we are told, which are raiſed in the different courts of Jamaica, amount annually to three thouſand, of which the greater part are actions upon bond; and of theſe, nine tenths are brought by ſlave factors as creditors. † In three years, half a million Sterling paſſed through the hands of one Sheriff, in conſequence of judicial ſales on executions chiefly ariſing from ſuch bonds; and the principal

* Edwards' Weſt Indies, b. IV. c. 4.; and Parliamentary Debates 1791 & 1792.

† Clarkſon's Impolicy of the Slave Trade, part 2. cap. 1. ſect. 3.

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part of the debtors in jail during that period were confined in conſequence of thoſe obligations. * A ſimilar account is given by authors who wrote long before the queſtion of abolition had begun to divide the public opinion, particularly by Mr Long, in his valuable Hiſtory of Jamaica. †

But the planters in the French iſlands have always been involved ſtill more deeply in this ruinous and cruel ſyſtem, partly from the ſuperior temptations of more fertile and extenſive lands, partly from the deficiency of capital, both among the creditors and coloniſts, but chiefly from the groſs defects of the French laws reſpecting the recovery of debts. In the Firſt Book of this Inquiry, I have explained the ſingular effects of theſe circumſtances upon the ſtate of property in the French iſlands. Cultivators placed in the ſituation which I there deſcribed, have no immediate intereſt in what is called their property. The care of their ſtock is the laſt method of increaſing it that ever enters into their minds. Immediate returns, by whatever means, are the only method of improvement that occurs to them; and as for any danger to be apprehended from increaſing the number of the negroes, that belongs to the whole

* Clarkſon's Impolicy of the Slave Trade, part 2. cap. 1. ſect. 3.

† Vol. I. p. 437.

whole community at once, and therefore affects none of its members until it is realized. 'Things will laſt my time,' ſays the Weſt Indian farmer, as men have ſaid before him in all ages, and in every part of the world—financiers on the brink of national bankruptcy, and princes, or their favourites, on the eve of a revolution.

If this was the ſtate of the French iſlands in the year 1789, it is eaſy to conceive how the ſyſtem muſt have been affected by the events which have happened ſince that time. The reſtoration of tranquillity in the revolted colonies, cannot at once render them a deſireable reſidence. Thoſe only will repair to the ſpot, or remain there, whoſe money has already been veſted in Weſt Indian property, from the temptations held out to purchaſers during the period of the greateſt confuſion, or whoſe eſtates have remained on their hands for want of purchaſers. The men poſſeſſed of ſuch extenſive capital as is required in Weſt Indian ſpeculations, will be ſtill leſs inclined now, than before, to ſuperintend a plantation in St Domingo. The cultivators will, as formerly, conſiſt, in a great degree, of perſons inclined to riſk their health, and ſacrifice the comforts of home, for the chance of acquiring a competency—perſons of ſmall capital, or mere adventurers. The devaſtations of the revolutionary times, with the accumulated

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accumulated intereſt of old debts, will render credit at once more neceſſary, and more expenſive than ever. Indeed, to ſuch a ſtate have the proprietors been reduced, that the beſt informed perſons ſeem to deſpair altogether of the colonial affairs of the republic. The interference of government will probably be neceſſary; and the nature of the expedients propoſed by ſome of the moſt intelligent planters, affords, as I before remarked, * abundant proof of their deſperate ſituation. Any aſſiſtance which the government can afford, will, at the very utmoſt, only enable the planters to go on. They are ſtill in a ſituation infinitely more deſperate than before the revolution—borrowing money at higher intereſt—forced to extract more labour from their ſlaves, in order to extend their culture, or reſtore their deſolated plantations. Some correction of the evils ariſing from the ſtate of the colonial laws, may indeed be expected—more particularly, the recovery of debts may be facilitated. But, beſides that this muſt, in the firſt inſtance, increaſe the neceſſities of the planters before it can lower the demands of their creditors for intereſt, we may obſerve, that the imperfections of the colonial laws ariſe, in a great meaſure,

* Book I. Sect. III. Part IV.

ſure, naturally from the circumſtances of the iſlands, and cannot be wholly removed ſo long as the dangers of a tropical climate render impriſonment a puniſhment of the higheſt ſeverity, and ſo long as creditors are willing rather to obtain the chance of repayment, or profit, by enabling their debtors to work, than, by completing their ruin, to loſe all chance of getting either, without repairing to the ſpot.

The low ſtate of credit, and the complicated difficulties of the planters, will always produce conſiderable derangement in the adminiſtration of the colonies. The firſt aſſiſtance which government may find it neceſſary to give, will be the abatement of ſome colonial impoſts, ſuch as the poll-tax on ſlaves; and the encouragement of aboliſhing the duties formerly known by the name of '*droits du domaine d'occident.*' The adminiſtration of the iſlands, and their defence, will thus fall a burthen on the exhauſted finances of the mother country. As ſoon as the cultivation has begun to revive, we may be well aſſured, that the government will attend more to the direct expences, than to the indirect advantages of ſuch eſtabliſhments. Like all governments, it will view theſe iſlands in the fiſcal ſpirit, and will alienate the oppreſſed planters, by impoſing on them the charge of ruling and defending themſelves. We have already

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already ſeen what their opinions are upon the ſubject of colonial militia, even in the moſt eaſy and peaceable times. It is not probable that they will now grudge their labour leſs when their occaſions are much more preſſing. To the troops or ſervices required for ſuppreſſing inſurrection, they may poſſibly make no objections. But the furtherance of any views of conqueſt, or even the meaſures neceſſary for their internal ſecurity, will be viewed as encroachments upon their exhauſted reſources, and will either be oppoſed or received with decided averſion. As to conqueſt, it muſt be clearly againſt their intereſt to be at variance with the neighbouring colonies; and the dominion of England would probably be preferred to that of France, as was the caſe about the beginning of the revolution, if ſhe burdened them with the expence or interruption of providing againſt an invaſion. So long, indeed, as the plantations depend upon credit from the mother country, their proprietors can have no objection to be connected with that nation whoſe trading capital is the moſt extenſive, and whoſe government is the mildeſt and moſt equitable of any in the world.

Theſe conſequences which, I apprehend, may be fairly expected to reſult from the late calamities, and the preſent ſtate of the Weſt Indian

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Indian colonies, are by no means to be conſidered as accidental, or peculiar to the circumſtances in which they have been placed. It is the lot of every diſtant province of an empire to experience many diſadvantages which the contiguous diſtricts never feel; and when ſuch provinces are involved in any unuſual calamity, much leſs care is beſtowed upon their re-eſtabliſhment, than if the like misfortune had happened to a nearer part. I have explained the reaſon of this in various parts of the Firſt Book. A colony or remote appendage is, by the policy even of thoſe ſtates which have moſt favoured the colonial ſyſtem, conſidered merely as a mine from which wealth is to be drawn in the form of direct revenue, or, at the utmoſt, as a ſpot to which the overflowing population of the metropolis may reſort in order to acquire opulence. Any unforeſeen expence which this poſſeſſion may coſt, is always grudged, as ſo much actual and uncompenſated loſs. In ſeaſons of calamity, it is left in a great degree to ſtruggle with the burden of its own adverſity. After the ſtorm is over, it is left to recover as it beſt can. The contiguous provinces, on the other hand, are viewed as neceſſary and integral parts of the empire, whoſe misfortunes muſt be ſhared by all the reſt, while they muſt be nurſed with ſedulous care, for their own ſakes,

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ſakes, in every unforeſeen diſaſter, and cheriſhed without a murmur, not from the proſpect of future revenue, but becauſe they form an inſeparable portion of the community. Calamities, then, from which the contiguous provinces ſoon recover without ſuſtaining any ſerious or permanent injury, are long and ſeverely felt by the colonies or remote provinces. Coldneſs or diſguſt ariſes between them and the mother country; and the ſeeds of ſeparation are ſown, which may either break out in actual rebellion or in factious diviſions, whenever a war is transferred, as all wars are, to thoſe quarters.

The probability of the French government being actuated in its conduct towards the revolted iſlands by leſs liberal views than the reduced ſituation of the planters demands, may be collected, not only from the fiſcal ſpirit which has uniformly preſided over the policy of all ſtates towards their colonial eſtabliſhments, but from the ſtate of the French reſources, and from the accounts of the late tranſactions in ſome of the Windward iſlands, more particularly the requiſitions made in Guadaloupe, if, indeed, any reliance is to be placed on thoſe ſtatements.

But however enlightened its policy, and however eaſy its yoke may be, if the co-operation

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tion of the planters is required in active measures of defenſive, or, ſtill more, of offenſive warfare, we cannot expect that any thing but diſobedience and diſcontent will be the conſequence.

Such, then, are the probable effects of the French colonial ſyſtem, and of the increaſed difficulties of the planters in the revolted iſlands, in conſequence of the loſſes in general which their unhappy ſituation during the late years has occaſioned. But if we attend more particularly to the nature of thoſe loſſes, we ſhall find reaſon to aſſent ſtill more implicitly to the foregoing concluſion. The greateſt devaſtation which the rebellion has occaſioned, is in the numbers of the negroes. M. Malouet reckons, that during the firſt ten years of revolt in St Domingo, the negro population was diminiſhed from five hundred thouſand to three hundred thouſand; that the loſs was chiefly in males; and that the number of children had rapidly increaſed.* Laborie, in 1797, eſtimated the reduction at much more than one half of the numbers in 1789; † Edwards ſuppoſes it to have been two fifths of the ſame numbers. ‡

All

* Mem. Vol. I. p. 52.

† Coffee-planter, Append. Art. X. § 12.

‡ St Domingo, cap. X.: Note to page 173.

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All the plantations, therefore, muſt be extremely underſtocked; and the firſt conſequence of a reſtoration of tranquillity, will be the importation of a vaſt number of new ſlaves to ſupply a deficiency fatal to the colonial agriculture.

In general, the proportion of females to the whole number imported, has been that of one to three. But now a much ſmaller number of females will be required, at leaſt for ſome time: ſo that the proportion of imported males will be much greater than before. The ſituation of the iſland will indeed be more favourable for breeding, from the ſuperfluity of females. But the conſequence of increaſe from this ſource muſt be ſlow, in compariſon of the effects produced by the other kind of increaſe. The yearly augmentation will be at firſt more rapid than formerly, becauſe the births will more nearly balance the deaths. But the treatment will be more harſh while the hands are deficient, and the importation will be greater than ever: ſo that the natural increaſe will be now brought to its former level, and the proportion of Creoles to new ſlaves will ſoon be much leſs than before. At the very firſt, the whole will be Creoles; but their peculiar ſituation will render them ſtill more dangerous than if they had been imported. They are juſt reduced from a rebellion, completely ſucceſsful for

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for a ſeries of years, bloody beyond all former example, and, from the variety of its military operations againſt all kinds of enemies, peculiarly adapted to render thoſe engaged in it warlike, if not ſkilful. Almoſt all the men have borne a part in it. The women and children have enjoyed the ſweets of freedom and idleneſs; they have ſympathized in the cauſe of their huſbands and fathers. All the conſiderations which before induced us * to admit the difficulty of reſtoring the ancient ſlavery, and which have inclined many to believe it a hopeleſs project, prove the difficulty of retaining the whole maſs of blacks in ſubjection, more eſpecially when new imports are perpetually adding fuel to the heap, and aggravated ill treatment is blowing up the ſparks of the ſcarcely ſmothered flame. If it is uniformly found that imported negroes are dangerous in a colony, though many of them only exchange the ſcene of their ſlavery, and all of them are kept in ſubjection by irons during the voyage, and taught to regard their white maſters as beings of a ſuperior order; how much more dangerous muſt thoſe be, who have never known the yoke, or forcibly broken it, and who have been for years in the ſituation, formerly unknown to Africans, of

* Book I. Sect. III. Part IV.

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maſters over white men and mulattoes by the right of conqueſt! In order to keep the new ſlaves in ſubordination, and to teach them habits of labour, as well as to diſarm them by diviſion, it has always been found neceſſary to diſtribute them among the old ſtock, and gradually to incorporate them with the whole maſs. But now, there is no ſtock with which to combine the revolted ſlaves. They are reduced to obedience, not in ſmall numbers and gradually, but ſuddenly, and all at one time; while thoſe newly imported are mingled with a body ſtill leſs fit than themſelves for the taſks and the ſtation of ſervitude.

While the revolt has diminiſhed the numbers of the negroes, and rendered new importations more neceſſary than ever, it has alſo ſwept away vaſt numbers of the whites, by maſſacres, by emigrations, and by diſeaſe, the conſtant attendant upon hard duty in the tropical climates, at leaſt to European conſtitutions. *

Malouet reckons that their numbers have been reduced to one half the population of 1789, or between ſeventeen and twenty thouſand. It ſeems proved, that this ſtatement of the whole amount is above the truth; and the effects

* Laborie's Coffee-planter, Append. X. 12.—Malouet, Mem. &c. IV. 32.—Edwards' St Domingo, cap. x. note to p. 173.

effects of the ſubſequent events, with the neceſſary ſtruggles that muſt yet be undergone before tranquillity is reſtored, will at leaſt counterbalance the increaſe of numbers ariſing from new ſettlers.

When order is re-eſtabliſhed, indeed, it is reaſonable to ſuppoſe that a conſiderable number of new ſettlers will repair thither with the ſtock which may be employed in reſtoring or extending the cultivation. But not to mention the temptations held out by thoſe iſlands which have never experienced the horrors of inſurrection, the acquiſition which France has made of the Spaniſh part of the iſland, cannot fail to attract towards that quarter a large proportion of thoſe new ſettlers. The moſt valuable part of them, thoſe who remove with their families, and with the purpoſe of making the colony their home, will certainly prefer a reſidence ſeparated from the quarter where murder and devaſtation have been naturalized, and will conſider the ſociety of their countrymen, when ſurrounded by the actors in thoſe ſcenes, as well exchanged for that of the Spaniards, whoſe ſlaves are few in number, and, from gentle treatment, have remained untainted with the ſpirit of inſurrection. The eaſtern part of St Domingo, too, contains a vaſt extent of the fineſt plains perhaps in the whole iſland. The

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land is a rich virgin ſoil, watered by the largeſt and moſt uſeful rivers. The acceſs from Europe and the Windward iſlands is eaſier, and the harbours are extremely convenient. Hence, we may expect that this quarter of the colony will allure ſpeculators and merchants, as well as other ſettlers, and thus prevent the old French territory from receiving a great increaſe of white inhabitants. But the partial increaſe of the whites in the weſtern diviſion where the negroes are, and not the total augmentation of whites in the iſland, is the circumſtance that muſt influence the ſecurity of the French power over the negroes; for the two diviſions are ſeparated from each other by a difficult country, of great extent, abounding in heights and ravines and impenetrable foreſts.

The ſituation of the colony, then, whether we conſider the ſtate of the black, or that of the white population, has been rendered infinitely more precarious than before, by the events of the laſt twelve years. The tenure by which the one of theſe claſſes is held in ſubjection to the other, muſt now be weak and delicate beyond all former example. No political ſociety that ever ſubſiſted in the world, has had ſo much reaſon to deſire a ſtate of complete tranquillity and repoſe from all external danger; none has ever exiſted ſo utterly unfit for being the ſcene of new

new conteſts; none ever offered to its neighbours more certain pledges of pacific intentions, ſhewed leſs capacity for aggreſſion, or preſented to its enemies a greater number of defenceleſs and vulnerable points.

The military eſtabliſhment which France will certainly maintain in this iſland, muſt find ample employment in preſerving internal tranquillity, and checking the ſeeds of new revolt as they ſpring up. It is idle to ſay, as ſome writers on colonial affairs have done, that ſhe derives a formidable aſpect in that quarter, from the pretext which her colonial poſſeſſions afford her, of increaſing to a dangerous degree her force in thoſe parts. It is not a pretext; it is a real neceſſity. In the Weſt Indies, ſhe has ample occaſion for more troops than ſhe can ſpare from Holland and Belgium, and the departments of the Weſt, and the Italian republic, and the protection of whatever dynaſty may happen for the time to be eſtabliſhed in the Thuilleries. With all her force, ſhe will find the preſervation of her colonies, as they at preſent ſtand, the moſt difficult taſk which ſhe has yet accompliſhed in the career of her towering ambition.

The remarks which have been ſuggeſted by the recent hiſtory of St Domingo, apply, though with leſs force, to the preſent ſtate of

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Guadaloupe. That iſland has, though in a more ſlight degree, been viſited by ſerious inſurrections: the defect of importation ſince the revolution, has checked the extenſion of cultivation, and probably diminiſhed the ſtock of ſlaves. There, as in St Domingo, the negroes have enjoyed the ſweets of liberty, and will return with great and natural reluctance to their former occupations.

The conquered iſlands have been exempted from all thoſe calamities, and their cultivation has rapidly increaſed. Some danger muſt, however, always ariſe from change of poſſeſſion: and we ſhall afterwards have occaſion to deſcribe more fully the probable effects of this event upon the adminiſtration of thoſe colonies. But the queſtion now turns chiefly upon the ſtate of the larger colonies, whoſe fortunes the others muſt follow: and if, from the circumſtances of St Domingo and Guadaloupe, France finds it impoſſible to combine military operations there, we may reſt aſſured that for the very ſame reaſon ſhe will remain at peace in her other iſlands. A rupture with her neighbours, in whatever quarter, muſt be attended with danger to the whole ſyſtem; and we may reckon upon the weakneſs or dangerous ſituation of her revolted iſlands, as if it extended to thoſe which the fortunes of the Britiſh arms ſaved from deſtruction.

Thus

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Thus it appears, in the *firſt* place, that a colony or remote province, in the general, is always leſs adapted than an independent ſtate to the operations either of defenſive or offenſive warfare, by the neceſſary circumſtances of its ſituation; *ſecondly*, that the peculiar circumſtances of the Weſt Indian iſlands, and the international policy of modern Europe, would render the independence of any one of *thoſe* colonies peculiarly dangerous to the reſt, and would render the colonial regimen a greater ſource of weakneſs to them than to any other eſtabliſhments of the ſame kind; and, *laſtly*, that the ſituation of the French colonies, after ſlavery is reſtored, muſt be far leſs ſecure than that of the other Weſt Indian ſettlements, both from the peculiar circumſtances of thoſe colonies, and from the manner in which the changes have been effected. We may conclude, therefore, that the maintenance of the colonial exiſtence of the French iſlands, and of the negro ſyſtem, as eſtabliſhed before the revolution, is much leſs hoſtile to the intereſts of the other European powers, who aim at preſerving their Weſt Indian ſettlements, than the ſeparation of the French colonies from the mother country, more eſpecially if that event is attended with the independence of the negroes. We are now to conſider the probable conſequences of a

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partial ſubjugation of the negroes, to the dominion of France, and the intereſts of the other powers in the Weſt Indies.

It cannot be doubted, that the total abolition of ſlavery in any one of the ſugar colonies, and the cultivation of its territories by free ſubjects, whoſe conſtitutions are adapted to the climate, would be attended with the moſt beneficial effects, and raiſe its comparative reſources and ſtrength to a very high pitch. The labour of ſlaves is much more expenſive than that of free men; and the colonies, which ſhould continue the old ſyſtem of cultivation, would be deprived of all that additional force with which the acquiſition of a vaſt population of free men would arm the new-modelled ſettlements. But although the iſlands are at preſent inhabited by a race of negro ſlaves, they are not poſſeſſed of men fit for the ſituation of ſubjects. They have as yet only the bodies of ſubjects—bodies animated by the minds of ſlaves, in the rudeſt ſtate of ſociety; and no power under that which called them into exiſtence, could at once transform them into men capable of ſupporting the relations required for the conſtitution of a free and civilized community. We ſhall, afterwards, in diſcuſſing the various plans for the improvement of the Weſt Indian ſyſtem, have occaſion to enter more fully into the ſubject

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ject of the negro character; and to demonſtrate the utter unfitneſs of thoſe men for the relations of voluntary labourers, in a regular and civilized ſtate. At the end of the preſent Section, too, we ſhall attend a little more minutely to this matter.

But, even if the negroes already in St Domingo could be ſuddenly transformed into peaceful and induſtrious ſubjects, their numbers are ſo reduced, that, in order to reſtore the cultivation of the iſland, and ſtill more, in order to extend it, a much quicker ſupply of hands will be neceſſary than the natural increaſe can afford. While the ſtock at preſent in the iſland continues free, the importation of ſlaves is impoſſible; and to expect induſtry or ſubmiſſion from Africans newly brought over, and ſuddenly let looſe, would be no leſs chimerical. Indeed, it is not eaſy to conceive how they could be brought from Africa, as no one can have any inducement to import a ſavage over whom he retains no excluſive authority after he has landed him. All ſudden addition to the number of hands, then, is inconſiſtent with the ſuppoſition of a community peopled by free blacks. In the mean time, until the chains of the negroes are either firmly rivetted, or broken for ever, the iſland muſt remain in a ſtate of inſecurity within, which will require the moſt undivided attention of the rulers to the maintenance of order among the whites,

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whites, and to the preſervation of external tranquillity.

But admitting, for the preſent, the poſſibility of keeping the negroes in a ſtate of partial ſubjection, and of forming a regular community, conſiſting of free Africans for the populace and Europeans for the higher claſſes; let us ſee what dangers the neighbouring colonies might have to apprehend from ſuch a political eſtabliſhment.

It has been ſuppoſed by ſome, * that if France ſhall fail in reſtoring the ancient order of things, ſhe will have at her diſpoſal, a formidable body of the ſoldiers beſt adapted to Weſt Indian warfare, and trained to military ſervice, by a ſeries of hazardous operations. How can ſhe ſo well employ them, (it has been demanded), as in expeditions againſt her neighbours, at whoſe expence her turbulent ſubjects will thus be occupied with military ſervice, and her dominions rapidly extended?

As this is perhaps the moſt obvious of the dangers which can attend a partial re-eſtabliſhment of the French power in the revolted iſlands, and as it has, at firſt ſight, a very formidable appearance, it may be worth while to examine, a little more minutely, whether or not the alarm is real,

* See, particularly, the 'Criſis of the Sugar Colonies,' *paſſim*.

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real, and to what extent ſuch apprehenſions deſerve to be entertained.

We muſt remark, in the *firſt* place, that thoſe who dwell upon this topic, have greatly overrated the diſpoſeable force likely to be left in the hands of France after the ſuppreſſion of the rebellion in St Domingo. The author of the '*Criſis*' eſtimates the whole negro population at five hundred thouſand, and the number of men able to bear arms at two hundred thouſand. Neither the one nor the other of theſe accounts is in any degree near the truth. We have before ſhewn, from the authority of the beſt-informed writers upon the ſubject, that the whole number of negroes has been reduced to leſs than one half during the rebellion; and it is evident, that the recent tranſactions in the iſland muſt have ſtill farther diminiſhed their force. It is equally clear, that almoſt all this extraordinary loſs muſt have fallen upon the males rather than the females, and upon the young and vigorous men rather than the infirm or the aged. In the imported Africans, indeed, there may be nearly the proportion of males able to bear arms which the author of the '*Criſis*' has ſuppoſed. But as all importation has ceaſed for twelve years, and as the blank occaſioned by deaths has in ſome degree been filled up in the natural way, and not otherwiſe, it is clear, that,

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that, even if as many females as males, and as many weak or decrepit as able-bodied men, had fallen in the troubles, the natural proportions of the two ſexes, and of the different ages, would by this time have been reſtored. The polygamy which prevails among the negroes might have retarded the total progreſs of population; but its effect would have been the ſame upon both ſexes; and it never could have deſtroyed the relative proportions of thoſe able to ſerve and thoſe unfit for war. The proportion of men fit to bear arms in any community is certainly not two in five of its whole population. It has never been reckoned more than one in four; and Sir William Petty makes it only one in ſix. Admitting, then, what is evidently impoſſible, that the revolt, and ſubſequent reduction of the negroes, neither diminiſhed their total population, nor altered the proportions of their different claſſes, the utmoſt amount of men fit for military ſervice, could not poſſibly exceed one hundred and twenty-five thouſand. But, in ſuppoſing ſuch a body at the diſpoſal of government for expeditions againſt the neighbouring iſlands, or for the defence of St Domingo, we muſt imagine that the plantations are to be cultivated, and the inhabitants ſerved by women and children alone; in which caſe, it is eaſy to perceive, that the planters muſt be ruined,

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ruined, and entirely alienated from the ſervice of the ſtate, and that the colony will no longer be worth keeping: ſo that, in every view which can be taken, after making all manner of conceſſions, it appears, that the eſtimate upon which the alarm is founded, is exaggerated many times above the truth.

On the other hand, when we conſider the multitudes who periſhed in the conteſt; when we think upon what part of the black population the loſs muſt almoſt entirely have fallen; and when we take into our view, alſo, the new loſſes which muſt happen before a final ſettlement can take place, and the manner in which thoſe loſſes muſt of neceſſity be diſtributed, we ſhall probably not underrate the total amount, if we conclude, that France will be unable to employ, in any military operations, more than ten thouſand negroes, conſiſtently with the moſt moderate attention which ſhe can beſtow upon the planters, and the colony at large, as a valuable poſſeſſion.

Now, in judging of the danger to be apprehended from the uſe that a rival, or an enemy, may make of any reſources, we are always to conſider the point to which his own evident intereſt directs him. As, in the detail of military operations, we are never to calculate upon groſs blunders in the plans of the oppoſite party:

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party: ſo, in ſyſtems of policy, we are not at liberty to ſuppoſe that a neighbouring power will commit palpable errors, and act inconſiſtently with its own obvious intereſts. If, then, any ſcheme propoſed appears, upon a plain and ſimple conſideration of its conſequences, to be diametrically oppoſite to the colonial intereſts of France, we may certainly conclude, that her neighbours are more ſurely guaranteed againſt its effects, than if they had bound her down by the force of treaties, or pledges, or hoſtages, to purſue a ſpecified line of conduct.

It is poſſible that the apprehenſions ariſing from the exiſtence of a conſiderable number of warlike men in the heart of a ſtate formerly the ſcene of their ſucceſsful rebellion, and the deſire of annoying a formidable and envied rival, may, for a moment, ſuggeſt to the rulers of France the idea of ſending forth an army of negroes againſt the Britiſh iſlands. But a very little prudence will certainly incline them to conſider, whether the execution of this plan may not be attended with ſtill more alarming conſequences than any which are likely to reſult from the dangerous criſis that ſuggeſted the idea. The ſucceſs of the meaſure can only be inſured in two ways; either the negroes, under the command of Europeans, and aſſiſted by white troops,

troops, may, by the regular progreſs of a campaign, conquer the enemy's troops, and reduce his poſſeſſions, or they may be led againſt him as the oppreſſor of their brethren, and for the purpoſe of effecting their emancipation. If ten thouſand negroes from St Domingo, accompanied by a body of French troops, land in Jamaica, and commence a regular campaign, it is not eaſy to ſee why they may not be oppoſed by the Britiſh forces, with the aſſiſtance of a choſen body of ſlaves, which the Britiſh iſlands will be much better able to ſpare for military ſervice than the exhauſted colonies of France. So long as the ſpirit of inſurrection is not fomented among the negroes, they are uniformly found to be peculiarly adapted to the operations of war; they uniformly ſerve with unſhaken fidelity that government which has levied them from the plantations. The ſudden acquiſition of liberty, by the free gift of the ſtate, and the exchange of ſervile drudgery, for the comparatively eaſy and honourable life of a ſoldier, is a benefit of ſufficient value to ſecure their loyalty: and men in this ſituation are probably better adapted to receive the leſſons of diſcipline and ſubordination, than thoſe who have always enjoyed the rank and privileges of free men. They have acquired habits of implicit obedience; and the freedom now conferred upon them,

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them, without weakening thoſe habits, inſpires them with that impulſe to voluntary exertion which they before wanted. The ſituation of ſoldiers is, indeed, the only one for which they are fitted by their previous mode of life. Unaccuſtomed to have a will of their own, or to act with any view but that of direct obedience to another, they are formed to make part of the great machine which conſiſts of men, and moves at the ſound of a ſingle voice. Troops raiſed in this manner have been found ſerviceable, even againſt inſurgents of their own colour. The revolted negroes of Surinam have been frequently oppoſed by bodies of ſlaves enrolled for the ſervice: the acquiſition of freedom has uniformly ſecured their faithful obedience to the government, and their zealous ſervices againſt the liberty of their brethren. I ſhall afterwards have occaſion to explain this circumſtance more particularly, when, in the Fourth Book of this Inquiry, I come to examine the ſituation of the free negroes. If ſo great reliance can be placed upon the exertions of the negroes againſt the immediate intereſts of their brethren, and the cauſe of negro freedom, it is evident that much more may be expected from their aſſiſtance when called out againſt bodies of their brethren, who are in ſubjection to the Europeans, and fighting ſolely for their cauſe. Such a force

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as the negro population could ſpare from the labours of the field, would be more than a match for the embodied and half-ſubdued rebels of St Domingo, accuſtomed to riot in licentiouſneſs, and as formidable to their employers as to their antagoniſts.

But, ſuppoſe the expedition has been attended with ſucceſs; that the negro army of France has proved victorious, without any aſſiſtance from inſurrection among the ſlaves of the invaded iſlands, and that it returns to St Domingo in regular order, after adding a rich province to the French empire: will the admiſſion of all theſe improbabilities bring us nearer to the point? It is not the nature of great ſervices to lower the pretenſions of thoſe who perform them. If the exiſtence of the half-ſubdued negroes, in the heart of the community, was ſo alarming as to render ſome enterpriſe neceſſary, which might find employment for them; ſurely their return after victory, and victory over a European power, is not leſs to be dreaded. In order to prevent them from uniting, and renewing the inſurrection, Government has ſeparated them from the reſt of their brethren; called them off from their peaceful occupations; armed and embodied them; allowed them to conquer, and thus formed them into a military body—a ſeparate

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claſs in the heart of the colony—a rallying point to their ſcattered countrymen, who are free but oppreſſed, and only wait for their permiſſion to join them. The government has weakened and divided its own forces by the conqueſt. Every white man that has fallen in the expedition, or is ſtationed at Jamaica, is an irreparable loſs; while the negroes are in the country of their ſupplies, and can eaſily repair the loſſes which their numbers may have ſuſtained.

The expedition, then, has only removed the danger a ſtep farther, in order to render it doubly formidable; and the Europeans in the colony have procured the ſhort reſpite of a Weſt Indian campaign, by the notable expedient of changing a probable into a certain cataſtrophe. If, on the other hand, the negroes are left in the conquered iſland, their conſent to this baniſhment muſt be obtained, and ſome means muſt be diſcovered to render them leſs formidable in a country where they have conquered, than they were at home before the expedition; otherwiſe, the danger is only removed acroſs the narrow channel which ſeparates the one iſland from the other—an exchange, of which we are immediately to ſpeak.

But the only certain means of ſucceeding in the ſuppoſed enterpriſe, muſt be ſought for in an appeal to the peculiar feelings of the negroes.

groes. In order to render their ſervices effectual, they muſt be marched againſt the neighbouring ſettlement, as the ſcene where their countrymen are ſuffering. The object of their efforts muſt be, to liberate the ſlaves; and the aſſiſtance of univerſal inſurrection muſt be expected in ſuch an enterpriſe. But, after the dominion of their old maſters has been forcibly overturned by a ſucceſsful and general rebellion, it is not very likely that the inſurgents will peaceably ſubmit to the controul of the invaders.

The French will have the ſame work to undertake in their new iſland, which they have juſt performed at St Domingo; with this important difference, that their force will be divided between the inſurrection to be quelled, and the newly eſtabliſhed order to be maintained. The troops, too, by whoſe aſſiſtance the inſurrection has been excited, will ſurely preſent a more formidable aſpect than they did before they were embodied for the ſervice; and, after the new iſland ſhall be reduced to the ſame ſtate of nominal ſubjection with the old, it is not eaſy to imagine, that the retaining of both in ſubordination will be an eaſier taſk than the preſerving of tranquillity in St Domingo alone. But if the more probable event takes place—the complete eſtabliſhment of a negro

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commonwealth in the conquered iſland, partly by the exertions of the invaders, partly by thoſe of its own ſlaves, we ſhall, in the next Section, have an opportunity of ſeeing, that the dangers of ſuch a neighbourhood to all the other colonies, are manifold and immediate. Much more formidable to St Domingo, whoſe negroes are with difficulty held in ſubjection, will be the neighbourhood of a people of their own race, almoſt within the bounds of the ſame viſible horizon, retaining, in conſequence of their efforts, a manifeſt ſuperiority in every reſpect, and rioting in all the ſweets of that licentiouſneſs which they themſelves have but lately loſt. Without giving the rulers of France, or the local ſuperintendants of her colonial affairs, credit for any extraordinary ſagacity or prudence, we may expect, that experience will have taught them to foreſee the dangers of uſing ſuch a weapon as negro rebellion, and that they will feel conſiderable repugnance at renewing, in any part of the Weſt Indies, thoſe ſcenes which the inſane councils of 1791 diſplayed in their own poſſeſſions. It is not to be imagined that any thing leſs than utter deſpair of retaining their ſugar colonies, will ever induce them to think of an expedient ſo full of dangers; and while the government of St Domingo ſhall poſſeſs ſufficient

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ſufficient energy to embody the negroes for a foreign ſervice, the planters will never deſpair of accompliſhing their fair and natural object, the reſtoration of permanent tranquillity, by the complete ſubjection of thoſe men and the entire re-eſtabliſhment of the ancient order of things.

If, on the other hand, all hopes of reſtoring ſlavery, or retaining the colonies without it, ſhall be abandoned; if France ſhall finally perceive that her power in the Weſt Indies muſt quickly expire; we need not very anxiouſly inquire what conduct ſhe will purſue in her laſt moments. A more formidable danger than any French invaſion, though aſſiſted by free negroes and favoured by inſurgent ſlaves, will then threaten all the neighbouring colonies—the eſtabliſhment of an independent African ſtate in the centre of the Weſt Indies. Nor does it ſeem of much conſequence to inquire, whether the univerſal deſtruction of the European name in the Charaibean Sea ſhall be haſtened by the machinations of a French government, or conſummated by the leſs regular and ſyſtematic attempts of negro chiefs.

We have now been contemplating an imaginary ſtate of things, which will indeed, moſt probably, be the intermediate and temporary reſult of the colonial criſis, but cannot be expect-

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ed long to ſubſiſt—the partial and nominal ſubjection of the negroes, or their ſubmiſſion, as ſubjects, to the authority of thoſe men whom they formerly obeyed as ſlaves. Various circumſtances, both in the ſituation of the negroes themſelves, and in that of the Europeans, concur to render ſuch an arrangement only temporary, and to prevent it from being any thing more than an intermediate ſtate preparatory to a farther and more permanent change.

There is at leaſt as wide a difference between the habits of a ſlave and thoſe of a free ſubject, as between the nature of an African and that of a European. A ſlave has to learn the difficult leſſon of induſtry, as different from compulſory labour as it is from indolence and ſloth. Hitherto he has only obeyed the impulſe of another man's will; he has been actuated by no motives but the fear of the laſh. The gift of liberty brings with it the burden of thinking, and willing, and planning; the taſk of providing ſubſiſtence for himſelf and for his family; the obligation of performing all the ſocial duties. The ſlave reſtored to liberty, has only had experience of thoſe parts of the functions of a citizen, which, in themſelves, are ſo diſagreeable to his nature, that nothing but violence could have induced him to perform them. The negroes of St Domingo have only known

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known the two extremes of ſlavery and rebellion; and it is hard to ſay from which of thoſe two ſtates the tranſition to the rank of a free ſubject is the greateſt and moſt difficult.

But the negroes are not only in a ſtate of ſlavery: they are in a low ſtate of civilization. The induſtry of a ſavage; his habits of voluntary obedience; his capacity for enjoying civil and political rights; and, in general, his fitneſs for becoming the ſubject of a peaceable and regular community, is, if poſſible, more limited than that of the mere ſlave. He has all thoſe habits of voluntary exertion and peaceable ſubmiſſion to learn, which are wholly unknown to the members of barbarous tribes, and which form the bond of union among the inhabitants of civilized ſociety. The inhabitants of rude nations, indeed, know of no medium between the extremes of ſervility and deſpotic ſway. They conſiſt only of two claſſes of people; tyrants or maſters, and ſlaves. Force is the only inducement to exertion, and indolence the chief reward of wealth or power. The ſlave, then, only works, and the maſter alone enjoys. But the former does not toil for himſelf, or of his free-will; and the envied privilege of the latter ſtation, is to be idle and tyrannical. We ſhall afterwards have an opportunity of ſeeing (in the Fourth Book of this Inquiry), that theſe re-

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marks apply, with peculiar accuracy, both to the African tribes in their own country, and thoſe who have been tranſplanted to the European colonies in America. Enough has now been ſaid, to ſhow the impoſſibility of expecting any ſucceſs in ſo chimerical a plan as that of forming the revolted negro ſlaves into a community of free ſubjects, under a regular European government.

But it muſt alſo be remembered, that the peculiar ſituation of theſe men in the new community will have very little tendency to promote their contentment and peaceable demeanour. They will form the oppreſſed and labouring part of the community; deſtitute of property; deprived of the moſt eſſential political privileges; toiling for a mere ſubſiſtence, whilſt others are enjoying the fruits of thoſe exertions. The claſs thus oppreſſed, too, will be united by common origin, habits and complexion; indelibly diſtinguiſhed from the ſuperior order by the ſame circumſtances; united to the reſt of the community by no common principles or intereſt; and held in ſubjection, though not in ſlavery, by a handful of ſtrangers. It is eaſy to ſee, that ſo unnatural a ſtate of things cannot have a long duration; that a body, formed of ſuch jarring principles, muſt contain within itſelf the ſeeds of ſpeedy diſſolution;

lution; that power, ſo eſtabliſhed, muſt quickly fall to pieces. A race of men ſuch as the Africans, can only be kept in ſubjection by the whites, ſo long as they are in chains. 'The 'day that makes a man a ſlave' (ſays Homer) 'deſtroys half his worth.' The day that breaks his fetters, deſtroys the whole authority and ſecurity of his maſter. Whilſt the ſlave ſyſtem exiſts, the diviſion of the negroes, the watchful eye of the overſeer, the conſtant fear of the driver's laſh, may prevent the multitude from uniting and overpowering the leaſt numerous claſs of the community. The maſters, though few in number, are civilized and united. Each proprietor of ſlaves has one conſtant and ſimple end in view, the preſerving of ſubordination, and the furtherance of work. The ſlaves are powerful indeed in numbers, but incapable of acting with premeditation or ſkill; and are prevented from combining, not only by the perpetual attention of the maſter, but by various circumſtances in their own character and habits.

If, however, for the cloſe inſpection, the intereſted care, and the abſolute authority of the maſter, there is ſubſtituted the general ſuperintendance, the limited power, and the unconcerned exertions of the government, checked by the acknowledged rights of the negro ſubjects,

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ſubjects, divided by faction, and diſtracted by multiplicity of cares: it is eaſy to ſee how rapidly a ſtill further change will be accompliſhed; how ſhort will be the duration of European property and power.

On the one hand, then, the circumſtances of the negroes, and their relative ſituation to the whites, will be conſtantly tending to conſummate the colonial revolution, by eſtabliſhing the complete independence, or, which is the ſame thing, the ſupremacy of the moſt powerful claſs, and by effecting the total extirpation of their former maſters. But, at the ſame time, the oppoſite intereſts of the Europeans will on the other hand be conſtantly tending to bring about an oppoſite event; to abridge ſtill more the rights of the negroes; to reduce them to a more complete ſtate of obedience; to perfect the reſtoration of the ancient order of things, upon the baſis of the ſlave ſyſtem.

Every proprietor of Weſt Indian ſtock will ſpeedily perceive how much his profits are diminiſhed by the new order of things. He will find it impoſſible to recruit his ſtock of negroes by new importations; to extend or reſtore his cultivation by an increaſe of his ſtock; nay, even to ſatisfy the demands of his creditors, or provide for his neceſſary wants, out of the ſcanty and capricious induſtry of hired negroes.

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His ſecurity will be as much endangered as his profits, even if no jealouſy ſhould ariſe from the inferior order poſſeſſing certain legal rights. Government, as well as individuals, will perceive the frailty of the tenure by which they hold the poſſeſſion of a ſociety ſo unnaturally conſtituted. The efforts of individuals will all be ſteadily directed to the accompliſhment of one end—the reſtoration of the ancient ſyſtem; and government, we may be aſſured, will favour the attempt. The conteſt, then, will be carried on quietly indeed, but unremittingly, by the ſkill, the intrigues, the united intereſt and combined operations of Europeans, againſt the wavering and unſteady efforts of ſavages half ſubdued, incapable of acting in concert, and united under no ruling heads. It will be carried on by the men who monopolize, not only all the talents and ſkill in the community, all the influence of government, and the force of the army, but who poſſeſs alſo the whole of the property, and who were once maſters alſo of the perſons of the inferior claſs. It is moſt probable, that a conteſt ſo unequal will ſpeedily terminate in favour of the Europeans, and that, unleſs the oppoſite event is conſummated before their plans ſhall have time to operate, the ſlave ſyſtem will again be eſtabliſhed over the revolted colonies. At any rate, it

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ſeems certain, that the partial ſubjection of the negroes, or their reduction to the ſtate of a free but ſubordinate race of citizens, can only be a temporary change, preparatory to a more complete and permanent arrangement of things: that there is no medium between the ſupremacy and the bondage of the negroes; between the maſtery and the extirpation of the whites: that any other ſettlement which may be made in the mean time, muſt either be a deluſive ſituation for the negroes, or a deceitful calm to the Europeans: that a very ſhort time will bring about the final adjuſtment, and either deprive France of her colonies, or overthrow the nominal freedom of the negroes.

The probable conſequences of theſe two extremes to other colonies, muſt be a matter of the deepeſt intereſt to all the neighbouring powers in the Weſt Indies. I have already conſidered the effects which may naturally be expected to reſult from one of them, namely, the ſucceſs of the French cauſe, and the complete reſtoration of the colonial relations. In the following Section, I ſhall take a view of the conſequences which may be expected to reſult from the oppoſite event, the total failure of France, and the eſtabliſhment of an independent African community in the Weſt Indies.

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SECTION III.

OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A NEGRO COMMONWEALTH IN THE WEST INDIES TO THE INTERESTS OF THE COLONIES WHICH REMAIN UNDER THE DOMINION OF THE MOTHER COUNTRY.

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THE events which have happened in the French colonies ſince the revolution, have been ſuch, as to fill every one with the utmoſt anxiety as to the fate of the whole colonial ſyſtem. The deſtruction of negro ſlavery has been followed by its natural conſequence, the complete overthrow of the European power, and the eſtabliſhment of an independent African commonwealth in the nobleſt ſettlement of the new world.

Immediately after the peace which followed the unfortunate ſucceſſes of the French arms in Europe, the attention of the new government of France was turned to the colonial affairs of the Republic. Meaſures were taken for reſtoring the dominion of the Mother Country over her revolted iſlands; and an expedition was fitted out, of a magnitude ſuited to the importance of the ſervice for which it was deſtined, with that promptitude and deſpatch

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patch which have diſtinguiſhed all the operations of the Corſican Chief.

The probable conſequences of this attempt have been diſcuſſed in the Firſt Book of this Inquiry, where I was induced to beſtow conſiderable attention upon the ſubject, not merely becauſe it is peculiarly intereſting at the preſent moment, but becauſe I conſidered it as part of the general queſtion, and intimately connected with the great topics of Weſt Indian policy. For the ſame reaſon, I am now to diſcuſs particularly the conſequences of the French expedition proving wholly unſucceſsful, and of the Africans obtaining the permanent ſuperiority in St Domingo; not becauſe this is an event which ſeems at preſent on the eve of being accompliſhed, but becauſe it is an event which at all times may be expected, and is in fact the natural conſequence of that policy, equally incautious and inhuman, by which the Antilles have been peopled with African ſlaves.

During the firſt ſtruggles between the different colours in the French iſlands, it was the univerſal, and very natural opinion, in the neighbouring iſlands, that the exiſtence of a negro commonwealth in thoſe parts, muſt be immediately fatal to all the other ſlave colonies. But the appearance of that remarkable perſonage,

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age, who acquired the chief power over the new community; the ſingular moderation of his views, and the inoffenſive conduct which he uniformly held towards all the neighbouring ſettlements, ſoon diſpelled the alarm with which every one had at firſt been ſeized. To a panic much ſtronger than was neceſſary, there ſucceeded, as is almoſt always the caſe, a fearleſs confidence, not warranted by any change of circumſtances. The Europeans in the Weſt Indies appeared, during the reign of Touſſaint, to have forgotten how much of their ſecurity was owing to the peculiar habits of that ſingular man, and to the length and horrors of the preceding conqueſt, ſufficient to ſatiate even Africans with plunder and blood. It was not conſidered, that, from every part of his conduct and profeſſions, the negro chief appeared to reſemble his countrymen in no one particular, either of his intellects, his acquirements, or his feelings; that this very circumſtance of diſſimilarity was, in all probability, preparing his downfal, although his life ſhould eſcape the variety of accidents by which he was ſurrounded; and that his ſucceſſor would, to an abſolute certainty, be a man differing from the reſt of the negroes only in the greater ferocity of his nature, his ſuperior cunning, and ſtronger limbs. Neither was it remembered, that although

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though years of bloodſhed and devaſtation might fatigue the moſt ſavage warriors, and diſpoſe them to enjoy an interval of repoſe, yet the ſame barbarians would ſooner recover from their ſatiety, and pant for the former ſcenes of cruelty and licentiouſneſs. We are now to conſider, whether there be any room for the thoughtleſs confidence into which the Weſt Indian proprietors have been lulled, beyond thoſe accidental circumſtances which gave birth to the temporary calm; the fatigue of the negroes, and the peculiar character of their chief.

The events which have already taken place in the colonies prove ſufficiently, if indeed any proof was neceſſary, that the ſlavery of the Africans has had no great tendency to promote their civilization, or inſpire them with a reliſh for the bleſſings of order and regular government. The oppreſſion of their maſters may have united them, and combined their efforts with thoſe of the mulattoes to effect the extermination of the Europeans. But this end was no ſooner accompliſhed, than the two parties attacked each other with renewed fury; and, if a ſhort time had been allowed to the conquerors, after ſubduing the people of colour, there can be little doubt that they would have quarrelled among themſelves, and ſplit into a number of petty barbarous ſtates.

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It is not in the nature of a rude people to unite in extenſive political aſſociations. All ſuch unions preſuppoſe the acquiſition of conſiderable ſkill in the arts of government. At firſt, the habits of filial ſubmiſſion, reverence for age, and awe of ſuperior bodily ſtrength, retain a ſingle family or kindred in ſubjection to the head of the houſe. The imperfect union of a few families generally ſpringing from the ſame common ſtock, and kept in a partial ſubmiſſion to the oldeſt, or the ſtrongeſt and moſt cunning perſon of the tribe, forms the next ſtep in the progreſs of the ſocial union. After conqueſt or treachery has extended the partriarchal government beyond the bounds of the kindred race; by an eaſy tranſition, the regular ſucceſſion to the chief power becomes liable to interruptions from the ſame cauſes which have enlarged the territory of the tribe—violence and cunning. Still, the ſubjection of a large community to one man; the extenſion of his dominion over a multitude of ſubjects whom he ſeldom has within his ſight; the obedience of thouſands of men to the will of a ſingle perſon, neither choſen by themſelves, nor poſſeſſed of any ſuperior faculties of body or mind—indicate no ſmall proficiency in the arts of policy upon the part of the ruler, and a conſiderable progreſs upon the part of the

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people, in the habits of abſtraction and in the peaceful arts.

After this ſkill has been acquired, and thoſe habits formed, we often meet with extenſive political aſſociations of men who are ſtill in a very rude ſtate. But the ſtability of government, and the permanent duration of extent and of power, inſeparably connected with the ſtability of a particular dynaſty in the ſovereignty of the ſtate, can only reſult from thoſe fixed ideas of hereditary ſucceſſion, which, as they are on the one hand a great cauſe of progreſſive improvement, ſo, indicate on the other hand, that a very conſiderable progreſs towards refinement has already been made. Moreover, all ſuch aſſociations of uncivilized men have ariſen from ſmall beginnings; have been gradually enlarged by the incorporation of conquered tribes; and have been ſlowly conſolidated, in ſo far as they poſſeſs any ſolidity, by the events that take place, and the habits that are ſtrengthened during a ſucceſſion of ages. It may ſafely be aſſumed as a general principle, that a multitude collected at random from various ſavage nations, and habituated to no ſubordination but that of domeſtic ſlavery, are totally unfit for uniting in the relations of regular government, or being ſuddenly moulded into one ſyſtem of artificial

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tificial ſociety; more eſpecially after living for a ſeries of years in a ſtate of tumult and diſorder, unnatural even to barbarians. In the moſt poliſhed ſtates, the ſudden and violent diſſolution of an eſtabliſhed government has a ſtrong tendency to produce general diſunion; and we may recollect the alarm excited in the earlier ſtages of the French Revolution by the terror of Federaliſm, which became indeed one of the common topics of accuſation in the code of political crimes. In fact, the ſudden formation of a political body has always been found the moſt arduous achievement in the art of governing. The eſtabliſhment of the North American colonies, gradual as it was, is the inſtance in the hiſtory of mankind, where this has been accompliſhed in the ſhorteſt time. Yet thoſe infant ſtates were animated by political or religious enthuſiaſm; united by a poſition in the midſt of ſavage nations; and peopled by men taken from the heart of civil ſociety—ſubjects for whom the moſt refined politician and profound philoſopher of the age was invited to legiſlate. *

The free negroes of St Domingo will form a turbulent and licentious aſſemblage of hoſtile tribes. A leader may now and then appear,

* Mr Locke.

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whoſe ſuperior talents enable him to acquire a temporary aſcendant over a conſiderable proportion of thoſe petty ſtates; but his death or aſſaſſination will be the period of the union, and the iſland will again be divided among a number of petty chiefs.

It is a moſt profound remark of Machiavel, that a commonwealth is much more to be depended upon by its neighbours and its ſubjects, than a prince: and, for preciſely the ſame reaſons, which I ſhall afterwards explain more at length, a large ſtate is much more to be depended upon than a ſmall one, under whatever form the government may be adminiſtered. The moſt unſtable and capricious of all neighbours muſt, therefore, be a petty ſtate, ſubject to an abſolute prince. But the tribes of St Domingo will be ſmall communities of turbulent ſavages, ſubject to the authority of deſpotic chiefs, whoſe powers perpetually vary, and who ſucceed each other, according to no order more regular than the caprice and violence of the human paſſions. It is eaſy to perceive, that ſuch a government muſt, beyond all others, be unſteady and changeful, utterly unfit for maintaining the regular alliance, or for preventing the depredations of its own ſubjects.

From a community of this deſcription, indeed, we can ſcarcely apprehend any very formidable

midable combination of hoſtilities againſt the other iſlands. The evils which ſome have thought probable from the reſtleſs ſpirit of conqueſt uſually predominant in the infancy of ſtates, are, I apprehend, by no means ſo much to be dreaded as thoſe which muſt ariſe from the ſpirit of plunder. The negroes, in their ſtate of ſlavery, have acquired many deſires, which they will ſtill ſeek to gratify at the expence of their ſkilful and induſtrious neighbours. The love of tobacco and ſpirituous liquors; the want of fire arms, and, in general, of the uſeful metals and the manufactures of Europe; nay, the want of ſlaves from among their brethren, will lead them to commit perpetual depredation upon the coaſts of the neighbouring iſlands. To ſuppoſe that they will ſupply themſelves with ſuch commodities by cultivating their own territories, and exchanging the produce of their induſtry with European merchants, is to fancy, that they have been civilized in the late times of anarchy and confuſion; that they have acquired habits of peaceful induſtry in a few years of maſſacre and plunder.

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The poſition of St Domingo is particularly favourable to the occupations of a piratical commonwealth. The various commodious harbours on the ſouth and weſt coaſts, furniſh the

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moſt advantageous ſtations for annoying the outward bound trade to Jamaica and Cuba, and the veſſels homeward bound, which take the windward paſſage; while the ſouth coaſt commands the direct communication between the windward and the two moſt weſterly leeward iſlands. Our Weſt Indian merchants well remember how ſeverely they ſuffered by the privateering which the French, during the late war, carried on from the ports of Jacquemel and Les Cayés. In one year (1794-5), notwithſtanding the ſtrong naval force which we had in thoſe parts to protect our trade, above thirty large veſſels were captured and carried into Les Cayés. The negroes, too, at a ſubſequent period of the war, attacked the ſmaller veſſels of the Britiſh and American traders, in armed canoes; and, after maſſacring the white crews, carried the ſhips into their harbours. *

In a predatory ſyſtem of this ſort, every capture muſt furniſh the means of further acquiſitions. The negroes, by their bodily ſtrength, and their aſtoniſhing powers of enduring every ſort of want, are admirably calculated for a ſeafaring life. They are employed for this purpoſe in many parts of the Weſt Indies. In the Bermuda

* Edwards' Poſtſcript to his Hiſtorical Survey of St Domingo.

Bermuda Iſlands, they are found to make as good ſailors as the whites; * and they were of ſignal uſe, both as ſeamen and marines, in the privateers fitted out from that convenient ſtation during the American war. † The proſpect of immediate plunder will unite and marſhal ſmall bodies of men, whom it would be in vain to think of forming into more extenſive aſſociations by the general principles of duty, or remote views of political expediency; and, in every quarter of the New World, men of European extraction, or adventurers from Europe, are to be found, whoſe deſperate fortunes will league them with the freebooters of St Domingo, and ſupply the deficiency of nautical knowledge. The events which have happened in the Weſt Indies, indeed, may teach us, that the negroes will probably receive a more regular aſſiſtance from men leſs abandoned than theſe. Not to mention the ready aſylum which the towns of Jamaica always offered to the Buccaneers, and the caſe with which thoſe pirates found a market among fair traders, wherever they carried their ſtolen goods; during the heat of the late civil war in St Domingo, the negroes were abundantly ſupplied with arms and

* Burke's European Settlements, part VII. cap. 2.

† Governor Brown's Report.—Report of Committee 1788, part III.

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ammunition by North American traders, in return for the colonial produce which they were thus enabled to ſeize from the plantations, after murdering the proprietors. * At ſuch kinds of traffic it is needleſs to repine; and it is equally vain to expect that they ſhall ever ceaſe. The genuine ſpirit of commercial ſpeculation cannot exiſt in full force, without giving riſe, at the ſame time, to evils like theſe. The ſame unreſtrained propenſity to adventure that conducted the Spaniards over unknown regions to the conqueſt of a new world, directed the depredations to which their ſucceſſors were afterwards expoſed. The temptation of high profits which opened to the Buccaneers the markets of Jamaica, led to the cultivation of the whole Weſt Indies; and, after covering with villas and farms the extenſive plains of St Domingo, contributed at laſt to their devaſtation and ruin.

From this ſyſtem of piracy, to a predatory warfare upon the coaſts of Jamaica and Cuba, the tranſition is eaſy. The trade wind, blowing almoſt without intermiſſion towards the leeward iſlands, will carry the gangs of theſe new Buccaneers, in a ſingle night, acroſs the narrow and unbroken channels that bound St Domingo on the weſt; and theſe irruptions will be made with

* Edwards' Hiſtory of St Domingo, chap. VI.

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with that careleſs prodigality of life, and that indiſcriminate thirſt of deſtruction, which mark the military operations of barbarians. To a civilized community, indeed, eſtabliſhed upon ſolid foundations, and united in one compact body for the purpoſes of regular defence, ſuch an invaſion would not be very formidable. But in the colonies, the enemy has a powerful auxiliary in the very heart of the ſettlements, againſt which his attacks are directed. The negroes of our colonies are already prepared for revolt, by the example of ſucceſs which has attended the ſtruggles of their countrymen on the oppoſite ſide of the Straits.

It is nugatory to talk of the depreſſed ſtate and obtuſe faculties of theſe men. They are of the ſame ſpecies with thoſe whom the mulattoes of St Domingo gained over, by the promiſe of liberty, in ſpite of the rooted antipathy which had formerly divided the two claſſes. They are not more degraded than thoſe who worſhipped the Preſident of the *Amis des Noirs* as their tutelary ſaint: nor will the eſtabliſhment of a negro commonwealth in the neighbouring iſland ſo far alter their nature, as to render callous to every thing affecting the fortunes of their race, the ſame people who, at the beginning of the conteſt, had ſhowed the livelieſt anxiety about the fate of the great queſtion of abolition—

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abolition; a queſtion, in itſelf, only remotely connected with their intereſts. * There is, indeed, no direct communication between the people of St Domingo and the great body of field negroes in the oppoſite iſlands: But theſe have various opportunities of obtaining information—from their brethren who are employed as houſe ſervants, and who thus learn the ſtate of affairs in a quarter that muſt always principally occupy the converſation of their maſters—from the artificers in the towns, whoſe intercourſe with the Europeans is more extenſive, and who are always better informed—from the free blacks, who, as a body indeed, we ſhall afterwards ſhow, cannot diſturb the peace of our colonies, but who rank among their numbers many idle and diſſolute perſons, ready to inſtruct the ſlaves in what is going forward—and, laſt of all, from the negro ſervants who return to the Weſt Indies, after having acquired, by their reſidence in Europe as free men, a large portion of information, and imbibed many of the opinions univerſally prevalent upon the ſubject of negro ſlavery. Without ſuppoſing, then, that the African inhabitants of St Domingo have become infected with that rage of proſelytizing which

* Edwards' Hiſtory of St Domingo, chap. VII.—Petition of Weſt Indian Merchants to the Houſe of Commons, March 1792.

which diſtinguiſhed their former maſters; or that any meaſures have been purſued in the other iſlands for enlightening and exciting the negroes; it is manifeſt, from the conſtitution of the communities of which they form a part, that they will have ample opportunities of information; and, upon ſuch topics, it is the ſame act to inform and to intereſt men placed in their ſituation. Indeed, when we conſider how much of the ſubordination of the negroes is derived from their habitual conviction of the decided ſuperiority of white men, and their conſtitutional terror of oppoſing them; ſurely nothing can operate more immediately the deſtruction of thoſe feelings, and of all the force which the negro chains derive from them, than the ſpectacle conſtantly preſented to their eyes, plain and intelligible even to Africans, of their countrymen in the neighbouring iſland poſſeſſing the territory in full ſovereignty; clothed with the ſpoils, and covered with the blood of Europeans.

Thus, in all likelihood the neighbourhood of a negro ſtate will have prepared our ſlaves for ideas of independence; and the firſt incurſions of the enemy muſt be the ſignal for revolt. We have already noticed the extent to which the plans of all the inſurrections hitherto quelled appear to have ſpread. * This can ariſe

* Book I. Sect. III. Part IV.

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ariſe from nothing but the proneneſs of men, in the ſituation of the negroes, to ſeek for any change. However partial, then, the depredations of our new enemy may be, their effects on the ſlaves will extend over the whole body. The freebooters may receive exemplary puniſhment; but they will firſt have communicated to our negroes the contagion for which they have been prediſpoſed. Nay, it is probable that no permanent footing will ever be gained by the invaders; and at any rate, that, in the beginning, their efforts will be wholly unſucceſsful. But if they ſtir up the ſpirit of revolt, by liberating the negroes on a few plantations before a ſufficient force can be brought againſt them, it ſignifies little to Great Britain that her largeſt colony ſhould fall into the hands of the Jamaica, inſtead of the St Domingo Africans, or that her planters and merchants ſhould have the conſolation of being murdered by their own ſlaves.

The ſituation of Cuba is in ſeveral reſpects leſs dangerous than that of Jamaica. The cultivated parts lye on the north-weſt coaſt, and muſt be approached from St Domingo by the difficult navigation of the old Bahama channel. The negroes, too, though their numbers are much increaſed ſince the ordinance 1765, and though they bear a greater proportion to the whites

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whites than in any of the Spaniſh colonies, are yet far leſs numerous than thoſe in Jamaica, and, like all the ſlaves of the Spaniſh and Portugueſe coloniſts, are much better treated than thoſe of any other European power. Were Cuba, then, to remain in its preſent ſtate, it would offer few temptations to the incurſions of the new community, and would probably attract little of their attention, until, by being conſolidated in the courſe of time into one ſtate, and ſubjected to a regular and efficient government, they might be in a ſituation to commence offenſive operations upon enlarged views of conqueſt. The face of things, however, is rapidly improving in Cuba. In conſequence of the more liberal ſyſtem of policy begun in 1765, and extended under the adminiſtration of Galvez, that noble iſland, the largeſt in the new world, has, by the variety of its natural reſources, attracted the firſt efforts of the mercantile ſpirit in Spain; and its cultivation has been ſo much extended, that in a few years its trade, inſtead of employing ſix veſſels, as formerly, required no leſs than two hundred, and was capable of more than ſupplying the mother country with ſugar. Various events which I have before enumerated, have contributed ſtill more, of late, to accelerate the cultivation of this ſettlement.

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ment.* But all thoſe improvements are intimately connected with the ſlave trade. They have uniformly kept pace with the removal of the reſtrictions upon the importation of negroes. The Aſſiento, transferred from France to Britain by the treaty of Utrecht, had been ſucceeded by a monopoly as ſtrict in favour of a private company. The firſt ſymptoms of ſpeculation appeared in Cuba, after the law of 1770 had encouraged the importation of negroes at the Havanna. In fact, as the agriculture of the iſlands depends upon commercial ſpeculation, and upon the employment of ſtock in purchaſing hands, their improvement proceeds, not according to the ſlow progreſs of population, as in other countries, but according to the amount of the ſtock employed, in proportion to which the population may be increaſed to any amount. While, therefore, the rapid importation of negroes which the improvement of Cuba requires, has been diminiſhing the ſecurity of the Spaniards, and while the trade which ſupports the improvement of the iſland, and the increaſed produce which is the conſequence of the extended cultivation, invites the depredations of the tribes in St Domingo; the cultivation of Cuba will ſoon be extended

* Book I. Sect. III. Part II.

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extended along the coaſts; and that iſland will be placed in the ſame ſituation of complicated dangers which we have already ſhewn muſt prove fatal to Jamaica; with this difference, that Jamaica being moſt probably in the hands of the negroes, Cuba will be expoſed to a double chance of deſtruction.

Yet the dread of theſe dangers, even in the event of the negroes ſucceeding completely in St Domingo, will ſcarcely prevent the importation of ſlaves into Cuba. It is the character of mercantile ſpeculation to be clear-ſighted, but not far-ſighted. The trader ſeldom conſiders any thing beyond the quickneſs and the profits with which his capital may be replaced for the two or three firſt times. He is not, like the agriculturiſt, intereſted in the preſervation of the ſtate, where his capital has been inveſted in a ſolid form. He views a change of ſpeculation without great reluctance, if it is not immediate; partly becauſe he flatters himſelf with the hopes of independence in the interval, partly becauſe the ſame ſpirit which made him change before, renders him leſs timid in repeating the riſk. The trade of planting, though connected with the ſoil, is yet, from the extent of capital required in it, from the rapidity of improvement, from the large profits and the conſtant riſk, and from the temporary reſidence

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reſidence which the proprietors make on their eſtates without families, while they are acquiring their fortune, much more nearly allied to commerce than to agriculture, and promoted by the ſpirit of mercantile adventure.

But in fact it ſignifies little, whether we conſider that the loſs of Cuba is likely to follow its extended cultivation, or that the proſpect of ſuch an event will immediately check the preſent active ſpirit of improvement. In either caſe, the conſequences are highly injurious to the intereſts of Spain, ſtripped as ſhe now is of her moſt valuable iſlands, and unable otherwiſe to continue the acquiſition of that colonial wealth which alone can render her a match for the preponderating influence of France in the Gulf of Mexico, after the reſources of the Republic, withdrawn from St Domingo, ſhall have been turned to the banks of the Miſſiſippi.

In the ſame manner will the eſtabliſhment of the negroes in St Domingo operate upon the ſafety of Porto-Rico, if the Spaniards ſhould attempt to cultivate that very inferior iſland, after failing in Cuba. Porto-Rico is indeed ſituated to the windward of the three great Antilles. But when a community of free negroes exiſts to the leeward of a ſettlement peopled by African ſlaves, the advantages ariſing from the obſtacles which the trade wind preſents to the depredations

depredations of the former, are counterbalanced by the temptations and facilities which it affords to the defertion of the latter. The Spaniſh part of St Domingo, our own ſettlements in Barbadoes previous to the ſubjugation of the black Charaibes in St Vincents, and the acquiſition of that iſland by the peace of Paris, the plantations of Jamaica before the expulſion of the Maroons, and thoſe of Surinam ſince the treaty of 1762 acknowledged the independence of the revolted negroes, have all experienced in a great degree the manifold dangers of a neighbourhood which excites the deſertion of the ſlaves, and leaves thoſe who do not eſcape, in a ſtate of mind ripe for inſurrection.

But further—Have we any reaſon to believe that the French will be more ſucceſsful in their Windward Iſlands, than in the colony from whence we are ſuppoſing them to have been expelled by the negroes?

I have before remarked, that the attention of French ſtateſmen having been directed almoſt excluſively to the great Leeward colony, by the events which have lately happened there, our information with reſpect to the progreſs of cultivation in the Windward ſettlements is by no means extenſive or correct. I have, however, detailed the various *data* which we poſſeſs, in public documents and other four-

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ces of information, for calculating the preſent amount of the negro population in thoſe ſettlements, and the rate at which it increaſed during the time that the population of St Domingo was doubling. The reſult of theſe computations led us to the concluſion, that the proportions of the different races in thoſe iſlands were as unequal, and that the unequality had been as rapidly increaſing, as in St Domingo. *

But it is alſo of importance, to conſider the ſituation of the free people of colour in the Windward Iſlands, ſince it is to them that the origin of the troubles in St Domingo may be traced. The circumſtances to which the rapid multiplication of this intermediate claſs was owing in St Domingo, muſt have exiſted in an equal degree all over the French Weſt Indies. In general, a much greater proportion of the proprietors reſided in the French ſettlements, than in the Britiſh and Dutch. In the French iſlands nine tenths of the proprietors lived upon their plantations, or in the colonial towns; in the others not above one fifth were ſuppoſed to reſide. † The lazy, diſſipated lives of theſe men were ſpent in amours with negreſſes or mulatto women; and as the fruits of this

* Book I. Sect. III. Part IV.

† Robinet, Dict. de l'homme d'etat, Art. *Colonies*.

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this intercourſe lay under all the diſadvantages of the mixed blood, the idea of marriage with the mothers was out of the queſtion. It will always be found, where the manners of a people are in this corrupt ſtate, that marriage, even between equals, falls into diſrepute. In the Britiſh Weſt Indies we ſee the conſequences of concubinage with blacks and mulattoes, in the ſmall proportion of white women, and the ſlow progreſs of the white population. In the French iſlands the numbers of the whites rather diminiſhed than augmented; and the natural increaſe of inhabitants, which may always be expected to ariſe from the cheapneſs of good land, and the paſſions of a warm climate, muſt be looked for, not among the whites, but among the mulattoes. Accordingly, the progreſs of the mulatto population muſt be calculated, not from the numbers of the mulattoes at any particular time, but from the numbers of whites. The free negroes, on the other hand, increaſe according to the progreſſive ſtate of the ſlave population. The mulattoes and free negroes, are uſually included together in the claſs of free people of colour; and it appears, that in ten years, ending 1789, this body had, in St Domingo, much more than tripled its numbers; whilſt the numbers of the whites had rather decreaſed. There is no reaſon to ſuppoſe that

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the people of colour were leſs numerous in the other iſlands in proportion. The ſame government and laws prevailed over the whole French Weſt Indies; the ſame diſſolute manners; the ſame want of white women; the ſame ſyſtem of intrigue with blacks and mulattoes. In Martinico, the free people of colour bore a greater proportion to the whites, by the enumeration 1776, than in St Domingo, by the enumeration 1779. In St Lucia, and Tobago, the proportion of people of colour was double that of St Domingo. In Guadaloupe, the proportion was a great deal leſs. But, in all the iſlands, we have ſeen, that the cultivation and the wealth of the planters, their luxury, and the numbers of their ſlaves, were rapidly increaſing. We may therefore infer, that the numbers, both of the free negroes and free mulattoes, were augmented in them all with great rapidity; and that, at the epoch of the revolution, this intermediate claſs had increaſed ſo as to bear the ſame proportion to the whites in the Windward Iſlands that it did in St Domingo.

That their grievances were the very ſame, we cannot entertain the ſmalleſt doubt. The colonial ſyſtem of St Domingo was common to all the French iſlands. Even the ſlight differences which the eſtabliſhment of ſeparate legiſlatures

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legiſlatures have produced in our iſlands, were unknown in thoſe of France, where the parliaments had, as in the mother country, only the power of regiſtering the royal edicts for the purpoſes of publication and authentication. They were all under the immediate ſuperintendance of the council of commerce, and in the department of the miniſter of the marine: they were equally affected by the edicts which the King iſſued in conformity to the advice of the miniſter and council. The *code noire* was a general ſyſtem of regulations with reſpect to the ſubordination of the inferior races in all the iſlands. The privileges which it conferred upon the people of colour, and the modifications which thoſe privileges received, were the ſame in all. The diſcontent of the mulattoes muſt have been common to this race wherever it exiſted. Similarity of origin and of government muſt have aſſimilated the manners of the whites. Subordination and grievances muſt have univerſally alienated the mulattoes. Their rapid increaſe in all the iſlands armed them with power to reſiſt; and it is probable, that the revolution alone, by emancipating the ſlaves, and eſtabliſhing political equality among all the claſſes, prevented the renewal of the events which ruined St Domingo, in ſuch of the windward ſettlements as remained unconquered.

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If, then, the natural advantages of the negroes ſhould be found ſo far ſuperior to all the circumſtances of policy, diſcipline, and union, on the part of the French, as to render the eſtabliſhment of an independent ſtate in St Domingo the neceſſary reſult of the conteſt, what is there in the ſituation of the other ſettlements which ſhould prevent the negroes there from following the example of their brethren to the weſtward? And what is there in the circumſtances of the two races which ſhould prevent the blacks from ſucceeding in the other iſlands, as we are ſuppoſing them to have done in St Domingo? The negroes of Guadaloupe have taſted of liberty; and the French have been attempting to reſtore the yoke. The negroes of St Domingo have lived in unbridled licentiouſneſs: order has been re-eſtabliſhed, and a reſtoration of the yoke is attempted. In Guadaloupe, inſurrection is by no means unknown; but it has produced none of thoſe effects which, in St Domingo, muſt tend to weaken the force, and reſtrain the barbarity of the negroes. It has neither glutted the fury, nor leſſened the numbers of thoſe ſavage men. In St Domingo, no farther danger is to be apprehended from the people of colour, at leaſt for a conſiderable time: their race is at preſent almoſt extinct. In Guadaloupe, the ſtate

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of morals, during the laſt ten years, has been peculiarly favourable to the increaſe of this race. A law has indeed proclaimed them equal with the whites; but unleſs the convention poſſeſſed the power of radically altering the nature of men in the colonies, whilſt at home it could not even change their political prejudices, we may be aſſured, that the mulattoes have continued the ſame degraded and oppreſſed race that deſtroyed the colony of St Domingo. The *code noire* of Lewis XIV. might have ſaved that iſland, had the power of the Great Monarch extended to the minds and the habits of his ſubjects. The ſubſequent tyrannical enactments were modified in their application, by the manners of thoſe in whoſe favour they were made, and of thoſe by whoſe means they were executed. The decrees of the revolutionary legiſlatures on colonial affairs, have not been more efficacious than thoſe of Lewis, and have been prevented from operating the equalization of the mulattoes, by the ſame cauſes which formerly mitigated the ſubordination of that claſs.

The conqueſt of Martinico, St Lucia, and Tobago, has indeed prevented any inſurrection in thoſe iſlands, by cutting off all communication with Guadaloupe, and enforcing ſtrict diſcipline, by means of a numerous army, formed

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partly of negro regiments, whoſe attachment to the Europeans, whether in war or in revolt, I have frequently had occaſion to notice. When theſe iſlands are reſtored, and the negroes in Guadaloupe have been ſucceſsful in their efforts to throw off their yoke, it is not difficult to foreſee the termination of the French dominion in the windward colonies. A conqueſt uniformly weakens the power of that government which, after defeat and expulſion, regains its authority by a treaty of peace. Every change of maſters is attended with a change of confidential ſervants and favourites; and thoſe who profited by the old ſyſtem, are ſeldom very friendly to the new order of things. The white inhabitants in Martinico were by no means ſo averſe to the republican government as a few royaliſts repreſented them; and the campaign of 1793 in the Weſt Indies, as well as in Europe, ſhowed the juſtice of the maxim which Machiavel has enforced with his uſual ſagacity, that much confidence ought not to be placed in the reports of exiles. * It can ſcarcely be imagined, that

* Diſcorſi ſopra la prima deca di T. Livio, lib. II. cap. XXXI. '*Quanto ſia pericoloſo credere a gli ſbanditi.*'—'*Debbe adunque un principe*' (ſays he) '*andare adagio a pigliare impreſe ſopra la relatione d'un confinato perche il più delle volte ne ſe reſta ò con vergogna ò con danno graviſſimo.*'

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that the Britiſh government, after conquering Martinico in the following campaign, ſhould treat the royaliſts and the republicans in its new poſſeſſions with equal favour: ſtill leſs can it be ſuppoſed, that the Britiſh government ſhould betray no partiality for the Britiſh planters, who, in conſiderable numbers, had made this iſland the place of their abode. They were enrolled in diſtinct corps, and entruſted with arms: they filled the moſt confidential places: they belonged, in ſhort, to the conquerors; while the other inhabitants held their property and privileges by tolerance, not by right. The reſtoration of the iſland to France, is attended, of courſe, with the re-eſtabliſhment of the republican government, under the unmingled influence of the French inhabitants. The Engliſh and the Royaliſts are permitted, no doubt, if they think proper, to depart in ſafety. But the colony was not merely the place of their abode; it was the ſcene of their ſpeculations. They muſt have ſome attachment to that ſoil in which their capital is veſted; becauſe they could not ſell their property without conſiderable loſs; nor remove their ſtock, and vary the employment of it, without ſome riſk. They will remain, therefore, to repay, by ſubmiſſion and oppreſſion, the advantages which they enjoyed under a more congenial ſyſtem;

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fyſtem; and their diſcontents muſt divide and weaken the new government, ſurrounded by people of colour and ſlaves.

Nor will the perils of ſuch a neighbourhood tend at once to unite the different orders of the community which is expoſed to them. Men are not always reconciled by community of dangers. The more immediate impulſe is generally obeyed; and ſentiments of jealouſy or hatred prevent the ſalutary operations of that wiſe fear which ought to be excited by the proſpect of the greater, though perhaps more diſtant evils. The ſame blindneſs which divides nations whoſe circumſtances imperiouſly dictate the neceſſity of making a common cauſe, diſtracts alſo thoſe branches of the ſame ſociety whoſe exiſtence ſeems to depend upon a cordial and intimate union. In ancient times, that blindneſs enabled Rome to conquer the world, by fomenting diviſions, and then ſubduing her allies. In more enlightened ages, it has prevented the maſter principle of modern policy from maintaining the independence of the European ſtates. It opened to Cortes the gates of Mexico; enthroned Pizarro in the temple of the Incas; and, after ſubjecting to the Britiſh ſceptre the peninſula of India, will moſt probably extend our dominion beyond the Ganges. It put into the hands

hands of Katharine the balance of the north; and in the ſouth annihilated the exiſtence of a rich and naturally powerful ſtate. It has led the tricoloured cockade over the faireſt portion of Europe; and raiſed up a generation of pigmy republics and kings around the common enemy of national independence. In the colonies of the great nation, the ſame principle took a different direction; armed againſt each other thoſe whom the fear of a common enemy ought to have bound together; and taught each party madly to call in the aid of that body which, in the end, was ſure to overwhelm both. We can ſcarcely be ſo ſanguine as to expect, that the different claſſes of whites in the reſtored iſlands will prove exceptions to ſo general a rule, and unite to ſtrengthen the hands of that government which muſt of neceſſity diſtribute its favours with ſome partiality. Yet the danger will be every thing but inſtantaneous. The people of colour in the Windward Iſlands have their paſſions as well as in St Domingo. They have their grievances too, and their temptations. They will diſregard the certainty of defeat by the negroes, in the event of a complete change; and, looking only to the gratification of their preſent feelings, will be callous to that fear which, in their circumſtances, is the ſame with wiſdom.

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The free ſubjects, then, of the French colonies which are reſtored by the peace, cannot be expected to unite in one compact body, as if no conqueſt had been made, or no difference of race had exiſted. We may indeed remember the dangers which threatened our own power in the ceded iſlands, particularly Grenada and Dominica, during the courſe of the late war, (not to mention the events of 1778 and 1779), from that animoſity between the French and Britiſh ſubjects which twelve years ſubmiſſion to the ſame mild and equitable government had not been able to extinguiſh, and which the dreadful examples then exhibited in St Domingo could not reſtrain.

It is not therefore deſponding too much, to conclude, that the French government will find it at leaſt as difficult to retain poſſeſſion of the conquered iſlands, as to overcome the negroes and people of colour in thoſe which have never changed maſters. Admitting, what is evidently untrue, that the example and communication of thoſe iſlands which ſhall have become ſubject to the negro dominion, can produce no direct effects upon the others which ſhall yet remain to France; we may be aſſured, that, in theſe alſo, the very ſame cauſes will conſpire to overthrow her dominion; and that,

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that, after the extirpation of the whites has been accompliſhed in the more leeward of the French iſlands, it will be chimerical to hope for the continuance of European influence in any of the reſt.

It is now only neceſſary, that we caſt our eyes on the map of the Carribbee iſlands, to be convinced of the immediate fall which, in this event, awaits the windward ſettlements of the other European powers. If the leeward poſition of St Domingo ſhall be ſuppoſed to have ſecured Porto-Rico and the leeward Charaibean iſlands, whilſt the depredations and dominion of the new commonwealths were ſpreading over Cuba and Jamaica, theſe are now expoſed to inevitable deſtruction from Guadaloupe and Martinico. In fact, the ſituation of the Carribbee iſlands, when expoſed to ſuch a neighbourhood, is much more critical than that of Jamaica, from three material circumſtances.

In the firſt place, they are ſo ſmall, that after an enemy has landed and ravaged the coaſts, their defence, by the manœuvres and the ſtratagems of protracted warfare, is almoſt impracticable.

Secondly, they are ſurrounded by the enemy, upon the ſuppoſition that all the French iſlands have been ſubdued by the Africans, whereas Jamaica

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Jamaica and Cuba had only to defend one point of attack. But,

Thirdly, and principally; they are eſſentially weaker than the great Leeward iſland, by the conſtitution of their ſociety, in which the diſproportion of the colours is much greater.

In Jamaica, the negroes are to the whites as more than eight to one. The average proportion of the Britiſh Charaibean iſlands (excluſive of Barbadoes) is eleven to one: and this is divided among them very unequally; for in Antigua, within ſight of Guadaloupe, the proportion is that of nearly fifteen to one; in Dominica, placed between Guadaloupe and Martinico, it is above twelve to one; and in Grenada, at a ſhort diſtance to the leeward of Tobago, it exceeds the proportion of twenty-three to one. If, then, the iſſue of the preſent eventful conteſt ſhall be the eſtabliſhment of the negro power in the French iſlands, what reaſon have we to hope for the Britiſh Windward colonies? The whole Charaibean chain will be overrun by the African hordes, as it formerly was by the leſs numerous and ſavage Charaibes. Barbadoes alone, from its poſition, from its ancient and conſtant eſtabliſhment under the Britiſh government, but ſtill more from its large proportion of white inhabitants (above one fourth of the negroes), may ſtand out for a ſeaſon; but, either overrun

overrun by the neighbouring ſettlements, or deſerted by its own negroes, it will, after a few years of reſpite, only enjoy the trifling conſolation, of being the laſt to ſhare the fate of thoſe valuable poſſeſſions.

Similarity of ſituation, produce, commerce, and internal arrangement, have led us to conſider the ſettlements in Guiana as forming part of the Weſt Indian colonies. In ſeveral material points, however, they differ from the iſlands, and from each other. Accordingly, they may be expected to have in ſome reſpects a different fate.

Notwithſtanding the attention which the French government has uniformly beſtowed upon the iſland and neighbouring ſettlements of Cayenne ever ſince the loſs of Canada, we have already ſeen how extremely ſlow the progreſs of theſe colonies has been. The number of negroes in 1770 was eight thouſand, according to the Cenſus, * which, however, is always conſiderably below the truth. In 1780, they were between ten and eleven thouſand †; and in 1794, according to the author of the '*Criſis*,' they did not exceed fifteen thouſand. ‡ The ſcarcity of negroes, ariſing from bad credit and

* Malouet, Mem. &c. II. 43.

† Neckar, Finances, tom. III. cap. 13.

‡ P. 37.

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and confined capital, has been the chief cauſe of the ill ſucceſs which has conſtantly attended the efforts of France to improve this colony. This deficiency in the importation muſt have made the planters more careful of their ſtock in hand, and rendered the condition of the ſlaves more tolerable than in the other ſettlements. Accordingly we find, that their enfranchiſement, in conſequence of the decree of Pluvioſe, An. II, was attended with none of the conſequences in Cayenne, which in the other colonies it was ſo well calculated to produce. After their emancipation, the negroes in general continued voluntarily upon the plantations of their former maſters; and no irregularities whatever were committed by thoſe men who had thus ſuddenly acquired their freedom. *

But beſides the milder treatment of the ſlaves in general, and the greater proportion of the Creole to the imported negroes, another circumſtance peculiar to the continental colonies, renders the ſituation of the whites far more ſecure in Cayenne than in any of the iſlands. The original poſſeſſors of the ſoil exiſt there in conſiderable numbers; and they live in the immediate vicinity of the Europeans. By an intercourſe with their civilized neighbours, uniformly amicable and mutually

* Voyage à la Guiane, &c. cap. XI.

mutually ſerviceable, they have acquired many of thoſe artificial wants which traffic and labour alone can ſatisfy. They are thus much leſs averſe to exertions of induſtry, than the reſt of the American Indians, whom the Spaniſh and Portugueſe invaders never ſuffered to remain independent until they ſhould become accuſtomed to voluntary labour. The French planters, in different parts of Guiana, have frequently ſupplied the want of negroes by the induſtry of hired Indians; * and this reſource rendered them much leſs dependent, than they otherwiſe would have been, on their ſlaves at the period of the revolution.

But the neighbourhood of the Indians has been attended with ſtill more important conſequences. As the French have conſtantly and ſucceſsfully cultivated the good will of thoſe tribes, and kept them at peace among themſelves, there can be no doubt that, in the event of a rupture between the planters and their ſlaves, the Indians would unanimouſly take part with the former, to whom they have, upon all occaſions, evinced a warm attachment; and would aſſiſt them in ſubduing and puniſhing the negroes, towards whom they have, in every inſtance, ſhown a violent antipathy †; a ſentiment which, it may

* Voyage à la Guiane, &c. cap. XVIII.

† Ibid.

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be prefumed, the whites have been at no great pains to eradicate.

From the concurrence of all thefe circumftances, it has happened, that as the emancipation of the negroes in Cayenne was attended with no inconvenience, fo, neither has the reftoration of the yoke been productive of the flighteft commotion. From the laft communications of the French government upon this fubject, it appears, that the flave fyftem and the flave trade, are re-eftablifhed in this colony; and that the progrefs of cultivation, fo long retarded, has of late years begun to be accelerated; probably, in a great degree, from the new obftructions to the employment of capital in the other fettlements. But, if this improvement continues, and, ftill more, if all the capital veſted in Weft Indian cultivation fhall be forced towards Guiana by fuch a cataftrophe as we have been fuppofing in the iflands, the conftant effects of rapid improvement in flave culture muft follow; an increafed difproportion of negroes; greater careleffnefs and cruelty on the part of the maſters; an exceſs in the numbers of imported over thofe of Creole flaves; and a rapid multiplication of the free people of colour: fo that, if to thefe circumftances there be added the eftablifhment of the negroes in the Carribbee iflands, the ruin of Cayenne is not likely to

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to be ſo far diſtant as its ſecurity during the late tumults might at firſt lead us to expect.

The probable fate of Dutch Guiana will expoſe Cayenne to new dangers. The Dutch, as well as the French in South America, have carefully cultivated the friendſhip of their Indian neighbours. But a variety of circumſtances have concurred to prevent this alliance from ſecuring the tranquillity of the Dutch ſettlements. The extenſive capitals employed in Surinam, Berbice, &c. have (as we formerly obſerved) * rapidly multiplied the numbers of the ſlaves. In 1769, they amounted to fifty thouſand; the whites to four thouſand. † In 1777, the ſlaves had increaſed to ſeventy thouſand; ‡ and, in 1789, while the whites ſtill remained about four thouſand in number, the negroes were eſtimated at ninety thouſand ‖.

The treatment of thoſe ſlaves, thus numerous and thus rapidly poured into a ſettlement ſo ill ſtocked with whites, was infinitely more cruel in the Dutch plantations than in any other, as we have before ſeen: And, in their annual importation of five or ſix thouſand, thoſe from the Gold Coaſt were uniformly preferred

* Book I. Sect. III. Part I.

† Emery, (apud Malouet Mem. &c.) III. 190.

‡ Ibid.

‖ Voyage à la Guiane, &c. cap. X.

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by that gainthirſty people, as the moſt capable of hard work, though certainly the moſt prone to rebellion. *

To theſe never failing cauſes of revolt and deſertion, muſt be added, the accidental circumſtance of the Maroon negroes left in the country by the Engliſh previous to their expulſion in the year 1666. This body, during the whole of the laſt century, was truly formidable to the Dutch ſettlements. On various occaſions they were ſucceſsful in the warfare which they perpetually waged againſt their civilized neighbours, in a regular and ſyſtematic manner. Their numbers being augmented by natural means, and receiving continual additions from deſertion, they grew every day more formidable. The peace concluded with them in 1761, was founded ſo exactly on the baſis of equality between the two parties, that the Dutch plenipotentiaries were obliged to ratify the treaty according to the African forms. † In 1772, a war again broke out with theſe dangerous neighbours; and the States ſent a large force for the protection of the colony. So much was the exiſtence of the Dutch power in America ſuppoſed to depend upon the ſucceſs of the expedition

* Malouet, Mem. III. 135.

† La Richeſſe de la Hollande, cap. V.

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pedition againſt the Maroons, that the intrigues of the houſe of Orange were anxiouſly directed towards obtaining a preponderance in the colonial affairs, by the adoption of one particular plan of military operations. For this purpoſe, an officer attached to the Orange party was ſent out; the colony was divided between the contending intereſts; both parties, as uſual, endeavoured to engage the interpoſition of France; and, at laſt, the Maroon invaſions were checked by the eſtabliſhment of a permanent cordon * round the whole of the ſide expoſed to the Maroon ſettlements.

Whilſt continual preparations for warfare have repreſſed and prevented the incurſions of the Maroons, the grievances of the ſlaves, and the increaſe of their numbers, by the extended cultivation of the colony, have encouraged deſertion, and rendered the neighbourhood of the inſurgents as dangerous as before. The influx of Britiſh capital during the late war, muſt have increaſed ſtill farther the negro population of thoſe ſettlements; and the change of maſters, and mixture of nations among the whites, will, as uſual, be unfavourable to vigorous and ſecure government. The operation of the cordon muſt, in one quarter at leaſt, tend to pre-

* Malouet, IV. *paſſim.*

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vent all communication with the Indian nations; and there is reaſon to believe, that the Maroons have found no difficulty, of late years, in uniting themſelves with the natives by marriage. *

If, then, the iſlands ſhould be in the poſſeſſion of negroes, it is not eaſy to conceive a colony placed in a more critical ſituation than Dutch Guiana—ſurrounded, as it will be, on all ſides by independent negro ſtates, and peopled by a feeble and divided body of Europeans, mingled with a moſt diſproportioned maſs of ſlaves, who have ſo ſuddenly been collected together, chiefly from the moſt ferocious tribes of Africa, irritated by every ſpecies of cruelty, and treated with the extremity of rigid parſimony. The exiſtence of the French on the other ſide of the river Marrowni, is evidently incompatible with the event to which ſuch a combination of difficulties and dangers will moſt probably lead.

Thus will the ruin be accompliſhed of thoſe fertile ſettlements in which the race of civilized men has been diffuſed, the miraculous effects of commercial ſpirit been diſplayed, and the prodigies of European arts and arms exhibited for upwards of three eventful ages.

The ſavage nations of Africa, renewing among themſelves thoſe horrors to which they have

* Voyage à la Guiane, &c. cap. X.

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have ſacrificed their maſters, will ſpread over the faireſt portions of the New World the barbariſm that ſtill covers their native deſerts. And thoſe regions where, for a while, the brightneſs of poliſhed life had ſeemed to dawn, will relapſe into a darkneſs, thicker, and far more full of horrors, than that which was (ſhall we not now ſay?) unhappily penetrated by the daring genius of Columbus.

—— ' *Nox atra cavâ circumvolat umbrâ.*
' *Quis cladem illius noctis, quis funera fando*
' *Explicet? aut poſſit lacrymis æquare labores?*
' *Urbs antiqua ruit, multos dominata per annos:*
' *Plurima perque vias ſternuntur inertia paſſim*
' *Corpora, perque domos, et religioſa deorum*
' *Limina Crudelis ubique*
' *Luctus, ubique pavor, et plurima mortis imago.*'

ÆNEIS II.

BOOK III.

INTRODUCTION.

In the laſt Book, we were occupied with the examination of the foreign relations of the members of a colonial ſyſtem in general, and more particularly of the European colonies, conſidered as independent of the mother countries, and viewed as forming a great federal community of ſubordinate or ſecondary ſtates, contiguous in poſition, and reſembling each other in their origin and hiſtory.

But the mother country muſt always be affected by every thing that affects its colonies, ſo long as the colonial policy is purſued by modern ſtates. A colony is, in fact, only a remote province of the empire; but it is not on that account leſs valuable either in itſelf, or as aſſiſting and enriching the other parts of the ſtate. This I have explained at great length in the Firſt Book,

BOOK III. INTROD.

Book.* Hence the councils of a ſtate will always be more or leſs influenced by a regard to its colonial poſſeſſions. The intereſts of the contiguous provinces will ſometimes give way to the ſuperior intereſts of the colonies; as the fortunes of the latter will, in moſt caſes, be made ſubſervient in their turn. Not only ought the domeſtic policy of the ſtate to be made ſubſervient in many inſtances to that of the colonies—its foreign policy ſhould alſo yield in the ſame manner to the policy dictated by the external relations of the colonies. This, however, has not often happened; I have before ſhewn † that the quarrels of the mother country alone are, in almoſt every inſtance, the cauſes which involve every part of the empire in wars; that the foreign relations of the colonies are almoſt always ſubſervient, and poſtponed to thoſe of the parent ſtate; and that, ſo far from involving her in their quarrels, they ſuffer more than any part of the ſyſtem by the proper quarrels of the metropolis. Certain circumſtances may, however, occur, in which it is to be preſumed, that the policy of interfering in behalf of the colonies would be allowed by all. Thoſe circumſtances are chiefly of two kinds.

In

* Sect. I. & II.

† Book I. Sect I.

In the *firſt* place, the colonies of a ſtate may be directly attacked in ſuch a manner as to ſhew clearly an intention of inſult, or to demonſtrate views of ambition in the aggreſſor: no nation can poſſibly tolerate either, without demanding immediate reparation and ſatisfaction. The common principles of ſelf-preſervation muſt impel her to defenſive meaſures; the principles of honour muſt induce her to perſiſt in oppoſing force by force, even although ſhe would previouſly have given up the invaded colonies without any remuneration: and common feelings of juſtice muſt incline her to view ſuch aggreſſions or inſults, as equally injurious, whether they are made in the remote or contiguous provinces of the empire. In caſes of this ſort, no one can for a moment entertain a doubt that the mother country is imperiouſly called upon to make war upon all the parts of the aggreſſor's dominions with all her own forces. Doubts may be entertained as to the expediency of colonial poſſeſſions, but no heſitation can ever be ſhewn upon the queſtion of war, when the colonies actually in her poſſeſſion, are invaded. On this point then, I ſhall not inſiſt any farther. But,

In the *ſecond* place, a neighbouring nation may extend its colonial dominions to a dangerous degree, by the conqueſt of ſome third colony, or of ſome of the native powers;

or

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or great and ſudden changes may take place in the internal ſtructure of its colonial ſyſtem, without any extenſion of its magnitude by conqueſt or uſurpation; or plans may be laid for acquiring an extent of territory in other parts, not immediately belonging to the colonial community, yet ultimately fatal to its colonial neighbours in that community, if attended with ſucceſs. None of theſe meaſures can, indeed, be conſtrued into a direct aggreſſion; ſtill leſs into an inſult upon the national honour. If you have not guaranteed the conquered power, or united your fortune to its fortunes by defenſive treaty, you cannot be ſaid to be immediately concerned in the affair; and thoſe who doubt the propriety of interfering at all in ſuch caſes, will certainly deny the expediency or ſuch guarantees and defenſive alliances. On the other hand, it has uniformly been the the policy of modern times to view with jealouſy every ſuch meaſure of a rival or neighbour, and to conſider each event in the international ſyſtem, as immediately affecting all its members. After all wars undertaken upon thoſe principles, it is uſual, and indeed not unnatural, for men who think war the only great national calamity, to call in queſtion the ſoundneſs of doctrines, from which much apparent evil has proceeded, balanced only by advantages

advantages of a nature too refined or remote to be perceptible to all obſervers. The ſyſtem of modern international policy has accordingly been called in queſtion repeatedly, during the courſe of the 18th century, and at no time more vehemently arraigned, than during the eventful period in which we have lived.

I have endeavoured, in the Firſt Book of this Inquiry, to ſhow, that it is a narrow policy which would conſider colonies as ſeparate and ſubſervient appendages of the ſtate; that they are integral parts of the empire which is happy enough to poſſeſs them; and that they ought to be conſidered as ſuch in all arrangements of domeſtic policy. I ſhall now endeavour to ſhew, that the ſame principle ought to be extended to the foreign policy of the ſtate; that in queſtions of this nature alſo, they ought to be viewed as parts of the empire; and that, accordingly, the queſtions of interference, balance of power, alliances, guarantees, &c. ought to be decided, with reſpect to colonial relations, upon the very ſame principles on which we may decide them with reſpect to the primary foreign relations of the ſtate. I ſhall therefore now conſider, in general, the principles upon which the modern ſyſtem of international policy is founded, and ſhall endeavour to ſhow that it is eſſential to the ſtate of modern ſociety. I ſhall at the

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the ſame time conſider the circumſtances in the natural ſituation of colonies, which render thoſe principles more peculiarly applicable to ſuch eſtabliſhments. As the chief purpoſe of this Third Book is to ſhow what line of policy is dictated to the European powers by the preſent ſtate of the French colonies, and that ſtate into which it is probable that they will very ſoon relapſe, even if tranquillity ſhould for the preſent be reſtored; moreover, as this particular inquiry is intimately connected with the general queſtions of interference, for the ſame reaſons that the ſubjects of European policy in 1792 were connected with the ſame queſtions, it will appear clearly how neceſſary the general inquiry is, even for the diſcuſſion of this ſpecial queſtion.

This Book, then, divides itſelf into two Sections.

In the Firſt, I ſhall explain thoſe principles upon which the modern ſyſtem of foreign policy is founded in the higheſt reaſons of neceſſity and expediency, and thoſe circumſtances which render it peculiarly applicable to the colonies, even if we ſhould not conſider them as integral parts of the ſyſtem to which they belong.

In the Second Section, I ſhall conſider what is the line of foreign policy recommended to the European powers, both in the colonies, and in Europe

Europe with a reference to the colonies, by the preſent ſtate of colonial affairs. This Inquiry will conſiſt chiefly of a compariſon of the concluſions deduced in the laſt Book, with thoſe deduced in the Firſt Section of this Book.

SEC.

SECTION I.

OF THE FOREIGN POLICY OF STATES IN GENERAL AND AS INFLUENCED BY THEIR COLONIAL RELATIONS.

BOOK III.

THE balance of power, and the general ſyſtem of international relations that has grown up in modern Europe, have afforded to one claſs of politicians perpetual ſubject of ridicule and invective, and to another claſs the conſtant opportunity of defending or attacking every meaſure, of diſcuſſing, or affecting to diſcuſs every political ſubject, by a reference to certain terms of art and abſtract ideas, of which it is fair to ſuſpect that they little underſtood the meaning and the force.

Of theſe reaſoners or declaimers, the former ſect are undoubtedly the moſt dangerous. The refinements of modern policy which have ſprung from the progreſſive improvement of the human ſpecies, and have, in their turn, ſecured that progreſs, and accelerated its pace, are in no danger of being either corrupted, or brought into diſrepute, by the petulance of pretended ſtateſmen. But the ſophiſtries and cavils which political ſceptics and innovators have founded, partly on

a

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a miſconception of the theory, and partly on a miſtatement of the facts, tend directly to a degradation of the ſyſtem in the eyes of ſuperficial reaſoners, and may ultimately renew a ſtate of things, from which the unaſſiſted efforts of national heroiſm would be altogether unable to redeem any one community.

The attacks of thoſe men have, moreover, been extremely inconſiſtent and contradictory. While, at one time, they maintain, that the idea of a political equilibrium is pregnant with every ſpecies of abſurdity, and would produce, if carried into the actual affairs of nations, thoſe very evils which the ſyſtem is extolled for preventing: at another time, they tell us that the notion is ſimple and obvious; that it ariſes naturally out of the paſſions of men; that it is no refinement of modern ſtateſmen, but has influenced the councils of princes and commonwealths in all ages of the world. Now—the balance of power is an unintelligible jargon, invented to cover every ſcheme; to furniſh pretexts for every act of national injuſtice; to lull the jealouſy of the people in any emergency; or to excite their alarms upon any occaſion. Now—it is uſeleſs and ſuperfluous; an interference with the natural order of things; or an attempt to effect that which would happen at any rate. Now—it is pernicious in the ex-

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treme; the parent of war and offenſive alliances; the exciting cauſe of national violence; the watchword of ambitious princes and deſtroying commonwealths; a refinement only of injuſtice; and a ſyſtem of nothing but treachery or caprice. It is very manifeſt, without any argument, that the ſyſtem of modern policy cannot be liable to all thoſe accuſations at once, and that the declaimers who have uſed ſuch language with reſpect to it, muſt have been talking of very different things at different times. * But as the foreign policy of nations was never, at any period of modern ſtory, ſo intereſting as at preſent; as the primary relations of ſtates to each other are generally thoſe which determine their external colonial policy; and as this whole ſubject has never yet been treated of in a general and ſcientific manner, I ſhall proceed, in the firſt place, to offer a few obſervations upon that ſyſtem, which has been ſo little underſtood either by ſpeculative writers or practical politicians.

The national jealouſy, by which at all times the European ſtates are animated, and which ranges them on different ſides in each public criſis, has been denominated, not a principle of policy, but a national emotion. Nations, it is ſaid,

* Note Ii

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ſaid, like the individuals which compoſe them, are moved by caprice, and actuated by paſſions; excited to contention by envy and hatred; ſoothed to reconciliation when exhauſted by the efforts of their enmity; leagued in friendſhip by the dictates of an intereſted prudence; united together by the thirſt of plunder; or combined for the gratification of ſome common revenge. The principle (we are told) that has been pompouſly called the great ſpring of civilized policy, is perhaps nothing more than a ſyſtematic indulgence of thoſe natural feelings which impel the ſavage to attack his more wealthy neighbour, or unite rival hordes in a temporary friendſhip, when invaded by a powerful and common enemy. The policy (it is added) which we have heard extolled as the grand *arcanum* of modern ſtateſmen, and dignified with the title of a ſyſtem, is nothing more than the natural reſult of a conflict between the deſire of conqueſt and love of ſecurity, refined on by ingenious men, and ſpun into a regular theory.

Theſe remarks are partly true, and partly unfounded. It is true, that nations are guided by human councils, and ſubject, of courſe, to the paſſions and caprices of men; but it is no leſs certain, that the more regularly any ſyſtem of government is eſtabliſhed, the more will men of ſober minds acquire a weight in the manage-

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ment of affairs; and that the longer the art of adminiſtering the concerns of empires is practiſed, will prudence gain the greater aſcendancy over paſſion. It is true, that the dictates of feelings not always amiable, and often outrageous, are frequently, more than any impulſe of reaſon, the ſprings which actuate the operations of ſtates; but it is equally true, that in all animals, the paſſions themſelves, even thoſe moſt liable to abuſe and moſt fatal in their effects when too ſtrong, are implanted for the wiſeſt of purpoſes; that inſtinct is the principle to which more than reaſon the preſervation of life, the population of the world, and the maintenance of order in the univerſe muſt be aſcribed; and that national councils may be operating what no foreſight could combine, while they appear to be ſwayed only by prejudice and paſſion. The exiſtence of rude ſtates is indeed frequently preſerved, and their civilization inſured by the operation of principles, to aſſiſt the developement of which is the great pride of the moſt learned and ſkilful ſtateſmen: yet, the want of this aſſiſtance in thoſe rude times, and the want of a conſtant ſuperintendance and controul which renders the popular feelings uſeful in one caſe, and harmleſs in another, is certainly the cauſe of that inſtability of national power, and thoſe perpetual changes of dominion—

thoſe

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thoſe conſtant broils, and that ſtate of unceaſing inſecurity, to which we may attribute the many revolutions in the lot of ſavage communities, the frequent viciſſitudes of their political fortunes, and the long continuance of their barbariſm.

That the ſyſtem which we are now conſidering has oftentimes been abuſed, no one can deny. What human inſtitution can defend itſelf from this charge? But many of the evils which are aſcribed to the principle in queſtion, have been owing only to an erroneous conception of its nature. Many of them have ariſen from failing to carry the line of policy recommended by it, to the lengths which it enjoins; and, in not a few inſtances, thoſe events which have been deemed pernicious, would have proved altogether fatal, had they not been modified and controuled by its influence. We are deſired, with no ſmall appearance of triumph, to view the hiſtory of the laſt century; and to mark the manifold wars which the balancing ſyſtem produced; the various intrigues to which it gave riſe; the deſtructive conqueſts of which it furniſhed the pretext; and the national cataſtrophes which it could not avert. But had it not been for that wholeſome jealouſy of rival neighbours, which modern politicians have learned to cheriſh, how many conqueſts and changes

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of dominion would have taken place, inſtead of wars, in which a few uſeleſs lives were loſt, and ſome ſuperfluous millions were ſquandered? How many fair portions of the globe might have been deluged in blood, inſtead of ſome hundreds of ſailors fighting harmleſsly on the barren plains of the ocean, and ſome thouſands of ſoldiers carrying on a ſcientific, and regular, and quiet ſyſtem of warfare, in countries ſet apart for the purpoſe, and reſorted to as the *arena* where the diſputes of nations may be determined? * We may indeed look to the hiſtory of the laſt century as the proudeſt æra in the annals of the ſpecies; the period moſt diſtinguiſhed for learning, and ſkill, and induſtry; for the milder virtues, and for common ſenſe; for refinement in government, and an equal diffuſion of liberty; above all, for that perfect knowledge of the arts of adminiſtration, which has eſtabliſhed certain general rules of conduct among nations; has prevented the overthrow of empires, and the abſorption of weak ſtates into the bodies of devouring neighbours; has ſet bounds to the march of conqueſt, and rendered the unſheathing of the ſword a meaſure of the laſt adoption; whereas, in other times, it was always reſorted to in the firſt inſtance.

In

* Book I. Sect. I.

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In the beginning of that century, we ſaw the gigantic power of France humbled by a coalition of princes, each reſolved to undergo immediate loſs, and run a great preſent riſk, in order to prevent the greater chance of ruin at the diſtance of a few years. In ancient times, the Stadtholder would have been more jealous of Britain or Auſtria, than of France. The Great Monarch, like Cæſar, would have found a Divitiacus in the heart of the empire. By ſplitting the neighbouring potentates into adverſe factions, and fighting one againſt the other, he would in a few years have ſubjugated the whole. No power would then have conceived that common prudence required an immediate ſacrifice of peace, in order to ward off a diſtant peril. All would have waited quietly till the invaſion came on; then, fighting with a deſperate, but an inſulated valour, all would have been conquered in detail, by the ambitious enemy of Europe; and the ſtory of the Roman Empire would have been renewed, when ſubmiſſion to foreign power, loſs of liberty, and interruption of peaceful purſuits, were no longer the phantoms of vulgar terror, or the themes of idle declamation, but real, and imminent, and inevitable calamities.

In the middle of the century, we indeed ſaw an ancient crown deſpoiled of its hereditary

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provinces; and the neighbouring ſtates in vain attempting to cruſh the new-born energies of the Pruſſian power. It is, however, extremely doubtful whether the principles of an enlightened policy would not have favoured the riſe of a power, whoſe profeſſed and natural object was the balancing of the Imperial Houſe, and the protection of the ſmaller princes of the empire againſt the preponderating, and formerly abſolute, ſway of the Auſtrian monarchs. At any rate, admitting the other powers to have been actuated by no ſuch principles, or to have viewed the policy of Pruſſia as tending to the deſtruction of the equilibrium, it is clear that the ſucceſs of the Sileſian uſurpation muſt, according to thoſe views, be attributed to the actual dereliction of the balancing ſyſtem, and not to its inefficacy; for, both in the Sileſian and in the Seven-years war, * the part of Pruſſia was openly eſpouſed by ſome of the great powers; in the former, by France and Bavaria; in the latter, firſt by England and then by Ruſſia herſelf. The preſervation and accurate adjuſtment of the balance might perhaps have required ſome ſuch event as the acquiſition

* It is well known that the peace of Dreſden was only a truce; that the war of 1756 owed its origin to the cauſe of the former conteſt; and that the poſſeſſion of Sileſia was only ſecured by the peace of Hubertſburg.

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tion which Pruſſia actually made; but if the immediate object of the ſyſtem, the maintenance of the eſtabliſhed diviſion of power, was held to be a more important conſideration, it is clear that the part of Pruſſia ought not to have been taken by France and Bavaria, in the one caſe, or by England and Ruſſia in the other, until the uſurped dominions of Auſtria had been reſtored; and then, the allies of that power ought inſtantly to have deſerted her, if ſhe did not remain ſatisfied with the fruits of their interference.

Soon after the Seven-years war was terminated, the diſmemberment of an ancient European kingdom was projected, by the powers who had been moſt exhauſted in the Sileſian conteſt, and who wiſhed to indemnify themſelves for their loſſes, at the expence of the Poles. The ſucceſs of this iniquitous tranſaction, although it only demonſtrates that the modern ſyſtem has not been carried to its proper length, that it is incapable of changing the nature of men, or diſarming the ambition and rapacity of princes, has been always quoted by a certain ſet of politicians, as an irrefragable proof of the futility and inefficacy of the great principle of modern politics. That calamitous event is indeed a ſufficient proof, that the ſtateſmen of Europe had for a while forgotten

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ten their moſt ſacred principles; and that the princes who did not interfere to prevent it, were blind to their beſt intereſts. It ſerves, therefore, to ſhow us what would be the ſituation of the world, were the maxims of ancient times to be revived, and the ſalutary ſyſtem of modern Europe to loſe its influence over the councils of ſtates; but, for this very reaſon, the partition of Poland cannot, with any truth, be ſaid to prove the inefficacy of thoſe principles, by acting in direct oppoſition to which, the great powers of Europe permitted it to take place.

If, however, the policy of the neighbouring ſtates provided no check to the injuſtice of the partitioning powers, the influence of the balancing ſyſtem upon the conduct of thoſe parties themſelves, was productive of the moſt important and beneficial effects. Had the ancient maxims of national indifference and inſulation prevailed in the cabinets of princes, at the criſis of Poliſh affairs in 1772, the diſtracted ſtate of that unhappy country would indeed have called in the interference of foreign force. But this interference would have proceeded from one quarter alone. Poland would have been overwhelmed, and its vaſt reſources appropriated, by one only of the conterminous powers, probably by the Ruſſian empire,

empire, which would thus have ſuddenly acquired a preponderance fatal to the reſt of Europe; and, without receiving any check from the proportional aggrandizement of the neighbouring ſtates, would have been enabled to ſtretch its reſiſtleſs arm into the very heart of the great weſtern commonwealth. But the prevalence of that national jealouſy, and anxious attention to the affairs of other ſtates, which is the maſter principle of the modern ſyſtem, prevented the uſurpation of Ruſſia, even at the moment when ſhe was actually miſtreſs of the kingdom, when ſhe garriſoned the capital with her troops, and ruled the national councils by a viceroy, under the name of ambaſſador. With all theſe circumſtances in her favour, ſhe was not even the firſt propoſer of the partition. Her natural enemies, Auſtria and Pruſſia, actually gained a greater ſhare of the ſpoil; and, inſtead of being the firſt victims of her extended empire, as they infallibly would have been in ancient times, they have themſelves acquired, at the ſame moment, an increaſe of reſources, which enables them effectually to withſtand the augmented force of her power.

Although, then, it is extremely abſurd to adduce the partition of Poland as an inſtance of the balancing ſyſtem, (after the manner of the

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the Pruſſian ſtateſmen *), it is equally ridiculous to aſſert, that it proves the inefficacy of that ſyſtem, or to deny that the reſt of Europe has been ſaved by the influence of thoſe principles upon the parties in the uſurpation, which ſhould have led the other great powers of Europe to prevent it.

It is ſcarcely neceſſary to remark, that I by no means intend to aſſert any thing further than the injuſtice and impolicy of the tranſaction upon a great ſcale: at preſent, I only look to the effects of the balancing ſyſtem in maintaining the independence of the weaker ſtates. The caſe of Poland appears to be one of the very few inſtances which have ever occurred, of a nation being placed in ſuch unnatural circumſtances of embarraſſment, turbulence, and degradation of every ſort, that no change of affairs could poſſibly render it worſe, and ſcarce any revolution, by domeſtic violence, or foreign invaſion, could fail to alter it for the better. Setting apart the high-ſounding phraſes of patriotiſm and national ſpirit, and the feelings

* Count Hertzberg (the King's firſt miniſter in 1772), in a ſpeculative eſſay on this ſubject, gives the partition as an appoſite caſe of the balancing ſyſtem. It was made, he ſays, '*ſelon les principes d'une balance dont les trois puiſſances partageantes etoient convenues entre elles.*' Mem. tom. i. p. 296.

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ings of admiration which the very natural emotions of pity have taught us to couple with the name of Poland, it is impoſſible for a ſober-minded obſerver not to perceive, that ages of the moſt debaſing ſervitude had utterly diſqualified the Poliſh boors for enjoying the privileges of free ſubjects; that a lifetime divided between unceaſing tumult in public, and the revellings of a boiſterous, barbarous hoſpitality, had utterly unfitted the reſt of the State from co-operating in the formation of a conſtitution which ſhould poſſeſs either energy or regularity; and that the happieſt event which has ever befallen the fine country of Poland, has been a diſmemberment, wept over and declaimed upon by thoſe who had no experience of its neceſſity, or need of its benefits. Thoſe benefits have moſt undoubtedly been the pacification of that unhappy kingdom, by the only means which human fancy could have deviſed for accompliſhing this end, without endangering the ſecurity of the other powers, namely, a fair diviſion of the country among the neighbouring and rival powers, and a conſequent communication of the ineſtimable bleſſings which their ancient ſubjects enjoyed under a ſyſtem of peaceful government and regular police.

The

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The memorable events which took place at the cloſe of the 18th century, it is almoſt needleſs to obſerve, were the immediate conſequence of an adherence to the principles of the modern ſyſtem of international policy. The internal ſtate of France would never have alarmed the neighbouring nations in ancient times. Without anxiety, they would have ſeen the overthrow of all regular government, the progreſs of Jacobin contagion, and the developement of thoſe popular energies which armed a people, devoted excluſively to war, with reſiſtleſs power to accompliſh the grand object of their demagogues, the overthrow of altars and thrones, and the eſtabliſhment of univerſal empire. Far from combining to reſiſt the progreſs of the new horde, they would have ſplit into factions, and aſſiſted its deſtructive courſe. No efforts to check it would have been thought of, until all reſiſtance was too late; nor would thoſe modern Gauls have found reſiſtance effectual to oppoſe them from the Manlius of any capitol in Europe. That this has not been the fate of every thing refined and valuable in Europe, is owing to the degree in which the maxims of the balancing ſyſtem began to operate their uſual effects at the very moment when the firſt changes took place in France. But, that much injury has been

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been done; that many independent ſtates have been humbled; that ſome powers have been overwhelmed; and that melancholy changes have been effected in the diſtribution of dominion, has been owing to the unprincipled ambition of certain princes, and the taint of diſaffection in the people of ſome countries; which have, together, prevented the modern ſyſtem of external policy from being followed out, and have given to the common enemy of national independence, an advantage proportioned to the neglect of thoſe ſound and neceſſary principles.

Let us hear no more, then, of the laſt century, as affording arguments againſt the balance of power. That eventful period in the hiſtory of mankind, has been marked by the formation of vaſt ſchemes, which either by their ſucceſs may allure, or by their failure may warn, future ſtateſmen to cling ſtill cloſer by thoſe maxims of conduct which are neceſſary to the preſervation of liberty and peace.

The remarks which have been frequently made on the knowledge of the ancients in this branch of policy are for the moſt part juſt. Mr Hume, ſo far as I know, is the firſt who diſtinctly ſtated this point, in an eſſay, replete with accurate reference, and ſignal acuteneſs of claſſical illuſtration; but mingled alſo with ſome injurious perverſions of facts in more recent hiſtory; and with the miſtatement, in one or two

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points of the great ſyſtem itſelf, which he appears to treat with diſreſpect. * The celebrated paſſage in Polybius, which has ſo often been quoted, † is indeed a diſtinct ſtatement of one general principle in that ſyſtem; and the orations of Demoſthenes contain ſome diſcuſſions of the moſt delicate parts of the theory—diſcuſſions which, from the events of his times, we may be aſſured were but imperfectly comprehended in thoſe early ages. ‡ But the number of diſcoveries, or inventions, which have been ſuddenly made in any branch of knowledge, is ſmall indeed. All the more important ſteps in the progreſs of the human mind, may rather be termed improvements, than inventions: they are refinements upon methods formerly known—generalizations of ideas previouſly conceived. By how many ſmall and ſlowly following ſteps was the true nature of the planetary motions brought to light? By how many inſenſible gradations did that theory receive its explanation, from the great law of gravitation, which, conſtantly and univerſally acting, keeps each body in its place, and preſerves the arrangement of the whole ſyſtem? In like manner has that theory of political expediency been gradually unfolded,

* Eſſay on the Balance of Power.

† Polyb. lib. i. cap. 83.

‡ Particularly the famous ſpeech for the Megalopolitans;—*paſſim*.

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unfolded, and its parts refined, which regulates the mutual actions of the contiguous nations of Europe; subjects each to the influence of others, however remote; connects all together by a common principle; regulates the motions of the whole; and maintains the order of the great complicated system. As the newly discovered planets are found to obey the same law that keeps the rest in their orbits: so, the powers which frequently arise in the European world immediately fall into their places, and conform to the same principles that fix the positions and direct the movements of the ancient states. And as, even in this enlightened age, we have not yet succeeded in discovering the whole extent of the planetary law, or in reducing certain apparent irregularities of the system to the common principles: so, in these days of political improvement, we have not attained the utmost refinements of international policy; and have still to lament the many irregularities which continue to disturb the arrangement of the European commonwealth.

It is not, then, in the mere plan of forming offensive or defensive alliances; or in the principle of attacking a neighbour, in order to weaken his power, before he has betrayed hostile views; or in the policy of defending a rival, in order to stay, in proper time, the pro-

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greſs of a common enemy—it is not in theſe ſimple maxims that the modern ſyſtem conſiſts. Thoſe are, indeed, the elements, the great and leading parts of the theory; they are its moſt prominent features; they are maxims dictated by the plaineſt and coarſeſt views of political expediency: But they do not form the whole ſyſtem; nor does the knowledge of them (for it cannot be pretended that ancient ſtates were in poſſeſſion of any thing beyond the ſpeculative knowledge of them) comprehend an acquaintance with the profounder and more ſubtile parts of modern policy. The grand and diſtinguiſhing feature of the balancing theory, is the ſyſtematic form to which it reduces thoſe plain and obvious principles of national conduct; the perpetual attention to foreign affairs which it inculcates; the conſtant watchfulneſs over every motion in all parts of the ſyſtem, which it preſcribes; the ſubjection in which it places all national paſſions and antipathies to the fine and delicate views of remote expediency; the unceaſing care which it dictates of nations moſt remotely ſituated, and apparently unconnected with ourſelves; the general union which it has effected, of all the European powers in one connected ſyſtem—obeying certain laws, and actuated in general by a common principle; in fine, as

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a conſequence of the whole, the right of mutual inſpection, now univerſally recogniſed among civilized ſtates, in the rights of public envoys and reſidents. This is the balancing theory. It was as much unknown to Athens and Rome, as the Keplerian or Newtonian laws were concealed from Plato and Cicero, who certainly knew the general effects of gravitation upon terreſtrial bodies. It has ariſen, in the progreſs of ſcience, out of the circumſtances of modern Europe; the greater extent and nearer equality of the contiguous ſtates; the more conſtant intercourſe of the different nations with each other.

We have been told by hiſtorians, * that the principle of the balance of power, was a diſcovery of the fifteenth century, made by the Italian politicians, in conſequence of the invaſion of Charles VIII. Againſt ſuch ſtatements as this, it is perfectly fair to adduce the arguments of Mr Hume and others, who have traced, in ancient times, much more refined notions of policy, than any that dictated the Italian defenſive league. It was, in truth, not to any ſuch ſingle event, that the balancing ſyſtem owed either its origin, or its refinement; but to the progreſs of ſociety, which placed

* Robertſon's Charles V. vol. I.

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the whole ſtates of Europe in the ſame relative ſituation in which the States of Italy were at that period; and taught them not to wait for an actual invaſion; but to ſee a Charles at all times in every prince or commonwealth that ſhould manifeſt the leaſt deſire of change.

The circumſtances of the European ſtates have been ſingularly favourable to the developement of thoſe principles of eaſy and conſtant union, of which I formerly deſcribed the tendency to promote national intercourſe *, and to render Europe a united whole within itſelf, almoſt ſeparated from the reſt of the world—a great federacy, acknowledging, indeed, no common chief; but united by certain common principles, and obeying one ſyſtem of international law.

It is from theſe natural ſources, through this gradual progreſs, and not ſuddenly from any accidental occurrences in the fifteenth century, or from the cabinets of particular ſtateſmen, that we muſt deduce the refined ſyſtem of interference, which has regulated, for ſo long a time, the councils of Europe in foreign affairs: and we are to conſider the union of the Italian ſtates againſt the invaſion of Charles, merely as a ſymptom of the ſame progreſſive improvement,

* Book II. Sect. III.

improvement, which has ſince taken place in the other parts of Europe.

The queſtion, of the propriety of a nation interfering with thoſe concerns of its neighbours, which have only a remote connexion with its own intereſts, may be ſtated in two different forms;—either as a general queſtion applicable to any ſtate, or in its particular reference to the ſituation of a nation placed in certain circumſtances. Thus, many politicians, who have no heſitation in recommending the balancing ſyſtem to ſuch powers as Auſtria and Pruſſia, placed in the heart of Europe, and ſurrounded by many other ſtates of various complexions and magnitudes, are yet of opinion, that the ſituation of Britain is very different; that ſhe is, by nature, inſulated from the reſt of Europe; that ſhe can defend herſelf againſt any invaſion, by means of her natural barrier and internal reſources; and that ſhe ought not to ſacrifice the improvement of thoſe reſources, and the means of maintaining peace, to the vain wiſh of holding the European balance, and embroiling herſelf in the ſtormy politics of foreign ſtates. To enter fully into the diſcuſſion of this great national queſtion, would carry me much beyond my neceſſary limits: But I cannot avoid remarking, that, ſo long as Great Britain is engaged

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in a commercial intercourſe with other nations; ſo long as her inſular ſituation only ſerves to promote and extend thoſe commercial relations; ſo long as other ſtates poſſeſs a large portion of ſea coaſt, engage in a wide commercial circle, and are acquiring a navy of formidable power; ſo long as Britain interferes with them in other quarters of the globe, where her dominions are the moſt valuable and extenſive; ſo long, in a word, as ſhe ſtudiouſly affects the colonial ſyſtem of policy;—it is an abuſe of language to talk of her being ſeparated from the continent of Europe by the ſtraights of Dover. The tranſport of an army by ſea, is often more eaſy than the march over a conſiderable tract of land. The fate of a naval engagement is generally more quick, deciſive, and dependent upon fortune, than the ſiege of barrier towns, or the forcing of mountainous paſſes; and the elements may, by retaining the Britiſh fleets in Plymouth or Portſmouth, while they waft the enemy's ſquadrons from Breſt or the Texel, deſtroy in a moment that bulwark to which we vainly intruſted the national defence, and render utterly uſeleſs the whole *natural force* of the country, which, after a change of weather, may diſplay, triumphantly, its flags over every ſea in Europe, while the Conſular legions are revelling in the plunder

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der of the bank, or burning all the dock-yards in the kingdom. To ſay that England may truſt to her fleets, then, is to recommend a full reliance upon the chance of a ſingle battle, or the event of a ſea chaſe; to inculcate a ſilly confidence in good fortune, and to counſel, that the fate of Great Britain ſhould be committed to the changes of the elements, the ſhifting of a wind, or the ſettling of a fog. It is to her armies, that every nation, inſular or continental, muſt look for her ſure and *natural defence*. But although it would be abſurd to recommend, that the internal reſources of a country ſhould be neglected, either in order to favour its naval force, or in order to commit its defence to the movements of intrigue, and the efforts of foreign policy; yet he would be an equally dangerous counſellor, who ſhould adviſe us to neglect thoſe means of preventing war, and of rendering it harmleſs when it does occur, which are only to be found in a compliance with the principles of the balancing ſyſtem.

When the different nations of Europe placed their whole glory in the ſplendour of their warlike renown, and attended only to the improvement of their military reſources, every perſon of free rank was a ſoldier, and devoted his life to the profeſſion of arms. But, as ſoon as the

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arts of peace acquired an aſcendancy, and other fame beſides that of martial deeds was ſought after, war became an object of dread, as deranging the main operations of ſociety, and expoſing the national independence to unforeſeen caſualties and dangers. Inſtead of being followed for its own ſake, it was now only reſorted to as a neceſſary evil, to avoid a greater riſk. The firſt great conſequence of this change in the occupations and character of men, was the ſeparation of the military from the civil profeſſions; the intruſting a ſmall claſs in each community with the defence of the reſt; the adoption of ſtanding armies, by far the moſt important improvement in the art of government, with which hiſtory has made us acquainted. As this great change has diſarmed war of almoſt all its dangers: ſo, another change, equally important, has ariſen out of it, rendered wars much leſs frequent, and confined their influence to a ſmall portion in the centre of the Continent. The European powers have formed a ſpecies of general law, which ſuperſedes, in moſt inſtances, an appeal to the ſword, by rendering ſuch an appeal fatal to any power that may infringe upon the code; by uniting the forces of the reſt inevitably againſt each delinquent; by agreeing, that any project of violating a neighbour's integrity, ſhall

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ſhall be prevented or avenged, not according to the reſources of this neighbour, but according to the full reſources of every other member of the European community; and by conſtantly watching over the ſtate of public affairs, even in profound peace. Such, at leaſt, would be the balancing ſyſtem, carried to its full extent; and ſuch is the ſtate of refinement towards which it is conſtantly tending. The diviſion of labour, too, and the ſeparation of the military profeſſion, has been carried, by ſome of the richer nations, to a ſtill greater extent than the mere embodying of ſtanding armies. Thoſe ſtates, which are the moſt injured by the operations of war, are alſo the richeſt in ſuperfluous ſtock. They have contrived a ſpecies of pecuniary commutation of war, ſimilar to the commutation of military ſervice, which paved the way for the introduction of ſtanding armies: they have managed to turn off the battle from their gates, by paying leſs wealthy allies for fighting in their cauſe at a ſafe diſtance. The operations of war are in this manner rendered very harmleſs, and a foundation is laid for their gradual diſuſe. A few uſeleſs millions, and a few ſtill more uſeleſs lives are ſacrificed; the arts of peace continue to flouriſh, ſometimes with increaſed proſperity; and the policy of preferring

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ring to purchaſe defeat at a diſtance, rather than victory at home—of paying allies for being vanquiſhed, rather than gain the moſt ſplendid triumphs on their own ground—has been amply rewarded by the ſafety, increaſed reſources, and real addition of power, which reſults from an enjoyment of all the ſubſtantial bleſſings of peace, with the only real advantages of neceſſary warfare. *

I have mentioned, among the circumſtances which connect a country like Great Britain with the politics of the Continent, the poſſeſſion of colonies. In fact, nothing can more directly contribute to give any ſtate an intereſt in the concerns of all its neighbours, than the adoption of colonial policy. When a country is of moderate extent (as I before remarked), † its movements are eaſily planned, and its external policy is of a very ſimple conſideration. All its intereſts may be perceived at one glance; they occupy a narrow ſpace; are all in the ſame direction; and do not oppoſe each other in different quarters. The territories, being compact and ſituated in the neighbourhood of the government, may be eaſily and promptly defended, on whichever ſide

* Book I. Sect. I.

† Book II. Sect. II.

ſide they are attacked, and however ſudden the invaſion may be. Offenſive operations may be carried on ſingly from any point, without the danger of diverſions and repriſals in other quarters lying at a diſtance and ill defended. In all theſe particulars, the ſituation of a political ſyſtem, comprehending various and ſcattered dominions, is widely different. The mother country cannot move without conſidering well the poſition in which her colonies may be left. An aggreſſion on a colony, in like manner, will draw the metropolis into danger. Neither, in providing for the defence of the ſtate, is it ſufficient, that the territories lying contiguous to the centre of the empire be placed in ſecurity. The more difficult taſk remains to be performed, of ſecuring the colonies—thoſe points to which, in modern times, the efforts of the chief enemy are in general directed. *

We have already ſeen, † how much leſs adapted a colonial eſtabliſhment is to the operations of warfare, than a primary and independent ſtate. An enemy may, by ſome ſudden movement, eaſily make himſelf maſter of ſuch a diſtant part of the empire, by arranging all

* Book I. Sect. I.

† Book II. Sect. I.

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all his own offenſive operations in ſecret, and concealing every meaſure calculated to put the colonial government on its guard, until the moment that the ſtorm is ready to burſt. The only mode which is left of recovering this poſſeſſion, is an attack upon all the other parts of the enemy's dominions. But ſeveral circumſtances muſt be taken into conſideration, as influencing all ſuch operations.

In the *firſt* place, the power which has been deſpoiled of its colonies by the ſudden operations of its neighbour, may be very inferior in reſources to the aggreſſor, and may find it utterly impoſſible to attack him with any proſpect of ſucceſs. That power may, nevertheleſs, be quite able to maintain its independence at home, and to ſupport its place in the European ſyſtem, from the ſuperior efficacy of primary government, and the advantages of a defenſive poſition. Thus, it would be extremely difficult, perhaps impoſſible, for France to conquer Spain by a regular invaſion of the European peninſula: at all times, however, ſhe has had it in her power to ſeize the Spaniſh territories in the Weſt Indies. If France had taken poſſeſſion of Trinidad and Spaniſh St Domingo, or the Havannah, how could Spain have regained thoſe valuable poſſeſſions by any attack upon France in Europe?

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In like manner, we may now (I apprehend) admit, that the conqueſt of France, by the ſingle efforts of Great Britain, is impoſſible. She has, however, generally had the ſuperiority in the colonies, both of the Eaſt and Weſt Indies: and when ſhe avails herſelf, during war, of this ſuperiority, France can never, by direct invaſion of Great Britain, hope to regain her loſt colonial poſſeſſions.

In the *ſecond* place, although the power whoſe colonies are liable to invaſion, may be a match for any one of its neighbours, and may be fully able to recover the loſt poſſeſſion by diverſion or direct attack, a combination of neighbours may be completely ruinous to its intereſts, and prevent it from attempting thoſe reprifals which might lead to a reſtitution of the conqueſts that have been made. Thus, Portugal could by no chance whatever keep any conqueſt ſhe might make from Spain in America, or from France in the Eaſt: an invaſion of her territories in Europe, would ſhake the cabinet of Liſbon, and cauſe an immediate ſurrender of the ſpoil. But, ſhould Britain unite with Portugal in Europe, to defend her againſt Spain, it is evident, that Spain might be deſpoiled of whatever colonies a ſudden movement had put into the poſſeſſion of her feeble neighbour.

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For theſe reaſons; *firſt*, becauſe the ſtate poſſeſſed of colonies may either not be a firſt-rate power, and unable to ſtand alone; or may be unable to obtain reſtitution by offenſive operations and repriſals, although a firſt-rate power and able to ſtand alone; and, *ſecondly*, becauſe a combination of rival powers may enable any ſtate to extend its colonial poſſeſſions at the expence of a firſt-rate power, which could eaſily have defended or regained its colonies from any ſingle enemy—it is abſolutely neceſſary, that ſome means ſhould be reſorted to for preſerving diſtant and expoſed provinces, beyond the mere unaſſiſted force of the mother country. The means pointed out by the policy of modern Europe, conſiſt in the reſources of foreign policy.

If a ſtate values its colonies, and is unable at all times to defend them, or to reconquer them when loſt, it may, by uniting its intereſts with another power placed in ſimilar circumſtances towards the common enemy, both immediately prevent its own loſs of territory, and in general curb the enemy's ſtrength. If the colonies of Spain are ſeized by Britain, it would be in vain for her to contend with the force of the Engliſh navy; but ſhe may call in the aſſiſtance of France, whoſe colonies and commerce are alſo expoſed to the Britiſh power; whoſe ſituation

tuation and purſuits render her the rival of England. As the dominions of Portugal, too, lye expoſed to the power of Spain, and as Portugal, for this very reaſon, is an ally of Britain, Spain may make repriſals on Portugal, and by increaſing, or threatening to increaſe, her European territory, obtain the reſtoration of her colonial dominions, from that fear of deſtroying the European balance by which every European power is naturally actuated. In fact, ſomething of this kind happened in the Seven-years war. The fineſt ſettlement in the Spaniſh Weſt Indies had been conquered from Spain by Britain. Spain, wholly unable to invade either the Britiſh colonies or the Britiſh dominions in Europe, invaded Portugal, when ſhe found that even the alliance of France was inſufficient to ſave her diſtant territories in that war, ſo uniformly glorious to Great Britain. Portugal, though aſſiſted by Britain, would probably have yielded; but her integrity was ſaved by the ceſſion of the Britiſh conqueſts in America. In like manner, the extent of the colonial conqueſts made from France during the ſame war, both in North America and in the Eaſt and Weſt Indies, and in the German war itſelf, had probably, together with the expoſed ſtate of Portugal, ſome ſhare in procuring for Spain the reſtitution of her moſt valuable iſland; and tended, by diverting the force of the Britiſh

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Britiſh arms to thoſe quarters, and preventing it from falling ſo heavily upon the Spaniſh colonies as it otherwiſe muſt have done, to ſave Portugal, and enable Britain to retain from the enemy whom ſhe had moſt deſpoiled, a deſireable part of the conquered territory. The conqueſts made from Spain were reſtored almoſt as ſoon as they were completed. Had the victories in Canada been gained for the defence, as they were for the conqueſt of a colony, their connexion with the campaigns in Germany would have furniſhed an equally appoſite illuſtration of our general poſition. At any rate, that conqueſt was entirely of a ſubordinate nature. It was undertaken for the defence of the North American colonies; it may be reckoned almoſt as much a defenſive meaſure, or a meaſure of repriſals, as the recapture of Gibraltar would be, or the taking of Guernſey and St Marcou. It would never have been thought of, had it not been neceſſary for the preſervation of the colonies already in our poſſeſſion; and it could not have been made without the aid of the campaigns in Europe. The interference of Great Britain in the affairs of the Continent, was here ſubſervient to her colonial, as well as to her European intereſts. America was defended, rather than conquered, in Germany. France was driven, by the fate of European campaigns, from a natural part of

of the Britiſh colonial empire, of which ſhe had long kept poſſeſſion; and the victories on the St Laurence would in all probability have been inſufficient to transfer the poſſeſſion of that important territory, had France been ſucceſsful in curbing the power of the King of Pruſſia.

If a ſtate is oppreſſed by the combination or aggreſſive alliance of ſeveral of its neighbours, nothing can be more natural, than that it ſhould defend itſelf by the ſame means, and ſeek for the means of reconquering its colonies, by making offenſive leagues againſt the aggreſſor with ſome power, which may in its turn be expoſed to a ſimilar injury from the ſame quarter. Thus, were a union between France and Britain to deprive Portugal of her natural ally, and to prevent her from making repriſals upon France in Europe, for the purpoſe of regaining any of her colonies which France might have conquered, it would be the manifeſt intereſt of Portugal to ſeek the alliance of Spain; and ſhe, on the other hand, being expoſed to a ſimilar danger from the new league, would unqueſtionably unite to force a reſtitution of the conqueſt. Auſtria, too, from her European policy, would be obtained as a party to the alliance, although unconnected with the colonial intereſts; and Holland, both from colonial and European views, would certainly join the common cauſe againſt

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a league, equally hoſtile to all the colonial and all the European intereſts of the different powers. This policy would be imperiouſly dictated to Portugal and thoſe other powers, by a regard for their colonies, admitting that the ſingle force of each nation could reſiſt the new confederacy at home.

But, in the *third* place, it may be for the intereſt of a power poſſeſſing colonies, to turn its views towards foreign policy, although no immediate danger threatens any part of its own colonial dominions. If a weak neighbour is ſtript of colonies, or a weak native power is deſpoiled of provinces in the vicinity of your own colonial ſettlements, you are not, indeed, immediately injured; you are not even directly threatened; but the enemy of your neighbour may attack you next; and the conqueſt of that neighbour's colony has enabled him to ſeize your's with reſiſtleſs force. To wait until the blow is levelled with this increaſed force, would evidently be fooliſh in the extreme: prevent the arm from acquiring ſuch powers, and never truſt to its uſing the new ſtrength with harmleſs moderation. '*Cui plus licet quam debet, ſemper plus velle quam licet.*' This holds of the foreign policy of a ſtate which has no colonial affairs to look after: but it holds doubly of one which has ſuch affairs. A ſtate, which has only its own defence to

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to provide for, may often truſt to its internal reſources, the ſpirit of its ſubjects, and the energy of its adminiſtration, for its defence againſt the increaſed power that an enemy has been ſuffered to accumulate. The defence of a colony or remote province is a much more difficult taſk. We have formerly ſeen, that ſuch ſettlements poſſeſs few of thoſe reſources which enable a ſtate to meet new emergencies and increaſed dangers with extended efforts of national ſtrength, and that the keeping of the country in ſubjection is always part of the difficulty attending its defence. Its ſituation, then, muſt be full of dangers, if the colonial power of a rival has been ſuffered to acquire a ſudden increaſe; or if ſeveral of the native ſtates have been ſuffered to coaleſce under one government, by conqueſt or otherwiſe; or if ſome of the other colonies have fallen a ſacrifice to thoſe powers; or if the colonial ſyſtem of a neighbouring power has been deranged, its relations to the mother country deſtroyed, and an independent community formed in its place. In proportion as colonial government and reſources are always leſs to be depended on than thoſe of primary ſtates; and in proportion as more is left to accident and fortune and ſudden movements of force or manœuvre, in colonial warfare, than in the conteſts of independ-

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ent ſtates: ſo ought the ſtateſman, entruſted with the adminiſtration of colonies, to keep a more watchful eye over the motions of all neighbours and enemies. They have to defend a part of the empire which is naturally feeble, and is connected with the reſt by a fickle tenure: they ought then to ſtrengthen and ſecure it by all thoſe ſubſidiary meaſures ſo neceſſary to prevent any criſis from endangering the weak part. The more healthy members of the body may ſtand alone, and ſtruggle by their native *ſtamina* againſt any unforeſeen combination of accidents; but the feeble limbs need extraneous ſupport, and cannot, without imminent danger, be expoſed to new and critical ſituations. A body in thoſe circumſtances ought never, without abſolute neceſſity, to leave that ſtate of repoſe in which alone its hopes of ſecurity lye; and nothing but a careful and vigilant attention to the affairs and plans of all its neighbours, can ever prevent the neceſſity of active exertions. It muſt not wait till the attack comes on, ſo full of riſks and dangers; but prevent the approach of ſuch a criſis, by leaguing with powerful neighbours, whoſe aſſiſtance may render the adoption of hoſtile meaſures certainly fatal to the enemy. It muſt conſtantly interfere in behalf of the eſtabliſhed balance of power; muſt

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muſt prevent any change whatever from taking place in any part of the ſyſtem; and muſt not permit any neighbour to gain a dangerous increaſe of power, by ſwallowing up a weaker neighbour, leſt this change may bring on that criſis which it has ſo much reaſon to apprehend will prove fatal, and leſt the total or even partial deſtruction of this neighbour may prevent the acquiſition of his alliance and aſſiſtance againſt the common enemy.

It is almoſt unneceſſary to give examples, or to put caſes in illuſtration of theſe remarks. An acquiſition of power by Pruſſia would certainly be dangerous to the Imperial Houſe; yet, provided that acquiſition is not made at her expence, Auſtria might probably be induced, by a ſhare of the ſpoil, as ſhe was in 1774 and 1794, to connive at a change only indirectly hoſtile to her intereſts. Although ſound views of policy certainly dictate the moſt vigilant attention to her rival's affairs, and the moſt unremitting care to prevent any change; yet the effects to be apprehended from every increaſe of the Pruſſian influence, are by no means immediately ruinous to her power, or fatal to her ſafety. The vigour of her government may draw forth new reſources to meet the new dangers; the ſpirit of her people may be roufed, as it was in one part of the ſtate,

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towards Maria Thereſa, by loyalty and almoſt ſuperſtitious attachment to that illuſtrious Houſe, or by an extended portion of civil liberty being wiſely communicated to the maſs of the imperial ſubjects. The reſources already in her poſſeſſion may be economized by ſalutary reforms, or directed with more effect by wiſe changes in the civil and military adminiſtration. The ſtrength which her rival has been allowed to acquire, may in this manner be reſiſted, and a ſtand may be made, until the other ſtates have time to interfere; and Britain may then be ſaved by the reſources of federal power, added to her own exertions of individual force.

But if any ſtate poſſeſſed of valuable colonies, as Great Britain, has incautiouſly or timidly permitted a neighbour to extend his colonial reſources, or a new and independent power to ariſe in the colonial ſyſtem; if, for inſtance, ſhe has allowed France to maſter ſome of the Portugueſe ſettlements; or the French ſlaves or their maſters to erect in any of the iſlands an independent commonwealth, it is evident that the Britiſh colonies cannot be ſaved from ruin by any of thoſe ſudden exertions which a great criſis of affairs is calculated to call forth in primary and free ſtates. A reſiſtance cannot be expected long enough to allow the aid of alliance or diverſion to be called in.

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In the one caſe, the alliance of Portugal is out of the queſtion, ſince Britain did not make a common cauſe with her in the ſeaſon of her difficulties: at any rate, her power to aſſiſt has been either deſtroyed or greatly diminiſhed by the events which have happened; and in the caſe of a new power ariſing in the ſyſtem, the means of making diverſions, or calling in the aid of alliances, are not to be obtained, for the reaſons which I have formerly explained. * It is therefore the undoubted intereſt of Great Britain to prevent every increaſe of power which her rivals in the colonies may attempt to obtain; to prevent the eſtabliſhment of any new community in that quarter, and, in general, to maintain the actual balance of the colonies.

We have hitherto conſidered the neceſſity of foreign policy to a nation poſſeſſed of colonies, in order to defend thoſe colonies, and prevent them from being ſeized by an enemy. But we have frequently had occaſion to obſerve, that total conqueſt is only the greateſt, not the ſole evil which can befal a ſtate. † Extenſive and alarming injury may be done to a nation by unſucceſsful invaſion; and a co-

* Book II. Sect. II.

† Book I. Sect. I.

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lony may be ruined to all intents and purpoſes by a war, which may cover the troops of the mother country with laurels, and terminate in the complete defence, or even in the extenſion of her colonial dominions. It is therefore of importance to take ſuch preventive meaſures as may ſecure the colonies from invaſion. It will often be in the power of a ſtate to avert the war from its own ſettlements, by turning that calamity towards ſome part of the enemy's dominions, or to fight two neighbours againſt each other, one of whom might have annoyed the colonies, if unemployed. Thus, in the ſame manner that colonial territories are highly uſeful to a ſtate, by affording a field in which war may be carried on without prejudice to the body of the nation: ſo, the reſources of foreign policy may be called in to protect thoſe colonies from the dangers of invaſion, and to turn off the attack, or at leaſt exhauſt its fury in foreign conteſts. The ſtates which poſſeſs colonial territories are thoſe which poſſeſs moſt ſuperfluous wealth, and can beſt afford to bribe or ſubſidize allies. It is for their higheſt advantage ſo to employ their reſources, as to ſave their own territories from invaſion. Next to their European territories, their colonies call for the ſame aſſiſtance. They are indeed much more expoſed to attack from their remote poſition and internal

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ternal weakneſs, as well as from the wiſh which every European power has to turn the dangers of war away from the metropolis, and to increaſe its colonial dominions. But at any rate, a ſtate poſſeſſed of ſcattered territory preſents more points of attack; touches in more parts the dominions of rivals or enemies; and, conſequently, has more need of that policy which may enable it to avert the dangers of actual invaſion, by diverſions, alliances, and political intrigues.

We may conclude, then, that, in every point of view, it is ſtill more for the intereſt of a nation poſſeſſing colonies, than for the intereſt of a nation compact and ſituated in one quarter of the world, to regard, with a watchful eye, every proceeding of its neighbours; to interfere in their concerns; to prevent their uſurpation; to maintain the actual balance of power, by checking every attempt at uſurpation or oppreſſion; to keep down the power of rivals, by befriending the weaker ſtates; and, by acquiring a place and footing in the general concerns of the international ſyſtem, to retain the conſtant power of defending all its poſſeſſions in the ſafeſt manner, and preſerve that tranquillity ſo neceſſary to its colonial affairs. If the ſtate in queſtion is an iſland, this concluſion ſtill holds; for, whatever may be ſaid of its

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its foreign relations in Europe, it is not inſulated in the colonies, but forms an integral part of the colonial ſyſtem, as much as if it were ſituated in the heart of the European Continent.

Such are the general outlines of the modern ſyſtem, founded upon a conſtant attention to the preſervation of a balance of power. The ſcience which profeſſes to diſcuſs the general principles of this ſyſtem, and their particular application in detail to the actual ſituation of the European powers, is, of conſequence, next to juriſprudence and police, the moſt important that can occupy the attention of the ſtateſman. It has however been alleged, that this is an inquiry reducible to no general or fixed principles; that it does not deſerve the name of ſcience; that it depends on the caprices of a few individuals, and the variations in their views or meaſures, occaſioned by accidental occurrences. Mr HUME, in particular, at the very time when he recommends the drawing of our concluſions on ſubjects of domeſtic policy, as fine as it is poſſible, adds, 'that in theſe affairs, the inferences reſt on the concurrence 'of a multitude of cauſes, not, as in foreign 'politics, upon accidents, and chances, and 'the caprices of a few perſons.'* It may, however,

* Political Eſſays.

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however, be obſerved, that the very ſame general arguments, ſo irreſiſtibly ſtated by that acute and profound writer to prove that politics may be reduced to a ſcience, † apply as well to the foreign, as to the domeſtic policy of a ſtate. A few more particular remarks on this point may ſerve to ſet it in a light ſufficiently ſtriking; and to illuſtrate, at the ſame time, the general foundation of the ſtability and expediency of the modern ſyſtem.

1. All the governments of Europe have tended uniformly, and not very ſlowly, towards greater freedom and mildneſs, ſince the riſe of the commercial policy of modern times, and the general diffuſion of knowledge by the art of printing. Inſtead of a collection of deſpots, actuated, in all their plans of internal and external arrangement by caprice or accident, the ſyſtem of European princes is now an aſſemblage of deputies from the different nations, which have intruſted them with certain powers and commiſſions for the public good. In the execution of their truſt, indeed, they are not directly accountable to any human authority; but, even in the ſtates where no conſtitutional controul is appointed to the power of the crown, the indirect influence of a numerous and enlightened people is uniformly ſtrong upon the councils

† Eſſay III.

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councils of the monarch. It is always his intereſt to rule by gentle and agreeable means, and to further, by every meaſure in his power, the proſperity of his ſtate. This intereſt, though for a while it may be concealed from his eyes, or overruled by oppoſite paſſions, can never be long hidden from him; but muſt always, in the long-run, force itſelf upon his attention; and be, for the moſt part, the guide of his conduct. The government of the moſt deſpotic princes offers conſtant examples of a ſubmiſſion to that opinion, which can there ſcarcely make itſelf heard; and not a few inſtances of obedience to the voice, which, from its reſiſtleſs power over divans themſelves, has been emphatically called the voice of God. A check is thus provided for the violence of royal paſſions, and a guide or regulator for the movements of even a deſpot's caprice. In the free governments of modern Europe, however, the influence of public opinion is direct; the voice of the nation is acknowledged; and the will of the people is in general obeyed, the only doubt being as to the particular line of conduct which that voice and will directs.

2. As almoſt all princes rule by the advice of miniſters, and muſt execute their decrees by the aſſiſtance of a great number of deputies; the connexion of thoſe men with the people at large;

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large; their responsibility to their country; the odium and personal danger which attaches to a failure of any plan executed by their intervention, whether suggested by their councils or not; must quicken their perception of every national danger; and embolden them to withstand, in the cabinet, any pernicious measure dictated by the ignorance or caprice of their master. Where so many must thus, in some degree, concur in every act of the sovereign power, and so many are responsible, in the eyes of the country, for every abuse in the government, it is manifest that the chances of wilful misrule, through the unprincipled caprice, or rashness, or levity, or passions of a single monarch, are considerably diminished; and that the true interests of the country, in its relations to foreign states, can only be lost sight of or thwarted, during casual intervals, when the ministers are utterly careless of popular opinion in comparison of their master's will, and the tyrant is so shortsighted and so corrupted by his unfortunate situation, as to despise his best interests and disregard his chief danger.

The actual responsibility of every minister to the country, even in governments the most unprincipled and despotic; and the submission of the Sovereign to the will of the people, however debased, is proved by so many striking facts of common

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common notoriety, that it is ſcarcely neceſſary to ſtate them in illuſtration of the foregoing remarks. 'The Soldan of Egypt' (ſays Mr HUME *) 'or the emperor of Rome, might 'drive his harmleſs ſubjects, like brute beaſts, 'againſt their ſentiments and inclinations; but 'he muſt at leaſt have led his Mamelukes or 'prætorian bands, like men, by their opinion.' There is evidently ſomewhat of inconſiſtency between the two parts of this propoſition. For, unleſs thoſe Mamelukes and prætorian guards were ſo numerous as to command the whole ſtate, and ſo ſeparated from the reſt of the commonwealth as to participate in no degree in their feelings, and to be altogether unconnected with their wrongs, it is clear, that in the long-run they muſt have been influenced by the national opinion. At any rate, although, in the *domeſtic* concerns of Egypt or Rome, the intereſts of the two orders might be frequently oppoſed to each other, and thoſe of the people be neglected, there can be no doubt that, in the *external* relations of the ſtate, the two claſſes formed but one body, and the beſt intereſts of the whole were the ſame. The caprice of the ſoldan or emperor, then, could never, for any length of time, ſtifle or diſobey the voice of thoſe

* Eſſay IV. on the Principles of Government.

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thoſe bands whom he had to guide by their good-will, and rule by their opinion; that is, by partly yielding to, and partly directing their wiſhes. In the moſt deſpotic governments of the Eaſt, the fury of a mob frequently obtains a change of miniſters, which is always a change of meaſures. The vizier who commands a vanquiſhed army, who adviſes an unproſperous war, or concludes a diſadvantageous peace, is generally bowſtringed at the firſt murmurs of the mob, and his body thrown to appeaſe them. This is a ſacrifice made by the moſt abſolute of monarchs to the will of the moſt enſlaved people in the world. The power of the Grand Signior, which lays every Muſſulman proſtrate at his feet, does not extend to the enacting of any law which might add to the taxes of the empire. He may cruſh the proudeſt of his baſhaws, and ſqueeze from the richeſt of his officers every particle of their accumulated wealth: he may bowſtring thouſands, whom ancient opinion and religious prejudice has taught to believe that their lives were made for his ſport: but he dares not iſſue any regular ordinance for a ſingle general impoſt; or the ſame people, who, in the ſtrange contradictions of this unnatural ſtate of ſociety, had kiſſed the axe that was lifted againſt their lives, would now raiſe their

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their united voice with a force powerful to ſhake the innermoſt receſſes of the ſeraglio.

When Peter the Great of Ruſſia wiſhed to invert the order of ſucceſſion to the Imperial throne, from an unnatural antipathy to the Tzarowitch, whoſe rights had formerly been in ſome degree acknowledged, he did not think it ſufficient to iſſue an expreſs edict, declaring the power of the Emperor to fix upon any ſucceſſor that he choſe. He began, by accuſtoming the minds of men to ſuch an unſettled and arbitrary mode of inheritance, in caſes of private property. He publiſhed a previous ordinance, obliging each father to bequeath his whole real property to one of his children, leaving him the choice of his heir. This ſingular barbarian, notwithſtanding the many vices that ſtained his character, and the conſtant cruelties in which his reign was ſpent, had the merit of beginning the civilization of his boundleſs empire. He wiſhed to raiſe his ſavage and enſlaved people to the rank of men; and the ordinance which I have mentioned, is an inſtance of ſubmiſſion to their will, from a real or ſuppoſed neceſſity, and from a wiſh to bring about a change in their opinions. The ſucceeding Tzars have adopted a regular mode of receiving the opinions of the moſt reſpectable and enlightened part of their ſubjects, and of impoſing a check on their own

own authority. Upon a new and general law being drawn up, the *ukaſe* containing it is tranſmitted to each of the *governments*, and the viceroys may aſſemble the different *courts* to conſider it. If they unanimouſly diſapprove, they may preſent a *repreſentation* againſt it to the ſenate. The law is reconſidered, and is not obligatory on the realm, until another ordinance has been iſſued confirming the former. * The ſilly paſſion for legiſlation which diſtinguiſhed the Emperor Joſeph II, produced many laws diſagreeable to the people: and although the whole tenor of that weak monarch's reign demonſtrates how little he was diſpoſed to recognize the rights of his ſubjects; yet thoſe obnoxious regulations were generally abrogated almoſt as ſoon as paſſed. While he was dragooning the provinces of the Netherlands into a ſurrender of their moſt ſacred privileges, and purpoſely acting in direct oppoſition to the wiſhes of his conſtituents in the Imperial diet, he could not obtain the acquieſcence of Auſtria (where his power is abſolute by law) in a trifling and abſurd regulation preſcribing the interment of dead bodies in lime-pits: and the diſcontent of that part of his empire obliged him to abandon this idle meaſure. †

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* Tooke's Ruſſian Empire, vol. II. p. 395.

† Mirabeau, Monarchie Pruſſienne, tom. IV. p. 472. 4to edit.

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3. It muſt be evident to every one, that the only reaſon why the theory of international relations has been ſuppoſed incapable of being reduced to fixed principles, is, the apparently ſmall number of men concerned in regulating the external policy of ſtates. Where a great body of people are nearly intereſted, and take a part in each meaſure; where their conſent, advice, or acquieſcence, is neceſſary to the execution of every plan, it is clear that there is always a much ſmaller chance of capricious and irregular operations being carried through, than where one or two individuals only are concerned. It is a remark of Machiavel, diſtinguiſhed by his uſual acuteneſs and profundity, that although, in matters of general diſcuſſion, the people are often miſtaken, yet, in matters reduced to particulars, they are moſt ſenſible and judicious; that the prince is much more apt to be ungrateful, both through avarice and ſuſpicion, than the people; that the multitude is generally both wiſer and more conſtant than the prince; and that thoſe leagues or confederacies are moſt to be truſted which are made with free ſtates, than thoſe which are made with princes. For the demonſtration of theſe important and curious propoſitions, both by reaſoning and illuſtration, I refer my readers to the diſcourſes

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diſcourſes of the Florentine Secretary, * more particularly the *fifty-ninth* chapter of the *firſt* book, which is moſt in conſonance with our preſent reaſonings, and contains as ſtrict a demonſtration of the principle, as any that we meet with in geometry, making allowance for the different nature of the evidence. † As we have ſeen, that in all ſtates, whether free or enſlaved, the regulation of public affairs is, in ſome degree, influenced by public opinion, and that the moſt deſpotic princes are not free from its influence, either directly or through their ſubordinate agents; it may be inferred, that the principles of the Italian ſtateſman are applicable, in ſome meaſure, to the movements of all independent communities; and that the external, as well as internal affairs of ſtates, are the more ſteady, and the more reducible to certain laws, the greater the number of men is, to whoſe management thoſe affairs are entruſted, and the more extenſive the circle is, whoſe opinion or will affects that management.

4. The relative intereſts of different nations are affected by various circumſtances, either unalterable,

* Diſcorſi ſopra la prima deca di T. Livio. Lib. I. cap. 29, 47, 58, & 59.

† Cap. lix. *Di quali confederationi è lega altri ſi può più fidare, è quella fatta con una Republica, è di quella fatta con un principe.*

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alterable, or only ſlowly alterable, in their relative ſituation and domeſtic ſtate. The knowledge and compariſon of thoſe circumſtances, forms the foundation of the ſcience, the principles of which we are now conſidering; and it is very evident that this knowledge muſt be of as difficult acquiſition, as it is important and practically uſeful. For, in order to have a clear view of the foreign relations of any power, it is neceſſary to be acquainted with the circumſtances, not only of that nation, but of all the reſt which compoſe the European commonwealth; to learn accurately their political ſtate; to inveſtigate their national characters and habits; to conſult minutely their ſtatiſtical ſituation:—ſo intimately is the federal power (the *puiſſance federative* of the foreign politicians) blended with the internal force, and the relative poſition with the inſulated ſtate of any country. The temporary circumſtances of the different powers deſerve alſo to be conſidered in a practical point of view:—the court intrigues; leading characters of the military or political departments; and the diſtinguiſhed men in the literary world. Theſe make up, in the great book of politics, what may be called the chapter of accidents; and it is a chapter which perpetually ſets all the inferences and calculations of the other parts at defiance. Except

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cept this laſt head, it is obvious that every other branch of the ſubject is general, and reducible to fixed principles: the other circumſtances which I have enumerated are of a general and invariable nature, or they vary ſlowly and regularly, or according to certain laws, which it is the buſineſs of the political philoſopher to aſcertain. The laſt kind of circumſtances which I mentioned, are, indeed, more irregular, and their diſturbing force is not denied. But, in conſidering the effects of the former, we muſt lay out of view thoſe deranging cauſes, as we demonſtrate (in Dynamics) the properties of the mechanical powers, without taking into view the effects of friction, or the reſiſtance of the medium in which the powers operate. In a practical point of view, thoſe diſturbing cauſes muſt be carefully weighed; and to inveſtigate them, is the buſineſs of the lawgiver, the prince himſelf, his miniſters of ſtate, with his agents in diplomatic affairs: in a word, of the practical politician or ſtateſman; a character of diſtinguiſhed rank in every country, filling at once the moſt dignified and difficult place which man can occupy, and very little deſerving of thoſe ill-tempered invectives which Dr SMITH has been pleaſed to heap upon it, in a fit of peeviſhneſs, not unnatural to one who had ſeen how

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very ſeldom this great and important character has been adequately ſupported. *

That ſuch diſturbing cauſes do exiſt to affect the foreign relations of every ſtate, is no more an argument againſt the ſcience of which we are treating, than the undoubted exiſtence and effects of cauſes exactly ſimilar in the domeſtic policy of ſtates is a reaſon for denying (what no one now thinks of doubting) that the principles of government are reducible to a general and certain ſcience. The degree of vigour inherent in any form of government—the freedom enjoyed by the people—the influence of the privileged orders upon the great engine of the ſtate—all theſe are liable to be affected every moment, and are actually affected by the characters of the leaders in the different departments of the conſtitution. Yet no one, ſince the days of Ariſtotle, has denied, that the doctrines of a monarchical, ariſtocratical, and democratical government are reducible to certain general

* My readers will be amuſed with the little piece of ill humour which this truly great man vents upon the ſtateſman or politician, in the paſſage here alluded to. He calls him '*an inſidious and crafty animal*;' forgetting, ſurely, that Cæſar, Cato, Demoſthenes, Richlieu, and many others, who have made the world tremble at their names, or revere their memory, muſt be ranged in this very claſs.—*Wealth of Nations*, Book iv. cap. 2.

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general principles; and that the nature of government, in general, is a ſubject of ſcientific inquiry.

In fact, the foreign affairs of nations are much leſs apt to be influenced by accidental events, than is generally imagined. The death of a civil or military chief, who had ſupported the greatneſs of a ſtate, by the vigour and wiſdom of his councils, or the glory of his arms, is ſeldom, if ever, a cauſe of great change in the relative importance of that country. Great men riſe in certain circumſtances; they are diſciplined in particular ſchools; they train up ſucceſſors for themſelves; they are called forth by certain emergencies in public affairs. This is more particularly the caſe in great ſyſtems, either civil or military—in the extenſive governments, or vaſt regular armies of modern times, all the operations of which are combined, and mutually dependent one upon another. As theſe can only be carried on by the united exertions of many perſons of the ſame habits and caſt of talents, their ſucceſs muſt always depend on the union of men whoſe abilities and experience in their arts are extenſive. If the general or the ſtateſmen falls, his place will be filled by ſome of thoſe whoſe talents have aſſiſted him in ſubordinate branches of employment; and the conſtant demand for merit, in a certain department, will generally excite men

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to apply their attention to the acquiſition of the excellence ſo much wanted, and ſo ſplendidly rewarded. Great occaſions draw into public life ſuch men as have long been labouring to fit themſelves for their ſtation; and new talents, new powers, frequently ſpring up in a man's mind, when he is placed in a ſituation of preeminent difficulty and ſplendour ſufficient to call them forth. The great object of every nation ſhould be, to remove every impediment or check that may prevent ſuch men from riſing into the ſtations for which their natural or acquired faculties render them fit. Under a free government, the reſtrictions upon the riſe of real merit are much fewer than under a deſpotiſm; and the chance of preferment is extended to a much wider circle. In thoſe countries, then, much leſs conſequence may be attached to the exiſtence, or to the loſs of a particular man. It is ſeldom that we meet with Fleurys, or Turgots, or Bernſtoffs, or Haſſans: But a Walpole, or a Pitt, is, happily for mankind, frequently reproduced in the courſe of an age. Thus, the appearance of thoſe illuſtrious characters, in whoſe hands the fates of nations are placed, is much leſs regulated by accident than is generally ſuppoſed, more eſpecially in modern times and in free ſtates. It follows, that, even in that branch of foreign policy which I have denominated the chapter of accidents,

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accidents, ſome principles may be traced; and that leſs is to be imputed to blind hazard than moſt men are at firſt apt to imagine. May we be allowed to hope that the time is approaching, (not rapidly, or by violent changes, but ſlowly and quietly, like all thoſe arrangements of nature which tend to the ſubſtantial improvement of the ſpecies), when the eſtabliſhment of equal rights, and rational ſyſtems of regular government over the whole of Europe, ſhall diminiſh yet farther the conſequences attached to the caprices and accidental fates of individuals, and ſhall reduce to complete order all the circumſtances that affect the intercourſe of nations; ſo as to ſubject their whole movements to certain general and invariable laws, to reduce every eccentricity of courſe, and to correct all accidental inequalities or alterations in the ſyſtem. *

I have now finiſhed the general obſervations that I purpoſed to premiſe, upon the nature and firſt principles of the ſcience which treats of international policy. I proceed to conſider ſome of the propoſitions in which the doctrine of the balance of power is contained. I have, in the foregoing ſtatements, inſiſted the more at

* See the general obſervation which Mr Stewart has made upon Mr Hume's doctrine, in his very profound and elegant work on the '*Philoſophy of the Human Mind*,' Chap. IV. ſect. 8.

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at large on the poſſibility of reducing the external policy of nations to certain general principles; becauſe, beſides the direct negation of this propoſition by Mr HUME and others, it has been very much the cuſtom of inferior politicians, and of the common run of mankind, more particularly in Great Britain, to decry ſuch ſpeculations as vain and illuſive; to hold them up as objects fit only for the pedantic ſtatiſt of Germany and Holland; and to deſcribe them as points that ſhould be ſettled by the finical, and too often contemptible characters, who are generally the repreſentatives of the greateſt nations, and who have brought a ſort of ridicule upon the very name of diplomacy. The graveſt ſubject that can occupy the human mind (intimately connected indeed with our preſent inquiry, though not altogether of the ſame kind with it), the *law of nations*, has been expoſed to a ſimilar contempt. Monteſquieu himſelf, lawyer and hiſtorian as he was, has, with his uſual paſſion for an epigram, groſsly miſrepreſented a ſubject as important and refined as any in his own department of municipal juriſprudence. He ſeriouſly explains 'the foundation of international law,' by telling us, 'that the whole ſyſtem is a ſet of obvious corollaries to a maxim in ethics—That in war 'nations ſhould do as little injury, and in peace 'as much good, to each other, as is conſiſtent 'with

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'with their individual safety.' Without asking whether it is possible that the author of this witticism should ever have heard of the insults of flags, the precedence of states, nay, the whole admitted causes of justifiable war, and admitting that all the parts of the system may be strained, so as to come under the general proposition; we may be allowed to remark, with great deference to so high a name, that such observations are extremely useless and unsatisfactory; that we learn from this remark nothing which can give the slightest hint of the nature of public law; that it is as instructive as if one ignorant of mathematics were to say, 'the whole of this troublesome science consists of obvious corollaries from a very easy 'axiom—whatever is, is.' In this manner might all science be simplified; and learners, who knew what '*corollary*' was, might be charmed to hear, that they had but one proposition to learn and remember, and that all the rest was '*corollary*' deduced from it.

I trust that the remarks already stated, will suffice to evince how mistaken are all such views of foreign policy or international law; that those sciences will appear strictly reducible to certain general principles, and leading to important applications; that those subjects will be found to be highly refined and delicate, and

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and as fully deſerving of minute inveſtigation as any within the range of the human intellect. As we proceed, farther illuſtrations of theſe remarks will occur, to ſet their truth in a ſtill ſtronger point of view.

1. *Treaties* or *public pactions* are the ſolemn and authentic expreſſions of certain agreements, which the governments of friendly or neutral powers have entered into for their mutual advantages. In ſo far as refers to our preſent ſubject, they are chiefly of three kinds, *amicable*, *defenſive*, *offenſive and defenſive*. The firſt are ſimple ceſſations of hoſtilities; the next are agreements of mutual aſſiſtance in caſe of attack from a third power; and the laſt are more ſtrict unions of intereſt, for the accompliſhment of certain objects mutually beneficial. The ſecond are ſeldom pure and unmingled. Many treaties bear the name of defenſive, which, by ſecret articles, or more commonly by mutual underſtanding, and not unfrequently by the expreſs tenor of the ſtipulations, are ſtrictly of the third kind; and, in general, a paction *bona fide* defenſive, has a tendency to bring about one of the more intimate and effectual deſcription.

The monopolizing and jealous ſpirit of mercantile policy, in modern times, has added to the

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the kinds of treaties juſt now mentioned, a fourth, known by the name of *commercial;* of which the object is, to ſettle a certain rate of trade between the high contracting parties; or (what comes to the ſame thing) to grant each other certain privileges of buying and ſelling, refuſed to other ſtates. Theſe treaties are in every caſe abſurd; they are meant to reſtrain that which ought in its nature to be free, and to be regulated only by the unreſtricted operations of private traders: they relate to ſubjects in which no government ought ever to concern itſelf: they are only tolerable when their object is the abolition of reſtrictions formerly impoſed by fooliſh rulers, or gradually ariſing from the prejudices of the people.

All treaties have been expoſed to the invectives and ſarcaſms of thoſe who do not duly appreciate the nature of the inſtitution. They are bits of parchment, and may be torn; they are made by men of peace in their cloſets, and may be violated by ſoldiers in the field; they are deeds, by which ſtates affect to bind themſelves, while no court of public law exiſts, in which the party failing may be compelled to perform his part; they are intended to check the ambition of princes or commonwealths, but they are to be obſerved by thoſe who feel the checks, and may in a moment throw them off.

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off. 'Give me,' ſaid Prince Eugene, in the true ſpirit of theſe reaſons—'Give me,' ſaid the General, when he ſaw that his allies were ſlow to fulfil conventions made againſt their obvious intereſts, and refuſing to gratify his ambition, againſt their own ſafety and beyond their means—'Give me a battalion of ſoldiers, 'they will do more than a thouſand treaties.' If all ſtates were ruled by general officers, this ſentiment would indeed be accurately true. In that caſe, a corporal would be a much more important perſonage than a publiciſt or an ambaſſador; but he would alſo be more intereſting than a municipal judge or juriſconſult: for all municipal law, as well as all public law, would yield to the truncheon and the bayonet. The ſame ſentiment would hold good, alſo, of all ſuch treaties as thoſe entered into about the time of Eugene, and thoſe to which he evidently alludes—treaties evidently diſadvantageous to one of the contracting parties, and wholly beneficial to the others. But it happens that, in the preſent ſtate of ſociety, Generals receive their commiſſion to act, and their orders to deſiſt, from men ſtrongly intereſted in the preſervation of pacific relations; in the maintenance of the national faith; in the exiſtence of a public code, to which all parties may at all times appeal.

If,

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If, by ſuch declamatory arguments, it is meant to demonſtrate, that treaties will not of themſelves be ſufficient to maintain peace or alliances—to preſerve the independence of ſtates—to inſure ſucceſs in war—we muſt admit the poſition; for certainly no one ever imagined that an ambaſſador's ſeal and ſubſcription communicated to the ſkin of a dead ſheep the faculty of tranquillizing, or rouſing the public mind, levying armies, gaining battles, and taking towns. One would truſt more to its powers in the hands of a drummer, than of a ſtateſman, to produce thoſe effects. But that ſuch ſolemn conventions as lead to treaties, ſuch diſcuſſions as attend them in the nations contracting, ſuch ratifications as finiſh them, ſuch ideas of pledge and form as they are uniformly ſuppoſed to convey—that all thoſe circumſtances have a moſt powerful influence, cannot by any one be called in queſtion, who is acquainted with the hiſtory of man, or the nature of the human mind. Independent of the ſpirit, indeed, with which thoſe conventions are made, the mere paction is but a bit of parchment. Independent of the ſpirit which extorted the Magna Charta and Habeas Corpus, thoſe records of the freedom and ſpirit of our anceſtors would be moſt unavailing to the liberties of the preſent generation. Both the one and other

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other are conventional ſigns—legal modes of expreſſing a bargain—certain ſolemn acts, the performance of which intimates to the world that certain intentions were perfected in the minds of the parties at the time—certain deeds, leaving a record which may refreſh the memory of the parties, and to which the party fulfilling may appeal. Neither the treaties of Weſtphalia (now, unhappily, a matter of hiſtory), nor the Magna Charta, can be enforced directly by the mandate of any human court, ſuperior to both parties. If the circumſtances which gave riſe to the latter were materially altered, it would become obſolete, as the former has already become. While no material change takes place, they ſtand on record before the whole world, to animate the parties contracting —to check them in their conduct on their honour and good faith—to ſhew the ſurrounding nations what compacts have been made—and to hold up to execration thoſe that break them.

The foundation of the ſtability of every treaty is the mutual advantage of the parties. It is a juſt remark of the Florentine Secretary, that, even after the moſt unequal conteſt, no peace between nations can ever be ſolid, by which one nation gains much more than the other. If the one gains much real good, and the

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the other only obtains ſafety from total ruin, the peace will be broken; either by the former, as ſoon as her power is recruited ſufficiently to complete the work of conqueſt; or by the latter, as ſoon as ſhe has breathed a little, and can hope to regain her loſt ground. All ſuch fooliſh treaties are rather conventions of truce, than of peace. They were one great means of conqueſt uſed by the Romans: they are rendered leſs frequent in modern times, by the principles of the balancing ſyſtem.

The obſervation of Machiavel may be extended to alliances in general between nations. Leagues, particularly thoſe of a nature both offenſive and defenſive, have generally owed their inſtability to a neceſſary diſunion of parties, ariſing from each poſſeſſing views radically incompatible with thoſe of the others; views, properly ſpeaking, ſecondary to the main object of the convention, but more intereſting and more binding to the individual party, than any views of the common cauſe.

The remarks made above, apply to thoſe ſubſidiary obligations, entered into by nations not ſtrictly concerned in the ſtipulations, in which the acceding powers guarantee the treaty or bargain to ſupport the party fulfilling againſt all infractions committed by the other. Theſe are generally modified by the diſpoſition

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of all parties at the time when the requiſition to perform is made to the parties guarantees. They are the refinement of the modern ſyſtem of interference.

2. The circumſtances in the relative ſituation of the European powers; their proximity, their conſtant intercourſe, their rivalry, and the uniform deſire that all princes have to extend their dominions, render it abſolutely neceſſary that no one power ſhould view with indifference the domeſtic affairs of the reſt, more particularly thoſe affairs which have a reference to the increaſe or conſolidation of national reſources.

For the purpoſe of acquiring ſuch information, the inſtitution of ambaſſadors has been adopted, or of *privileged ſpies*, as they have been called by witty men, with much the ſame propriety of ſpeech that would mark the perſonage who ſhould be pleaſed to call Generals maſter-butchers, or Judges hangmen. From the inſtitution of ambaſſadors, an eſſential and peculiar part of the modern ſyſtem, have reſulted the moſt important conſequences—a conſtant intercourſe between the two governments; frequent opportunities of detecting and preventing hoſtile meaſures or artifices; and ſtill more frequent occaſions of avoiding ruptures, by timely complaint, and explanation or redreſs. The natural

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natural effects of the ſyſtem to which this matter has been reduced, are certainly the prevention of wars, and the ſyſtematizing of the grand art of pacification.

The relative influence of the national changes that happen in one part of Europe, upon the proceedings of the other parts, might be illuſtrated by a variety of facts from modern hiſtory. That influence ſeems to be wholly independent of all theory or ſyſtem—it is founded on natural circumſtances: and I have formerly ſtated ſeveral of theſe, particularly the hiſtory of ſtanding armies, and of the formation of the ſtates which compoſe the great national community of modern Europe. *

The right of national interference (a late refinement of this right of proportional improvement) has, like all other valuable and ſacred principles, been called in queſtion. It has been denied, that the total overthrow of all regular government in the greateſt nation of Europe; the abolition of every ſalutary reſtraint upon the operations of the multitude; the erection of a ſtandard to which every thing rebellious and unprincipled might repair; the open avowal of anarchy, atheiſm, and oppreſſion as a public creed:—it has been denied

* Book II. Sect. III.

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that the exiſtence of this grand nuiſance gave the vicinage (to uſe Mr Burke's appoſite illuſtration) a right to interfere. Yet it is difficult to conceive what national changes, except the introduction of the peſtilence, could give a better right to the neighbourhood to reject all intercourſe with ſo infected a maſs as France then was. And if ſuch defenſive meaſures were abſolutely neceſſary, it is evident that the ſlighteſt aggreſſion on the part of this neighbour, juſtified that open war, which was ſo loudly preſcribed by the ſlighteſt chance of its leading to a reſtoration of order. The immenſe acquiſition of power which the French government acquired by the revolution; the general levy and arming that immediately took place—would have juſtified all neighbours in extending their reſources, upon the common principles of the modern ſyſtem. Now, if this increaſe of French power had taken place on the Spaniſh, inſtead of the North ſide of the Pyrennees; if it had been, not a ſudden augmentation of internal reſources, but an increaſe of territory and power by conqueſt—no one doubts the propriety of an immediate interference: nay, if this increaſe had only been in contemplation, no one would heſitate to conſider the formation of the plan as ſufficient cauſe for war:—So thought our forefathers at leaſt, when

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when they attacked Louis XIV. a hundred years ago. But, what difference is there, as to foreign ſtates, whether ſuch an augmentation of power takes place at the expence of the Spaniſh branch of the Bourbons, or at the coſt of the other branch of that illuſtrious houſe? whether this ſudden change in the aſpect of one powerful rival neighbour is the conſequence of her foreign conqueſts, or of her rapid internal changes? whether the addition is drawn from the pillaged provinces of Spain, or the overthrow of all the peaceful inſtitutions, and the plunder of all the wealthy orders at home? When ſuch a ſudden and prodigious increaſe of reſources takes place in one country, as can only be matched by a ſimilar revolution developing equal powers in the neighbouring nations, thoſe neighbours are exactly in this dilemma;—either they muſt wade through all manner of turbulence and danger, to the ſudden poſſeſſion of reſources ſufficient to balance this new power; or they muſt ſubmit to this new power. One mode of eſcape only remains from alternatives equally cruel: they may unite againſt this common nuiſance; they may interfere, and abate it. If France had conquered the kingdoms of Leon and Caſtile, who doubts that Britain and Auſtria might have attacked her, though neither of them were friends of

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Spain? But this was not abſolutely neceſſary; for, firſt, they might have perhaps ſaved themſelves by defenſive alliance, and the peaceable improvement of their internal reſources; or, ſecondly, they might certainly have acquired in Holland, or Denmark, or Spain itſelf, an extent of territory equal to that gained by France. But the former meaſure would have been dangerous; the latter both dangerous and unjuſt. In like manner, Britain and Auſtria might have met the criſis of their affairs, ariſing from the new and ſudden acquiſition of reſources which France made at the revolution. Firſt, they might have united defenſively, as ancient allies, and worked all the while to improve their internal reſources; or, ſecondly, they might have revolutionized, and followed the French example. The firſt, however, of thoſe plans would have been dangerous; the latter, both dangerous and unprincipled. One alternative remained; — a union againſt the unheard-of nuiſance.

I heſitate not, then, to lay it down as a principle applicable to this extreme caſe, that, whenever a ſudden and great change takes place in the internal ſtructure of a ſtate, dangerous in a high degree to all neighbours, they have a right to attempt, by hoſtile interference, the reſtoration of an order of things which may be

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be ſafe to themſelves; or, at leaſt, to counterbalance, by active aggreſſion, the new force ſuddenly acquired. If a highwayman pulls out a piſtol from his boſom, ſhall we wait till he loads and preſents it, before we kill and diſarm him? Shall we not attack him with like arms, if he diſplays ſuch weapons, whether he takes them from his own ſtores, or ſeizes them from ſome other perſon in our ſight? * We do not attack a neighbouring nation for plundering or conquering a third power, becauſe we wiſh to avenge or redreſs the injury, but becauſe we ſhall be ourſelves affected by its conſequences. Shall we be leſs injured by the ſame conſequences, becauſe the dangerous power of doing us miſchief is developed from receſſes within, and not forcibly ſnatched from without?

That ſuch a principle as we have now been conſidering, is liable to limitations, no one will deny: it is indeed only applicable to extreme caſes. It would be going too far, to aſſert that the right of interference is applicable to the caſe of gradual improvement, however great, in any nation; nor to the caſe of that more ſudden amelioration which national reſources may receive

* The doctrine of the balance of power is deduced by Vatell, from ſimilar grounds. *Vide* Droit des Gens, Liv. iii. chap. 3. § 44. & ſeqq.

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from the operation of a ſalutary reform, or a uſeful law, or a beneficial change of rulers. I only think the right competent in caſes of ſudden and great aggrandizement, ſuch as that of France in 1790; and then, I maintain, that, if it endangers the ſafety of the neighbouring powers, no manner of importance ſhould be attached to the nature of thoſe circumſtances from whence the danger has originated. Indeed, it may even be ſuſpected, that the eſſential, though not always avowed principles of modern policy, would bear us out in a wider interpretation of the propoſition. It would appear, that many of the alliances of ſtates, formed with a view to check the growing power of a common rival, and always ending in offenſive meaſures, have been formed without any pretext of violence having actually been committed by the dreaded power, or being apprehended from that quarter; and without any conſideration whatever of the ſource from whence this dangerous ſtrength has been derived, whether from external acquiſitions (the moſt common caſe), or from the ſudden developement of internal reſources, or from the gradual increaſe of national ſtrength while neighbouring ſtates were more ſlowly increaſing or were loſing force. This increaſe it is—this comparative ſtrength, which excites the ſalutary jealouſy of modern councils towards neighbouring

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bouring powers. The pretexts, indeed, for war, have been various; but the cauſe of ſuch wars has generally been the ſame. The pretext has been adopted in conformity to ancient uſage or prejudices, or to humour the feelings of the multitude, and cauſe them to take part, by working on their paſſions much more powerfully than if the real cauſe were ſtated. The great maxim has generally been, '*Obſta principiis*'—'*Venienti occurrite morbo.*' I recommend it as a general watchword to all nations placed in the European community; to thoſe, more eſpecially, who are neighbours of Pruſſia and France; above all, I recommend it to the greater powers of Europe, the natural guardians of the great commonwealth; and to this country in particular, whoſe preeminent rank among them gives her a title to interfere for others, as well as for her own immediate ſafety. To her, I would addreſs a language not unknown to her children in former times—the language of the balancing ſyſtem:

'*Tu regere imperio populos, Romane, memento;*
'*Hæ tibi erunt artes; paciſque imponere morem,*
'*Parcere ſubjectis, et debellare ſuperbos.*'

VIRG. ÆN.

3. It has been urged, as a glaring inconſiſtency in a ſyſtem which has for its profeſſed object

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object the preſervation of peace, that, according to its principles and technical language, certain nations are denominated *natural enemies*, and others *natural allies*. A little attention to the meaning of the propoſition, in which theſe terms are uſed, will at once demonſtrate the futility of the criticiſm, and lead us to one of the moſt general and fundamental doctrines of modern international policy. It is not meant by this phraſeology to aſſert, that ſome nations ought always to view each other with ſuſpicion and enmity. The intention of ſuch a form of expreſſion is merely to ſtate a very general, and, unfortunately, an unqueſtionable fact in the hiſtory of the human ſpecies—that nations placed in certain circumſtances, are uniformly found to entertain towards each other ſentiments of rivalry and animoſity. The balancing ſyſtem preſcribes the means of diſarming this bad principle in our nature of its deſtructive tendency, by teaching us to conſider other nations as our natural friends, and by making the members of each claſs unite, ſo as to act ſyſtematically with a view to the preſervation of national peace. A few obvious conſiderations will ſhow what thoſe principles are, and will compriſe the more general doctrines of the practical part of the balancing ſyſtem.

The circumſtances which are uniformly found to conſtitute natural enmity between nations,

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tions, are threefold; *proximity* of ſituation, *ſimilarity* of purſuits, and near *equality* of power. From the oppoſite cauſes ariſe the natural indifference or relative neutrality of ſtates; a reaſonable *diſtance*, *diverſity* of objects, and conſiderable *inequality* of reſources; while natural alliance reſults from the common enmity produced by a concurrence of the three cauſes firſt mentioned in the relations of two or more powers towards the ſame third power.

But it may often happen that a ſtate is involved in hoſtile relations with another of which it is not the natural enemy, either from being the accidental ally of a third power primarily the enemy of this ſecond; or from being natural ally to this third power, in conſequence of their common relations of enmity towards ſome fourth or fifth power. Hence, indeed, ariſes the intricacy, if it has any, of the balancing ſyſtem; and hence the multiplied relations of each individual power with all the reſt, ſo that no one can be permitted to remain, for a moment, an indifferent ſpectator of what is paſſing in the moſt remote parts of the European commonwealth. A few examples will illuſtrate the foregoing propoſition. Theſe illuſtrations contain the theory of what is called, in practice, the European balance. The utility and application of ſuch ſpeculations may, like their object, be temporary and local; the principles are of all times and

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and places; they are regular, fixed, and general.

In conformity to the propoſition above enunciated, France is ſaid to be the natural enemy of Great Britain. Theſe ſtates, ſeparated by a narrow channel, are of ſufficient relative ſtrength to be mutually formidable; the one, by the extent and compactneſs of her territory, and by her large and uſeful population; the other, by her immenſe wealth, the defence afforded by her inſular ſituation, and the myriads of her fleets which cover the ocean. They are both engaged in ſimilar purſuits; becauſe the circumſtances of their ſituation are ſimilar. The iſland, however, is more adapted to commercial occupations, by the genius of her inhabitants, the nature of her produce, and the extent of her ſea-coaſt; from whence has reſulted a habit of application to manufactures, navigation, and trade, and, in conſequence, ſuperior ſkill in the arts, and greater extent of trading capital. The other country, eminent alſo in thoſe points of view, is, however, ſo far inferior to the iſland, that her attention has, for above a century, been conſtantly directed to emulate ſo valuable a ſuperiority; while Britain, finding herſelf deficient in direct power to ſway the continental ſtates of Europe, otherwiſe than by intrigue and gold, has returned France the compliment of attempting

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attempting to beat, on her own element, the natural miſtreſs of the European continent. From this reciprocal inferiority, and conſequent emulation, has ariſen that ſpirit of rivalry, which will, it is to be feared, permanently alienate from each other, the two nations moſt formed to love and eſteem each other; beſt adapted to entertain cloſe and profitable relations of commerce; and able, by their union, to ſecure the laſting peace, and ſway uncontrouled the ſceptre of the civilized world. Unhappily the natural paſſions of the people, and the ambition of their rulers, have taught both to 'bear no 'brother near the throne;' to ſuffer no equal in trade, in arts, or in learning; and to divide, by their irreconcileable enmity, the other powers in the ſyſtem of which that enmity has become the corner ſtone.

Holland, from her proximity to Britain, her extenſive commerce, and her ſplendid reſources of national wealth, would have been our natural enemy, had France been out of the queſtion. But as Holland lay ſtill nearer to that ambitious power, with whoſe purſuits ſhe interfered at leaſt as much, not to mention the jealouſy excited by her democratic government and Calviniſtic religion, it became her intereſt to league with the enemies of her formidable neighbour. Accordingly, in all the wars of the two laſt centuries, Holland has been found

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found on the ſide of England, with only two exceptions;—the impolitic conteſt of Charles II. when he was in the pay of France, and the jealous enmity of Holland in the end of the American war, as anomalous in Dutch politics, as the war of Charles had been in the hiſtory of Great Britain. After the peace of 1782, the breach was kept open, chiefly by the ſucceſſes of the republican party, until the year 1787; when, by one of the moſt ſkilful and ſucceſsful interferences in continental affairs, which the balancing ſyſtem has ever accompliſhed, the Stadtholder's power was re-eſtabliſhed, French influence deſtroyed, and the Dutch reſtored to their natural alliance with England.

The preſent alliance of the French and Batavian republics is obviouſly no anomalous caſe: it is in every reſpect the reſult of a conqueſt, retained, as it was made, by the force of arms and the influence of factious intrigue. The day is perhaps not diſtant, when even the preſent ſlight appearances of national independence will be thrown off, and the abſorption of the United Provinces into the modern empire of the Franks, be (ſhall we ſay?) the laſt great ſacrifice to the ſweeping principle of '*Arrondiſſement*,' one of the moſt ſignal inventions of the 18th century.

Next to France, the greateſt power on the continent of Europe reſides in the Houſe of Auſtria,

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Auſtria, from the union of its hereditary dominions in Hungary, Bohemia, Auſtria, the frontier provinces, and the late acquiſitions in Poland and the Venetian territories, with the Imperial crown, which confers an authority, chiefly of indirect influence, over the princes of the empire. The hereditary loſſes of this power in the late war, have on the whole been trifling; but ſhe has loſt much in the power of ſwaying the affairs of Italy, much of her influence in the Germanic affairs, and ſtill more of relative force, by the aſtoniſhing increaſe of France, and the augmentation alſo of Pruſſia (her natural rival in Germany), to one or other of whom, or their dependants, has accrued every thing loſt by Auſtria. After all, the Auſtrian power is great and formidable. It would be the greateſt and moſt formidable in Europe, were its extenſive territories ſomewhat more compact, ſo as to derive full advantage from their central poſition; were it to acquire a ſmall addition of ſea-coaſt in the Adriatic, ſo as to have eaſier vent for its numerous and coſtly products in the foreign markets; were its vaſt reſources called forth and wielded by a better formed government, or a wiſer race of ſtateſmen, ſo as to take every advantage of the fineſt climates, richeſt mountains, moſt fertile valleys, and greateſt variety of hardy ſubjects; and, more eſpecially, were its armies,

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the firſt in the world, organized upon a better plan, ſo as to place at their head younger leaders: Were theſe advantages (the moſt of which may be acquired) added to its immenſe natural reſources, Auſtria might be deemed the firſt power in Europe, and dreaded by all her neighbours as reſiſtleſs in the ſcale.

The circumſtances which render Auſtria the natural enemy and counterpoiſe of France, render her alſo the natural ally of Britain, and the great continental ſupport of the Britiſh influence in Europe. In proportion to the enmity between thoſe leading powers, this natural union between Britain and Auſtria has always been more or leſs cloſe, ſince the ſeparation of the Spaniſh from the Auſtrian branch of the houſe. It has experienced only one remarkable intermiſſion, and that a ſlight one, during the peace-loving adminiſtrations of Fleury and Walpole. In the war which ſucceeded the fall of Walpole's miniſtry, France ſiding with the Bavarian Emperor, England naturally took the part of the Empreſs-Queen, at that time almoſt cruſhed by the union of her enemies. The ſingular alliance of 1756, the *chef-d'œuvre* of Kaunitz, and, according to the French politicians, the greateſt error France ever committed, deranged, for a while, the natural relations of the continental powers. Britain was not thrown out of amity with Auſtria; but

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but Auſtria, ceaſing to be the enemy of France, ceaſed alſo to be the ally of Britain. Yet ſtill, it is worthy of remark, that the aſſiſtance given by us to Pruſſia during the Seven-years war, in conſequence of France ſiding againſt Frederic II. *, was pointed, not againſt Auſtria or Ruſſia, his two moſt formidable enemies, by checking whom we could at once have ſaved him, but againſt our natural enemy alone, to our deſire of oppoſing whom, Pruſſia owed the aid ſhe received from us.

Practical ſtateſmen, as well as ſpeculative writers on political ſubjects, have been much divided in opinion upon the ſoundneſs of that policy which dictated to the French government the adoption of Kaunitz's ſcheme of alliance. The moſt enlightened politicians in the reigns of Louis XV. & XVI. have loudly decried that ſyſtem, as deſtructive to the military, as well as the federal power of France: they have attributed to the treaty 1756, and the conſequent military operations of France during the Seven-years war, not only the im-

* *Vide* Hiſt. de la Guerre de Sept-ans, vol. I. cap. 1. where that Prince himſelf details the reaſons that induced him to undertake the war. One of theſe was, the certainty of both England and France *not* taking the ſame ſide; whence, he could count on the aſſiſtance of one of thoſe powers.

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mediate loſs of men and money at that criſis, all for the benefit of Auſtria, without any good to the concerns of France; but alſo the ſubſequent aggrandizement of the Auſtrian houſe, already too powerful, by the exhauſtion of Pruſſia, and the valuable acquiſition of territory from Poland, the natural ally of France and ſcene of French influence, whoſe deſtruction they have not heſitated to impute to the Auſtrian ſyſtem. The advocates of the alliance, on the other hand, without denying the loſſes experienced by France during the war, and the ſtill greater evils ariſing to her from the Poliſh cataſtrophe, have aſcribed thoſe conſequences to the maladminiſtration of French affairs in the Seven-years war, and during the whole interval between the peace of Hubertſburg and the Revolution. They have maintained, that the wiſeſt policy which France could poſſibly have adopted, was, the ſecuring of a long peace by an alliance with her natural enemy. They have argued this point upon much the ſame grounds as thoſe choſen by the defenders of Walpole and Fleury; and contended, that no danger whatever could have ariſen to France from the alliance of 1756, if the adminiſtration of her domeſtic affairs had been as wiſe and energetic as the management of her foreign relations at that æra.

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It appears to me (although I cannot now enter into the diſcuſſion), that the doctrine of the former claſs of ſtateſmen, with a few limitations, is by far the ſoundeſt. All the benefits of repoſe might have been gained by France, although ſhe had never entered into the defenſive treaty of 1755, or the ſubſequent conventions of 1756 and 1757. The chance of France being attacked, was chimerical. By whom, but Auſtria or England, could ſhe poſſibly be annoyed? If by the former, of courſe the defenſive treaty was abſurd: if by the latter, clearly Auſtria could never aſſiſt her; ſince the Britiſh forces would only attack by ſea, or by a littoral warfare, or in the American and Eaſt Indian colonies. But Auſtria was liable to attack from that power which had deſpoiled her of her fineſt provinces a few years before. Beſides, the object of the treaty turned out to be (according to the remarks on conventions which we formerly made), not defenſive, but offenſive. France was in fact to aſſiſt Auſtria with 24,000 men to recover Sileſia, and humble the houſe of Brandenburg, or diſmember its dominions. After the war broke out, the ſtipulation was forgotten; that is, the terms were changed, as is very commonly the caſe; and, inſtead of 24,000, France ſent 100,000 men, to be defeated by the Britiſh and Pruſſian

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armies. How could ſhe poſſibly gain by ſuch an object, though completely ſucceſsful in attaining it? She was fighting for Auſtria, conquering, without reimburſement or reward, for her profit, and, if defeated, ſharing her loſſes. *

The vicinity of Spain to France, their diſtance from the reſt of Europe, and the compactneſs of their territories, which renders them, as it were, parts of one great peninſula, might have rendered them natural enemies, had not Holland and Britain been ſituated in much the ſame predicament, with reſpect to France, on the north. Beſides, the inſulated poſition of Spain, joined to her great inferiority of ſtrength from political and moral cauſes, makes her naturally dependent on her powerful neighbour. But, above all, the ſeparation of the Spaniſh from the Imperial crown and the Auſtrian dominions, and the conſequent diſputes between the courts of Vienna and Madrid about the dominion of Italy, have thrown Spain into the arms of the natural enemy of the houſe of Auſtria. I do not enumerate, among theſe cauſes, the family compact, which ſo cloſely united the two branches of the houſe of Bourbon, or the blood relationſhip

* Note K k.

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tionſhip which was the cauſe of that convention. Thoſe circumſtances may have drawn cloſer the natural ties of alliance between France and Spain: but, ſtill, they are to be viewed as accidental and ſubordinate. If it was the evident intereſt of Spain to depend on France, and of France to rule over Spain, the death or marriage of one of the reigning branches, could never for a moment have prevented the union of the nations. The laſt-will of Charles II. indeed, ſet all Europe in arms, to break this formidable union. But does any one imagine, that had Alberoni ſucceeded in ſtealing this document, the other powers would have ſhut their eyes on the ſtrides which Louis was making to obtain dominion over Europe by playing off Spain againſt Auſtria? Or, had the combined enemies of that ambitious prince been prudent enough to accept of the terms extorted by his humiliation, and terminated the Grand Alliance-war at Gertruydenberg; can any one ſuppoſe, that the union of the two natural allies, thus apparently broken, (for Louis' offers went to this length), would have ſubſiſted leſs cloſe and compact at the next criſis of European affairs?

To ſuch as believe that all great events depend more on chance than principle, and de-

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ſpiſe all general reaſonings on the train of human affairs, I would recommend one or two obvious conſiderations. Did the alliance of 1756 maintain indiſſoluble the unnatural union of the two powers? Or, has the diſſolution, with every cruel aggravation, of the marriage which had been intended to cement that temporary alliance, prevented peace and ſeeming amity from ſubſiſting between the murderers and the neareſt blood relations of the ill-fated Antoinette? Has not one of the various means tried by Spain to regain that power over her feeble neighbour, which the Bragança revolution (1640) overthrew, conſiſted in always endeavouring to have a Spaniſh princeſs on the Portugueſe throne? And yet, has that prevented her from ſeconding her policy by open force, and attacking the throne which ſhe had immediately before filled with her royal offspring? Or, to come ſtill nearer the preſent diſcuſſion, was not the family compact diſſolved in 1793, under circumſtances of complicated inſult and violence to every branch of the houſe of Bourbon, as well as of imminent danger to the moſt deſpotic and bigotted government in the weſt of Europe? And have the ancient politics of the Spaniſh cabinet in any reſpect varied, in conſequence of all thoſe perſonal conſiderations, and grand occurrences? No. After a few

months

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months of languid co-operation with the combined powers (from the expectation of cruſhing the infant republic), as ſoon as Spain ſaw that the new ſtate could ſtand alone againſt foreign attacks, and had ſome chance of ſurviving the revolutionary ſtorms, ſhe inſtantly returned to her natural policy, and reſumed her alliance with France; that is to ſay, ſhe reſigned all her family regards, the conſequences of which had once alarmed all Europe; ſacrificed much of her trade; expoſed her ſea-coaſt to the troops and fleets of England; riſked and loſt her fleets by fighting the battles of France; and put the very exiſtence of her weak-handed government to the ſevereſt trial, by a free intercourſe with republicans and regicides—by acknowledging and receiving into her capital a Jacobin emiſſary with his crew. In a word, the Spaniſh branch of the Bourbon line is as cloſely united, or rather as ſubmiſſively dependent on the uſurper of that throne which the ſiſter branch once filled, as ever it was during the proudeſt days of the French monarchy. In return for his homage, the haughty Sovereign of the two Indies is pleaſed to receive for his ſon, from the French Chief, a crown patched up of the Italian ſpoils, taken from the natural enemy of Spain. The ſer-

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vice performed, and the boon granted, are equally illuſtrative of our general principles.

The internal ſtate of Portugal and her relative poſition to foreign powers are equally ſingular and worthy of our attention. A petty ſtate, thinly inhabited by a lazy and uncultivated people; governed by a ſucceſſion of weak princes, and in general by miniſters as inefficient; ſubject to a conſtitution eſſentially vicious in church and ſtate; the ark where prieſtcraft and hierarchical tyranny have found a ſhelter amidſt the flood of liberal opinion that has ſpread over the Weſt of Europe; ruined and depopulated at home by the moſt cruel and ſhortſighted policy which deſpotiſm and ſuperſtition combined could invent: Portugal has, for ſeveral ages, been reduced to a ſtate of weakneſs which muſt have long ago rendered her an eaſy prey even to Spain, had not her ſituation with reſpect to that neighbour, and the danger ſhe thereby incurred of being ſwallowed up, and augmenting the federal influence of France, rendered her the natural ally of Britain.

It is indeed worthy of remark, how exactly the foreign connexions of this power, always naturally dependant, have varied according to the circumſtances of Auſtria and Spain, and

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and their relations to France and Britain. At the revolution, which, in 1640, ſeparated Portugal from Spain, and placed the Houſe of Bragança on the throne, France was at war with both the branches of the Houſe of Auſtria, and was accordingly the firſt to acknowledge the independance of Portugal, whom ſhe defended during the firſt twenty years of the war of the *Acclamaçion*. When France and Spain were pacified by the treaty of the Pyrennees in 1660, and the latter turned her whole force againſt Portugal, the weaker power would have ſuccumbed, had not France protected her underhand, and enabled her to make the peace of 1667. During the ſame war, the policy of Cromwell, his enmity to Spain as well as his alliance with France, induced him alſo to ſide with Portugal; and he obtained the treaty of 1654, the moſt advantageous treaty of commerce that England ever concluded. This, however, was the only time that Europe ever ſaw the phænomenon of Portugal in alliance with both France and England. The protector's treaty raiſed Colbert's mercantile jealouſy. This was increaſed by the marriage of Charles II. with the Infanta of Spain; and the acceſſion of Philip V. to the Spaniſh throne, by uniting Spain to France, and oppoſing her to Auſtria, fixed Portugal as our natural ally, and determined

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mined alſo her alliance with the Imperial Houſe. In 1703, ſhe joined in the grand alliance, and granted to Britain what has been thought by many an advantageous treaty of commerce, and was certainly conſidered as ſuch at the time by both parties. * In this firm union ſhe has ever ſince continued, and has been repeatedly ſupported by Britain in her difficulties—probably ſaved from entire ruin, particularly in the Grand Alliance war, the war 1762, and the late conteſt. The events of the laſt of theſe wars have undoubtedly affected the balance of Europe; and Portugal has been peculiarly expoſed to the power and to the influence of the New Republic aided by its natural ally. How long ſhe may be ſuffered to continue, even in a ſtate of nominal independance; how long her great ally may be able to ſupport and protect her; how long her rulers may be pleaſed to ſtruggle againſt every diſadvantage natural as well as political on this ſide of the Atlantic, whilſt the fair and extenſive dominions of South America lye open to their occupancy; it is not within my province (although it were in my power) to inquire.

I might now proceed to trace the relations between the Italian ſtates and the Tranſalpine powers

* Note L l.

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powers to the right and left of the Rhine; between the Porte and Ruſſia, or the Porte and Britain or France: the connexions between the three powers ſurrounding the ancient and diſmembered kingdom of Poland; the mutual relations of the Northern Crowns. All theſe juntos of ſtates form ſeparate aſſemblages, of particular intereſts; ſmaller ſyſtems, influenced internally by the ſame principles, and connected by the ſame law with the general maſs of the European community. I have, however, gone through the chief points in the mutual relations of the great powers poſſeſſing American and Eaſt Indian colonies. The mutual relations of thoſe ſecondary ſtates which form the different colonial ſyſtems, depend upon ſimilar principles, and are regulated in the ſame manner. It would be needleſs to give any particular example of thoſe relations at preſent: In the next Section we ſhall meet with abundance.

In the mean time, I truſt it will be admitted, that enough has been ſaid to ſhew, that, in practice, as well as from theoretical conſiderations, this important ſubject is capable of being reduced to ſyſtematic arrangement, and to fixed, general principles. I have now only to conclude this general ſketch, with repeating, in a form ſomewhat different, the propoſition which at the outſet I propoſed to demonſtrate.

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It appears that, by the modern ſyſtem of foreign policy, the fate of nations has been rendered more certain; and the influence of chance, of the fortune of war, of the caprices of individuals upon the general affairs of men, has been greatly diminiſhed. Nations are no longer of tranſient or durable exiſtence in proportion to their internal reſources, but in proportion to the place which they occupy in a vaſt and regular ſyſtem; where the moſt powerful ſtates are, for their own ſakes, conſtantly watching over the ſafety of the moſt inſignificant. A flouriſhing commonwealth is not liable to loſe its independence or its proſperity by the fate of one battle. Many battles muſt be loſt; many changes muſt concur; the whole ſyſtem muſt be deranged, before ſuch a cataſtrophe can happen. The appearance of an Epaminondas can no longer raiſe a petty ſtate to power and influence over its neighbours, ſuddenly to be loſt, with the great man's life, by ſome unforeſeen victory at Leuctra. In the progreſs of freedom, knowledge, and national intercourſe, this great change has been happily effected by ſlow degrees; it is a change which immediately realizes the advantages that every former change has gained to mankind; a ſtep in his progreſs, which ſecures the advancement made during all his previous career; and contributes, perhaps more than

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than any other revolution that has been brought about ſince the invention of written language, to the improvement and magnificence of the ſpecies.

Let ſtateſmen, then, reflect on theſe things; and, in the preſent awful criſis of affairs, let them often ponder upon the principles which ſhould direct their public conduct. Without neglecting the increaſe of their internal reſources, by wiſe regulations, and gradual improvements of the civil and military conſtitution of the countries entruſted to their care, let them conſtantly look *from* home, and remember, that each ſtate, more eſpecially if poſſeſſed of colonial territories, forms a part of the general ſyſtem, liable to be affected by every derangement which it may experience; and, of neceſſity, obliged to truſt for its ſafety, and for the maintenance of its colonial power, to a concurrence of other cauſes beſides thoſe which domeſtic policy can controul. '*Non arma neque* '*theſauri regni præſidia ſunt, verum amici: quos* '*neque armis cogere, neque auro parare queas;* '*officio et fide pariuntur.*' Sal. Jugurth. *

* Note M m.

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SECTION II.

OF THE RELATIVE INTERESTS OF THE DIFFERENT EUROPEAN POWERS AS WELL IN THEIR COLONIES AS IN OTHER QUARTERS ON ACCOUNT OF THEIR COLONIAL RELATIONS.

BOOK III.

HAVING, in the foregoing Section, laid down, at great length, the general principles which ought to regulate the international policy of ſtates, with reſpect both to their primary and their colonial circumſtances, the following Inquiry will embrace chiefly the leading points in the application of the principles to the actual ſtate of the European colonies in the Weſt, and to their connexion with the other parts of the world. It will conſiſt rather of an exemplification of our general views, than a full and minute detail of all the circumſtances that influence the mutual relations of the different powers in conſequence of their colonial intereſts. I ſhall begin with the circumſtances which are proper to the actual poſition of affairs in the colonial ſyſtem—and ſhall then diſcuſs the intereſts of the European powers in a colonial

colonial point of view, with regard to certain changes which may happen in European affairs. SECT. II.

PART I.

OF THE INTERCOLONIAL RELATIONS OF THE EUROPEAN POWERS, AS INFLUENCED BY THE POSITION OF AFFAIRS IN AMERICA.

FROM attending to the deductions contained in the Third Section of the Firſt Book, and to thoſe contained in the Second Book, ſeveral practical inferences muſt already have forced themſelves upon the reader.

In the *firſt* place—I endeavoured to ſhew, that, from the natural ſituation of Holland in Europe, her colonies are of infinite importance to her proſperity, of much more importance than thoſe of any other European power; that, from the preſent ſtate of things in the Spaniſh and Scandinavian peninſulas, the diſtant ſettlements of the nations inhabiting thoſe vaſt tracts of various territory, are an object of very ſubordinate importance; that to both France and Britain their colonies are of great importance,

of

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of an importance every day increaſing; but that, in almoſt every point of view, the colonial trade and agriculture are of much more importance to the wealth and power of France, than to the wealth and power of her natural rival.

In judging concerning the probable conduct of any nation in a given combination of circumſtances, it is chiefly, and in a government perfectly free it would be almoſt ſolely, neceſſary * to inquire, what is the line of conduct recommended by the obvious intereſts of the ſtate. Sometimes, however, more eſpecially in countries ſubject to a deſpotic government and far behind their neighbours in political improvement, a laſting prejudice may affect the tone of public meaſures, and a uniformly erroneous ſyſtem of policy may be long perſevered in, until it has become interwoven with the character and fixed fundamental principles of the national councils. Sometimes, though more rarely, even in the freeſt ſtates, a popular prejudice derived from accidental occurrences or from the ignorance and falſe views of leſs enlightened times, may retain the public councils in a courſe of great and obvious error. If I might be ſo bold as to hint at ſuch an example, I ſhould not ſcruple to give the Britiſh

* Book III. Sect. I.

Britiſh prejudice and conſequent political ſtruggles in favour of the rock of Gibraltar, as an inſtance of falſe policy perſiſted in by a wiſe government, from deference to the loud voice of a people remarkable as well for high ſpirit as for good ſenſe, until it has become a point of national honour, and has for this reaſon acquired a real and ſolid importance in the mutual relations of Britain and Spain. Inſtances of uniform and fatal prejudice in the political ſyſtems of abſolute governments, are to be found in a melancholy variety and number; moſt frequently in the domeſtic policy of thoſe ſtates, and ſometimes in that branch of their domeſtic policy which forms the ſubject of this Inquiry. A very obvious example is furniſhed by the colonial hiſtory of Spain and Portugal. The large ſums uniformly received from South America by the cabinets of Liſbon and Madrid, have ſtrongly attracted the attention of all the rulers of both countries to colonial affairs, and have given the poſſeſſion of America a falſe importance in the eyes both of the monarchs and of the people. Many years will in all probability elapſe before thoſe nations ſhall have brought themſelves to admit even the idea of their exiſtence ſeparated from their rich colonial ſettlements; and it is not unlikely that the fineſt provinces of the mother countries would be ſacrificed

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crificed by the ſovereigns of the Indies, with the full concurrence of their ſubjects, in order to preſerve the diſtant realms from which thoſe high-ſounding titles are derived.

In judging, then, concerning the probable conduct of theſe powers in any colonial criſis, it is not ſufficient that we ſhould eſtimate the real value of their American ſettlements, which is unqueſtionably great; but we muſt alſo take into the calculation, that much higher value which they have thus acquired in the eyes of the parent ſtates, from ancient prejudice, national ſpirit, and political ignorance. We cannot, becauſe the Brazils and Peru are really of much leſs eſſential importance to Portugal and Spain, than the Weſt Indian iſlands are to Britain and France, conclude, that any meaſures tending to endanger their colonies, would be more readily purſued by the courts of Madrid and Liſbon, than by thoſe of London and Verſailles. A criſis which ſhould end in the univerſal ſeparation of the colonies, though it would certainly injure the proſperity of thoſe different powers in very unequal proportions, would moſt probably be equally dreaded by all; and the meaſures ſuggeſted with a view to prevent ſuch a criſis, would be as readily adopted by thoſe ſtates to whoſe prejudices they appealed for their ſupport, as by thoſe whoſe real and ſolid views of policy all concurred in the recommendation.

In

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In comparing the ſituation of Britain with that of France, we find the prepoſſeſſion in favour of colonial eſtabliſhments equally ſtrong, but much better founded in the former than in the latter country, inaſmuch as the diſmemberment of her empire would be much more fatal to her wealth and power. We may therefore conclude, that France will be the laſt power in Europe to relinquiſh the plans of colonial policy; that ſhe will conſtantly and ſedulouſly avoid all meaſures which have a plain tendency to deſtroy her colonial ſyſtem; and that, unleſs ſuch infane councils as thoſe of the revolutionary times ſhall again ſway her public affairs (a cataſtrophe not to be reckoned upon), ſhe will never think of gratifying her ancient ſpirit of rivalry or animoſity againſt Britain, by purſuing ſuch ſteps as muſt far more irreparably injure herſelf than her neighbour. It is ſurely the plain intereſt of France, and conſiſtent with her prejudices as well as her intereſt, to maintain that ſtate of things which renders her territorial ſuperiority over Britain as great as poſſible, and brings her wealth and maritime reſources as nearly as poſſible on a level with thoſe of her powerful and opulent rival. To abandon her colonies, becauſe by ſo fooliſh and cruel a ſtep ſhe may ſtrip Great Britain of her ſettlements alſo,

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would be as ridiculous a piece of national ſpite, and as obviouſly ruinous, as if Britain, in order to diminiſh the territory of France, were to make a treaty, giving up to ſome third power all her dominions except the Iſle of Wight, provided France gave up to ſome other power an equal number of ſquare miles. It would be a ſort of policy ſimilar to that which ſhould incline France to ſet her whole fleet againſt the fleet of Britain, with orders to engage deſperately, ſo that ſhip for ſhip might be ſunk or burnt. Such conduct in a nation is exactly analogous to thoſe eccentric actions which mark the deranged moments of individuals. And as no one in trade, or in faction, or in private communication, ſquares his behaviour by the expectation that his neighbours will act like madmen (however much he may lay his account with experiencing their faithleſſneſs and cunning), ſo, no ſtate needs ever purſue meaſures framed with a view to counteract ſchemes which can reſult from nothing but national inſanity in a rival or enemy, however much all ſtates ought to act as if their neighbours were influenced ſolely by regard to their private intereſts. It will therefore be always a ſufficient guarantee to Britain againſt any line of policy of which ſhe may dread the adoption on the part of France, if it can be ſhown that ſuch a line of policy will be more

more hurtful to France than to her. We ſhall even have a ſufficient ſecurity, in common caſes, againſt any meaſures which are proved to be equally detrimental to the two powers. Such guarantees, in fact, are the beſt that we can poſſibly expect to obtain. Wherefore, if it has been ſhown that any ſyſtem of colonial policy would bring about the ſeparation of the French ſettlements, we have the moſt complete ſecurity againſt its adoption. We need only dread thoſe ſchemes, which, whilſt they do not materially injure our rival, are ſeriouſly detrimental to our own influence or wealth. But ſince meaſures of this deſcription, for ſimilar reaſons, may always be expected, they ought conſtantly to be guarded againſt, as if they were hanging over our heads, and were actually in a train of preparation.

In the *ſecond* place, I have endeavoured to ſhew, * that no meaſures can be deviſed more effectual for the deſtruction of all the colonies, than the eſtabliſhment of negro independence in any one of them; that, of all the colonies, the French are moſt expoſed to danger ariſing from this quarter; and that the inſurrection of the Britiſh, or Spaniſh, or Dutch ſlaves, would, to an abſo-

* Book II. Sect. II. & III.

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lute certainty, bring about their ſupremacy in the ſettlements where they formerly laboured in chains. It can never be ſuppoſed then for one moment, that, in any event, France ſhall endeavour to overpower her colonial neighbours by the aſſiſtance of the negroes, unleſs ſhe finds her colonial affairs utterly deſperate; and in that caſe, as I before remarked, it ſignifies little what her conduct may be, as a much greater and more inevitable cataſtrophe awaits all the ſlave colonies, from the deſtruction of thoſe whence the French ſhall have been expelled.

We cannot therefore admit the fairneſs of any view of the ſubject, which repreſents the reſtoration of tranquillity in the French iſlands, whether, by a total or partial ſubjection of the inſurgents, as dangerous to the other colonies, from the chance that France may then invade them, and ſucceed through the help of inſurrection. We muſt be ſatisfied that ſuch a conqueſt would inſtantly bring on her own ruin in the Weſt Indies; and we need not fear that ſhe will ever adopt ſuch expedients in order to humble her enemies, or increaſe for a few moments her own nominal power. It may indeed be ſaid, that in the American war, France, contrary to her own moſt obvious intereſts, took the part of the North American colonies againſt Britain.

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Britain. But, beſides that a repetition of ſo acknowledged a blunder is not to be ſuppoſed, † we may remark, that the dangers of that policy were far leſs conſiderable than thoſe of the meaſure which we are now ſuppoſing. For, in the firſt place, the colonies of France did not lye expoſed to thoſe of Britain in North America. In the next place, the dangers to be apprehended from the growth of North America as an independent ſtate, were ſurely very diſtant and trivial, compared with thoſe inevitable calamities which the progreſs of negro rebellion muſt ever bring along with it, and of which France has already had ſo bitter a taſte. Had the planters of Jamaica and Barbadoes thought of rebellion, it may be imagined that they would have received little aid from either Holland, France, or Spain, ſo long as Surinam, St Domingo, and Cuba, were ſubject to the Dutch, French, and Spaniſh governments. Still leſs would they have met with a favourable reception in Amſterdam, Paris, and Madrid, had they propoſed to execute their purpoſes by the aid of their liberated ſlaves. Leaſt of all would their application for aſſiſtance have been ſucceſsful, had it been made in the preſent day, when the maſſacres of Guadaloupe and St Domingo are freſh in the recollection of every European

† Note N n.

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court, and are the perpetual theme of terror to all whoſe property or reſidence lies in ſlave colonies. It is not therefore a thing to be taken into the calculation, that the re-eſtabliſhment of tranquillity, by whatever means, in the revolted iſlands, can affect the ſecurity of the neighbouring colonies, by enabling France to purſue offenſive meaſures againſt them, with the aſſiſtance either of free negro ſubjects, or of negro inſurrection.

3. It has been proved, * that any meaſures which can be deviſed for the reſtoration of tranquillity in the revolted iſlands, however ſucceſsful, muſt leave the colonial reſources of France ſo exhauſted, and her power there ſo unſtable, as to render the ſlighteſt movement, even of regular warfare, moſt pregnant with dangers. Nothing, then, but abſolute neceſſity can ever tempt her to ſacrifice a ſtate of peace, in which her only chance of exiſtence lies, for all the dangers and uncertainties of Weſt Indian warfare. Her reſources, too, are little adapted in that quarter for new efforts, admitting that ſhe ſhould be fearleſs of the reſult; and it may be preſumed that the mother country is herſelf ſomewhat exhauſted by the late conteſt, expenſive and bloody in an unexampled degree. What better ſecurity for paci-

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* Book II. Sect. II.

fic conduct can any ſtates poſſibly have, than that their natural enemy or rival is in a ſituation of weakneſs and exhauſtion, which muſt render all attempts to conquer or plunder abortive, and in a ſtate of internal confuſion or half-quelled tumult, which muſt render every ſuch aggreſſion a ſtep to abſolute ruin? I demand, if the poſſeſſion of her treaſures, and armories, and dock-yards, would furniſh ſtronger pledges of pacific conduct, or greater ſecurity againſt any effects of a rupture?

4. I have ſhown * that a colony is, in all circumſtances, a leſs formidable neighbour than a primary and independent community; that, of all colonies, thoſe in the Weſt Indies are the weakeſt and leaſt formidable neighbours; that they are the colonies which would be moſt improved in ſtrength by a ſeparation from the parent ſtates; and that, of all the Weſt Indian colonies, the French are not only the weakeſt, but are the ſettlements which would be moſt improved in reſources by being ſeparated, in whatever way, from the mother country. Since the relation of colonial dependence, then, is a cauſe of weakneſs, its continuance is always to be favoured by each power belonging to the ſyſtem, and the independence of any one member of that ſyſtem is uniformly to be dreaded as fatal, both to

* Book II. Sect. I. & II.

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to the dependence of the reſt, and to their ſafety from hoſtile aggreſſion. In general, therefore, we may conclude, that it is the intereſt of every power poſſeſſing colonies, to league with whatever parent ſtate may be annoyed by colonial rebellion, and to aſſiſt its colonial neighbours, even if they ſhould be its natural rivals or allies, in cruſhing all revolt, and preventing the independence of the colonial inſurgents. No aſſiſtance in troops, or treaſure, or ſhips, can be thrown away, that is directed to prevent ſuch a cataſtrophe. The principles of modern policy evidently require, that every exertion ſhould be uſed to prevent a change immediately fatal to the ſecurity of the national or colonial ſyſtem. If a colony is leſs dangerous to the ſecurity of its neighbours than a primary ſtate, the independence of that colony is an event as much to be dreaded, and as vigorouſly to be reſiſted by thoſe neighbours, as the conqueſt of any of the petty powers in the European commonwealth. The motive to reſiſt the change is the ſame in both caſes. If France conquers Bavaria, ſhe becomes a more dangerous neighbour to Auſtria and Pruſſia, than France and Bavaria were when ſeparate. Auſtria and Pruſſia, then, to prevent this, will forget their mutual animoſities, and defend Bavaria; nay, Pruſſia will defend Bavaria, although that power is the ally, or rather the dependant of Auſtria,

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Auſtria. In like manner, if a free ſtate in St Domingo is more dangerous to the Britiſh iſlands than a colonial eſtabliſhment in that iſland, Britain is called upon, if ſhe values her colonial intereſts, to aſſiſt France in preventing the riſe of ſuch a free ſtate. She thus aſſiſts her natural enemy, but ſhe does not make the ſituation of that enemy better than before: ſhe only prevents a change hurtful to both.

This inference is evidently of a very general nature; it is applicable to all colonial ſyſtems, and to revolts of every kind. But it applies much more forcibly to the ſituation of the Weſt Indian colonies, which are more liable than any others that have ever been planted, to be affected by a change of government, and by being ſeparated from their parent ſtates; moſt of all does it apply to the mutual relations of the French colonies and the other ſettlements, from the peculiar circumſtances which I have fully explained in the civil and political ſituation of the former. While, then, the circumſtances of thoſe iſlands preclude all poſſibility of their being dangerous as colonies after tranquillity ſhall be reſtored, the ſame circumſtances would render them moſt formidable neighbours as independent ſtates. The other powers of Europe, therefore, but more eſpecially Holland and Britain, are imperiouſly called

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called upon to aſſiſt France in all her meaſures for reſtoring the colonial ſtructure of her ſettlements. Without abating any thing of that national jealouſy with which thoſe two powers ought always to view their great rival—nay, in conſequence of the very principles which recommend this jealouſy in European affairs, they ought, without any heſitation, to unite with her to prevent all revolt and all eſtabliſhment of new powers in the Weſt Indies, if they value the balance of the colonial ſyſtem and the poſſeſſion of their own colonies, incompatible with any change which ſhall emancipate the rich ſettlements of the French Republic.

5. Although all ſuch changes in the colonial relations of the different members which compoſe the Weſt Indian ſyſtem, muſt be dangerous to the others which remain dependent, and muſt deſtroy the colonial balance, I have endeavoured to ſhow, that ſome changes of this kind would be infinitely more hazardous than others. By tracing the probable conſequences of the negro independence in any of the iſlands, more particularly in the French ſettlements, where that calamity ſeems moſt to be apprehended, I attempted to demonſtrate, in the Third Section of the Second Book, that the eſtabliſhment of a free negro commonwealth in

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any part of the ſyſtem, would be the moſt dangerous event that could poſſibly happen to the other iſlands, and would inevitably and ſpeedily be followed by the extirpation of all the white coloniſts—the univerſal dominion of the Africans over the Weſt Indian ſettlements. The negroes, then, are the enemy moſt to be dreaded in America by all Europeans; they are the natural foes of thoſe white men who are diſtinguiſhed from them by indelible marks in body, and by marks almoſt indelible in mind. The hoſtility has originated in every ſpecies of cruelty and oppreſſion on the part of the moſt civilized but leaſt numerous claſs; it has been cemented by length and variety of injuries; it has been occaſionally inflamed by reciprocal ferocity, and barbarous revenge, on the part of the ſavages; it is rendered perpetual by all thoſe events and habits of animoſity, and by thoſe eſſential marks of natural diſtinction. With ſuch a power as the New Black Republic, no European colony can form a league againſt any other European colony, or any other negro ſtate. The negroes are alike hoſtile to all who have been maſters of Africans; to all who are civilized and white. In oppoſing them as enemies, after their independence has once been acknowledged, the Europeans have almoſt every diſdavantage to contend with; and all idea of a peace with ſuch men muſt be chimerical—a mere

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mere truce with the wild leaders of ſavage tribes, whoſe numbers ſurround and overwhelm the handful of their weak and poliſhed enemies. If any power, then, deſerves the name of a natural enemy, it is the negro commonwealth; a ſtate with which no other power can live in amity, or form an alliance; a ſtate equally hoſtile, and radically hoſtile, to all its neighbours. If any criſis can call for vigorous meaſures of prevention, it is that which may terminate in the eſtabliſhment of ſuch a power—a power which, if once ſuffered to breathe alone and independent, muſt overwhelm every thing within its graſp. If the European powers value their colonial poſſeſſions, it becomes them to unite againſt this tremendous enemy; to forget all rivalry, and join in oppoſing the progreſs of this inevitable calamity; to interfere, at all events, and abate this unexampled nuiſance. *

6. Hitherto we have only conſidered the effects of the changes which we have been ſuppoſing to take place, upon the intereſts of the European powers, in a colonial point of view. Some of the changes that may be imagined, can indeed affect thoſe colonial intereſts alone. The extenſion of any one colony at the expence of its weaker neighbours, and the emancipation

* Book III. Sect. I. (Vol. II. p. 262.)

emancipation of any colonial eſtabliſhment from its dependence on the mother country by the efforts of the European coloniſts. can only affect the power of the other parent ſtates over their colonies, by bringing about the conqueſt or emancipation of the other colonies. The only termination of ſuch a criſis, will be the univerſal independence of the colonies, or a great extenſion of power—the acquiſition of univerſal colonial ſovereignty to one or to a few of the European powers. Of both theſe cataſtrophes, I have already explained the probable conſequences to the commercial relations of the ſtates, formerly ſupreme over the emancipated or the conquered ſettlements. * A mutual trade will ſtill ſubſiſt, in the one caſe, nearly as before; in the other, modified by the colonial policy of the conquering power. But effects, widely different indeed, will attend the more formidable cataſtrophe of negro ſupremacy being eſtabliſhed over the Weſt Indian Archipelago. It is manifeſt, that all commerce with thoſe rich and fertile ſettlements will now be at an end. All the capital veſted in the Weſt Indian trade will be inſtantly thrown out of employment, and that which is ſimilar in colonial property will of courſe be buried for ever: all the caſh employed in colonial loans will be either loſt, or ſuddenly forced back

* Book I. Sect. I. & Sect. II. Part I.

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back upon the European market: all the loſſes of the planters will be immediately ſhared by their European creditors and correſpondents: all circulation of population and wealth to thoſe parts of the world will at once be terminated:—not to mention the leſs important conſideration of private diſtreſs; leſs important, only becauſe it is of a leſs laſting nature. An univerſal earthquake or deluge, which ſhould at once blot out thoſe fertile regions from the face of the phyſical globe, is not ſo much to be deprecated as the lamentable cataſtrophe which ſhould abſorb them in negro dominion, and deſtroy their exiſtence as a civilized quarter of the globe.

It is needleſs to add, that the total loſs of thoſe ſettlements as colonies, or their complete ſubjugation by any one European power, are bleſſings to every party concerned—bleſſings ſurely to the very Africans themſelves, compared with the annihilation of the European name in the Charaibean Sea. Admitting, what I have demonſtrated to be falſe, that all the dangers are real which ſome ſpeculative men have apprehended from the reſtoration of the French colonial power; admitting, what is evidently chimerical, that the aſſiſtance, ſo ſtrongly recommended to be afforded the French government in the Weſt Indies, would ſtrengthen its hands at our own expence; and, to put the matter

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matter in its ſtrongeſt light, admitting that every aid which Britain lends to her, is an expence and a danger embraced in order to ſtrengthen our natural enemy, ruin our whole colonial ſyſtem, and eſtabliſh the univerſal ſovereignty of France over the Weſt Indies :—what is all this, in a political, a commercial, or a moral point of view, but wiſely and humanely chooſing the leaſt of two evils, and giving up what we can do without, in order to prevent a ſhock, from which, although all feelings of humanity ſhould be laid aſide, it is difficult to conceive that the mercantile reſources of Great Britain herſelf could recover? France would, indeed, be more affected than even Britain by ſuch a ſhock; in other words, we ſhould have little to fear during our adverſity from the direct attacks of the French government. But, beſides the dangers to be apprehended from other powers unconnected with America, and from thoſe colonial powers ſo much leſs involved in the calamity than the two nations hitherto the arbiters of European affairs —are there no dangers in domeſtic confuſion; no chances of ruin and revolution in commercial failure; no evils in national bankruptcy, which may render the political independence of France and of Britain, little worth maintaining, and which either of thoſe great ſtates would feel but little alleviated by the melan-

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choly reflection, that they were common to both?

It is natural that the prejudice ſhould be ſtrong in this country againſt any cloſe alliance, and much more againſt any active aſſiſtance to an enemy whoſe power in Europe we have had ſuch reaſon to dread, and of late years to lament. However clear the reaſons may appear in favour of the ſyſtem of policy propoſed, and however definite the line between aiding France in the colonial ſyſtem, and favouring her pretenſions to univerſal power in the European commonwealth, it is eaſy to perceive, that he who ſhall argue the queſtion upon the grounds above expoſed, and recommend the practical concluſions to which the reaſonings in the laſt and in the preſent Book of this Inquiry appear to lead, will have a great weight of popular prejudice to combat, and a variety of powerful declamatory topics to reſiſt, from many reſpectable quarters. It is by no means my intention to propoſe any thing but the utmoſt vigilance towards our natural enemy in every part wherein the two countries are contiguous, and may interfere. In the colonial, as in the European ſyſtem, her boundleſs and conſtant ambition may be fatal to the balance. Let us endeavour, by every precaution which jealouſy and political foreſight can ſuggeſt, to keep her influence

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influence within due bounds, in that as in every other part of her extenſive empire. But let all thoſe precautions be regulated by circumſpection, as well as prompted by alacrity, leſt the meaſures adopted for the purpoſe of avoiding a danger on one ſide, may throw the ſum of affairs into much greater and more irreparable diſorder on the other. Let a union againſt French aggreſſion be cultivated with all the European powers who can maintain the relations of amity, and bind themſelves by the faith of treaties. But let not the very firſt principles of modern policy be violated, by permitting the colonial power of any European ſtate, even of France herſelf, to be annihilated, and annihilated too by the common enemy of all Europeans.

And ſurely, if it is neceſſary to uſe ſuch arguments, popular topics may well be found in the ſtate of colonial affairs, to ſtrengthen the concluſions which plainer and more valid deductions have eſtabliſhed, and to convince thoſe whoſe paſſions muſt be inflamed before they can liſten to the voice of reaſon. Admitting every thing that can be urged againſt the policy of aſſiſting France, and thus enabling her to retain her American dominions, do the lives and properties of thouſands of our countrymen in thoſe parts claim no regard, that we ſhould for a moment entertain the idea of ſacrificing them to

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a mean desire of needlessly ruining our rivals in a quarter where they cannot materially hurt us, merely because the catastrophe will injure ourselves in a somewhat smaller degree? 'It 'is the sinfullest thing in the world,' (says an author not very blameable for excess of tender feelings) 'to forsake or destitute a plantation 'once in forwardness; for, besides the dishonour, it is the guiltiness of the blood of many 'commiserable persons.' *

It is indeed no common fate to which the European settlements in the Charaibean Sea will be left, if their parent states desert them by suffering the French negroes to triumph in St Domingo. It is not to the peaceable yoke of some civilized nation, nor the quiet transference of dominion by treaty or conquest, nor the miseries of long contested invasion by regular troops, nor the hardships of blockade and famine, nor even to the anarchy of Jacobin law. The worst of these calamities, which may be dreaded from the preponderance of France in the colonial system, is nothing compared with the warfare of the African labourers. Hordes of blood-thirsty savages, intimately acquainted with every corner of the planter's house, every retreat into which his family may be driven, every crevice in the whole country; mad with unnatural rage against all that deviates from the sable hue

* Bacon's Essays, p. 164. edit. 1800.

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hue of their own ferocious brethren; pouring over each ſpot where European life exiſts; ſcattering on all ſides, not deſtruction, for that would be mildneſs, but every exquiſite form of ingenious torment; only ſtopping, in moments of ſatiety to lay aſide the ſword for the torch, and, in the intervals of mercy alone, exchanging torture for murder; marching againſt the parent with the transfixed body of his butchered infant as a ſtandard; ſacrificing the weaker ſex to their brutal luſt, amidſt the expiring bodies of huſbands and kinſmen; and enacting other deeds of ſuch complicated horror, that it is not permitted to the pen of a European to deſcribe or to name them—theſe are a few features of the picture which wretched eye-witneſſes have given us of negro warfare; and it is to ſcenes like theſe that we ſhall inevitably expoſe thouſands of our countrymen, if we ſacrifice the ſecurity of the Europeans to gratify either a fooliſh jealouſy of our rivals in the Weſt Indian commonwealth, or a ſtill leſs excuſeable tenderneſs for the barbarians who have unhappily been poured into the French iſlands.*

With the greateſt ſympathy, then, for the unmerited ſufferings of the unfortunate negroes; with unmingled deteſtation of the odious traffic to which they owe all their wrongs,

* Edwards' Hiſtory of St Domingo, chap. VII.

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and the Weſt Indian colonies their chief dangers; the conſiſtent friend of humanity may be permitted to feel ſome tenderneſs for his European brethren, although they are white and civilized, and to deprecate that inconſiſtent ſpirit of canting philanthropy, which in Europe is only excited by the injuries or miſeries of the poor and the profligate, and, on the other ſide of the Atlantic, is never warmed but towards the ſavage, the mulatto, and the ſlave.

It appears, therefore, on the one hand, that the greateſt of dangers to the Weſt Indian community lies in the ſucceſs of the negroes, and that the reeſtabliſhment of the old ſyſtem in the French iſlands can alone inſure the permanent ſuperiority of the Europeans, either there or in the other colonies. Nothing but the ſubdiviſion of the negroes, and their ſubjection to the power of maſters armed with abſolute authority, can prevent them from acquiring that aſcendancy to which divided ſuperiority in numbers and ſtrength naturally and invariably leads. On the other hand, I have endeavoured to ſhew that the complete ſucceſs of the French Weſt Indian policy, while it removes for the preſent all the dangers of our ſituation, can never arm the republican government with power to overthrow the colonial balance. But, even if ſuch a derangement of the ſyſtem was the neceſſary conſequence of the reſtoration; we may fairly aſ-

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ſert, that the welfare of all the European colonies, and of the parent ſtates ſo far as their intereſts depend on colonial affairs, is intimately connected with the ſucceſs of the republican arms, unleſs it ſhall be ſaid, that a total extirpation, or expulſion, or ſubjugation of the white inhabitants is a leſs awful cataſtrophe than the univerſal eſtabliſhment of colonial ſupremacy by any one European power. The intereſts of all the whites in the Weſt Indies are one and the ſame. The negroes are truly the Jacobins of the Weſt: They are the anarchiſts; the terroriſts; the domeſtic enemy: Againſt them it becomes rival nations to combine, and hoſtile governments to coaleſce. If, according to the principles formerly detailed,† Pruſſia and Auſtria felt their exiſtence to depend on a union againſt the republican arms in Europe, (and who does not lament that their coalition was not more firm and enlightened?) a cloſer alliance is imperiouſly recommended to France, and Britain, and Spain, and Holland, againſt the common enemy of civilized ſociety, the deſtroyer of the European name in the New World. If, according to the obvious conſequences of the ſame principles, as formerly deduced, all neighbouring nations are juſtified in providing for their ſelf-preſervation, by interfering in the internal affairs of any one member

† Book III. Sect. I.

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of the great national community who may eſtabliſh a ſtate of things hoſtile to their domeſtic peace and independence; by the ſame rule, would the neighbours of any large colonial eſtabliſhment, where the negroes ſhould be ſuddenly let looſe and permitted to raiſe an independent ſtate, be juſtified in uniting to attack both maſters and emancipated ſlaves, until the intolerable nuiſance was abated, and the ancient order of things reſtored. *

In the actual caſe, however, this interference is not called for. The French government of the preſent day, different from that of 1792, is neither hoſtile to the domeſtic tranquillity of the neighbouring ſtates, nor to the ſecurity of their colonies, however dangerous the power of the republic may be in Europe. In the firſt ſtage of the revolution, it belonged to their peace in the Weſt Indies as well as in Europe, to ſtep forward and take part with one faction againſt another in the management of the domeſtic affairs of France—with the planters againſt the inſane councils of the republican government in the colonies, as with the royaliſts againſt the anarchical principles of the Jacobins in the mother country. At preſent, the powers which compoſe the Weſt Indian ſyſtem, are only required to aſſiſt the ſtrenuous efforts of the French government in the revolted iſlands, as they would be called upon in Europe

* Book III. Sect. I.

Europe to aid the regular government of France, were the Jacobins once more to ſpread themſelves over the country, and to threaten an immediate reſtoration of the reign of terror.

Let us then at once adopt that ſyſtem which our common intereſts clearly point out. Let us not ſtartle at a ſound, and ſhrink back from the name of a French alliance, at leaſt in the Weſt Indies. Let us remember, that we are in thoſe parts expoſed to a common enemy, whoſe yoke would be incomparably more ſevere than the dominion of Jacobiniſm itſelf; whoſe ſtrength is more to be dreaded than the boaſted army of England or the Grand Monarch of the ſeventeenth century in the plenitude of his power. And as the aggrandizement of Ruſſia would drive us, however unwilling, into an alliance with France, even in Europe: ſo, let us make a common cauſe with her where ſhe cannot endanger our ſecurity, where we are threatened with a foe more terrible than Tartars and Coſſacks. It is to be hoped that the French troops may themſelves ſucceed in the great enterprize committed to their charge, becauſe, in that caſe, their conqueſt will be more eaſily retained. But if they ſhall ſtand in need of our aſſiſtance, let us recollect, that in ſubſidizing the colonial treaſury of France, we are preſerving that trade which ſupplies our fleets with ſeamen, and pours millions into our exchequer; that the troops which may be ſent to aſſiſt the government of

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St Domingo are fighting the battles of our own colonies, and defending from the ineffable horrors of negro warfare, one of the faireſt portions of the habitable globe.

PART II.

OF THE EXTERNAL RELATIONS OF THE EUROPEAN POWERS IN DIFFERENT QUARTERS AS INFLUENCED BY THEIR COLONIAL INTERESTS.

When a ſtate poſſeſſed of colonial eſtabliſhments is drawn into any quarrel with its neighbours, every part of its territories may become the theatre of warlike operations, and all the branches of the empire muſt neceſſarily take part in the conteſt, whatever may be the origin of the diſpute. We have already ſeen how much more frequently the colonies are expoſed to the evils of warfare than the mother country, although they are very ſeldom the cauſe of the rupture. * If, however, a war ſhould be undertaken on account of the remote provinces, the contiguous diſtricts muſt of courſe bear their ſhare of its burdens, and the mother countries may thus, on account of their colonial intereſts, be

* Book I. Sect. I.

be engaged in war with each other, in Europe and in the colonies at the ſame time. This is one of the neceſſary conſequences of extenſive and remote poſſeſſions, and forms an eſſential part of the very idea of a political union.

It will indeed happen, in the great majority of caſes, that the intereſts of the colonies are made ſubſervient to thoſe of the other provinces, which are generally more extenſive, and always more valuable. Thus, while the whole empire will inevitably be plunged into an obſtinate war for the advantage or honour of the metropolis, the colonies may often ſuſtain injuries, or receive inſults, of which a ſlight explanation or acknowledgement will be admitted as a ſufficient reparation. Accordingly, I have already * ſhown how very ſmall a ſhare the colonial intereſts have had in producing thoſe conteſts which conſtantly recur to divide the European powers, after a ſhort interval of peace recruits their forces and treaſures. It does indeed almoſt always happen, as I have formerly obſerved, † that when any neceſſity for reparation of injuries, or any change in the balance of power, is attended with a transference of dominion in conſequence of a deciſive war, the territories given up as indemnities obtained by right of conqueſt, are taken from the colonial eſtabliſhments

* Book I. Sect. I. † Book II. Sect. II.

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ments of the humbled nation, becauſe every ſtate naturally wiſhes to retain, firſt of all, its contiguous provinces, and to make both the calamities and the effects of war fall as much as poſſible on thoſe remote diſtricts, which, from their diſtance, are too much undervalued. It would, however, be extremely erroneous to conclude from thence, that the acquiſition of thoſe dominions was the object of the war on the one ſide, or their defence the motive of reſiſtance on the other. While the campaigns of Germany or Egypt may have led to no other change in the relative poſition of the belligerent powers, than the transference of ſome iſland in America or ſome factory in the Eaſt Indies, it neither follows that the maintenance or the change of the colonial balance was the object of the war, nor that the change or the preſervation of colonial dominion is the only purpoſe to which the ſucceſs of the hoſtile operations has been ſubſervient. If the party whoſe diſtant territory has been defended, had not inſured ſucceſs by carrying on the war in every quarter, new aggreſſions in the nearer parts of the empire would have been the conſequence. If the ſtate whoſe victories, in various regions, have procured an enlargement of colonial dominion, had failed from confining the war to the colonies alone, its honour would not have been preſerv-

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ed or raiſed; its name and influence in the ſyſtem, always proportioned to the total, rather than to the partial ſucceſs of a war, would not have been extended; it would not have thus far diminiſhed the power of a natural rival; and, on the next rupture, it would have wanted all thoſe means of intimidating the enemy, which are acquired by exhibiting proofs of military greatneſs in whatever quarter of the world.

But although the colonial intereſts of a ſtate are thus ſecondary and ſubſervient, it will frequently happen, that the ſituation of affairs in thoſe ſyſtems where the diſtant territories are ſituated, may call for a ſacrifice on the part of the mother country, and a temporary ſubmiſſion of her own intereſts to thoſe of the colonies. I have already pointed out * thoſe general caſes where ſuch an appeal to the principles of modern policy is conſiſtent with ſtrict prudence, and have illuſtrated this poſition by a reference † to the preſent ſtate of affairs in America. The ſafety of valuable poſſeſſions, as well as the honour of the nation, may often call for active meaſures of precaution, or of vengeance on the ſpot, altogether dictated by colonial views. The ſame views may ſometimes be extended ſo far as to preſcribe the moſt vigorous interference with

* Book II. Introd. † Ibid. Sect. II. Part I.

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with the conduct of foreign ſtates, if it tends mediately to operate the deſtruction of the colonial balance, and affect the ſecurity of our own poſſeſſions or thoſe of our allies.

Thoſe nations which poſſeſs no colonies of any value (Sweden and Denmark for example), can never be called upon by any danger, even by the direct violation of their colonial property, to plunge their contiguous provinces into a ſtate of war, for the purpoſe of preſerving the benefits derived from ſuch inconſiderable ſettlements. The whole value of the territory loſt by any ſudden aggreſſion of a neighbour, will not be ſufficient to compenſate the expence and danger of recovering the poſſeſſion, and revenging the inſult. Yet, even thoſe colonial dominions can never be given up to the forcible attack of an enemy, without ſuch an injury to the honour and name of the mother country, as muſt diminiſh her influence at home, injure the ſpirit of her people in all future negotiations, and weaken her federal power in all future European wars. That ceſſion then of a uſeleſs territory (admitting the colonies to be in any caſe uſeleſs), which ought not to be deemed any evil in a commercial or financial point of view, ſhould uniformly be refuſed to forcible aggreſſion; although, after the honour of the nation is ſaved by

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by retaliation, and after ſome equivalent is procured, it will never be wiſe for the government to adjuſt matters very ſcrupulouſly, by nicely comparing the revenge with the inſult, or the indemnity with the loſs ſuſtained.

But the name and honour of a nation cannot be immediately affected by ſuch changes as only tend indirectly to endanger the ſafety of its diſtant ſettlements, or ultimately to ſhake the colonial balance. Thoſe ſtates, therefore, which poſſeſs colonies of inconſiderable value, can never be called upon, by the principles of ſound policy, to interfere in the affairs of their European neighbours, for the purpoſe of preventing the adoption of any line of conduct only remotely dangerous to the colonial ſyſtem in which they have ſo trifling an intereſt. Thus, although the ſupremacy of France in the Weſt Indies would be highly dangerous to every other power poſſeſſed of colonial territory; and although that ſupremacy would be a very natural conſequence of a compact between Britain and France transferring to the latter Jamaica and Barbadoes; what could be more ridiculous than that Sweden and Denmark ſhould endeavour to unite Ruſſia with them in order to prevent or annul the bargain? It would clearly be nothing more than common prudence in Sweden and Denmark to aſſiſt France (as we have

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have already ſeen) in quelling the inſurrection of her ſlaves, becauſe the danger ariſing from ſucceſsful negro rebellion is immediate to every white colony. It would be equally neceſſary for thoſe ſtates to arm in all parts, and to avail themſelves of the reſources of federal power, if unjuſtly attacked in the colonies, becauſe their honour and name would demand this, and becauſe the certainty of retaliation in every quarter is the great check to ſuch aggreſſions in a ſyſtem which, like that of the colonies, is not properly balanced of itſelf. But if nothing ſhort of war could prevent the projected change, it would never leſſen the name, or ſtain the honour of either Denmark or Sweden, to allow France peaceably to acquire the decided ſuperiority in a quarter where their power is at any rate ſo trifling, and to truſt for their defence in the laſt reſort to their ſubſequent exertions when attacked, and to the reſources of foreign policy—even although in the end thoſe ſtruggles and alliances ſhould fail to ſave the colonies, or to obtain exact reparations and indemnities. Still leſs reaſonable would it be for powers thus circumſtanced, to hamper their European policy with colonial conſiderations in matters more remotely connected with colonial intereſts, ſuch as thoſe which I ſhall immediately point out; or to ſuffer the circumſtances of their trifling ſettlements,

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ments, however nearly affected, to ſtand in the way of any amicable arrangements ſubſervient to the proſperous management of their foreign affairs in the great national ſyſtem. The peculiar difference between a remote and contiguous province conſiſts in this—that whereas the latter, however trifling in itſelf, muſt at all events be retained as a part of the empire directly neceſſary to keep the whole together, the former is disjoined from the reſt, and although a component part in every other reſpect, yet is only indirectly ſubſervient to the exiſtence of the whole body; and may therefore be ſacrificed in ſuch emergencies as would otherwiſe endanger the contiguous members of the ſyſtem. The caſe of Sweden and Denmark, with reſpect to colonial affairs, is one in which the trifling value of the diſtant ſettlements will always render the probable ſacrifice preferable to the loſſes and dangers of hoſtilities undertaken from motives of extreme precaution, and dictated by the view of preventing changes only ultimately dangerous to the colonial balance.

But widely different is the ſituation of thoſe powers which poſſeſs colonies of great intrinſic value as important parts of their dominions and rich mines of commercial wealth. In various points of view, their conduct muſt be regulated by a regard to their diſtant, as well as to their contiguous provinces. An invaſion of

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their colonial territory is, next to an invaſion of their European dominions, the event moſt to be dreaded, even although unſucceſsful, and, if poſſible, to be averted by all the reſources of federal power. The attack, when made, is to be repulſed and revenged, not merely from a regard to national honour, but from a conſideration of the real value of the poſſeſſion which is at ſtake. All the means which the cautious and longſighted views of modern policy can ſuggeſt, muſt be put in practice to remove every danger that may ariſe in any quarter to the colonial balance; becauſe ſuch riſks, though indifferent to the name and honour of a ſtate, lead to a cataſtrophe ſubſtantially hurtful, perhaps ruinous—the loſs of an important branch of the national territory, the diſmemberment of the empire. To prevent changes only ultimately dangerous to the colonial ſyſtem, or even to obviate the effects of arrangements that may lead to ſuch changes, the whole influence of the mother country ſhould be called forth; that influence which her internal reſources and her colonial poſſeſſions have conſpired in beſtowing, and which will no longer be her's, even in affairs ſtrictly European, if ſhe ſhall be ſo blind to her beſt intereſts as to neglect all the meaſures neceſſary for keeping her ſcattered empire together.

It is eaſy to imagine a variety of caſes, in which changes may be effected, of the nature which I have juſt now deſcribed. By amicable contract between two powers naturally allied, a transference of colonial dominion may take place. Such was the compact by which France ſold to Sweden the only iſland which ſhe poſſeſſes in the Weſt Indies. Had this iſland been of great importance, and had the tranſaction been reverſed, ſo dangerous an increaſe of colonial power to the French dominions would have called for the determined interference of the neighbouring ſtates, as much as if a ſimilar compact had transferred to France a part of the European continent.

By a treaty of peace, terminating either a general or a partial European warfare, a ſimilar transference of colonial territory may be effected. In the one caſe, all the powers poſſeſſing colonies will be conſulted, as having an immediate intereſt both in the pacification and in the colonial ſyſtem. In the caſe of a partial treaty, ſuch as that which conſolidated the whole of St Domingo under the French dominion, it becomes the other powers to interfere, according to the principles of modern policy. * If the matters at ſtake in Europe be not more important than the colonial intereſts, it becomes all parties to join againſt the new ſti-

* Book III. Sect. I.

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pulation, regardleſs of the ſides which they had eſpouſed in the previous part of the conteſt. If, on the other hand, as was the caſe at the peace of Baſle, the fate of colonial affairs is of leſs moment than the European intereſts ſtaked on the conteſt, the colonial powers are called upon, by the partial treaty which has taken place, to defer their oppoſition until the end of the European diſpute, and then to introduce the conſideration of the change that has happened, into the diſcuſſion of the general pacification; or if the fortune of war has unhappily confined their influence, as has been but too much the caſe in the inſtance which we are contemplating, their colonial intereſts require that they ſhould defer their oppoſition to a more favourable opportunity, when their ſtrength ſhall be recruited, and the eyes of the powers, whoſe deſertion from the common cauſe has produced all the evil, ſhall be opened to their real honour and advantage. Such ought to be the conduct of the powers poſſeſſing Weſt Indian colonies, in the preſent ſtate of affairs. The great increaſe of territory which France has acquired in the iſlands, is indeed rendered leſs dangerous than it otherwiſe would have been by the augmentation of the Britiſh dominions in the neighbourhood; and the change has attracted leſs attention than it ought to have done, from the diſtracted ſtate of the whole

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whole French colonies in thoſe parts. But as it is for the evident advantage of the other colonies, nay eſſential to their exiſtence, that the French ſettlements ſhould be reduced to a ſtate of order; and as, in the event of their pacification, the vaſt force of the newly acquired dominion will far more than counterbalance the increaſed power of Great Britain, it certainly becomes the other powers to aid her in attempting to reſtore the colonial balance, before the complete ſubjugation of St Domingo and its augmented cultivation ſhall have rendered it a formidable neighbour. I have already * ſtated the greater probability of St Domingo becoming ſoon independent of the mother country, in its preſent united ſtate, than in its former ſtate of diviſion. This circumſtance, and ſtill more the reſtoration of Louiſiana to France, forms an additional reaſon for an interference, in which the United States would moſt probably bear an important part. And it ſurely deſerves ſome conſideration, that Spain, engaged only as a ſecondary party in the great European conteſt, ſhould not only have paid ſo great a ſhare at home, but ſhould have entirely furniſhed the equivalents in the Weſt Indies. The ſame remark applies to Holland in the Eaſt: So that,

* Book I. Sect. III. Part IV.

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in the colonies, as well as in Europe, the ſame melancholy reflection muſt ſtrike every one who contemplates the events of the late memorable conteſt. The great powers who began the war, and who were the principals in it from beginning to end, received all their indemnities, and equivalents, and *douceurs*, from thoſe leſſer powers who had only an indirect concern in the origin of the conteſt, and were dragged into it unwillingly. The defeats, both of Auſtria and Pruſſia, were paid for by Venice and the German princes. The victories of France were, in Europe, recompenſed by the ſpoils of Germany and Italy. In the colonies, Spain and Holland alone were ſtripped of their fineſt territories, in order to reward the ſucceſſes of the French and Britiſh arms. The time is certainly not yet arrived, in which the balance of Europe and of the colonies can be readjuſted, and the violation of public equity repaired. Unfortunately, the ſpoil has been ſhared by almoſt all the great powers of Europe; and thoſe who have received an inadequate portion, will not, it is probable, be inclined to make reſtoration, until the ſacrifice is found neceſſary, as a preliminary to the meaſures that may be preſcribed by the wiſh to ſtrip thoſe whoſe ſhare has been dangerouſly great.

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Nor can we expect that the colonial power of France will receive no farther augmentation at the expence of her vaſſal allies, if her preponderance in European affairs ſhall remain as formidable as it now is. If the other powers of Europe ſhall continue as blind to their intereſts as they have hitherto been, and ſhall ſuffer the New Republic, recruited during the preſent interruption of hoſtilities, to domineer over ſo large a portion of the continent under the name of protecting and befriending it; what ſecurity is there to thoſe ſtates which retain their independence and poſſeſs valuable colonies, that new gifts and ceſſions of colonial territory ſhall not follow thoſe which we have been conſidering, and pave the way for the immediate acquiſition of ſupreme power? In Europe, it may be enough for France to ſway the continental balance, by the aſſiſtance of the ſubordinate powers whom ſhe uſes as tools, while ſhe allows them to retain their ſeparate names and fictitious independence, without running the riſk of the internal diſunion and the oppoſition from without, which always attend the eſtabliſhment of unwieldy empires. She gains as much real power as ſhe can retain over the deſtinies of the world, by ruling Holland, and Italy, and Switzerland, and Spain, through the medium of their own governments. But in order to turn the Dutch and

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Spaniſh colonies to her own uſe, the actual poſſeſſion of them muſt be transferred. This is the only way in which the advantages, whether political or mercantile, peculiar to colonial eſtabliſhments, can be uſurped; and we can ſcarcely doubt, that the temptations held out by territories ſo rich in natural and acquired reſources as thoſe of Holland and Spain both in the Eaſt and Weſt, will be a ſufficient inducement to the ambition and the national avarice of France to reſtore her colonial proſperity in America; to extend her influence in the Indian ocean; to recruit her exhauſted treaſury; and to revive her commerce and her navy—all at the expence of an ally who has more territory than ſhe can cultivate, and a vaſſal who dare not murmur, although her capital were to be ſacked by the republican troops.

It is only by interfering in the immediate concerns of France, Holland and Spain, that Britain and Portugal can prevent a cataſtrophe ſo ruinous to their intereſts immediately in the colonies, and ultimately alſo in Europe. By ſubſidizing other powers leſs directly concerned in ſuch arrangements, and by reviving that ſalutary jealouſy of the French power in general, which has for ſome years been lulled or terrified into a ſtate of reſt, a check may be given to ſuch meaſures as muſt in the mean time deſtroy the

the whole balance of the colonial ſyſtem, and in the end complete the ſupremacy of the great republic over the European commonwealth.

The ſtates which poſſeſs territories in the Eaſt Indies, are certainly expoſed to fewer dangers from the ſide of Europe, than from the operations of the native powers. Yet, even from Europe, ſome danger may be apprehended. The extenſion of Ruſſia towards the ſouth and eaſt, and the feeble ſtate of the princes to the north of Indoſtan, ſeem to have filled the ambitious mind of Katharine II. with plans for accompliſhing her darling object, the extenſion of the Ruſſian commerce, by an invaſion of the rich provinces that now form the great eaſtern wing of the Britiſh empire. To thoſe who reflect upon the feeble tenure by which, at the peace of Kainardgi, the Britiſh dominions in India were held, the bare mention of ſuch a ſcheme as that attributed to Katharine, will not ſuggeſt any contemptuous ideas. Since the convention with Ruſſia put an end, at leaſt for the preſent, to all fears from that quarter, the fortunes of the Britiſh arms in the Eaſt have no doubt placed our dominion in a very different ſituation, by the extinction of our great natural enemy in the peninſula. But ſtill, many of the native powers poſſeſs a force, which, if united, might prove dangerous in the extreme. They all retain their jealouſy of England;

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England; and, upon half enlightened politicians, it would not be difficult for European councils to prevail, even if their real intereſts were not (as they unqueſtionably are) inimical to the exiſtence of the Britiſh name in the Eaſt. From France and her allies, they have no proſpect of aſſiſtance, at leaſt according to the preſent diſtribution of colonial force. From the wealthy and populous ſtate on the eaſtern ſide of the Bay of Bengal, they may expect the moſt cordial co-operation. The ſame ſalutary jealouſy of Europeans, which has ſteadily prevented them from intruding into the Burman territories, and dictated to the natives a line of policy that might do honour to more enlightened ſtateſmen, would certainly induce that prudent people to co-operate in checking the progreſs of a nation, from whoſe increaſe nothing but deſtruction can ariſe to all the Indian ſtates. A Ruſſian invaſion, then, would be moſt probably ſeconded by the Eaſtern powers, to whom the ruin of the Britiſh intereſts, though effected by the introduction of a new European tribe, would ſtill be highly advantageous.

Beſides, it ſhould be remembered that Ruſſia is by no means ſo far removed from thoſe ſcenes, as to render the efforts of her own individual force contemptible, or the plan of conquering India by direct and ſeparate invaſion, chimeri-

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cal. From Aſtracan to the northern frontier of Indoſtan, the diſtance is not greater than from St Peterſburg to thoſe plains where Suwaroff defeated one of the fineſt armies in Europe; and the affairs of government in Siberia and Kamtchatka are managed by communication with the metropolis, although the diſtance is nearly twice as great as that of Calcutta from the Gulf of Finland, and the route incomparably more difficult. If the Britiſh empire in the Eaſt has been acquired by all manner of intrigues, rather than by force, and ſupported partly by the ſame means, partly by armies ſent from an immenſe diſtance; will it be impoſſible for Ruſſia to diſpute the prize, partly by the aid of thoſe ſtates whoſe paſſions and intereſts conſpire to alienate them from the firſt great intruders, and whoſe jealouſy muſt now be increaſed, and their union cemented, ſince the defeat of their chief ally; partly by the force of thoſe armies who may in ſo ſhort a time march from Aſtracan, a ſtation peculiarly adapted to become the depôt of an armament, from its maritime ſituation, its own importance, and its eaſy communication with the heart of the empire? Is it then a chimerical fear that makes us tremble at the conſequences of that ſyſtematic ambition, which may pour into the peninſula a well equipped army of a hundred thouſand men, ſingularly adapted

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apted to Eaſtern warfare, and ſhake the Britiſh power in provinces remote from the ſeat of empire, peopled by a diſunited maſs of inhabitants, retained in ſubjection, as they were conquered, by the force and cunning of a handful of men; ſurrounded by powerful ſtates, ready to promote any change that may weaken the Europeans, and give them the chance of freeing the great Indian commonwealth from thoſe formidable intruders who have ſo long revelled in its ſpoils? An invaſion, although unſucceſsful on the part of Ruſſia, might have the moſt fatal conſequences to the Britiſh power all over Indoſtan. Such an attempt muſt be viewed as a calamity which it becomes Britain to avert by every exertion. Her naval power; her influence in continental affairs; the force of her treaſures; her intereſt with allies; in ſhort, all the reſources of modern policy muſt be exerted in Europe, to prevent the great northern power from attempting a blow, of which the ultimate ſucceſs and failure are almoſt indifferent to the fate of our Eaſtern empire, provided it is levelled with a force at all adequate to the magnitude of the occaſion. * In the mean time, an equal jealouſy ſhould be entertained of any encroachments which Ruſſia may

* Note Nn.

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may attempt on the ſouth. She lately added to her dominion, if common fame may be credited, a conſiderable province of the Perſian empire; and her encroachments on the Turkiſh dominions deſerve unremitting attention, as well on account of their ultimate conſequences to the colonial ſyſtem, as on account of their immediate effects upon the adjuſtment of the European balance.

I ſhall now take an example of a remote cauſe, which may, by a leſs obvious and apparent proceſs, operate the deſtruction of the colonial ſyſtem in the Weſt, and affect more immediately, though not ſo dangerouſly, the colonial dominions ſituated in the Eaſt Indies.

During the laſt years of the eighteenth century, by far the moſt eventful period in the hiſtory of the human ſpecies, a ſcheme was put in execution, by the revolutionary rulers of France, which appears to have been frequently in the contemplation of the ancient Government. When the colonial power of the republic in America had been almoſt extinguiſhed, the foundation of a new and invaluable colony was laid by the ſudden conqueſt of Egypt. The unparalleled achievements of the Britiſh arms, towards the end of the war, reconquered to it the Turkiſh empire. But it is almoſt needleſs to obſerve, that for many years before the French

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French expedition, the Porte had ceaſed to have any real power over this fine province; * that the unexpected victories of the laſt campaign have not in any degree reformed its domeſtic adminiſtration; that it lies as much expoſed as before to the armaments which France may again fit out from her Mediterranean coaſt; and that a convention between the Porte and the Republic, dictated by alarm or obtained by the promiſe of aſſiſtance againſt two powers the natural enemies of both, may peaceably transfer a poſſeſſion almoſt totally uſeleſs to its preſent maſters. It is of ſome importance to conſider the natural conſequences of an event ſo extremely probable, to the intereſts, firſt of the Aſiatic, and then of the American colonial ſyſtems.

I. The moſt obvious danger, but, I apprehend, by far the leaſt formidable that can ariſe from the eſtabliſhment of any European colony in Egypt, is the riſk of invaſion to which the Eaſt Indian ſettlements may be expoſed. As France is the power moſt likely to attempt the eſtabliſhment of a colony in Egypt, and as ſhe is undoubtedly the moſt able to derive advantage from this acquiſition, we ſhall, in general, take for an example the caſe of Egypt becoming a French colony; a caſe already for nearly three years fully realized.

* Note O o.

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1. In attacking from this quarter the Britiſh ſettlements on the Malabar coaſt, France will poſſeſs many very obvious advantages, from the near neighbourhood of her new colony. The communication between Alexandria and Marſeilles is much eaſier and ſhorter than that between the capital and the frontier provinces of ſome European ſtates; between St Peterſburg, for inſtance, and the Ruſſian provinces on the Black Sea. The average paſſage to Alexandria is fifteen or twenty days; and from thence to Suez is only a journey of a week. It is poſſible, with favourable winds, to deſpatch a courier from Paris, who ſhall paſs through Egypt; deliver his inſtructions to the colonial government eſtabliſhed at Cairo; carry on advices to the expedition fitting out at Suez or Coſſeir on the Red Sea, and proceed with deſpatches to part of the armament arrived at Surat on the Malabar coaſt, in fifty days.* But admitting the average to be ten weeks, how much ſhorter is this than the time taken by a quick-ſailing veſſel to reach Bombay from Britain?

It muſt, however, be remarked, that the route, though ſhort, is almoſt entirely by ſea. So

* Maillet, (Ed. de Maſcrier), Part. III. p. 200.—Ricard, III. 43.—Niebuhr, Voyages, I. 205, 228, 248, & 356. (French edit. in 4to.)

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So long as Britain retains the decided naval ſuperiority in Europe, the communication between France and her new colony is commanded by Britiſh cruiſers. The ſame remark applies ſtill more ſtrongly to the communication between Egypt and India. A powerful fleet, ſtationed on the Malabar coaſt, may always cruiſe off the Straights of Babelmandel, or in the Channel itſelf, or in the Red Sea, of which the navigation muſt be ſtill more dangerous to a large fleet of tranſports than to a ſquadron of the line. Beſides, the veſſels neceſſary for the expedition muſt be conſtructed in the colony, where for many years ſhipbuilding cannot be expected to flouriſh; or they muſt be brought round by the Cape, and conſequently expoſed to the Britiſh fleets. The navigation of the Red Sea, too, in every part extremely bad, is impracticable for large veſſels within eighty leagues from Suez. * It muſt alſo be remembered that no part of the world is more ſubject to regular and ſtrong monſoons than the Indian Ocean and the Red Sea; and, what cannot fail to hamper any expedition fitted out from Egypt with very great difficulties, the direction of the wind varies in different parts of the paſſage at the ſame time. Thus, during the ſix months of northerly monſoon

* Econ. Polit. et Diplom. (Encyc. Method.) II. 254.—Note P p.

ſoon in the Red Sea, the ſoutherly monſoon prevails in the Indian Ocean. *

After the dangers of the firſt coup de main, therefore, are over, (and in modern times ſuch ſudden ſhocks have ſeldom or never any effect), the Bombay government, aſſiſted by the ſquadron which the neighbourhood of Egypt will conſtantly render neceſſary in the Indian Ocean, may be expected to provide ſufficiently for the defence of that ſettlement.

2. There can be no doubt, that, from its aſtoniſhing fertility, and advantageous poſition, Egypt, under a colonial government, will ſoon acquire immenſe wealth; and that the extenſive population which it actually maintains, and the ſtill larger number of inhabitants which it may eaſily ſupport, added to its other reſources, muſt render it a formidable neighbour to the ſettlements on the Malabar coaſt, the moſt inconſiderable of all the Britiſh colonies in the Eaſt. But the dangers to be apprehended from this improvement of Egypt, are far from being immediate. To mention only one circumſtance—The population of the country, though much greater than that of the Bombay eſtabliſhment, is made up of ſo many

* Capper on Winds and Monſoons, p. 68. 72.—Bruce, I. 431.—Note Q q.

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different nations, in ſuch a low ſtate of civilization, ſo refractory and diſunited, that for many years the colony will be very ill adapted to encounter the riſks of a ſtate of war; and, at any rate, muſt truſt for its defence and government entirely to the troops of the mother country. It can only, then, ſerve as a point from whence India may be attacked, by ſerving as a depôt or paſſage for French troops, while it offers every where the moſt vulnerable points to attract an effectual diverſion from the enemy. When, on the other hand, the reſources of the colony have been augmented and its inhabitants diſciplined and enlightened by the progreſs of civilization, it will become, as an ultimate object, an invaluable poſſeſſion. Its ſtrength and proſperity being derived from commerce, its inhabitants will naturally be averſe to war, and more particularly to war with ſome of their beſt cuſtomers. If the mother country ſhould force it on to hoſtilities, ſhe will probably meet with reſiſtance; and the amicable intercourſe may thus be continued between Egypt and Indoſtan, to their mutual advantage, in ſpite of the mother country's ambition.

3. The ſhortneſs of the paſſage between the Malabar coaſt and Suez, has often induced ſpeculative politicians to imagine that the ancient

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cient communication between Europe and India might be revived with advantage, not only for the purpoſe of conveying intelligence, but alſo for the purpoſes of commerce. It has therefore been imagined, that the nation poſſeſſed of Egypt may deprive Great Britain of her Eaſt Indian trade, and monopolize the wealth of the Eaſt, by joining the Mediterranean with the Red Sea, or by making Egypt an entrepôt for the Aſiatic merchandize.

Upon this point it may be remarked, in the *firſt* place, that the communication between the Indian ocean and the Mediterranean, even admitting the poſſibility of joining the Red Sea with the Nile or the Mediterranean by means of a canal, would be extremely tedious and inconvenient for the courſe of mercantile tranſactions. A ſwift ſailing veſſel, of ſmall bulk, fit for beating to windward and for avoiding rocks and ſhallows, might eaſily carry deſpatches down the Red Sea, at times when no fleet of merchantmen could encounter the monſoons. The meſſenger intruſted with them could, without difficulty, perform his journey through Egypt in a week, either by the Nile and the canal, or by land carriage, while repeated difficulties would neceſſarily occur to retard the progreſs of laden boats and caravans. I ſpeak not of the dangers which valuable merchandize muſt

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run, in the preſent unſettled ſtate of the country, from the various tribes of banditti that infeſt both the river and the deſerts; or of the many difficulties and vexations ariſing from the poſitive inſtitutions ſupported by the Porte and the Beys, for the purpoſes of legal plunder. * Admitting that all theſe impediments to the communication ſhall be aboliſhed, as ſome of them certainly muſt ceaſe with the preſent order of things, there are ſtill various phyſical obſtacles to the projected communication, which muſt for ever diminiſh, perhaps deſtroy, the ſuperiority of this route in point of ſhortneſs. The ſame veſſels which navigate the Mediterranean cannot aſcend the Nile, and croſs the deſert in the canal. The goods muſt therefore be all unloaded at Alexandria. The canal and river boats can never encounter the tempeſts and ſwell of the Red Sea and Indian Ocean. Another loading will therefore be neceſſary at Suez, although the river boats ſhould be able to navigate the canal. Hence the loſs and expence of two additional loadings and unloadings muſt be deducted from the profits of the cargo; and the delay occaſioned thereby muſt be added to the total length of the paſſage. Moreover, unleſs

* Note R r.

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leſs a prodigious number of veſſels are employed in this trade, the goods muſt often pay for two veſſels inſtead of one; ſince it will frequently happen, that the empty veſſels cannot immediately receive a new freight. The profits, too, of the conſignees in Egypt muſt be taken into account; or, if the goods are accompanied by ſupercargoes, their wages come to diminiſh the total gains. Laſtly, however ſhort the voyage may be, it cannot be undertaken at all times, on account of the monſoons. Niebuhr ſays that a ſkilful voyager may go from Suez to India and back again in a year, by taking advantage of the half-yearly wind. * But if the winds blow half-yearly, it is clear that two voyages may be made in thirteen months. Still it will not be poſſible, after making every allowance, to perform the voyage from Europe to India oftener than twice in the courſe of eighteen months. This will clearly appear from the following ſtatement.

The moſt advantageous time of ſailing from Marſeilles, will be the middle of June. Suppoſe that the average time taken in tranſporting goods from thence to Suez is ſix weeks (it cannot poſſibly be rated lower, when we conſider

* Deſcript. de l'Arabie, p. 303.

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the double loading and unloading): The merchandiſe is ſhipped at Suez in the beginning of Auguſt, and is immediately carried down the Red Sea by the northerly monſoon. In a month it arrives at the Malabar coaſt, and is unſhipped: A new cargo, we ſhall ſuppoſe, is taken in, and ready to return with the firſt ſoutherly monſoon; it arrives at Suez in the beginning of November, and at Marſeilles about the middle of December. Now, in however ſhort a time a new cargo may be ſhipped, it cannot ſail ſooner than the middle of February, otherwiſe it would have to wait at Suez for the northerly monſoon, which begins in April. The veſſel will arrive at Bombay in May, and muſt wait there till October for the ſoutherly monſoon. It will therefore not return to Marſeilles until the middle of December, which is juſt eighteen months from the ſailing of the firſt cargo.

The expence of theſe two voyages will undoubtedly be ſomewhat ſmaller than that of the Cape voyages, which might be performed in the ſame time. But the expences of loading, the canal and river expences, the commiſſion or ſupercargo's wages, the extraordinary tear and wear of veſſels in the Red Sea and Straits of Babelmandel, together with the inutility of thoſe ſhips during the months when they are not

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not employed, and the idleneſs of the crews during the greater part of that time, may be conſidered as almoſt ſufficient to balance ſo trifling an advantage.

But it is not by any means probable that the communication between the Mediterranean and Red Seas will be ſo eaſy as we have ſuppoſed. The junction of the Nile with the Gulf of Suez by a canal, has been frequently projected; and we are even told that in ancient times it was effected. That it was more than once attempted, there can be no doubt; but the impracticability of ſuch a ſcheme is now almoſt placed beyond a doubt. This ariſes, not ſo much from the old opinion, of the level being higher in the Red Sea than in the Mediterranean, as from the nature of the ground through which the cut muſt neceſſarily paſs. The diſtance between Cairo and Suez is above one hundred and five Engliſh miles by the caravan track, according to Niebuhr; * according to others, one hundred and fifty miles; † it is above ſeventy miles in a ſtraight line. The canal cut muſt certainly be one hundred at the very leaſt; and the whole of this route is a ſandy deſert, where the ſoil is perpetually ſhifting with

* Voyages, tom. I. p. 175.

† Econ. Polit. et Dipl. (Encyc. Method.) II. 254.

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the wind, and where no foundation can be obtained for conſtructing works of any kind. ‡ Beſides, although the natural level of the Red Sea and Mediterranean may be the ſame, the effect of a wind of uncommon violence, that is, the half year's monſoon, or, as ſome have called it, the nine months monſoon, blowing all the waters of the Indian Ocean through the Straits of Babelmandel, muſt be to raiſe their level, and drive an irreſiſtible current through the Gulf of Suez. This, of itſelf, would render the canal impracticable, even although the experiment ſhould be tried, as it once was, by cutting from Suez due north, ſo as to join the Red Sea with a ſmall river that runs into the Nile a few miles below Cairo, or by cutting ſtraight through the Iſthmus. The manifold inconveniences, too, of an inland navigation through a deſert, deſerve to be conſidered, admitting the poſſibility of forming the cut. All theſe inconveniences would either be of ſuch a nature as to damage the goods tranſported, or to increaſe the expence of carriage, by the repairs neceſſary for the canal, and the diſtance from whence it would be neceſſary to tranſport every article of conſumption required for the perſons

‡ Econ. Polit. et Dipl. (Encyc. Method.) II. 254.—Volney's Egypt and Syria, I. 210.

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perſons and cattle employed on its banks, or in the boats. We may therefore conclude, that the communication between Europe and India through Egypt, cannot be facilitated by any internal navigation; and that, in addition to all the expence and delay formerly enumerated as the neceſſary attendants of ſuch a ſcheme, there muſt be reckoned the coſt and time required for a new loading and unloading at Cairo, together with the conſignee's profits, and the riſks and charges of a journey acroſs the deſert. From all that has been ſaid, I am inclined to infer the impoſſibility of gaining any important advantage, in point of eaſy and expeditious mercantile communication with the Eaſt, by the poſſeſſion of Egypt.

It may farther be obſerved, that the ſtatements above detailed with reſpect to the winds, clearly prove the abſurdity of ſuppoſing that ſuch a communication would be ſhorter or eaſier to France than to any other maritime country. The only difference between the navigation of the Marſeilloiſe and the Newcaſtle veſſels is, that the former would be a few weeks in the year longer at reſt than the latter. They would both make the ſame number of voyages in the year; and, conſequently, if a free trade were allowed to India through Egypt, the diſtant nation would be able to derive as much advantage

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vantage from it as the nation poſſeſſed of the colony, and ſituated in its immediate vicinity.

But, in the *ſecond* place, admitting the certainty of all the advantages which have been expected from the communication with India by the Iſthmus of Suez; and admitting that France, in poſſeſſion of Egypt, ſhall monopolize the carriage of Eaſt Indian commodities; it is evident that this change muſt be as beneficial to Great Britain, to the other conſumers of Aſiatic produce, and to the colonies themſelves, as to France. The ſuperior cheapneſs and ſhortneſs of the new route will be the cauſe of the preference given to the French carriers; and, like any of thoſe natural or acquired advantages which confer upon particular nations ſuperior ſkill in one branch of trade or manufacture, the poſſeſſion of Egypt will be a benefit, not only to the French, but to their cuſtomers. The advantages derived from it will thus be mutual, like the advantages which once rendered the Dutch the carriers and brokers of Europe, and thoſe which render the Engliſh the chief manufacturers. The goods of Eaſt Indian growth or fabric will be tranſported cheaper and better to England and Holland, though not in Engliſh and Dutch veſſels; the agriculture and manufactures of the colonies will therefore be promoted; and the capital formerly

formerly employed in carrying the colonial merchandize to the mother country will be employed either in ſupplying the new demands of the colonies, occaſioned by the improved communication, or in preparing manufactures to meet the demands of the French market, extended by the increaſed wealth of the country, and deprived of a ready ſupply by the quantity of ſtock withdrawn to the carrying trade.

A ſimilar obſervation may be applied to that view of the ſubject which would lead us to apprehend danger from our natural enemy becoming maſter of the wealth and ſtrength of Egypt, in ſo far as its reſources are likely to be augmented by its mercantile connexion with the Eaſt. There cannot indeed be any doubt that the poſition of Egypt is extremely favourable to all the branches of commerce, as its ſoil and climate are admirably adapted to the raiſing of raw produce; that it will ſoon become the moſt valuable colony in the world; and that one of the branches of trade which will contribute eſſentially to its wealth, is the traffic with India. In itſelf, therefore, this ſplendid acquiſition will be of incalculable advantage to France; and, from its ſituation in the immediate neighbourhood of Europe, as well as from its influence upon the relative power of the mother country, it is a change well calculated to rouſe the jealouſy

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ouſy of all the other ſtates. But, at preſent, we are only contemplating the probable effects of the acquiſition upon the colonial ſyſtems; and, however much Egypt immediately, or France conſequentially, may gain by the commerce of the Eaſt, the advantage muſt neceſſarily be exactly equal to the Indian ſtates or the colonies with which the trade may be carried on, and conſequently to the European ſtates poſſeſſing thoſe Aſiatic colonies.

Were the Eaſt Indian commerce of Britain and Holland laid open to the whole capital which could be drawn into it, the neighbourhood of ſuch a colony as Egypt muſt ſoon become, under the government of France, would be, of all changes that could happen, the moſt beneficial, both to the Indian colonies, and to the mercantile intereſts of the parent ſtates as connected with thoſe colonies.

From its poſition, Egypt will be the natural entrepôt of the Indian merchandize; from its wealth, it will offer, in itſelf, a moſt extenſive market for every thing which is raiſed or manufactured in Aſia. From the nature of its produce (as we ſhall immediately ſee), it will interfere ſo very little with the commodities raiſed in the Eaſt, that no great or ſudden ſhifting of colonial capital or induſtry will be the conſequence of Egypt being improved to the uttermoſt;

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uttermoſt; and from the peculiar fertility of this country in all ſorts of grain, it will afford a ſure reſource to the natives of the peninſula, ſo often liable to the miſeries of extenſive famine. To the colonies, then, and in like manner, to the conſumers of colonial produce, the neighbourhood of this great entrepôt for Eaſtern merchandize, will be as advantageous as the corn-merchant is to the farmer and conſumer of grain, or the retail dealer to the manufacturer and uſer of wrought goods, or the merchant importer in the mother country to the colonies and conſumers of colonial produce; while the market and the ſupplies which ſo rich and populous a country will afford, cannot fail incalculably to promote the wealth of the colonies in the firſt inſtance, and ultimately to augment the riches of the mother country alſo.

There is indeed no doubt, that ſome of the ſtock formerly employed in carrying Eaſt Indian goods, muſt now be ſhifted to another occupation. Part of that ſtock, inſtead of bringing them round the Cape, with a ſlow return of profits, will now bring them from India to Egypt, and from Egypt to Europe, with a much quicker return. The competition of Egyptian and French capital will unqueſtionably throw out another part of the capital formerly veſted in the Indian trade. But this is only

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only a conſequence of the free commerce which we are ſuppoſing to be eſtabliſhed, and which would produce the very ſame effects on the traffic, as is at preſent carried on by the Cape. It is unneceſſary to prove that this ſhifting of capital, ſlowly effected, can produce only good conſequences to the mother country, and confer upon the colonies the ſame benefits as if a vaſt capital were gradually poured into their agriculture, manufactures, and commerce.

If it be ſuppoſed that the preſent ſyſtems of monopoly ſhall continue in the Aſiatic colonies, the colonies and the parent ſtates will have to lament all that additional loſs to which they will now be ſubjected, comparatively ſpeaking, by being excluded from a ſhare in the vaſt additional benefits ſo likely to flow from a free trade with their new neighbours. But this neighbourhood will not on that account occaſion any real loſs, either to the colony or the mother country. Things will remain actually in the ſame ſtate as before the eſtabliſhment of the colony in Egypt. If, however, the abſurd policy of the other ſtates poſſeſſing Eaſt Indian territories, ſhall drive the new rulers of the colony to ſeek for ſettlements among the native powers on the coaſts of the peninſula, or among the iſlands of the Indian ocean, or to attempt, by treaty with thoſe powers, the extenſion of the ſettlements already

already obtained, or to extend their commercial relations with the Aſiatics, whoſe purſuits may in no ſmall degree be new-modelled by the intercourſe of the merchants belonging to the new colony; then, the ſupport of the preſent Eaſt Indian monopolies will be a matter of much greater difficulty than it hitherto has been. In ſpite of England and Holland, the merchants of the French colony will obtain abundance of Eaſt Indian goods, and will be able greatly to underſell the Eaſt India Companies in every market, although thoſe bodies ſhould reform their groſs abuſes, trade as economically as individuals, and be contented to take the loweſt, inſtead of the monopoly profits. Thus, beſides the great difficulty of preventing a contraband trade, mutually lucrative, from being carried on between Egypt and their ſettlements in India, the companies will have to ſtruggle againſt the ſtill greater difficulty of preventing a contraband trade equally gainful from being carried on in Europe. In order to ſupport the excluſive privileges of thoſe corporations, the legiſlatures of the reſpective countries will be obliged to new-model all their reſtrictive laws; and it may probably be found that a new code of cuſtom-houſe law will be inadequate to check ſuch a ſyſtem of ſmuggling as muſt be engendered both in Aſia and Europe, by the temptations

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tions of aſtoniſhing profits, and to maintain the excluſive privileges of the trading corporations for any profitable purpoſe. The contraband trade in Swediſh teas carried on ſome years ago, notwithſtanding all the efforts of the Engliſh Eaſt India Company to check it, muſt be freſh in the memory of every one; yet, compared with the new contraband, of which we are now ſpeaking, that traffic was trifling indeed. In ſhort, it is ſcarcely poſſible to figure the continuance of ſuch trading companies, after the Egyptian colony ſhall have been firmly eſtabliſhed. The influence of thoſe bodies will probably prevail, ſo far as to obtain the ſupport of their reſpective governments, until the evil becomes too great for any legiſlative remedies. The end of ſuch commercial nuiſances will then be allowed to approach, when no efforts of ſtate can prevent the cataſtrophe; and, according to a feature but too common in the character of human councils, the nations which have been ſo eſſentially injured by thoſe deſtructive ſyſtems of monopoly, will at laſt be forced to relieve themſelves from the evil, in conſequence of external events beyond the ſphere of their controul. It is not eaſy to avoid wiſhing for any change, even a change favourable to the power of France, which may gradually but effectually blot out from the colonial

colonial policy of Europe all remains of commercial monopoly and company government. *

In a mercantile point of view, then, the powers poſſeſſing Eaſt Indian colonies have nothing to apprehend, but much to hope for their diſtant ſettlements, from the improvement of Egypt and its ſubjection to a regular and efficient government. In a political point of view, thoſe colonies have little to dread from ſuch a change. A little more vigilance will be required, a larger fleet and a higher eſtabliſhment of land forces will be neceſſary in time of war; but no real danger can ever ariſe from this quarter, to the preſent ſyſtem of colonial power in the peninſula and Aſiatic iſlands. Still leſs need any apprehenſions of this nature be entertained from the eſtabliſhment of an independent and primary government in Egypt, ſuppoſing ſuch an event to be at all poſſible in the preſent circumſtances of that country. The new power will never regard India as a ſcene of conqueſt, whilſt Arabia, Syria, and the Archipelago remain unſubdued. It is only the relations which ſubſiſt between France and the parent ſtates of the Indian colonies, that could ever render the project of invading the peninſula a matter of ſerious conſideration. In a commercial point of view, it will not make any difference whether the improvement of Egypt

* Note S 9.

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is effected by foreign conqueſt, or by the efforts of an independent and civilized government eſtabliſhed upon the ruins of the Ottoman and Mameluc power. In either caſe the conſequences muſt be equally beneficial to the colonial intereſts of all the European powers poſſeſſed of Aſiatic dominions.

II. I come now to conſider that view of the ſubject which is apparently very remote and fanciful, but in reality preſents to our attention the moſt important and ſerious conſiderations—the probable effects of the ſubjection and improvement of Egypt upon the Weſt Indian colonies of the European powers. There can remain no doubt whatever in the mind of any perſon who examines the natural reſources of Egypt, that the cultivation of this noble province, by an induſtrious race of men, will be attended with the immediate deſolation of the whole Charaibean iſlands, from Cuba to Trinidad, and of the continental poſſeſſions of the Europeans along the Weſt Indian coaſt of South America.

1. Let us attend, in the *firſt* place, to the prodigious extent of fertile land which has all been at different times, in a ſtate of high and eaſy cultivation in Egypt, and let us compare this with

with the whole cleared and cultivated Weſt Indian territory.

The Delta and the fertile parts of the country adjoining it on the Canopic and Tanitic branches of the Nile, form a vaſt plain, of a figure ſomewhat triangular, or rather a ſector of a circle, whoſe arch extends from Tana to Alexandria, and whoſe radius is a line drawn from Cairo to Cape Berelos. As the chord is about one hundred and forty Engliſh miles, and the radius about one hundred and ten, the whole area cannot contain fewer than eight thouſand ſeven hundred ſquare miles. The lakes Abuſiche and Menzale are indeed included in this ſpace, as well as a ſmall portion of deſert to the weſt of the canal Bahre: But this is nearly balanced by the cultivated land belonging to Lower Egypt, and not comprehended in the portion which we have been conſidering. However, we ſhall ſuppoſe that all theſe deductions, together with the ſpace occupied by the river, amount to about a twelfth part of the whole, and we ſhall eſtimate the fertile part of Lower Egypt at eight thouſand ſquare miles, or five million one hundred and twenty thouſand acres.

Upper Egypt, or the Said, contains, in proportion to its extent, but a ſmall diſtrict of fertile ſoil. It is, in fact, one vaſt deſert, through which the Nile runs in a winding valley of no great breadth. This valley is the only fertile

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part of the whole territory; and its extent cannot be computed with any tolerable degree of preciſion. We may however obſerve, that the length of a ſtraight line drawn between the two extremities of the valley Aſſuan, and Cairo, is about five hundred and fifteen Engliſh miles, or, allowing for windings, ſix hundred miles. The greateſt breadth is about twenty-five, near Beniſuef; and it grows gradually narrower and narrower to its ſouthern extremity at Aſſuan, where it is only ſeven or eight miles broad. If we call the average breadth ſeventeen miles, we ſhall certainly keep much within the truth; and this hypotheſis gives ten thouſand two hundred ſquare miles for the ſuperficies. But to this muſt be added the rich diſtrict of Faioum, by far the moſt fruitful part of the whole country. Beſides ſeveral other fertile ſpots not comprehended in the valley, Faioum contains, of itſelf, between five and ſix hundred ſquare miles. So that, altogether, the cultivated part of the Said cannot poſſibly be rated at leſs than eleven thouſand ſquare miles, or ſeven millions forty thouſand acres; and the whole fertile territory of Egypt muſt of conſequence be above twelve millions of acres, at the very loweſt computation. *

Let

* Savary, tom. I. let. 1. tom. II. let. 3.—Ricard, III. 433.—Danville & Niebuhr's maps.

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Let us compare this with the extent of territory at preſent cultivated in the Weſt Indies, in order to ſupply the demands of the European market.

The number of acres in cultivation in the iſland of Jamaica, in 1787, was one million fifty-nine thouſand; and the exports from thence were valued at two million one hundred and thirty-ſix thouſand four hundred and forty-two pounds. As the total exports from the Britiſh Weſt Indies during the ſame year were ſtated at five millions two hundred and ſixty-five thouſand one hundred and two pounds, and as many of the iſlands contain far more fruitful ſoil than Jamaica, we may ſafely conclude, that not above two millions ſix hundred and nine thouſand eight hundred and forty-five acres were in cultivation. The reports of the French Chambers of Commerce to M. Neckar, give the exports for the year 1788 conſiderably lower, *viz.* four millions one hundred and fifty-ſeven thouſand five hundred pounds: ſo that, according to this eſtimate, the cultivated land would only amount to about two millions of acres; but we ſhall take the higheſt computation.

The number of cultivated acres in the French iſlands was four millions twenty-four thouſand ſix hundred and ſixty, according

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to the average of Jamaica produce, which, for almoſt all thoſe fine territories, is a great deal too low. In the Spaniſh iſlands, the number of cultivated acres was ſeven hundred and forty-five thouſand eight hundred and eighty-three; and in the Dutch colonies of Guiana, about eight hundred and fifty thouſand, according to the ſame very low average: ſo that we may compute the whole cultivated land in the Weſt Indies at eight millions two hundred and thirty thouſand three hundred and eighteen; or, allowing for the trifling ſettlements of Sweden and Denmark (the laſt of which has only ſeventy thouſand acres meaſured out for cultivating), we may call the total eight millions three hundred thouſand acres, ſuppoſing all the land to be of the ſame indifferent quality with that of Jamaica. *

Thus it appears that there is in Egypt nearly half as much more of fertile land as there is in all the parts of the Weſt Indies which the demand for colonial produce has cauſed to be cleared, even if we ſhould ſuppoſe as

* Edwards' Weſt Indies, vol. I. p. 185—230. & II. 385.—Barré de St Venant, Colonies Modernes, I. chap. X.—La Richeſſe de la Hollande, tom. I. p. 334.—Ricard, III. 676.—Catteau, Tableau des etats Danois, tom. II. p. 320.—See alſo Book I. Sect. III. of this Inquiry.

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as much of the Weſt Indian ſoil to have been uſed for raiſing this produce, as would be neceſſary were the whole territory of an inferior degree of fertility. Let us now ſee to what uſes the Egyptian ſoil may be turned.

2. The wonderful fertility of Egypt in all ſorts of grain, is too well known to require any deſcription. The only remark which it is neceſſary to make, is a correction of the vulgar exaggerations that have been grafted upon the real account of its fruitfulneſs. Inſtead of one, two, and three hundred fold, the common return is twenty-five and thirty, and ſometimes as much as fifty for one. But theſe crops are the produce of the moſt careleſs huſbandry in the world. The indolent Copt ſcarcely takes the pains to ſcratch the rich earth on which he liſtleſsly ſpills his ſeed-corn; and in four months his harveſt is reaped. Another ſucceeds in the ſame year; and in ſome favoured diſtricts, particularly of the Delta, where abundance of water can be procured, the ſoil yields no leſs than three crops to thoſe lazy and unſkilful cultivators. The ancient cultivation of Egypt, indeed, when it was the granary of the Roman empire, or the country in which Ptolemy Philadelphus amaſſed a treaſure of one hundred and ninety millions, or the

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conqueſt from which the Arabs drew a revenue of three hundred millions of crowns, cannot now be perceived. Thoſe innumerable canals by means of which the precious ſupplies of the river were diſtributed, and thoſe reſervoirs which aſſiſted the induſtrious natives in œconomizing that treaſure, have for the moſt part been neglected ſince the decline of the ſtate under the Saracen dominion. But, though choked up and ruinous, the works may without much difficulty be repaired. The ſoil ſtill preſents the ſame ſoft ſubſtance to the ſpade, and the ſame materials for the kiln, that formerly enabled the Ptolemies to excavate the entire channel of the river, and raiſe the ſtupendous mountains of architecture which alone, of all human works, ſeem capable of reſiſting the injuries of time. The ſand that in many places lightly covers the ſurface of the country, ſcarcely conceals the ancient furrows over which it has been permitted to ſpread; and all Egypt offers to the cultivator thoſe tempting proſpects of exceſſive returns which have allured Europeans to clear the thick foreſts of the New World, with this ſtriking difference, that its fineſt ſoil is every year renewed, enjoying the perpetual advantages of the virgin ſtate which only once belong to the American plains, while the labour of the cultivator

tivator who firſt ſows a field, is no greater than that of his ſucceſſors who repeat the ſame operation. *

The quantity of grain at preſent raiſed in this favoured territory cannot be aſcertained with preciſion. But it is enough to obſerve, that bad as the Egyptian huſbandry is, the very ſmall part of the community, who may be rather ſaid to reap the ſpontaneous fruits of the river and ſoil than to till the ground, abundantly ſupply the whole population of nearly four millions of perſons, feeding chiefly on grain and vegetables, beſides exporting a great part of the grain required by the inhabitants of Conſtantinople, and the whole of what is conſumed in Arabia. It may eaſily be imagined, then, with what eaſe a ſmall part of the twelve millions of acres which according to our computation form the fertile territory of Egypt, may be appropriated to raiſing the ſupply of grain required for the ſubſiſtence of the community, while

* Suetonius in Veſpaſiano.—Plutarch. in Antonio.—Hiſtory of Eaſt Indian Trade, apud Harris's Collection, Vol. I. p. 419.—Maillet, (Edit. Maſcrier) Part. I. p. 14.—Ricard, tom. III. p. 433. & 443.—Sonnini, Voyages en Egypte, chap. XXVI. & XLVIII.—Savary, tom. I. Let. 1.; tom. II. Let. 3. 18.; tom. III. Let. 2.—Volney's Egypt, vol. I. p. 55, 67.—Eton's Survey of the Turkiſh Empire, chap. VII.

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while the part now employed in raiſing grain for exportation, and the ſtill greater portion laid waſte by abſolute neglect, is devoted to the raiſing of more valuable commodities.

We have thus found our proviſion grounds and pens, to uſe the language of the Weſt Indian agriculture, and in an abundance ſo great as to preclude the neceſſity of importation, under which almoſt all the American colonies labour. Let us ſee if we cannot diſcover alſo the plantations.

3. From the narratives of various authors, ancient and modern, more particularly of thoſe travellers who have viſited Egypt, and given us a deſcription of their route, with no other view than to gratify their own or their reader's curioſity about the antiquities of the place, we may gather, that every article of Weſt Indian produce, except coffee, flouriſhes with peculiar felicity on the banks of the Nile.

The great Weſt Indian ſtaple, the ſugar cane, appears to be indigenous in Egypt. It has been raiſed there in all ages, ſometimes in very conſiderable quantities, and always from ſeed. Its culture is attended with no difficulty, and trifling expence. In Faioum, more eſpecially, it grows in abundance, and almoſt ſpontaneouſly. Although the natives are but little acquainted

acquainted with the culture of the plant, or the ſubſequent preparation of the commodity, they manufacture a conſiderable quantity. All the ſugar uſed in the ſeraglio at Conſtantinople is made in Egypt; and the peculiar excellence of its quality is a ſufficient proof that the cultivation of the cane might be there carried to any degree of perfection. It is in fact to all appearance natural to the ſpot; whereas in the Weſt Indies there is every reaſon to believe that it is exotic. We muſt remember, too, that the ſugar lands in Egypt would produce exactly twice as much as thoſe in the American iſlands, although the ſoil were in itſelf only equally fertile: for in the Weſt Indies the cane pieces muſt be allowed to lye fallow every alternate year, whereas the ſoil of Egypt is annually renewed. But, for this very reaſon, the ground in Egypt muſt be incalculably more productive, and muſt have, for ſugar culture, and the other branches of planting, as well as common huſbandry, the perpetual advantages which belong to a virgin ſoil.

Flax and cotton are articles of Egyptian growth; and only require a little care and ſkill to render them equal to what they anciently were, when the linen and cotton cloths of Egypt were proverbially noted for delicacy and durability. The exquiſite dyes which are brought to

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to ſuch perfection by European induſtry and art in the new world, need ſcarcely be looked for among the Copts and Turks. So much of the value both of cochineal and indigo is owing to the mode of preparation, that we may conſider them as the growth rather of a certain ſtate of ſociety than of a particular ſoil. Nevertheleſs, there can be no doubt that both the inſect which furniſhes the materials of the one fabric, and the plant which produces the other by the intervention of one of the moſt delicate and uncertain proceſſes in the whole circle of the arts, are to be found in their natural ſtate in Egypt; and are even uſed by the natives as dyes, after a rude and inefficacious preparation.

Several of the moſt valuable ſpices and perfumes, not to be found in the Weſt Indies, as caſſia, myrrh, gums, frankincenſe, &c. are indigenous in Egypt; the pimento and others might without doubt be eaſily introduced; and no country is ſo favourable to the growth of the ſilk-worm.

Coffee, we are told by ſome authors, has never been cultivated with ſucceſs in Egypt, although repeatedly tried. Others, however, have poſitively denied this; and have argued, with great appearance of probability, that a plant by no means delicate, requiring very little care, and flouriſhing in the worſt of thoſe ſoils which produce

produce the other Weſt Indian ſtaples, may be expected to thrive in a country ſo very favourable to all thoſe articles; more eſpecially as, in the neighbouring territory of Arabia, the fineſt coffee in the world is raiſed in prodigious abundance: and in Syria, which cloſely reſembles Egypt in its phyſical character, coffee can be raiſed to a degree of perfection that rivals the famous produce of Arabia. A country perfectly flat, is not indeed favourable to the growth of this valuable fruit. In the Delta, therefore, we can ſcarcely expect its culture to ſucceed; but in the Said, on the ſides of thoſe hills between which the valley of the Nile lies, we can hardly doubt the poſſibility of bringing this branch of planting to as great perfection as that which attends the ſcanty exertions of the cultivators on the other ſide of the Red Sea. It has in general been remarked of the Egyptian ſoil, that it is not favourable to exotics, unleſs their culture is introduced gradually and carefully. We may be allowed to ſuſpect, then, that the experiments, upon the failure of which Maillet and others have aſſerted the impoſſibility of raiſing coffee in Egypt, were not fairly tried.

If, however, all the other articles of value which I have enumerated, ſhall be raiſed in ſuch abundance by the coloniſts of Egypt, it ſignifies

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ſignifies little whether or not this one remains an exception. The neighbourhood of Arabia will amply ſupply the deficiency; the coffee planting of that rich territory will be promoted and reduced to a ſyſtem by the demands of the new colony; and if the European traders reſort to Egypt for all the other commodities which they formerly received from the Weſt Indies, they will alſo uſe the coloniſts as middlemen in the coffee trade, while Egypt will be as much benefited by becoming the emporium of this produce, as by raiſing and ſelling her own ſtaples. At this day, the Mocha coffee, ſo much prized all over the world, bears a much higher price than it ought, in conſequence of the various taxes raiſed upon the tranſport, and the reſtrictions laid on the exportation, by the governments of the countries where it is produced and of thoſe through which it muſt be carried; ſo that the article which at Mocha coſts only from fourpence to ſixpence per pound, coſts at Cairo no leſs than from one ſhilling and threepence to one ſhilling and tenpence, or even two ſhillings and a penny, and at Marſeilles about half a crown. *

4.

* Bruce's Travels, vol. I. p. 81.—Volney's Egypt and Syria, vol. I. p. 220. & 229.; and vol. II. p. 318.—Maillet (edit. Maſcrier), Second Part, p. 15.—Savary, tom. I. Let.

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4. For the manufacture and tranſport of all the articles which have been enumerated, Egypt poſſeſſes natural conveniences by no means enjoyed by the Weſt Indian colonies. Abundance of cedar and palm trees are to be had, of a nature admirably fitted for the tool. It has however been found ſo much more profitable to uſe the ſoil for other purpoſes, in the beſt times of this province, that timber has generally been imported. As the cultivated country all lies near the river, of which the navigation is eaſy, and as various ſtreams interſect the valley to join it, the uſe of machinery, and the tranſport of goods by water carriage to the ports of ſhipping, where the hill joins the ſea, muſt of courſe afford ineſtimable conveniences to the planter and manufacturer. Beſides, the level nature of the whole territory and the aſtoniſhing fecundity of all the domeſtic animals are circumſtances equally favourable at once to the eaſy communication between the different diſtricts, and to the erection of machinery wrought by wind or draught. Here are produced, too, in unrivalled

Let. 1. & 5.; tom. II. Let. 3.; and tom. III. Let. 4.—Sonnini, Voyages en Egypte, chap. XXXI. & XLVIII. —Niebuhr, Voyages, tom. I. p. 116. 117. id.—Deſc. de l'Arab. p. 127.—Commerce (Encyc. Method.) tom. III. p. 790. Ricard, tom. III. p. 439. Eton's Survey, Appendix, Art. I.

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led abundance, ſome articles of ſignal ſubordinate uſe in various branches of manufacture, particularly natron, ſaltpetre, and ſal ammoniac. I have already noticed the adaptation of the ſoil, both for eaſy excavation, and for the manufacture of bricks and earthen ware.

5. The climate of Egypt has been ſuppoſed by many to be as unfavourable to animal life, as it is genial to the productions of the ſoil; and one author, remarkable for a general and unmeaning ſyſtem of invective, has declaimed againſt it as the worſt under which the human ſpecies has been permitted to live. * There is however, every reaſon to believe that theſe prejudices are wholly unfounded, and that we ſhould come much nearer the truth, were we to beſtow upon the climate of this country praiſes equal to thoſe which all mankind have agreed to heap upon its ſoil.

The extraordinary fecundity of all animals on the banks of the Nile, has been repeatedly deſcribed, both by ancient and modern writers. This circumſtance, of itſelf, forms a ſtrong preſumption, if not a ſufficient argument, in favour of the wholeſomeneſs of the air. The prejudice againſt Egypt on account of the frequent diſeaſes

* Pauw ſur les Chinois & les Egyptiens, *paſſim.*

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eaſes of the eyes to which its inhabitants are ſubject, has of late years been removed by the ſatisfactory explanations of the moſt intelligent travellers; and it now appears that this malady, ſo long a reproach to the climate, owes its origin in fact to the cuſtoms of the people, their conſtant uſe of hot-baths, the weight of clothes which they wear round their heads, and their fondneſs for the practice of ſleeping in the open air, expoſed to the chilling dews of night, after the heats of the day have opened all their pores.

The plague, too, has been ſuppoſed by many * to be indigenous in Egypt. Yet nothing can be more certain, than that in ancient times it was unknown to the induſtrious cultivators and merchants of this province; and there is no doubt that it has often been confounded with other maladies. The true cauſe of thoſe putrid diſeaſes which ſometimes prevail on the banks of the Nile, muſt be ſought for in the habitual uncleanlineſs of the inhabitants reſpecting every thing but their bodies; the dirty clothes which they always wear, even after ſteeping themſelves for hours in boiling water; the uncommon filthineſs of their ſtreets at all ſeaſons of the year; the innumerable pools of ſtagnant water which they never think of draining or filling up. As for the plague, it is now proved

* Eton's Survey, chap. VII.

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beyond a doubt, that this diſeaſe is always of foreign growth; and has never, except after a famine, been hatched even in Cairo itſelf, where nine hundred thouſand inhabitants are heaped together in a dirty, confined, and moulder-ing city. But, notwithſtanding its conſtant prevalence in ſome parts of the Ottoman empire, and generally at Conſtantinople, the communication between Alexandria and thoſe infected quarters is never for one moment ſtopt. No regimen or ſyſtem of health laws is adopted. Indeed, in the whole extent of the Grand Signior's dominions, there never was a ſingle act of quarantine performed. The univerſal belief of the Turks in predeſtination, and their utter ignorance of medicine, both prevent any means from being purſued to check the progreſs of infection, and preclude all chance of a cure being effected, or the diſeaſe being eradicated, until the natural courſe of the ſeaſons brings relief. How abſurd, then, is it to accuſe the climate of engendering a malady which ſeems to be courted by all the efforts of the people, with the entire concurrence of their rulers?

No ſituation in fact can be more ſalubrious than that of Egypt; a level plain expoſed to the ſea breeze, with no foreſts or hills to obſtruct the freeſt circulation of air; a perpetual vegetation of the plants moſt adapted to purify it; and a conſtant flow of water through all parts of the country

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country increaſing the motion and coolneſs of the atmoſphere. Accordingly, there can be no doubt that the encomiums beſtowed on the ſalubrity of the Egyptian climate by all the ancient authors, are in themſelves juſt, and perfectly applicable to the preſent circumſtances of the country. In no part of the world do we meet with fewer prevailing diſeaſes; in no ſtate have the numbers of mankind multiplied more rapidly, and kept pace more exactly with their induſtrious exertions, than in Egypt during the better days of its government and manners. The natives are not affected by the moſt violent heats of the ſun, ſcarcely even by expoſure to the effluvia of their ſtagnant pools, or to the Khamſin wind, which occaſionally blows during ſix or ſeven weeks of the year, and is the only unfavourable attendant of the Egyptian climate. The moſt violent efforts of bodily fatigue are borne with eaſe and ſafety. Even the culture of rice, which in every other country is the moſt unwholeſome of all occupations, is in Egypt attended with no manner of inconvenience or injury to the health. *

* Volney's Egypt and Syria, I. 67. 202. 244. & 255.—Savary, tom. III. Let. 1.—Maillet, (edit. Maſcrier) Part. I. p. 14.—Sonnini, Voyage en Egypte, chap. XXVI. XXXI.

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It is evident, then, that the climate of the new ſettlement will be found as far ſuperior to the climate of the Weſt Indian colonies, as the fertility of the ſoil and the facility of cultivation. But, even if the difference in point of climate were wholly in favour of the old colonies, it is not certain that this circumſtance would occaſion any obſtruction to the improvement of the leaſt wholeſome territory. On the contrary, we ſee conſtant examples of health being ſacrificed, without heſitation, to the proſpect of wealth; and the moſt deadly climates in the world have not been able ſeriouſly to retard the cultivation of thoſe regions which preſent to the adventurer the irreſiſtible temptations of cheap and rich land. It is worthy of remark, that the greateſt population and wealth which can be found in any European ſtate of equal extent, are collected in a diſtrict labouring under the moſt unwholeſome of the European climates; and that the colonies which have accumulated the moſt ſplendid treaſures in proportion to their extent, have been thoſe of the Dutch in Java and Guiana, ſubject to the moſt peſtilential atmoſphere that is breathed by men on the whole ſurface of the earth: So feeble an influence have the greateſt of all dangers on the minds of men, if placed at a little diſtance, and ſet in oppoſition to the ſtrong paſſions of avarice or ambition!

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We have ſeen how favourable the ordinary ſtate of the climate in Egypt is to animal as well as vegetable life. It enjoys another very eſſential advantage, in being free from thoſe deſtructive hurricanes and earthquakes which ſo often prove deſtructive both to the wealth and the lives of the Weſt Indian planters. * This circumſtance gives the new ſettlement a decided ſuperiority over the old colonies in point of capacity for improvement; a ſuperiority which cannot be compenſated, like the common advantages of a wholeſome atmoſphere, by the daring ſpirit of adventure ſo conſtantly diſplayed in thoſe remote ſcenes of induſtry and fortitude.

Indeed, the general circumſtances of climate affect (though much leſs conſiderably) the riches as well as the comforts of any ſettlement, by their influence upon the progreſs of population; but of this we are to ſpeak in the ſequel.

6. The ſituation of Egypt gives it as decided a ſuperiority over the American colonies, as its great fertility, its favourable climate, and terraqueous diſtribution. It is placed almoſt in the immediate neighbourhood of the market which its various and plentiful produce is adapted to

* Volney, I. 262.

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ſupply. The diſtance between Alexandria and Marſeilles, is not greater than that between the Baltic and the northern ports of France. Italy is not ſo far from the Egyptian coaſt, as the ſouth of England from Bourdeaux. The Turkiſh empire is ſcattered round this fine province; Conſtantinople itſelf not being more than five days ſail from Alexandria. The navigation of the Mediterranean is in general eaſy and ſafe, except at the equinoxes, when ſtormy weather prevails in the weſtern parts of the ſea. The run is almoſt clear from Italy, France and Spain; it may be made at any ſeaſon. *

The harbours on the coaſt of Lower Egypt are not now very good; but they were once the fineſt in the world. The port of Alexandria, for example, is almoſt choked up by the mud which the river brings down, and by the ballaſt which all veſſels have for many ages been allowed to diſcharge into the water. As this change, however, is entirely owing to the indolence of the government and inattention of the police, the activity and ſkill of Europeans will eaſily reſtore things to their former ſtate, and open once more the great harbour of Egypt to the commerce of the world. The other ports on the

* Capper on Winds and Monſoons, p. 78.—Ricard, III. 438.

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the coaſt are by no means in ſuch a ſtate of diſrepair; and ſome of them are excellent. †

It is evident, then, how much more advantageouſly than the Weſt Indies, Egypt is ſituated in point of diſtance for the tranſport of its produce. Inſtead of a ſix or eight weeks voyage, the Egyptian commodities will only have to pay for a voyage of two or three; a voyage not liable to the dangers of the tropical hurricanes, the delays of regular winds, and the numerous riſks of foul channels and narrow ſtraights. This advantage alone, even if the price of the goods at the ports of ſhipping were the ſame, would be ſufficient to drive out of the European market every article of Weſt Indian growth which could be raiſed in Egypt. It deſerves alſo to be noticed, that the trade may be carried on at almoſt any time of the year to and from Egypt, both from the ſtate of the population and the diſtribution of profeſſions, as we ſhall immediately ſee, and from the variety of ſeaſons in different quarters at one time. The harveſts being retarded or accelerated according to the ſituation of the land with reſpect to the water, which is the univerſal ſpring of fertility, a ſucceſſion of crops may be procured by the diſpoſition of the canals and ſluices—a ſucceſſion which is indeed in ſome reſpects natural to the country, without any

† Ricard, III. 436.—Volney, I. 7.

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contrivance, from the various poſition of the grounds.

7. The laſt, but in every reſpect by far the moſt important advantage, which the new ſettlement will poſſeſs over the American colonies, yet remains to be conſidered—the ſtructure of the ſociety.

The population of Egypt has indeed been gradually decreaſing ſince the Saracen conqueſt. With the reign of Omar began that dynaſty, which, during a courſe of ages, was employed in deſolating the conquered territory, and in ſpreading the ſame devaſtation over the provinces that yet remained free. The Ottoman power, which ſucceeded the Caliphat, carried ſtill farther every principle of intolerance and barbarity in government and in religion, adding, in all its operations, to thoſe bad qualities that marked the Saracen rulers, the feature of extreme and infectious ignorance. Under the complicated miſeries which Egypt has for centuries been doomed to ſuffer from conqueſt, inſurrection and civil war, almoſt naturalized in thoſe fruitful regions, it is no wonder that the traces of her ancient glory ſhould be almoſt worn away, and the numbers of her inhabitants greatly reduced. It is no ſmall proof of her various capacity and natural

natural reſources, that ſhe ſtill can reckon ſo many as four millions of ſouls. *

This large population is indeed of a mixed and impure conſtitution. The moſt numerous claſs are the Arabs; men not remarkable for their induſtrious habits; but, in general, deſcribed as bearing a moſt reſpectable character †. I ſpeak not of the Bedouins, who belong properly to the deſert, nor of the Fellahs or Arabs of the villages on the river. Both of thoſe claſſes are inconſiderable, compared with the Arabs who are employed in an imperfect ſort of agriculture. The Bedouins, engaged rather in the occupations of ſhepherds, are, like all tribes devoted to the paſtoral ſtate, not the innocent Arcadians ſung by poets and canted over by philanthropiſts, but robbers and butchers. The Fellahs are for the moſt part pirates or thieves. The agricultural Arabs, on the other hand, are generally a people of ſimple lives, remarkable for honeſty and good faith, for obedience to their patriarchal chief, and valour in defence of his cauſe. It muſt be admitted, that theſe qualities are at leaſt the rudiments of a good national character; and if the diſſenſions which have ſo long torn the country to pieces, with the total want of all but military law,

* Note T t. † Savary, tom. III. let. 2.

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law, have divided thoſe tribes naturally peaceful, armed them againſt each other, and cramped their habits of induſtry, it is ſurely no great conceſſion to allow that the pacification of the country, the eſtabliſhment of a regular and vigorous government, the accurate allotment of land, and the introduction of thoſe new wants which are natural to poliſhed ſociety, will revive the more quiet and natural induſtry of the Arabs, reclaim them from habits of military exertion, and afford to the ſtate the full benefit of their characteriſtic good qualities. I do not maintain that ſuch an improvement will take place as ſuddenly as the new government may iſſue ordinances, or even as rapidly as the eſtabliſhments ſo decreed can be inſtituted: But I contend, that the improvement of the Arabs may be expected to proceed with no common degree of celerity; that men in their ſituation will be eaſily reſtored to orderly habits; and that the firſt fruits of the political change will be an increaſed induſtry on the part of the people. They are not, they never have been ſlaves, never even in a political relation to the government, much leſs in domeſtic bondage to the authority of a maſter.

They have not, then, thoſe principles and habits to acquire which are wanting in men born to ſlavery, and broken down or eradicated in men made ſlaves by capture. They are in a very different

different ſituation from the negroes, of whoſe character and powers we have elſewhere treated. Their labour is indeed deſultory, or rather languid; but it is voluntary—it is induſtry. The political changes which a new order of things muſt introduce, will be ſufficiently powerful to operate a ſpeedy extenſion and confirmation of thoſe habits already acquired, and to develope more fully principles whoſe exiſtence is unqueſtioned.

After the Arabs, who form two thirds of the whole population, the Copts deſerve to be conſidered. They are the proper Egyptians; deſcendants of the ſubjects over whom the Ptolemies and Cleopatra once reigned. The character of theſe men, too, is repreſented as reſpectable; and one circumſtance of no ſmall importance diſtinguiſhes them from the Arabs, to whom, in ſome other reſpects, they are inferior—they are all Chriſtians. The defects to which their political circumſtances have rendered them liable, flowing from the ſame cauſes, are ſimilar to thoſe which I have noticed in the habits of the Arabs, with this difference, that the Copts have not the martial qualities ſo characteriſtic of the other people. They are more accuſtomed to peace, and more ſubjected to the controul of oppreſſive and barbarous rulers. They are probably more induſtrious

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duſtrious than the Arabs; and they are ſaid to have at bottom a great natural fire of character.* Such are the materials of which the new community is fundamentally to be conſtructed. The handful of Turks and Mamelucs deſerve no attention: they will probably be exterminated in the ſtruggle which may precede a conqueſt of the country; if not, they muſt be ſunk in the common maſs.

From theſe particulars it may be inferred, that the general qualities or capacities of the materials of civil ſociety, juſt now deſcribed, are favourable to the plan of government which a European dynaſty will certainly adopt; and that a ſufficient number of cultivators, that is, of day-labourers, will not be wanting to perform the ſimple and eaſy operations of Egyptian agriculture, in the new form which it muſt immediately aſſume; while the ſtewards, overſeers, upper ſervants, teachers, clerks, and moſt of the mechanics, will be brought over from the mother country.

It is not, then, by ſlaves brought from a diſtant country, and ſcarcely reſembling their maſters in any one particular, that the new colony will be cultivated. A numerous body of

* Volney, I. 202.—Savary, tom. III. let. 2.

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of hardy and active peaſantry will ſoon be formed, enjoying the freedom granted by the mild forms of European government, working for the maintenance of their families, and rewarded by the enjoyment of pleaſures, comforts, and political privileges. The African ſlave trade, it is moſt fervently to be hoped, will never find admittance into this promiſing ſyſtem, from the temptations which very low prices and abundant ſupply of negroes hold out. The government which we are ſuppoſing to obtain the rich poſſeſſion, will ſurely remember the fates of the French ſlave-maſters in America, aboliſh at once the trifling commerce in men, which at preſent ſubſiſts in Egypt *, and prefer a ſtruggle with ſome ſmall additional inconvenience or delay, to the contemptible and tranſient advantages that may be obtained at the riſk of ultimate ruin.

We may conclude, then, that the ſtructure of the new colony will be firm and pure; as well adapted to ſuſtain all the ſhocks to which it may be expoſed, as any colonial eſtabliſhment can poſſibly be; cloſely united to the mother country, both by commercial or caſual intercourſe of inhabitants, interchange of population, and reſpectable public character; and more eſpecially connected with it by the proximity of its ſituation.

* Sonnini, chap. XXXVI.

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ſituation. In all theſe eſſential particulars, it will have a manifeſt advantage over every American colony; and they are circumſtances affecting the wealth, as well as the political importance and relations of a remote province. But, above all, Egypt will be cultivated by a numerous body of free and hardy men; labour will bear its ordinary price; the produce will be raiſed at an expence trifling indeed when compared with that of the Weſt Indian negroes *; and it will be manufactured into its moſt refined forms, with the ſame facility as in Europe, ſince labour will be nearly as cheap. This free peaſantry will cultivate the moſt fertile region on the face of the earth, with every convenience for manufacturing their raw produce and tranſporting their wrought goods; with a conſtant facility of ſelling their commodities at home,

* We may remark the important conſequences of employing hired labour, in the prices of Aſiatic ſugars, which are raiſed entirely by free hands. In Cochin, the great ſugar market of the ſouth of Aſia, the fineſt ſugar is ſold for leſs than a penny the pound, (De Poivre, Voyage d'un Philoſophe, p. 89.) Although the truth of this fact is no manner of argument in favour of the emancipation of the negroes, or the culture of the Weſt Indian colonies by free hands; a purpoſe to which ſome zealous and worthy men have attempted to apply it, (Clarkſon's Eſſay, part II. chap. I. § 3.—De Poivre, p. 90.); yet it proves clearly how much cheaper Egyptian produce will be raiſed by free men, under a favourable climate, and in an excellent ſoil.

home, and with a conſtant demand for them from Europe and Aſia. The goods thus raiſed in the moſt frugal manner and in the moſt luxuriant abundance, will be collected into depôts by the wholeſale merchant and manufacturer; a claſs of men who will not be wanting in the new colony, as they are in the defective ſociety of the Weſt Indies. They will be tranſportable at all ſeaſons, ſubject only to the additional expence of a ſhort, ſafe, and eaſy voyage to the conſumer.—And thoſe are the commodities with which the Weſt Indian planters have to ſupport a competition! Is it fanciful to aſſert, that every cane-piece which is holed in Egypt, muſt neceſſarily lay waſte two in the Antilles? and that the tropical colonies of the New World muſt be deſolated, by the rapid operation of irreſiſtible powers, exactly in proportion to the revival of induſtry and ſkill in the moſt ancient theatre of human exertion? The cultivation, that is, the conqueſt of Egypt by a European ſtate, or its improvement by an enlightened and independent government, muſt be as inevitably fatal to the exiſtence of the European name in the Charaibean Sea, as the eſtabliſhment of a negro commonwealth; with this difference, that the latter cataſtrophe will, in all human probability, work its effects by force and ſlaughter, while the former event will deſolate the Weſt Indies by

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a peaceful though ſudden operation. The one is the violent, the other the natural death—the true *euthanaſia* of the old colonial ſyſtem.

Such appear to be the conſequences, firſt to the Aſiatic, and next to the American colonies of the European powers, which muſt neceſſarily flow from the improvement and cultivation of Egypt, in whatever manner that event ſhall be brought about. It remains to take a curſory view of the policy dictated by the colonial intereſts of the different ſtates, with reſpect to the combinations which may accelerate ſuch conſequences as thoſe that have juſt now been paſſed under review.

We have ſeen, that to the Aſiatic colonies nothing but good can ariſe from the improvement of Egypt, whether under an independent government, or under the colonial dominion of any one European power. But the Aſiatic colonies are of much leſs importance to the parent ſtates than their American ſettlements. The abſurdity, then, of ſacrificing the exiſtence of the latter, to the partial improvement of the former, is abundantly obvious: and we have ſeen, that nothing leſs than the annihilation of of the Weſt Indian colonies, by far the moſt important part of the American ſyſtem, can reſult from the improvement of Egypt, whether it is effected by an independent or by a colonial

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nial regimen. It appears manifeſt, then, and at firſt ſight altogether unqueſtionable, that the improvement of Egypt is an event to be deprecated, and if poſſible prevented by all the European ſtates which poſſeſs colonies in the Weſt Indies. But a little farther attention to the ſubject, may perhaps lead us to modify this concluſion in ſeveral important particulars.

A great diſtinction muſt be made between the improvement of Egypt as a colony of ſome European power, and its improvement as an independent ſtate. Let us, in the *firſt* place, conſider the general conſequences of the deſolation of the Weſt Indies, whether cauſed by the eſtabliſhment of an independent government in Egypt, or by the efforts of ſome power unconnected with the European community, or by the victories of ſome European power.

The improvement of Egypt can only deſtroy the Weſt Indian ſyſtem, by enabling a new ſet of planters and merchants greatly to underſell thoſe of the Weſt Indies. All the conſumers of Weſt Indian produce, therefore, muſt be great gainers by the change. Thoſe only can loſe who are immediately concerned in the plantation trade, who have removed to the Weſt Indies for the purpoſe of ſelling their labour dear, who have inveſted their ſtock in the purchaſe of land, or who have lent their capital to perſons engaged in the Weſt Indian

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agriculture. All theſe claſſes of men will be ruined by the change; the labourers will be forced to remove elſewhere, the proprietors will loſe all their ſtock, and the creditors all that part of their capital which they had lent to the proprietors. But the merchants-importers of colonial produce will gain by the new arrangement. They will trade to Egypt inſtead of the Weſt Indies. The returns of their capital will be quicker, though their profits will be a little leſs; the riſk will be conſiderably diminiſhed; and the cheapneſs of the Egyptian produce will increaſe the demand for it. The manufacturer of goods formerly uſed in the colonies, will alſo gain by the change, inaſmuch as the new market will be much more extenſive than the old.

The general intereſts of manufacture and trade will gain in like manner; for a portion of the capital formerly employed in the more expenſive traffic will now be ſet free by the diminution of the prices; and the cheaper the conſumer purchaſes that produce, the more money will he have left to purchaſe other articles. The general intereſts, then, both of the mercantile and conſuming part of the community, will reap great and ſolid advantage from this new diſtribution of colonial property, whether that ſhall be effected by France, Spain, or Holland,

land, or by ſome independent government eſtabliſhed in Egypt, or by ſome power unconnected with Europe.

On the other hand, the intereſts of the Weſt Indian coloniſts, and of thoſe concerned in the agriculture of the iſlands, will be ruined; the mother countries will loſe all the advantages, political and commercial, which they formerly derived from purſuing the ſyſtem of colonial policy, and which I endeavoured to point out in the Firſt Book of this Inquiry. All the capital embarked in colonial ſpeculations and loans will of courſe be ſunk; but the new capital conſtantly accumulated, which would naturally have ſought for employment in the Weſt Indies, will now be employed either in the remaining colonies, or in the new community. Different nations will evidently ſuffer in very different degrees by the change. Holland, whoſe colonial policy is of moſt importance to her, and whoſe Weſt Indian colonies bear a greater proportion to her whole colonial dominions than thoſe of any other power, will be moſt of all injured. France will probably ſuffer next, admitting that ſhe is not miſtreſs of Egypt; after her Britain; and then Spain, whoſe intereſts will be very little affected: while Portugal can ſcarcely ſuffer at all by the change. It happens, however, that all the powers which poſſeſs Weſt Indian territories

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ritories of conſiderable importance, poſſeſs alſo other colonies both in Aſia and America, except Holland, whoſe remaining colonies lye in Aſia and Africa. The ſcene of their colonial proſperity will therefore be changed by the new arrangement; and inſtead of cultivating the Weſt Indian iſlands, they will improve North and South America, Africa and Aſia, after adopting thoſe reforms, and introducing that liberal ſyſtem of provincial policy, which the loſs of their fineſt ſettlements muſt ſtrongly recommend.

It is not eaſy to form any comparative eſtimate of the advantages and diſadvantages likely to ariſe from any event, ſo as to balance the one againſt the other, when the benefits are altogether of a commercial, and the injuries are both of a commercial and political nature. All the benefits which can reſult to the ſtates of Europe from the improvement of Egypt, are of a nature ſtrictly commercial or œconimical; they end in the ſaving or the increaſe of the national capital. The loſſes to which this event will unqueſtionably ſubject the ſtates poſſeſſing Weſt Indian colonies, are partly commercial, and partly political. It may be poſſible to compare the commercial loſſes with the gains likely to reſult from the change; and there can be little doubt that we ſhall be inclined to ſtrike a balance favourable to the change

change in this reſpect, if we take into the account the vaſt extent of the conſumption of colonial produce, now reckoned amongſt the prime neceſſaries of civilized life; the ſmall amount of the capital employed in raiſing that produce, compared with the capital employed in circulating and in purchaſing it for conſumption; and the vent which remaining colonies will ſtill afford to the future accumulations of ſtock. On the other hand, admitting that an overplus remains in favour of the new arrangement conſidered as a mercantile benefit, this balance, conſiſting entirely of commercial profit, cannot be compared with the remaining loſs attendant upon the event, and compoſed entirely of political inconvenience or injury. The wealth of France and Britain, for example, may, upon the whole, be increaſed by the change which ſhall deprive them of their Weſt Indian colonies. But thoſe colonies, conſidered as an integral part of the French and Britiſh dominions, are productive of various advantages to the other parts, beſides contributing to augment the national capital. Theſe have been enumerated in a former part of this Inquiry, * and they cannot properly be compared with any pecuniary conſiderations. They therefore remain to induce an oppoſition on the part of Britain and France to any plan which may improve Egypt at

* Book I. Sect. I.

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the expence of the Weſt Indies. Perhaps, too, the total clear gain in point of wealth which is to be expected from the improvement of Egypt, may receive a great diminution from the ſuddenneſs of the change. The ſhock which the credit of the mother country is likely to experience from ſuch an event as the rapid deſtruction of the Weſt Indian colonies, and the injury which the whole ſyſtem muſt receive from a ſudden change in the employment of part of the trading ſtock, are evils of a ſerious nature in all communities of modern ſtructure. Joined to the political inconveniences and injuries before mentioned, theſe circumſtances will probably be deemed, by all the European powers, to afford ſufficient reaſons for deprecating, and if poſſible preventing the improvement of Egypt, in whatever way that event may be brought about.

But let us conſider, in the *ſecond* place, the relative conſequences which may be apprehended from the loſs of the Weſt Indian colonies, if it is accompanied with the eſtabliſhment of a European power in Egypt. There is, in this caſe, no difficulty whatever. A ſingle glance muſt convince us, that this mode of improving Egypt is in the higheſt degree hoſtile to the intereſts, political as well as commercial, of every other European power beſides the one to whoſe lot Egypt may

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may fall. It is evidently hoſtile to the commercial intereſts of Europe, inaſmuch as the poſſeſſion of the colony puts the whole produce under the power of one trading nation. Admitting that, for the purpoſe of more rapid improvement, a free trade ſhall be allowed at firſt, then the Weſt Indian iſlands are laid waſte, and a monopoly continues in the hands of the power poſſeſſing Egypt; the colonial produce will therefore be ſubjected to imports, taxes, duties, and all the regimen of the fiſcal ſyſtem, excited by the jealouſy of rival traders and hoſtile governments. But the poſſeſſion of the new ſettlement is ſtill more dangerous to the neighbours of the mother country, from the immenſe addition which it muſt ſuddenly beſtow on her reſources. Whilſt all her neighbours have loſt their Weſt Indian colonies, ſhe alone has acquired one of importance equal to the whole colonial ſyſtem, placed almoſt in the vicinity of her contiguous provinces, and immenſely valuable, not only as a ſubſtitute for all the Weſt Indian ſettlements, but as an emporium of Eaſt Indian and of European trade.

This noble province will unite all the advantages of a colony, in a higher degree than they have ever exiſted elſewhere, with moſt of the benefits ariſing from a great extenſion of the proper boundaries of the parent ſtate. The poſſeſſion of

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Egypt muſt of neceſſity derange the European balance. After deſtroying the colonial ſyſtem of the Weſt, the keys of the Nile will probably beſtow the decided ſuperiority in the arbitration of European affairs upon the nation which ſhall be permitted to keep them, as they anciently threw the ſupreme power over the deſtinies of the Roman empire into the hands of the firſt pretender who was happy enough to ſeize them.

It is unneceſſary to point out more explicitly the conduct which theſe conſiderations dictate to every European ſtate, but more eſpecially to thoſe poſſeſſing American colonies. In a merely colonial view, it appears that the poſſeſſion of Egypt by any enlightened power, however beneficial to the Aſiatic colonies, is ruinous to thoſe of the Weſt Indies, and that the colonial intereſts of all the other powers are oppoſed to ſuch a revolution. In a more general point of view, ſuch a revolution is to be deprecated as fatal to the European ſyſtem; and the dread of it will be eſteemed at all times a ſufficient reaſon for vigorous coalition againſt the ſtate whoſe views may be directed towards this quarter, ſo long as the different members of the great commonwealth retain that ſpirit, equally prudent and honourable, which has ſo often ſaved the whole ſyſtem from deſtruction.

Let

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Let us apply theſe remarks more particularly to the event which was in fact accompliſhed during the late war—the conqueſt of Egypt by France.

The difficulty and expence in which the French Weſt Indian adminiſtration has for ſome years been involved, appear to ſome more than a match for the whole benefits of the colonial policy. It is even thought that ſuch complicated diſadvantages cannot long be borne, and that the negroes muſt ſoon obtain the ſupreme power in the French iſlands. I have endeavoured to ſhow * that this concluſion is not warranted by the circumſtances of thoſe ſettlements; but it has all along been admitted that the ſtruggle by which the colonial exiſtence of the republic muſt be maintained is one of no common difficulty and hazard. If, then, the poſſeſſion of Egypt ſhall transfer all the benefits of the Weſt Indian ſyſtem to a Mediterranean colony, with various additional advantages which the old ſettlements never poſſeſſed, it is fair to conclude, that the Weſt Indies will be abandoned by France at the very moment of her obtaining a quiet footing in the new province. Long before an independent government could ſo far improve the Egyptian territory

* Book I. Sect. III. Part IV.

tory as to underſell and lay waſte the Weſt Indian colonies, the eſtabliſhment of negro ſuperiority in the French iſlands will deſolate the whole ſettlements in the Archipelago. The caſtrophe, then, which we have been contemplating †, will be moſt ſuddenly accompliſhed by the eſtabliſhment of the French yoke in Egypt. This is, in every reſpect, the mode of improving that country moſt hoſtile to the colonial intereſts of the European powers.

In like manner we may, from this point of view, eaſily perceive new inducements to aſſiſt France in her ſtruggle againſt the Weſt Indian ſlaves. If her affairs in that quarter grow deſperate, ſhe has only one way of retrieving her colonial exiſtence;—ſhe muſt ſtake her commercial proſperity on the acquiſition of Egypt, and prepare for making a ſtrong effort in that quarter with the remains of her colonial troops and treaſure, and the flower of her European forces; ſhe will of courſe abandon her Weſt Indian poſſeſſions at the outſet of the ſtruggle, both in order to ſave the continued expence of the war and government, and alſo in order to make a diverſion by means of the revolted negroes, who will now be fighting her battles as effectually as they before ſupported their own cauſe.

In

† Book II. Sect. III.

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In every point of view, therefore, two inferences may be drawn from all that has been ſaid. We may with certainty conclude, that the colonial intereſts of the European powers dictate the neceſſity of aiding France in the Weſt Indies, and vigorouſly keeping her out of Egypt; and that the European intereſts of thoſe ſtates dictate the neceſſity of purſuing the ſame conduct in the Weſt Indies, as well as in Egypt. The acquiſition of Egypt is directly hoſtile to the European ſyſtem, and indirectly deſtructive of the colonial ſyſtem. The continuance of the French power in the Weſt Indies, is directly eſſential to the colonial ſyſtem, and indirectly favourable to the balance of Europe, from its tendency to prevent the ſtrong efforts which otherwiſe muſt be made againſt Egypt.

The ſucceſs of the French arms during the late war, and the blindneſs of ſome European powers to their beſt intereſts, render it not impoſſible that France may ſucceed in the attempt which we are now conceiving her to make. May not ſome meaſures be purſued with the view of continuing a kind of balance ſuited to the new order of colonial policy which muſt in the ſuppoſed event be introduced? May not Britain, for example, obtain a ſimilar ſhare of the Turkiſh empire? The rich and extenſive

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extenſive province of Syria, in little more than in name a part of the Turkiſh empire, is in many reſpects a more valuable acquiſition than Egypt itſelf. The poſition is not altogether ſo convenient, nor the territory ſo well diſtributed, nor the ſoil ſo inexhauſtible in conſequence of perpetual renovation: But the fertile territory is twice as extenſive; the harbours are more convenient and numerous; the climate is ſtill more variegated and ſalubrious; the growth of animals wild and domeſtic more abundant; and the fertility of the land in vegetable productions if poſſible more rich and various. Beſides affording every ſpecies of uſeful grain in prodigious plenty, the climate and ſoil of Syria are admirably fitted for the culture of the ſugar cane, the cotton and tobacco plants, the indigo and coffee trees, the vine and the olive, not to mention the cochineal inſect and ſilk-worm, which thrive in great perfection and abundance. Even under the worſt conceivable ſyſtem of adminiſtration, almoſt all of thoſe valuable articles are at preſent raiſed in great quantities, without any thing more than the moſt contemptible exertions of induſtry and ſkill. In its ruined and deſolated ſtate, Syria produces a revenue of nearly one million three hundred thouſand pounds Sterling; and its population,

pulation, rapidly diminiſhed by a long ſucceſſion of execrable meaſures in every department of government and police, is ſtill reckoned at two millions three hundred and five thouſand by Volney, whoſe eſtimates are in other inſtances greatly under the truth. †

If this rich and delightful region were added to the Britiſh empire, the acquiſition of Egypt by France would be in every reſpect harmleſs, and in many points of view advantageous. The Aſiatic colonies would be ſaved from every chance of annoyance, whilſt all the advantages formerly pointed out as likely to reſult from the improvement of Egypt, would now in a manifold proportion attend the joint cultivation of Egypt and Syria. The general intereſts of the European powers, and of Britain as well as France, would be promoted by the abundant production of colonial produce in its cheapeſt form. The Weſt Indian ſyſtem would indeed be overturned; but on its ruins there would be raiſed a more ſolid and valuable colonial ſtructure, a new ſyſtem, in which France and England

† Volney's Egypt & Syria, vol. II. p. 318. 359. 363. & 364.—Ricard, III. 421.—Geographie (Encyc. Method.) III. 318.—Econ. Polit. & Diplom. (ibid.) IV. 297.—Commerce (ibid.) III. 784.—Eton's Survey, p. 292.—Harris's Collection, II. 841. *et ſeqq.*

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land would be mutually poiſed. The dangers that might ſo fairly be apprehended to the European balance from the conqueſt of either province by one power, would now be rendered nugatory by the equal and oppoſite acquiſitions of the two great natural enemies whoſe quarrels divide the European ſyſtem. The Turkiſh empire would, indeed, apparently be diſmembered; and a certain deſcription of politicians would lament the fates of the Ottomans, as they once wept over the deſtinies of the Poles. But ſurely no ſuch change could render the Syrians, Copts and Arabs, leſs happy than they at preſent are in their political circumſtances; whilſt any beginning of enlightened government muſt be the dawn of national improvement, civilization and civil enjoyment to all thoſe unfortunate tribes of men. The lovers of humanity, too, might juſtly rejoice in the execution of the project here ſketched, as the dawn of a happier day to a vaſt portion of the human ſpecies. The downfal of the odious traffic which has always been intimately connected with the Weſt Indian ſyſtem, is the neceſſary conſequence of the propoſed partition; and if there were no farther argument from general topics of philanthropy, this ſurely would deſerve our attention, that it is not eaſy to cloſe our ears againſt any ſcheme, of which the neceſſary conſequence muſt be, the

the inſtantaneous abolition of the African ſlave trade.

I do not here enter at greater length into theſe ſpeculations. The ſubject is in its nature very much mingled with conjecture and hypotheſis. I have ſtated the moſt material facts, and attempted to point out, both the probable conſequences of the events which are ſo confidently expected by many politicians, and the peculiar difficulties which attend the different branches of this Inquiry. Some of the concluſions which I have now drawn, appear to follow with ſufficient certainty from a compariſon of thoſe facts with the principles formerly eſtabliſhed. The reſt, together with other inferences which may be purſued on this ſubject, I leave to the diſcernment of the reader.

BOOK IV.

OF THE DOMESTIC POLICY OF THE EUROPEAN POWERS IN THEIR COLONIAL ESTABLISHMENTS.

INTRODUCTION.

In the Firſt Book of this Inquiry, I explained the relations between colonies and their mother countries; that is, the internal ſtructure of the ſyſtem compoſed of colonies and a parent ſtate. In the Second Book, I proceeded to deſcribe the relations between different colonies; that is, the ſtructure of the ſyſtem compoſed of various colonial eſtabliſhments ſituated in the ſame part of the world. In the Third Book, I conſidered the relation between different powers as influenced by their colonial intereſts; that is, the effects produced by colonial relations upon the ſtructure of the great national ſyſtem which we denominate the European Commonwealth. I now proceed to the laſt object of Inquiry, the

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Domeſtic or Internal Colonial Policy of the European powers; that is, the arrangements of colonial adminiſtration contrived with a view to promote the happineſs of the ſettlements, and to preſerve their dependence upon the mother country.

As the great objects of all domeſtic policy are the preſervation of domeſtic tranquillity, the repulſion of foreign invaſion, and the promotion of national wealth (which is in many reſpects alſo the foundation of the two former objects): ſo, the great ends of the internal adminiſtration of colonial affairs are the increaſe of wealth, and the ſecurity both of the colonial government and the power of the mother country from all the efforts of external and internal violence. This branch of the Inquiry, therefore, divides itſelf into two general heads, the commercial and the political adminiſtration of the colonies. Under the former head, are comprehended all laws relating to trade, agriculture and manufactures, in ſo far as thoſe may be modified by the ſubordinate predicament in which the ſettlements are placed. Under the latter head, are comprehended all laws relating to the ſecondary government eſtabliſhed in the colonies, their military as well as civil affairs, and their dependence upon the parent ſtate.

This

This is the general claſſification which is ſuggeſted by the circumſtances common to all colonies whatever; but the peculiar ſtructure of ſociety in the American ſettlements is of ſuch a nature, as to preſent a ſeparate and preliminary object of ſpeculation. The ſlave ſyſtem has now become ſo radically incorporated with the colonial ſyſtem, as to form an eſſential part of it, and to affect immediately and powerfully every branch of internal adminiſtration, whether commercial or political. Before we can proceed to diſcuſs a ſingle meaſure connected either with the wealth, the government, or the defence of the American colonies, it is abſolutely neceſſary to examine the grand feature which diſtinguiſhes thoſe ſettlements from every other, and extends its influence ſo widely over the whole ſyſtem, that no arrangement of policy can be adopted without a conſtant reference to the peculiar conſtitution of the colonial ſociety. This ſubject, then, is in itſelf complete, and is by far the moſt important that can occupy our attention in conſidering the great weſtern branch of the modern colonial ſyſtem.

The domeſtic policy of the Aſiatic provinces being adapted entirely to the ſtate of conquered countries, does not properly fall within the plan of this work. The detail of the internal adminiſtration of the American colonies preſents ſo wide a field of diſcuſſion, that I do not

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intend at preſent to enter into it, farther than is neceſſary for the diſcuſſion of the preliminary ſubject. The domeſtic policy of colonial eſtabliſhments is indeed the part of our general ſubject which is the leaſt intricate and the moſt completely underſtood. The principles of national policy upon which ſuch inquiries reſt, are ſufficiently comprehended by all inquirers in modern times. The only difficulty which incumbers the diſcuſſion, ariſes from the ſtructure of the colonial ſociety in America, and from ſeveral particulars hitherto miſunderſtood in the general ſyſtem of colonial policy. Thoſe errors I have attempted to remove in the Firſt Book of this Inquiry; and, after I ſhall have finiſhed the conſideration of the Negro Slavery, which forms the ſubject of this Book, the remaining part of the Inquiry, which I propoſe to omit, can preſent no material difficulty. It will conſiſt of a few eaſy corollaries from the principles laid down in the three firſt Books, and from thoſe which I am now about to explain.

The complicated iniquities and the manifold diſadvantages of the ſlave ſyſtem, have for ſeveral years called the attention of European ſtateſmen to the correction of abuſes ſo flagrant, and the remedy of evils ſo pregnant with danger to the ſum of colonial affairs. Various expedients have been propoſed during the

the wide diſcuſſion which thoſe momentous queſtions have excited. Some zealots have contended, with an inexcuſeable thoughtleſſneſs, that the crimes of thoſe whoſe avarice has transferred the population of Africa to the Weſt Indies can only be expiated by immediate emancipation of the ſlaves. The councils of ſuch fanatics have unhappily been adopted and carried into effect by one of the moſt enlightened nations in the world; and we have frequently had occaſion to view the conſequences of thoſe inſane meaſures in the courſe of this Inquiry.

Others have propoſed an abolition of the traffic which has been the original cauſe of the evil. But they have differed among themſelves as to the time and mode of effecting this object.

The abolition of the ſlave trade, however, does not ſeem, in the opinion of many, to be a ſufficient remedy for the dangers of our colonial ſyſtem at the preſent day. Several ſchemes have therefore been brought forward with a view to provide ſuch remedies as the urgency of the occaſion appears to call for. Of the plans ſketched out with this view, the moſt important are thoſe which recommend an amelioration of the condition of the negroes, and a gradual change in their hard lot. It has been ſuggeſted by many, that ſettlements not yet cultivated may be peopled by free negroes; and the moſt ſanguine hopes have been entertained of the ſalutary conſequences

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of ſuch a ſcheme. The poſſeſſion of a great extent of waſte lands, highly fitted for the purpoſes of Weſt Indian agriculture, ſtrongly recommends to every trading nation any project which may facilitate the clearing and peopling of the deſert, without the danger and expence attendant upon the old ſyſtem. Any plan, too, which comprehends the idea of free negroes, or includes the word, is peculiarly adapted to accord with the feelings of thoſe worthy perſons who are ſo keenly alive to the ſufferings of the Africans in a ſtate of bondage. It is natural, therefore, that the ſchemes to which I allude ſhould be well received, and even eagerly embraced, before a ſufficient interval is allowed for ſober examination. The topic has been lately renewed by ſome ingenious and virtuous men of this country. It is ſaid to have found a favourable reception amongſt a certain claſs of practical politicians, and, if common fame may be truſted, it has for ſome time occupied the attention of men high in the public confidence. It has at various times, too, been canvaſſed, both by the ſpeculative inquirers, and by the ſtateſmen of other nations. It appears to have been a favourite idea of the virtuous and philoſophical Turgot, as well as of others connected with him in affairs; and a project was completely prepared about the time of his memorable adminiſtration, for conducting the cultivation

tivation of French Guiana upon the principles of the free negro ſyſtem. *

The projects to which I am here alluding, are dangerous in the extreme. They have all the dangers and defects of puny half-meaſures; they offer no remedy to the great evil; they lull the attention of men during thoſe critical moments when a real cure might be effected by bolder ſteps. They give the intereſted advocates of the preſent order of things a plauſible pretence for affecting to concede on their part, and claiming reciprocal conceſſions from the other party. They afford the falſe friends of the abolition an opportunity of deſerting a ſtrong hold which they do not wiſh to ſee defended, and of occupying a middle ground ſafe only to themſelves. In politics, the bold and deciſive meaſure is generally the ſafeſt in the end; though it requires ſtronger nerves to attempt it, and a more capacious mind to perceive its ſuperior wiſdom. In the preſent great queſtion, the bold and deciſive line of conduct is either immediate abolition, or a ſteady perſeverance in the ſyſtem now eſtabliſhed. Paltry and timid minds would ſhudder at the thought of mere inactivity, as cowardly troops would tremble at the idea of calmly waiting for the enemy's approach. Both the one and the other haſten their fate by reſtleſſneſs and fooliſh movements, inſtead of boldly advancing

* Note U u.

vancing to the charge, or firmly awaiting the onſet.

I purpoſe, therefore, in the *firſt* place, to examine this very intereſting queſtion; to prove, from the moſt ſimple and obvious conſiderations, the inefficacy and impoſſibility of the plans propoſed; and to ſhew, that the dangers of the new order of things intended to be eſtabliſhed by ſuch ſchemes would be ſo great, as to render their utter impracticability a real bleſſing. This will form the ſubject of the Firſt Section. In the Second Section, I ſhall proceed to conſider the means of ameliorating the ſtructure of ſociety in the ſlave colonies, and of averting the dangers which impend over the whole fabric, from the preponderance of the inferior claſſes, their low degree of civilization, and the ſucceſſes that have, in ſome of the colonies, attended their efforts to revenge themſelves upon their ſuperiors.

The diſcuſſion of theſe topics will complete the general and preliminary view of Weſt Indian policy, which alone I purpoſe, at preſent, to embrace in this Book, and will comprehend the examination of all thoſe queſtions connected with the ſlave ſyſtem, which have not been conſidered in the foregoing Books. An inveſtigation of the remaining ſubjects that fall under the title of Domeſtic Colonial Policy muſt be deferred to a future opportunity.

SEC.

SECTION I.

OF THE FREE NEGRO SYSTEM, OR THE POLICY OF CULTIVATING THE COLONIES BY MEANS OF FREE NEGROES.

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It has been remarked a thouſand times, that the deſires and wants of man in a rude ſtate are few and eaſily gratified. The chief exertion to which neceſſity impels him, is the procuring of food; and his hunger is no ſooner ſatisfied than he ſinks into the luxury of repoſe. When the natural fertility of the ſoil affords him ſpontaneouſly a regular, though ſimple and perhaps ſcanty ſupply, and the unvaried ſerenity of the climate precludes the neceſſity of covering or ſhelter; the powers of his mind become languid and feeble; his corporeal ſtrength decays; and he regards as the greateſt of all evils any occupation that calls for mental exertion, or is attended with bodily fatigue; while this indolence in its turn enables him to ſubſiſt on a much ſmaller portion of food, than is required to ſupport a life of activity and labour.

Thus, the original inhabitants of America were aſtoniſhed at the voracity of the Spaniards,

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Spaniards, who, probably from the ſame cauſes, are the moſt temperate people in Europe: and while the neceſſaries of life were ſo eaſily procured, the conquerors found it utterly impoſſible to overcome the conſtitutional repugnance to labour of every kind, which they perceived in their new ſubjects. Before they had recourſe to an expedient which they knew muſt in the end prove ruinous, the ſyſtem of *repartimientos*, every trial was made to call forth voluntary induſtry: But they ſoon diſcovered that men, who had no deſires to gratify, would not ſubmit to work; and that no fear of diſtant evil, nothing but the laſh of a maſter, could conquer the rooted averſion with which habit had taught the Indian to view every purſuit that required active exertion. Even after the plan, ſo fatal to the inhabitants of the New World, had been adopted, the humane zeal of Las Caſas brought its impolicy and injuſtice repeatedly under the review both of Ferdinand and Charles. The ſubject was inveſtigated by Ximenes, with his uſual boldneſs and ability: the miniſter was overcome by the arguments of the 'Friend of the 'Indians:' commiſſioners of the moſt undoubted integrity and talents were appointed to inveſtigate on the ſpot, the whole merits of this great queſtion, with powers ſuitable to the importance of their office; but the reſult of their

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all their inquiries led to the ſame concluſion, that the emancipation of the natives muſt be the ſignal for an univerſal ceſſation of induſtry; and the Spaniſh government had not ſufficient virtue to embrace this alternative. Towards the latter part of Charles's reign, the conſequences of the ſyſtem were fatally experienced in the rapid extermination of the Indians. Anxious if poſſible to preſerve ſo large a portion of his American ſubjects, the Emperor, with that quickneſs of deciſion which too often marked his councils, proclaimed their immediate and unconditional emancipation. Still it was found that their induſtry and freedom were incompatible. The alarm was inſtantly ſpread over the whole Spaniſh colonies: Peru, for a while loſt to the monarchy, was only reſtored by the repeal of the obnoxious law: the quiet of New Spain was preſerved, by a combination of the Governor and the ſubjects to ſuſpend its execution: and all that the power of the Spaniſh government has hitherto been able to effect, conſiſtently with the profitable cultivation of its American poſſeſſions, is the eſtabliſhment of certain humane regulations, tending to mitigate the neceſſary ſervitude of the Indians.

The negroes, though in a leſs degree, are nearly in the ſame circumſtances with that unhappy race, to whoſe bondage and toils they

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they have been doomed to ſucceed. Born in a leſs genial climate, and compelled to procure their ſuſtenance by ſomewhat greater exertions, they are not content with ſo ſmall a portion of food, and view with leſs horror the labour of providing it. But beyond this their induſtry does not extend. Like all ſavages, they are incited to exertion only by immediate neceſſity. If you talk to them of conveniences, and comforts, and the delights of activity, you ſpeak a language which they have not yet learnt to comprehend; and the idea of a pleaſure which muſt be purchaſed by toil, preſents to their minds a contradiction in terms. Were they, indeed, allowed to remain in their own country, the influence of thoſe deſires which ſpring from local attachment, the ties of kindred, and the intercourſe of more civilized men, might by ſlow degrees awaken thoſe appetites, and create thoſe artificial wants, which alone can excite regular and effective induſtry. But if ſuddenly removed to a milder climate and a more plentiful ſoil, with their original repugnance to exert more labour than neceſſity preſcribes, it is not to be imagined that any thing except the power of a maſter can prevent them from ſinking into the ſtate of liſtleſs inactivity, which ſeemed to be the natural condition of the Indians. *

Accordingly,

* Park's Travels in the Interior of Africa, Chap. XXIV.—Wimpffen's Letters, No. XV.

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Accordingly, the negroes who have been tranſported to America, are uniformly found to be totally deficient in active induſtry. That thoſe who continue in a ſtate of ſlavery ſhould exhibit the appearance of an indolence which nothing but the immediate terror of the laſh can overcome, is perhaps more the conſequence of their degraded condition, than of their uncivilized ſtate. But the want of activity is not confined to the ſlaves. The free negroes in the Weſt Indies are, with a very few exceptions, chiefly in the Spaniſh and Portugueſe ſettlements, equally averſe to all ſorts of labour which do not contribute to the ſupply of their immediate and moſt urgent wants. Improvident and careleſs of the future, they are not actuated by that principle which inclines more civilized men to equalize their exertions at all times, and to work after the neceſſaries of the day have been procured, in order to make up the poſſible deficiencies of the morrow: nor has their intercourſe with the whites taught them to conſider any gratification as worth obtaining, which cannot be procured by a ſlight exertion of a deſultory and capricious induſtry.

The ſlaves, indeed, who are forced to labour during the whole week for their maſters, ſhew ſome ſymptoms of application in cultivating their own proviſion-grounds on the holidays

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holidays allowed them. But the moſt indolent of men, if puſhed into activity for the advantage of others, will naturally continue their exertions, at leaſt for a ſhort time, when they are themſelves to reap the fruits of the additional toil; and the voluntary labour for their own profit, during the little interval of liberty, may become tolerable, by forming a contraſt to the unrepaid and compulſory fatigues, in which by far the greater part of their days are ſpent. In fact, even under theſe favourable circumſtances, the ſlaves in our Weſt Indian iſlands allot but a very ſmall proportion of their free time to the work for which they are with certainty to be recompenſed, by gains that no maſter ever interferes with. Out of the ſix days per month (beſides accidental holidays) which are allowed them in Jamaica, for the cultivation of their grounds, the more induſtrious do not allot above ſixteen hours to this employment. *

But from the accounts which have been received of the free negroes, it appears that their induſtry is ſtill more ſparing. Of their invincible repugnance to all ſorts of labour, the moſt ample evidence is produced in the Report of the Committee of Privy Council in 1788. The witneſſes examined upon Queries 37. & 38. from all the Britiſh iſlands, concur

* Edwards' Weſt Indies, Book IV. chap. 5. [note.]

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cur in this ſtatement. It will be ſufficient to refer more particularly to the evidence from Jamaica and Barbadoes. In the former ſettlements, Meſſrs Fuller Long & Chiſholme ſtate, that free negroes were never known to work for hire; and that they have all the vices of the ſlaves. The Committee of Council of the iſland, beſides corroborating this aſſertion, add, that the free negroes are averſe to work for themſelves, except when compelled by immediate neceſſity. Mr Brathwaite, the agent for Barbadoes, affirms, that if the ſlaves in that iſland were offered their freedom on condition of working for themſelves, not one tenth of them would accept of it. Governor Parry ſtates, that the free negroes are utterly deſtitute of induſtry; and the Council of the iſland adds, that from their confirmed habits of idleneſs they are the peſts of ſociety. *

The accounts which foreigners have given us of the ſame claſs of men in almoſt all the other colonies, agree moſt accurately with the ſtatements collected by the Committee of Privy Council. M. Malouet, who bore a ſpecial commiſſion from the French government to examine the character and habits of the Maroons in Dutch Guiana, and to determine whether or not they were adapted to become hired labourers, informs us, that they will only work one

* Report 1788, part III.

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one day in the week, which they find abundantly sufficient, in the fertile soil and genial climate of the New World, to supply all the wants that they have yet learnt to feel. The rest of their time is spent in absolute indolence and sloth. 'Le repos,' (says he) 'l'oisiveté sont devenus dans leur etat so-'cial leur unique passion.' * He gives the very same description of the free negroes in the French colonies. † Although many of them possess land and slaves, the spectacle, he tells us, was never yet exhibited of a free negro supporting his family by the culture of his little property. ‡ All other authors agree in giving the same description of free negroes in the British, French, and Dutch colonies, by whatever denomination they may be distinguished, whether Maroons, Charaibes, Free blacks, or Fugitive slaves. The Abbé Raynal himself, with all his ridiculous fondness for savages, cannot, in the present instance, so far twist the facts according to his fancies and feelings, as to give a favourable portrait of this degraded race.

Such are the men by whose voluntary labour it is proposed to clear the thick forests of the New World, and to cover its boundless savannahs with plantations and pens. Nor does it seem to be of much consequence, in this view of

* Mem. sur les Colonies, V. 121.

† Ibid IV. 141. ‡ Ibid V. 127.

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of the matter, whether the new ſtock of negroes is imported at once from Africa, or purchaſed in a ſtate of ſlavery from our old ſettlements. Thoſe who had been ſlaves, either in the European plantations, or the kingdoms of Africa (eſpecially the former), would from habit be more prepared for labour, and more ſkilful in performing work, than free men in a rude ſtate, who had never experienced the hardſhips of fatigue. The Whydah negroes, in their own country, are for the moſt part in a ſtate of bondage, and their lands are in much better cultivation than thoſe of the other tribes. Accordingly, in the Weſt Indies, they are uniformly preferred to all others for docility, quietneſs, and ſubmiſſion to the maſter. * The Koromantees unite to greater bodily ſtrength a more fierce and untameable diſpoſition: but ſuch of them as have been ſlaves in Africa, are obſerved to apply with greater alacrity and effect to field labour, † and are on this account preferred by the Dutch planters to all others. ‡ Theſe habits of induſtry, however, have been formed by the conſtant dread of puniſhment; no principle leſs powerful can maintain them; and they muſt ceaſe with the maſter's authority to which they owed their exiſtence.

* Edwards, b. IV. c. 3. † Edwards, ibid.
‡ Book. I. Sect. III. Part I.

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This has been clearly eſtabliſhed by the view which has already been taken of the free negroes in our old ſugar colonies. But ſtill more chimerical would be the expectation of any voluntary exertion of induſtry in Africans newly imported from a ſtate of freedom in their own country. Is it to be ſuppoſed that thoſe men, carried directly from their native ſands and deſerts to the New World, will at once feel wants and acquire habits to which they were formerly ſtrangers? In our old colonies, it is found neceſſary to teach the newly imported ſlave the difficult leſſon of induſtry by ſlow degrees, by the example of others to whoſe care he is committed for inſtruction, and by the conſtant application of the driver's laſh. In the Portugueſe ſettlements, this courſe of diſcipline is ſtill more ſedulouſly attended to; and, that it may begin ſooner, the ſlave ſhips are partly manned with Brazil negroes. But, in the Weſt Indies, the ſame uncivilized men are ſuddenly to become diligent and quiet labourers, eager for employment and ready to be taught, able to ſhake off with their ſhip irons all their ancient habits of liſtleſs indolence, and anxious to divert their thoughts from brooding over their misfortunes, by ſubmitting to a life of active exertion, with that cheerful reſignation which is the moſt valuable growth of a refined and philoſophic age. I greatly fear that theſe projectors

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projectors truſt a little too much to the effects of the middle paſſage upon thoſe unfortunate men. I muſt be allowed to ſuſpect, that, in order to people Trinidad and the other unſettled colonies with negroes who will work for hire, they muſt diſcover a new race of Africans induſtrious in their own country, or invent ſome method of operating inſtantaneouſly upon the tribes already known, an enlargement of deſires and a change of habits, which, in the natural progreſs of human ſociety, is the ſlow produce of many ſucceeding ages.

Voluntary labour for hire, that exertion which we denominate induſtry, however ſimple it may appear to us who are accuſtomed to it, is nevertheleſs a refinement wholly unknown among the ſavage tribes of Africa. All travellers agree in this ſtatement of the fact. The numbers who are either born or made ſlaves in that continent, are ſaid to exceed thoſe of the free inhabitants in a threefold proportion. There, as in the Weſt Indies, the bondſmen form the labouring part of every community. In Africa, as in our colonies, that unnatural ſtate of ſociety exiſts in full perfection, which ſeparates the toil from the enjoyment of its fruits. No ſuch thing as a man working for another, from the inducement of hire or reward, or from any voluntary bargain, was ever heard of in that continent. Nothing, then, but compulſion can there effect

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that diviſion of labour and reward which is ſo repugnant to natural juſtice. Thoſe who have no ſlaves, work juſt long enough to ſupply their neceſſary wants, or hire the ſlaves of others if they can afford it: thoſe who have ſlaves of their own, never think of labouring themſelves.*

It would appear then, that, with reſpect to the habits and qualities of the negroes, the moſt hopeleſs of the two ſchemes for extending the Weſt Indian cultivation, is that which conſiſts in direct importation. But beſides the objections already urged againſt the more circuitous method of procuring negroes, there are others ſo inſuperable as of themſelves to render its adoption impoſſible.

After a reſidence in our iſlands ſufficient to train and ſeaſon the negroes, they muſt have formed local attachments ſtrong enough to make tranſportation in a high degree painful. Accordingly, in the penal code of the ſlave laws, baniſhment occupies the next place to death. Still more cruel would ſuch an exchange be to the Creole negroes, for whom, as moſt valuable, the demand would be greateſt. And as the place of all who are exported muſt be ſupplied by freſh importations from Africa, a double cruelty and injuſtice would thus be committed.

* Park's Travels in the Interior of Africa, chap. XXI. & XXII.

committed. Beſides, the ſecurity of the old colonies would be manifeſtly injured by ſuch conſtant drains of their ſeaſoned hands, and ſo great an influx of new and unbroken ſlaves; while the inhabitants of the new ſettlements would have their profits, already much leſs than thoſe of ſlave proprietors, ſtill more diminiſhed by being forced to buy their negroes, not at the African price, nor yet at that which new ſlaves fetch in the Weſt Indian market, but at the ſtill higher rate which the old planters muſt demand for ſlaves already trained to work. This additional expence, firſt, from the double paſſage, next, from the difference between the labour of the negroes ſeaſoned in the iſlands, and the labour of thoſe firſt ſeaſoned and then tranſported, and, laſtly, from the extra profits of the Weſt Indian planter, would operate at the very period of cultivation, already ſufficiently encumbered with coſt and difficulty, and would effectually diſable the planter, who ſhould adopt the new ſyſtem, from entering into competition with his brethren in the old colonies: not to mention the impoſſibility of preventing a contraband trade with the coaſt of Africa, where the temptation would be ſo ſtrong, and the means of concealment ſo eaſy; in extenſive countries abounding in harbours, and thinly peopled with men more or leſs engaged in planting, and in-

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tereſted in conniving at abuſes of this ſort. Suppoſe it were required to people Trinidad in this way, the foreign ſettlements in the Weſt Indies and America would be at leaſt as unfit to ſupply the demand as our own, except perhaps Brazil, which is favourably ſituated, and is enabled, by the extent of the Portugueſe poſſeſſions in Africa and the ſhortneſs of the middle paſſage, to import ſlaves at a much cheaper rate than any other colony; but, then, the Portugueſe laws ſtrictly prohibit re-exportaion, doubtleſs, in order to keep up the proportion of Creole negroes; and as, in various inſtances, they watch over the rights of ſlaves, it is evident that goods of this deſcription would be of all others the moſt difficult and expenſive to ſmuggle.

We may conclude, therefore, that the only practicable method of tranſporting a population of negroes to Trinidad, or the other uncultivated colonies, is the direct importation from Africa, while, unfortunately, the people thus procured, are leaſt of any adapted to the ſituation of free labourers, which they are required to fill.

But, admitting for a moment that capitaliſts acquainted with the nature of the buſineſs could be induced to ſpeculate in the way recommended, let us conſider the probable conſequences of the

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the plan ſucceeding, and ſee whether the very ſame dangers might not reſult from filling the ſettlements with emancipated exiles, that are ſo juſtly to be apprehended, from the more practicable and ſcarcely leſs humane ſcheme of allowing the ſlave trade to be introduced in its full extent.

In the *firſt* place, as it is granted on all hands that the cultivation by free negroes will, for ſome years at leaſt, be more expenſive than the old method, both from the price of their labour in addition to their purchaſe-money, and from the inferior efficacy of their voluntary induſtry; ſome compenſation for this difference muſt be given, and a ſtrong temptation held out to induce planters to employ their capital in a ſpeculation againſt which ſo many violent prejudices may be expected at firſt to prevail. If any allurements can be found ſufficient to counteract theſe; if, for example, as has been propoſed, * government ſhall freely grant the crown lands to cultivators; and if the inducement of ſaving the original purchaſe-money ſhall be ſtrong enough to outweigh the conſiderations of ſubſequent expence and riſk; it is moſt probable that the balance will only need to be turned, in order to preponderate as much the other

* Criſis of the Sugar Colonies, let. IV.

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way. The ſpirit of adventure delights in ſudden movements, and when once excited, generally runs into extremes. In the New World, at leaſt, it has always been of an infectious nature; and a ſpeculator who is led aſtray by its flattering influence, ſeldom wants companions either to partake of his ſucceſs or to ſhare his ruin. If the general effects of large capital, and the character of Britiſh traders, left us any room to doubt that they are as ſuſceptible of theſe impulſes as the firſt invaders of America; the whole hiſtory of our ſugar iſlands, but ſtill more the eagerneſs with which Britiſh capital was poured into the Dutch colonies during the late war, might convince us of what we have to expect, ſhould any means be adopted for opening a paſſage to the rich and virgin ſoil of Trinidad. The inſtant that the obſtructions to the new ſcheme are removed, we may reſt aſſured, that no bounds will be ſet to the enterpriſing ſpirit of monied men. If the engine is once put in motion, its velocity will be prodigious. The arguments which convince, or the proſpects which allure one planter, will ſpread their influence to many; and in a very ſhort time the few white inhabitants of the iſland will be ſurrounded with multitudes of free negroes, far more ſuddenly collected, and probably in greater numbers, than the ſlaves who cultivate

tivate the moſt populous of our ancient poſſeſſions.

Now theſe ſwarms of barbarians, thus rapidly introduced, are indeed to be all free.

Before examining what, in their ſituation, muſt be the meaning of this word (whoſe ſound ſeems to have ſtrangely miſled ſo many writers and orators on the colonial queſtion), let us conſider under what circumſtances the importation is made. So great and ſudden an increaſe in the demand for negroes, muſt produce extraordinary exertions on the part of the African ſlave merchant and his providers. The ſtock of thoſe who poſſeſs ſlaves will ſoon be exhauſted; the number of thoſe condemned for crimes will remain nearly the ſame as before; the deficiency muſt be ſupported by an increaſe of the only other means of procuring negroes, war and pillage. * It is eaſy to perceive, that the tract of country whoſe inhabitants are moſt fierce and contentious, will be neceſſarily reſorted to. The peaceful natives of Whydah will furniſh but a ſmall part of the additional ſupply. The ferocious inhabitants of the Gold Coaſt, eaſily roufed to

* In the language of moſt of the African nations, what we call war is diſtinguiſhed by the name of the '*Great Pil-*'*lage*;' a metaphor (ſhall we call it?) peculiarly deſcriptive of the hoſtilities of thoſe people, and not altogether inexpreſſive of the contentions carried on in ſome other parts of the world.

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to hoſtilities congenial to their diſpoſitions, will recruit the holds of our ſlave ſhips, and form a large proportion of the quickly increaſing population of the new ſettlements. Can it be imagined, that tribes of ſavages thus torn from their native country, ſuddenly deprived of that unreſtrained freedom which was the pride of their roaming lives, loaded with chains, and crowded into a nauſeous dungeon, tranſported to a diſtant region by a ſtrange race of men, known to them only by their cruel rapacity—Can it be imagined, that immediately on the words of emancipation being pronounced, they will become peaceful ſubjects of their oppreſſors, and voluntarily ſubmit to an authority unſupported by force?

We know, that in all colonies where the ſtrict ſubordination of ſlavery exiſts, the newly imported negroes are carefully diſtributed among thoſe whom time has habituated to the yoke; and any rapid increaſe of numbers is dreaded as the forerunner of rebellion. In almoſt all negro inſurrections, the new ſlaves have been the chief inſtigators *; and thoſe from the Gold Coaſt have generally been found the moſt difficult to tame, and moſt prone to rebellion. † Yet our iſlands have been ſlowly peopled;

* Long's Hiſt. of Jamaica, vol. II. p. 444.

† Edwards' Weſt Indies, b. IV. c. 3.

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peopled; and time has always been given for uniting the unbroken negroes with the general maſs. In the beginning of the laſt century, the average imports from the Britiſh Weſt Indies amounted to ſeven hundred thouſand pounds. In the middle of that century, this average had only increaſed to a million and a half; and at the end of the century, it was under five millions, including the produce of Trinidad and the iſlands ceded by the peace of Paris, and notwithſtanding the diminiſhed ſupply occaſioned by the ſtate of the French Weſt Indies, and the diverſion of capital from North America in conſequence of the war. The increaſe of the whites, too, bore ſome proportion to the importation of ſlaves. In 1734, the negroes of Jamaica amounted to upwards of eighty-ſix thouſand; the whites to ſeven thouſand ſix hundred only. In 1768, the former had increaſed to about a hundred and ſixty-ſeven thouſand; the latter to ſeventeen thouſand: And in 1791, the negroes amounted to two hundred and fifty thouſand, while the whites had increaſed to thirty thouſand, of whom eight thouſand eight hundred were ſeamen, and ſix thouſand three hundred bore arms in the militia. The vaſt importations into St Domingo during the ten years previous to the contentions between the whites

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whites and the people of colour, facilitated in all probability the defigns of thofe who excited the negroes to inſurrection. While the numbers of the whites had rather decreaſed, * the ſtock of negroes had riſen from two hundred and fifty thouſand to four hundred and eighty thouſand, including thoſe employed in domeſtic ſervice and town occupations, who were of courſe as numerous in 1779 as in 1789, that is, about forty-ſix thouſand. The field negroes, then, were conſiderably more than doubled. † Yet even in St Domingo, there was a large population of ſlaves born in the iſland, with whom thoſe newly arrived might incorporate. In Trinidad and the other new ſettlements, there is not even this foundation to build upon. Every thing muſt be begun anew. Swarms of negroes muſt be poured in, with only the few proprietors of plantations to keep them in ſubjection, and to ſtand between them and plunder.

But the *freedom* of theſe unfortunate men is, according to the principles upon which the project appears to have been formed, ſufficient to diſarm them of all defigns hoſtile to the ſecurity of the whites. Let us for a moment conſider the ſituation in which this freedom will place them. It

* Necker, Adminiſt. des Finances, tom. I. chap. 13

† Rapport à l'Aſſemblée Legiſlative 1792.

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It is propoſed that the planter ſhall have a preferable right to purchaſe the labour of the negroes whom he imports, and this right of preemption is deſcribed as an additional encouragement to ſpeculation. But it is manifeſt that this is not merely a gratuitous encouragement; it is a neceſſary part of the plan. No man could ever be found fooliſh enough to buy or import negroes, if, upon their landing, another might reap the profit of the ſpeculation, by hiring them for his own uſe. It is therefore not an arbitrary regulation added for the farther encouragement of cultivation, but an eſſential ingredient of the ſyſtem, that the importer or purchaſer of a negro ſhall have the ſole right to his labour for a term of years, at a rate of wages fixed by law. This is called by the projectors, particularly by the author of the *Criſis*, 'the known relation of indented ſervant;' and the fancied analogy ſeems at firſt to give the ſcheme a more feaſible aſpect. But it ſhould be remembered, that indented ſervants in the North American colonies were always men accuſtomed at home to labour for hire; driven from their country by want of employment, or the proſpect of greater wealth, and eager to find work in the new world. They were, therefore, exactly in the ſituation from which the greateſt exertions of induſtry might be expected, whether for profit or for hire; and

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and there was no occaſion for coercion to prevent them from being idle. The free negroes, on the other hand, muſt be forced to work; and accordingly, it is farther admitted, that maſters ſhould have the power of inflicting moderate chaſtiſement. It is very clear, that the two modes of exciting induſtry, puniſhment and hire, are utterly incompatible. They appeal to different principles, and give riſe to oppoſite habits. Beſides, it is not eaſy to conceive a ſyſtem of regulations which ſhall prevent this power, neceſſarily entruſted to the planter over his ſervant, from degenerating into the tyranny of the maſter over his ſlave.

But, at any rate, admitting the poſſibility of drawing a line between the two relations, it is evident that two orders of men will be formed in the ſettlements: the Whites, poſſeſſing all the land, entruſted with the whole civil power, clothed with domeſtic authority: and the Blacks, whoſe lives are ſpent in poverty and ſubjection; toiling for maſters whom they conſider as a different race of beings, and in whom they recognize the enemies that tore them from their country. Between theſe two orders there can exiſt no bond of union but that of force; they are the oppreſſors and the oppreſſed. Similarity of complexion and ſituation will conſtantly unite the one againſt the other; and there will be no intermediate claſs,

at

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at leaſt for a ſeries of years, to ſoften the tranſition, to hold the balance, or to connect the two claſſes to together. The White will always view the Black as a being of an inferior order, bought with his money, depending on him for ſupport, and born for his uſe. In all the colonies of the Europeans in the New World, the colour is made the ſtandard of diſtinction; and by its different ſhades the approaches to a ſtate of equality with the whites are regulated. * Nor is it of much conſequence, whether we conſider the diſadvantages attached to negro blood, as having originally been the cauſe, or the reſult of the contempt which the difference of colour excites. The preſent race of planters, who are to found the free negro ſyſtem, labour under the prejudice, from whatever cauſe it may have ariſen; and he who ſhall ſuperintend the eſtabliſhment, may poſſibly find it ſomewhat difficult to change the nature of theſe men. Nay, ſhould he ſucceed in finding, or creating a new generation of white proprietors, half the work would ſtill remain. The Africans, too, muſt undergo a radical change: they muſt be enlightened with the ideas of abſtract philanthropy, and inſpired with the ſenſe of general expediency, and the love of order. In ſuch circumſtances, it is idle to talk of laws and regulations. Men muſt firſt be found ready to obey,

* Wimpffen's Letters, p. 63.

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obey, and to conform. Manners and circumſtances are independent of poſitive inſtitutions. They preſcribe bounds to the decrees of deſpotiſm, and give laws to the legiſlator in the plenitude of his power. It will be vain to think of ſecuring the privileges of the negro vaſſal, ſo long as the hand of nature has diſtinguiſhed him from his lord, and the circumſtances of his ſituation have given his brethren the ſuperiority in numbers as well as ſtrength. The magiſtrate, however appointed, will generally be inclined towards the cauſe of his fellow Chriſtian; and ſhould he even be impartial, how is the negro to adduce his evidence? The mere circumſtance of ſlavery, is not the only reaſon for rejecting the teſtimony of the Blacks againſt the Europeans, in the American colonies. The diſtinction of race; the radical difference of manners and character; the perpetual oppoſition of intereſts, as well as prejudices; the inefficacy of oaths in the mind tempted by paſſion, uninfluenced by religious impreſſion, and a ſtranger to the dictates of honour,—theſe are the circumſtances which render a negro's teſtimony utterly inadmiſſible againſt a white man; and they would mark the ſituation of the vaſſal as deciſively as they now do that of the ſlave. We muſt therefore expect that abuſes, beyond the knowledge of any conſtituted

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conſtituted authority, would ſoon aſſimilate the villenage of Trinidad, &c. to the ſlavery of our old poſſeſſions; and that there would reſult from the new ſyſtem, a ſtate of ſociety tainted by radical evils, beyond the reach even of parliamentary legiſlation. The modifications of ſlavery eſtabliſhed by law in favour of the negroes, would, without rendering their ſituation much more tolerable, give them far greater opportunities to diſturb the peace of the colony. Actuated by the ſame *eſprit de corps*, which even under the whip of the driver has ſo often broken out into revolt, and given riſe to plans concerted with wonderful prudence and unanimity, in ſpite of all the regulations by which, in the organization of the old colonies, they are ſeparated from each other; the vaſſal of Trinidad would be free from many of thoſe obſtacles which the ſlave ſyſtem throws in the way of inſurrection. The laws, for inſtance, which prevent ſlaves from poſſeſſing horſes, fire-arms, and ammunition; thoſe which reſtrict their powers of locomotion, and thoſe which prohibit them from meeting for the purpoſes of recreation, are utterly inapplicable to the condition in which it has been propoſed to place the negroes of the new ſettlements, if it is intended that there ſhould be more than a nominal difference between the projected ſyſtem and the one at preſent eſtabliſhed.

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It is eaſy, then, to ſee the reſult of all this. The planters, knowing that by law their vaſſals have certain rights, will uſe their power over them with far leſs moderation than if they lay wholly at their mercy. The negroes, on their part, finding how nugatory their conſtitutional privileges become, in the particulars moſt eſſential to their happineſs, and united by every tie which can induce men to make a common cauſe, will avail themſelves of the few advantages of which their ſuperiors cannot deprive them, and will at once revenge the injuries of their race. From every view of the ſubject, therefore, we are led to the ſame concluſion, that, admitting the plan to be practicable, its conſequences muſt be ſo inevitably fatal, that we are eaſily reconciled to the proſpect of the various difficulties which cannot fail to prevent its adoption.

But, it will be ſaid, the magnitude of the change produced upon negroes by their emancipation, has been proved by the example of the free negroes in all the European colonies; and more particularly by the unſhaken fidelity of thoſe ſlaves who have been taken from field work, and entruſted with arms, ſometimes in the midſt of rebellion. The univerſal prejudice of our coloniſts againſt ſuch troops will be overlooked; and the hiſtory

tory of the revolts in Surinam, of our own black corps, and in general of the free negroes in the different colonies, will be appealed to as proofs, that the dangers of our ſituation ariſe from the bondage in which the bulk of this unhappy claſs of men are kept. Theſe facts it is by no means my intention to diſpute; but I apprehend that a little reflection will ſhew how imprudent it would be to draw from them any inference in favour of the ſcheme now under conſideration.

There is perhaps no principle more univerſal in its influence over the mind of man, or more conſpicuous in its effects on his conduct, than the deſire of being diſtinguiſhed among his fellows. The eagerneſs of individuals to better their condition, is indeed one of the moſt powerful of the ſprings by which the great machine of ſociety is moved. But the love of diſtinction ſeems to be the moſt univerſal criterion, by which they judge of the comparative advantages of different ſituations; more eſpecially in a rude ſtate, where comforts and luxuries are little prized. This deſire, it is evident, directs itſelf in relation to the claſs to which we ourſelves naturally belong, and at which our envy or jealouſy is always pointed. The fortunes of thoſe who are removed to a great diſtance, either above or below us,

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have no power to raiſe ſuch emotions. All our ideas centre in our own order. Thus, it is not among the poliſhed ſtrangers who viſit his coaſt, but among his kindred tribes, that the ſavage warrior pants to ſignalize himſelf; and where the principles of policy are ſo imperfectly underſtood, the aid of the foreigner is cheerfully accepted againſt a rival horde.

This is the very principle that attaches the free negroes in the Weſt Indies to the party of the Europeans. A ſlave, born or trained to ſervitude, courts the favour of his maſter, becauſe it diſtinguiſhes him from his fellow ſlaves. After he has obtained this mark of diſtinction, he naturally takes the ſide of his maſter, partly becauſe his comrades view him with diſtruſt, and partly becauſe his relative importance is connected with his maſter's ſafety. In like manner, the ſlave who has obtained his liberty, views this honourable diſtinction, not with a reference to other freed men whom he reſembles in every thing, or to Europeans whom he ſcarcely reſembles at all, but to the great body of ſlaves by whom he is ſurrounded, and to whoſe claſs he once belonged. The free negroes form in each ſettlement a ſmall body naturally related to the bulk of the inhabitants, but proud of the diſtinguiſhing circumſtance which raiſes them above the common level.

They

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They are as it were the privileged order in the African community. As the nobles in the European monarchies have for the moſt part rallied round the throne, ſince the commonalty became an order independent of their authority: ſo, the free negroes have generally joined the whites, in their reſiſtance to the great body of enſlaved blacks. They are as much intereſted in preventing a univerſal emancipation, as the ariſtocracy of a well regulated kingdom would be, in oppoſing a ſyſtem of levelling, or a plan for conferring on the lower orders all the privileges of nobility.

So long, then, as the free negroes bear a very ſmall proportion, both to the Europeans and ſlaves, the former may always count upon having their aſſiſtance againſt the latter. This is happily the ſituation of all our Weſt Indian poſſeſſions, and of thoſe parts of the United States where ſlavery is tolerated. In Barbadoes, they are not much more than the twentieth of the whites, and ſcarcely the ſixty-eighth part of the ſlaves. In Jamaica and Dominica, where they are moſt numerous, their proportion (including the large body of free people of colour) to the whites in 1790, was that of one to three, and to the ſlaves that of one to twenty-five; and thoſe negroes who have at different junctures been armed, both in our own and in the Dutch colonies, bore a

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ſtill ſmaller proportion to the body of the people.

If, however, we ſuppoſe that the numbers of the free negroes are ſo much increaſed as to equal thoſe of the whites, the caſe is materially altered. By degrees they will conſider themſelves as on a level with thoſe who were once their maſters. Being always leſs induſtrious and wealthy, they will view the European proprietor with envy. Idleneſs, diſcontent and indigence will give birth to projects of plunder; and the ſtate of degradation in which they have been held by the whites, will add a mixture of revenge. Accuſtomed now to regard the European more than the ſlave, and ſufficiently ſtrong to fancy that they can manage the latter, and keep their ground againſt either, they may poſſibly form the dangerous ſcheme of attacking the whites, and of calling in the aſſiſtance of the enſlaved negroes.

Unhappily this is no longer a matter of ſpeculation. The devaſtation of the fineſt colony in the world was produced by theſe very means. The rebellion in St Domingo was begun by the free people of colour, who were nearly equal to the whites in number, and kept by them in the ſame ſtate of inferiority and oppreſſion in which the free negroes are all over the Weſt Indies. It ſhould ſeem, then, that ſome danger is to be apprehended from

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from the free negroes, even in the iſlands where the bulk of the community are enſlaved. Accordingly, the policy of our colonies has watched over this intermediate order of men with a jealous eye. Various laws have been made to prevent too great an increaſe of their numbers, to enforce their ſubmiſſion to the whites, and to limit their influence in the community. In Antigua, * St Vincent, † and the Virgin Iſles, ‡ they are obliged to chuſe a white man for their patron. Unleſs they have landed property, they cannot become freeholders, and are incapacitated from poſſeſſing more than eight acres of land. If they ſtrike the meaneſt white ſervant, they are to be ſummarily and ſeverely whipped; whilſt a white who ſtrikes a free negro or mulatto is only to be bound over to the next ſeſſions, and puniſhed at the diſcretion of the juſtices. In the Bahamas, ‖ there is a heavy tax upon all free negroes or mulattoes who come thither; and in Barbadoes ¶, the evidence of a ſlave is received againſt them. In what light they are viewed by the colonial juriſprudence of France, we may gather from the following paſſage of the *Code Noire;* a ſyſtem of laws diſtinguiſhed for nothing ſo much as its extreme mildneſs towards the negroes. ‘ *D'ailleurs, les*

* Act 1702. † Act 1767. ‡ Act 1783.
‖ Act 1784. ¶ Act 1739.

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'*negres en general ſont des hommes dangereux ;*
'*preſque pas un de ceux auxquels vous avez ren-*
'*du la liberté qui n'en ait abusé, et qui ne ſoit*
'*porté à des exces dangereux pour la ſocieté.*' *

But if ſuch are the dangers to be apprehended from a body of free creole negroes, gradually formed in old eſtabliſhed colonies, where the whites and ſlaves are numerous ; what muſt be the ſituation of the new communities, when, in conſequence of the plan now propoſed, they ſhall, in the ſpace of a few years, be peopled with freed and imported negroes, in numbers and ſtrength far exceeding the whites, bound to them by no deſire of diſtinguiſhing themſelves from a ſurrounding multitude of ſlaves, or of uniting againſt an enemy equally formidable to both ?

In St Domingo, the influence of manners ſoftened the rigour of the laws againſt the free people of colour ; they were connected with the whites by the ties of blood ; and the property which they poſſeſſed defended them ſtill farther from oppreſſion. In the new colonies, the manners will be ſtill more ſevere than the laws upon the free negroes quite unconnected with their oppreſſors ; and, long before they can acquire the protection of property, matters will have come to a criſis. In St Domingo, the ſlaves formed

* Edit. 1762, 31 Mars & 5 Avril.

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formed a third party, to whom indeed the mulattoes appealed, but whoſe aſſiſtance could not be procured without much difficult management, and whoſe ſubjection to the whites afforded them an opportunity of moderating, in many parts of the iſland, the violence of the combined attack. In the new colonies, the vaſſal negroes will have no ſuch ſteps to take; the contagion will ſpread at once; and the Whites have no auxiliaries to whom they can appeal. * The poſition of St Domingo to the leeward of the other French colonies, enabled the vigorous government which was eſtabliſhed there to throw in very ſeaſonable ſuccours. Admitting (to take the inſtance of our own colonial affairs) that our iſland eſtabliſhments could afford relief to Trinidad, the cataſtrophe will probably be over before a ſingle tranſport can reach the Gulf of Paria. After the French in St Domingo

* It is, indeed, propoſed that government ſhould take into its pay a certain number of the imported negroes; and the author of the '*Criſis*' more particularly remarks, that they will be faithful from their gratitude to the power that has delivered them from ſlavery, and will delight in the honours of a military life. But, in the *firſt* place, government, ſo far from emancipating them, has only carried them off from their own country to a Weſt Indian garriſon; and, *ſecondly*, when ſlavery is aboliſhed, we find that military ſervice is a ſevere puniſhment to field negroes.—*Vide* Touſſaint's Proclamation.

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go had been ſubdued, the two great claſſes of men whom common enmity had united, inſtantly turned their arms againſt each other, with a rage ſtill more exterminating than that which had marked their combination. Both parties, now, pretended authority from the Republic, and in both armies the Whites acquired ſome influence. An opportunity was thus given them to undermine their enemies, to reconcile the conquering party, and to put in motion all the powers of intrigue, by which ill cemented alliances of half-civilized men may be quickly diſſolved. But in Trinidad and the other ſettlements organized upon the ſame plan, our vaſſals will form one united band, bent on the extermination of the European name, unfit for any union or compromiſe by which the whites may retain a footing, and, after having expelled the planters, capable only of renewing, in the moſt favoured quarters of the New World, thoſe ſcenes of ſavage life to which their forced intercourſe with Europeans will rather have increaſed their attachment. Then will Trinidad, more particularly, be to all the Carribbee iſlands that windward fire which we have before proved that the Leeward ſettlements would experience in the negro commonwealth of St Domingo; with this only difference, that its inhabitants, leſs civilized and totally unacquainted with the arts of peace, will devote themſelves

themſelves to the extirpation of the Europeans in thoſe ſeas. SECT. I.

'*Suſpecta majoribus noſtris fuere ingenia ſervorum, etiam cùm in agris, aut domibus iiſdem, naſcerentur, caritatemque dominorum ſtatim acciperent. Poſtquam verò nationes in familiis habemus, quibus diverſi ritus, externa ſacra, aut nulla ſunt, colluviem is tam non niſi metu coercueris.*' *

I have thus rapidly attempted to ſketch a few features of the picture which the experience of the paſt holds up for the inſtruction of thoſe who may be inclined to ſport with negro emancipation. And if the examples already furniſhed in that quarter of the globe which is to be the theatre of the new experiment, are not in all their details applicable to the caſe which may ariſe from the proſecution of the propoſed ſcheme, we may conclude, that theſe inſtances fall infinitely ſhort of the dangers with which it is fraught. But when the various inſurmountable difficulties attending this new and untried ſyſtem are fully conſidered, we can entertain no ſerious apprehenſions of its being carried into effect. The old, and impolitic, and iniquitous, but practicable, and, I really believe, leſs dangerous mode of colonization, will probably be reſorted to.

* Tacitus, Annal. lib. XIV. cap. 44.

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to. The dominion of the cart-whip re-eſtabliſhed over the ancient ſettlements of the weſtern Archipelago, will be extended to the more ſerene regions of the Oroonoco and the Miſſiſſippi, where the traffic of human fleſh will be interrupted by no avenging ſtorms, and the avarice of Europeans may for yet a few generations wallow in the blood-ſtained ſpoils of African labour; until, in the fulneſs of time, the great event, which has for ages been ſlowly preparing, ſhall be accompliſhed; and the African warriors, gradually civilized in the fruitful iſlands of America, ſhall obtain quiet, and, may we not add, rightful poſſeſſion, of thoſe plains which have been cultivated by the toils and ſufferings of their fathers.

SECT.

SECTION II.

OF THE NEGRO SLAVE SYSTEM, OR THE PRESENT STATE OF SOCIETY IN THE SLAVE COLONIES, AND THE MEANS OF IMPROVING IT.

SECT. II.

The remarks which have been made upon the character and habits of the negroes, both in the laſt Section, and in the former Parts of this Inquiry, ſeem to ſuggeſt certain concluſions of a very poſitive and definite nature with reſpect to the internal ſtructure of the ſlave colonies.

It may be obſerved, in the *firſt* place, that all attempts ſpeedily to change the ſtate of ſociety in thoſe ſettlements by legiſlative enactments, are if poſſible ſtill more ridiculous, and, if attended with any material conſequences, ſtill more dangerous than ſimilar endeavours made ſuddenly to new-model communities of the ordinary texture.

In the *ſecond* place, we may remark, that however deficient in civilization, the negroes are evidently capable of acquiring thoſe wants and deſires which are the ſeeds of induſtry; that they are endowed with powers, not only of body but of mind, ſufficient to render their improvement

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ment and high refinement a matter of abſolute certainty under a proper ſyſtem of management; and that there is nothing in their nature peculiar or diſtinguiſhing, which renders them a ſeparate claſs, or places them beyond the influence of the paſſions and principles common to all the reſt of mankind in certain ſtages of ſociety. Through the whole of this Inquiry, I have argued every queſtion relating to the negroes, upon the ſame general grounds which are uſed to inveſtigate the hiſtory, or determine the probable fates, of other rude nations. All the facts with which we are acquainted, concur to juſtify a mode of reaſoning pointed out by the cleareſt analogies; and the greateſt errors have been committed by politicians, both in ſpeculation and in practical arrangements, from the fundamental and vulgar prejudice of conſidering the Africans as a peculiar race, to whom general views do not apply. The Africans, in fact, as cloſely reſemble every other rude people in their characters and habits, as in their circumſtances. When enſlaved their characters and habits are modified by the change of ſituation; and they become ſimilar to all rude tribes placed in a ſtate of bondage. When wiſe and liberal regulations mitigate the hardſhips of their lot, a door is opened for their gradual improvement and progreſs in civilization, according to that general

ral principle of advancement which ſeems to be an eſſential part of the human character, and which always works its effects in the moſt obvious manner, unleſs when ſtifled by abſurd or wicked inſtitutions.

We may remark, in the *third* place, that the mixed breed of mulattoes in the ſlave colonies does not render the ſtructure of the ſociety anomalous. On the contrary, theſe men are ſubſervient to many uſeful purpoſes. They are in ſome reſpects ſuperior to the negroes; as, in civilization and mental endowments. In bodily ſtrength and adaptation to the circumſtances of the tropical climate, they are almoſt on a level with the pure African breed. They are uniformly attached to the Whites, in thoſe colonies where cruel rigour on the part of the government has not alienated them, or their numbers rendered them formidable. They form, together with the free negroes, an intermediate claſs of men, connecting the other two, however imperfect the link or however ſudden the gradation may be, compared with thoſe uniting principles which knit and mould the more curiouſly arranged fabrics of European and Aſiatic ſociety. It is entirely from the influence of manners, and of poſitive inſtitutions, that the people of colour have uniformly been held in a ſtate of degradation, and even claſſed with the free negroes.

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The exiſtence of ſlavery is the great cauſe of thoſe manners and inſtitutions. The free mulattoes are tinged with a hue which is almoſt the characteriſtic of degradation and bondage in the eyes of Weſt Indians. They are related by blood to the vileſt portion of the ſociety; they are of the ſame race with many who yet obey the cart-whip: while no white man can name a brother in chains. They are, moreover, from the ſtate of morals among the Whites (the immediate effect of the ſlave ſyſtem), almoſt univerſally the fruits of illicit and vulgar amours; they owe nothing to their mother but life; and are, in their turn, ſacrificed to the brutal paſſions of the common tyrants. It is evident that theſe circumſtances which diſtinguiſh the mixed race in the colonial ſociety, are altogether the conſequences of the ſlave ſyſtem, and of the ſtate of manners which that ſyſtem has produced. They preſent, therefore, no formidable obſtacle to the legiſlator who would, by gradual and prudent meaſures, reform the corrupted maſs, and lay the foundations of a more natural arrangement in the ſocial union, by cautiouſly but firmly applying the axe to the root of the evil, and undermining the inſtitutions that have grown up in defiance of all juſtice and policy.

The ſame remarks apply with equal preciſion to the free negroes, who indeed reſemble

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ſemble the mulattoes in their moral and political circumſtances. And as the ſtate of ſociety among the Whites themſelves is evidently affected in the moſt material degree by the ſame ſyſtem of inſtitutions which ſo peculiarly diſtinguiſhes the tropical colonies of America *, we may with confidence conclude, that the whole fabric of colonial ſociety has naturally ariſen out of the circumſtances in which legiſlative enactments originally placed thoſe provinces; that it preſents no inſuperable difficulties to the wiſdom of enlightened reformers; that it may receive complete and radical amelioration from the gradual abolition of the noxious and artificial eſtabliſhments which have been formed by the meaſures of former ſtateſmen.

In the *fourth* place, there can be no doubt that the climate of the Weſt Indies renders the labour of negroes eſſential to the cultivation of the ſoil. It is only in their corporeal qualities that thoſe men are fundamentally diſtinguiſhed from the reſt of the human ſpecies. They excel all the other races of mankind in hardineſs, agility, and ſtrength of limbs; in the capacity of ſuſtaining the moſt galling fatigue and pain; in the faculty of enduring labour under every

* Book I. Sect. I.

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fort of privation, and all kinds of annoyance; above all, in that quality which chiefly diſtinguiſhes the human body from the bodies of the lower animals, the power of ſubmitting with eaſe to every change of ſeaſon, and adapting the corporeal habitudes and functions, with ſafety and alacrity, to all the varieties of climate. From the firſt diſcovery of America to the preſent time, the experience of every day in thoſe ſultry though ſplendid regions, has proved, that neither Europeans nor their deſcendants are capable of enduring fatigue in the burning climates of the ſouthern colonies. To the negro, all climates and ſoils are the ſame. He thrives as well in thoſe marſhes whence the heat of the vertical ſun exhales every noxious vapour, and engenders all the multifarious forms of animal and vegetable poiſon, as in the happieſt vallies of the old world, where the breeze, the ſhade, and the ſtream, temper the genial warmth of the moſt ſerene and fragrant air. As long, therefore, as the colonies are cultivated, the population muſt conſiſt of a mixed and variegated tribe. The great object of the legiſlator is the improvement of that ſtate of ſociety, and that ſyſtem of manners, which have ariſen from the neceſſary introduction of diſtinct races of men, differing from each other in civilization, in bodily qualities, and

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and in political privileges. The only plan which can be admitted into our thoughts muſt proceed upon the principle of new-modelling the preſent ſtructure of ſociety, and retaining at the ſame time all the parts of which it is compoſed. I have endeavoured to illuſtrate, by a few general obſervations, the poſſibility of accompliſhing both theſe ends. I ſhall now attend more particularly to the means which are ſuggeſted for the attainment of this purpoſe, by the nature of the principal evils which in the preſent ſituation of things call ſo loudly for correction.

I. The firſt and the greateſt of thoſe evils, the radical vice of the whole Weſt Indian ſyſtem, is, beyond all doubt, the oppreſſive treatment of the negro ſlaves. It requires very little argument to prove, that the quantity of work which may be obtained from a labourer or drudge, is liable to be affected as much by the injurious treatment that he receives, as by the idleneſs in which he may be permitted to indulge. Where this drudge is a ſlave, no motive but fear can operate upon his diligence and attention. A conſtant inſpection is therefore abſolutely neceſſary, and a perpetual terror of the laſh is the only preventive of indolence. But there are certain bounds preſcribed even to

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the power of the laſh. It may force the unhappy victim to move, becauſe the line of diſtinction between motion and reſt, action and repoſe, is definite; but no puniſhment can compel the labourer to ſtrenuous exertion, becauſe there is no meaſure nor ſtandard of activity. A ſtate of deſpair, not of induſtry, is the never-failing conſequence of ſevere chaſtiſement; and the conſtant repetition of the torture only ſerves to blunt the ſenſibility of the nerves, and diſarm the puniſhment of its terrors. The body is injured, and the mind becomes as little willing, as the limbs are able to exert. Bad food, ſcanty ſupport of every kind, conſtant expoſure to the extremities of the weather, muſt weaken the ſtrength and exhauſt the conſtitution even of a Creole negro. Want of reſt, which thoſe men can bear, or appear to bear, with miraculous indifference, muſt ere long wear them out. Both their bodies and their minds muſt ſooner become incapable of labour than thoſe of voluntary workmen, who have conſtantly before them the ſtrongeſt poſſible motives to activity; and whilſt complicated ill uſage is rapidly deſtroying the lives of the ſufferers, it muſt evidently diminiſh the productive powers of the exertions which the ſurvivors continue to make.

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It may therefore appear ſomewhat ſingular, that the melancholy hiſtory of the American colonies ſhould preſent ſo unvaried a picture of cruelty and oppreſſions, when nothing can be more manifeſt than the immediate and groſs impolicy of ſuch conduct. Thoſe who are always confident in mens honeſty as long as their direct and ſpecific intereſts draw them to the paths of integrity, may find ſome reaſon, in the annals of Weſt Indian cultivation, to believe that the caprice and folly of human nature is ſcarcely inferior to its depravity; and that, inſtead of following the dictates of humane feelings or conſcientious principles, in oppoſition to the temptations of ſelf-love, there ſeems to be ſome rooted predilection for vice and cruelty ſo ſtrongly implanted in the human breaſt, as to predominate altogether over the united temptations of virtue and intereſt. Certain it is, that the maſters of ſlaves have in all ages indulged their worſt appetites and moſt uſeleſs caprices, at the expence of thoſe very intereſts, to further which the ſlaves were purchaſed; and that, in order to gratify thoſe momentary guſts of paſſion, they have ſyſtematically given up the beſt and eaſieſt means of purſuing the great objects of their whole lives.

The facts which have repeatedly been laid before the world, prove to a demonſtration the

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truth of theſe remarks. It is eſtabliſhed beyond all doubt, that the moſt unprofitable plantations are not always thoſe of which the ſoil is unfruitful or incommodiouſly ſituated, but uniformly thoſe which are cultivated by negroes ſubjected to a cruel and ſtingy ſyſtem of management; that the moſt laborious duty is performed by the beſt fed and moſt indulged ſlaves; that the more nearly the negro is permitted to approach the condition of freedom in his enjoyments, his privileges and his habits, the more alacrity does he ſhew in performing the taſk aſſigned to him. Yet, in ſpite of this uniform experience, ſo few experiments have been tried of the mild and profitable ſyſtem of management, that thoſe plantations into which it has been introduced are pointed out as remarkable. The exception to the general rule is not found in that eſtate, of which the proprietor prefers the commiſſion of cruelty and injuſtice, to the purſuit of his evident advantage; but in that eſtate, of which the owner purſues the eaſieſt and moſt profitable ſyſtem of management, notwithſtanding its moral rectitude. There appear, then, to be certain bad principles inherent in the human heart, certain blind paſſions and movements of caprice, which conſtantly impel men, in certain circumſtances, to a line

line of conduct as obviously inconsistent with their interests as repugnant to their duty.

The ill treatment of the negroes is as unfavourable to the manners of the colonial society, as it is prejudicial to the wealth of the settlements. The negroes are deprived of all opportunities of individual improvement; all chance of gaining a part of that civilization, in the midst of which they are placed; all possibility of acquiring industrious habits, so incompatible with the constant exertion of cruelty and unjust oppression. Where they are allowed certain indulgences, and gradually made to feel their own importance and reap the rewards of voluntary labour, by receiving certain privileges connected with property, and being permitted to work for the increase of their own *peculium*, we may expect the foundation to be laid of those industrious principles which are the great cause of human improvement, and form the bond of civilized society. The more cruelly and unjustly any dependent order of men are treated by their superiors, the more debased will all their sentiments become. Where fear is the only motive of action, or the great and predominant feeling in the mind, it soon absorbs every other principle, and moulds all the habits of thought to its own degrading form. Where caprice is min-

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gled with tyranny, the principle of implicit obedience becomes ſtill more corrupting. No general rules of conduct can be followed. The body of the wretched ſlave becomes a mere machine, actuated in all its movements by a power placed at a diſtance from it. The bad paſſions of the maſter too, pollute, by the mere force of example, the ſlave who is ſubject to them and can eſtimate their full extent. It is partly from this cauſe that the ſervant or the beaſt of a ſlave, is of all animated beings the moſt wretched.

The oppreſſive treatment of the negroes is equally prejudicial to the manners of the whites themſelves. We have formerly had occaſion to trace this effect of the negro ſyſtem in its ſtate of abuſe; and to remark the injuries ariſing from thence to the extent and value, as well as to the character of the white population. *

But the moſt fatal of all the conſequences which reſult from the corruptions of the ſlave ſyſtem, are thoſe that immediately affect the ſecurity of the colonies. We have often had an opportunity of contemplating the effects of cruel treatment upon the fidelity of the negroes in the different ſettlements. In ſtrict conformity to thoſe general principles which the beſt writers upon the human character have ſo

* Book I. Sect. I.

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ſo ſucceſsfully explained, and in broad defiance of all the abſurd aſſertions, ſo confidently made by the apologiſts of the Weſt Indian policy, it has been proved, by the united teſtimony of all the authors whoſe opportunities of information are moſt extenſive, that the pronenefs of the negroes to revolt, is in preciſe proportion to the cruelty and parſimony of their maſters. The hiſtory of the Dutch colonies, contraſted with that of the Spaniſh and Portugueze ſettlements,* and (I fear we may add) the hiſtory of the Spaniſh and Portugueze ſettlements, contraſted with that of all the others, furniſhes abundant proofs of this ſtatement, in itſelf ſo extremely probable, that it requires ſcarcely any ſupport from experience to gain belief. In all rebellions, the plantations where the ſlaves were treated with moſt indulgence, have ſuffered the leaſt from the fury of inſurrection; and, on the contrary, thoſe eſtates have generally been the hotbeds of the rebellion, or the firſt objects of its attack, where the overſeer was cruel, and the maſter avaricious or needy; where, of conſequence, the ſlaves were hard-worked, ſcantily provided with neceſſaries, and ſeverely or unjuſtly puniſhed.

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* Book I. Sect. II. parts I. II. & III.

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The inefficacy of mild treatment, in ſpite of all theſe facts, has been aſſerted with a degree of confidence, more perhaps the reſult of mercantile prudence, than of entire conviction on the part of thoſe whoſe intereſts have led them to ſupport the ſlave ſyſtem. As a ſpecimen of the manner in which this important branch of the ſubject has been diſcuſſed, by perſons of the deſcription juſt now mentioned, I ſhall ſtate the argument of Mr Edwards, adduced in his Hiſtory of St Domingo; a work certainly containing much valuable information, but conceived in a temper of mind very different from that in which the moſt dignified ſpecies of compoſition ought to be undertaken; and apparently written more with the intention of making an appeal to popular feelings againſt the cauſe of the abolition, than with the deſign of impartially recording the moſt intereſting ſeries of events that has been diſplayed in the annals of the negro race. I ſhall quote the argument in Mr Edwards's own words. It is introduced under the form of an anecdote, after a variety of inſinuations urged in the ſame impoſing diſguiſe. 'The largeſt ſugar plantation on the plain, 'ſays our author, in his deſcription of the 'firſt inſurrection at the Cape, *) was that of 'Monſ. Gallifet, ſituated about eight miles 'from

* Chapter VI.

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'from the town, the negroes belonging to 'which had always been treated with ſuch 'kindneſs and liberality, and poſſeſſed ſo many 'advantages, that it became a proverbial ex-'preſſion among the lower white people, in 'ſpeaking of any man's good fortune, to ſay, "*il eſt heureux comme un negre de Gallifet*," (he 'is as happy as one of Gallifet's negroes). M. 'Odeluc, the attorney or agent for this plan-'tation, was a member of the General Aſ-'ſembly; and being fully perſuaded that the 'negroes belonging to it would remain firm 'in their obedience, determined to repair 'thither, to encourage them in oppoſing the 'inſurgents; to which end he deſired the aſ-'ſiſtance of a few ſoldiers from the town-'guard, which was granted him. He pro-'ceeded accordingly; but on approaching the 'eſtate, to his grief and ſurpriſe, he found all 'the negroes in arms on the ſide of the re-'bels; and (horrid to tell!) *their ſtandard 'was the body of a white infant, which they 'had recently impaled on a ſtake.* M. Odeluc 'had advanced too far to retreat undiſcover-'ed; and both he and a friend that accom-'panied him, with moſt of the ſoldiers, were 'killed without mercy. Two or three only of 'the patrole eſcaped by flight, and conveyed

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'the dreadful tidings to the inhabitants of the 'town.'

The following extract from Mr Clarkſon's '*Eſſay on the Impolicy of the Slave Trade*,'* will probably furniſh, in the firſt place, a ſatisfactory explanation of the ſtatement thus confidently given by Mr Edwards; and in the next place, a commentary upon the general fidelity of the latter gentleman's narrative. 'In the 'iſland of St Domingo is an eſtate which has 'experienced a ſimilar change. The owner 'conſidered himſelf as the father of his ſlaves; 'he never haraſſed them with exceſſive labour; 'he fed and treated them ſo well, and ſo 'mild and gentle was his government, that it 'became a proverb, "As happy as a ſlave of "Gallifet." Thus treated, their increaſe was 'rapid. About fifteen years ago he died. The 'preſent proprietor has ſince adopted a differ-'ent ſyſtem. His ſlaves continually decreaſe, 'and he loſes by the change of management.'

It may be obſerved, that this narrative of Mr Clarkſon, publiſhed in 1788, long before the rebellion, is introduced among twenty-five other facts collected, as we are told in the preface, from authentic information obtained by direct communication with St Domingo.† The object

* Part II. chap. I. ſect. I. † Page 1.

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ject of thoſe ſtatements is entirely different from the purpoſe for which I have uſed the authority, as will appear to any one who reads the above quotation. It is in every reſpect highly probable, that the ſtatement of the total change of management is correct. Now, Mr Edwards did not publiſh the firſt edition of his work on St Domingo till eight years after this narrative had been given to the world by Mr Clarkſon. I am very much miſtaken if he does not mention Mr Clarkſon's writings in the courſe of his work; at any rate, it is abſurd to ſuppoſe that he could be ignorant of them; and as the paſſage which I have extracted is among the arguments urged by the reverend author upon the moſt important branch of the whole ſubject—the poſſibility of keeping up the ſlave ſtocks without importation—it is to be feared that Mr Edwards could ſcarcely have omitted to peruſe it. But whether he did ſo or not, the charge which I am under the neceſſity of grounding upon the collated paſſages, is equally fatal to the credit of Mr Edwards's general ſtatements. Of the narrative given by Mr Clarkſon, the truth is beyond a doubt; and it is difficult to ſay whether the raſhneſs of Mr Edwards's aſſertions, admitting him to have been ignorant of the real fact, or his want of fidelity, ſuppoſing him to have read the other account, throws the greateſt ſtain upon

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upon his character as an hiſtorian. After the eaſy explanation which the real ſtatement of the tranſaction affords, it would be credulity indeed to truſt the other anecdotes of a ſimilar ſtamp, which Mr Edwards has paraded in his rapidly compoſed and ill-digeſted performance. What concluſion, for inſtance, can we draw, with any degree of ſafety, from the ſtory of the poſtillion, who, in the rebellion, was the firſt to attack and butcher a maſter that had treated him with marked kindneſs? * Poſſibly here, as in the former inſtance, a true narrative of this affair, reconciling the whole to the common order of occurrences, may have been publiſhed eight years before Mr Edwards wrote his book. Still leſs dare we follow our author in drawing ſuch general concluſions againſt the efficacy of gentle treatment, as are contained in the beginning of the anecdote in page 100. (edit. 1801.) He does not ſcruple to inſinuate, that this ſolitary inſtance of fidelity and attachment forms an exception to the whole conduct of the negroes during revolts. †

Such is the raſh or uncandid mode of argument adopted by thoſe who would prove, what nothing but the ſtrongeſt evidence can ever eſtabliſh—that the negroes are in their nature diametrically

* Chap. VI. † Note V v.

metrically oppoſite to all the reſt of mankind; that kindneſs and compaſſion for their misfortunes meets with no return of fidelity from their ſtubborn hearts; that thoſe acts of gratuitous beneficence which attach all other races of men to their ſuperiors, only ſerve to alienate the ſavage African, in whom favours and indulgences produce nothing but the blackeſt ingratitude and perfidy. No one can entertain the ſlighteſt doubt upon this ſubject, after caſting his eye over the ſtatements which I have given in the Third Section of the Firſt Book, borrowed chiefly from writers whoſe antipathy to the negroes is extreme, and whoſe works abound in the moſt abſurd allegations againſt the character of that race. It is ſufficient to mention the teſtimony of M. Malouet, who, with all his attachment to the ſlave ſyſtem, and all his violent prejudices againſt the negroes,* has laid down, in the moſt unqualified terms, the very propoſition which I have been maintaining, and ſupported his general opinion by a variety of facts that came within his perſonal knowledge.† '*Quelle* '*jouiſſance,*' (ſays he, after deſcribing the good treatment experienced by the ſlaves on ſome eſtates in Surinam) '*pour un maitre ſenſé et* '*humain*

* Mem. ſur les Col. tom. V. *paſſim.*

† Ibid. V. 152. III. 116.

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'*humain de ſe procurer ainſi la recompenſe de ſa* '*juſtice : car les habitans dont je parle ont dans* '*leurs atteliers une population nombreuſe, ſont* '*cheris de leurs eſclaves, et n'eprouvent jamais* '*les deſordres du marronage : leurs propres ne-* '*gres exterminent les Marrons quand ils vien-* '*nent chez eux.*' This fact, it muſt be remembered, is ſtated with regard to the colony which of all others has ſuffered moſt conſtantly from negro rebellion and deſertion, and which has been, more than any other, the ſcene of domeſtic cruelty and oppreſſion.

We may conclude, then, that the maltreatment of the negroes directly and uniformly promotes the ſpirit of inſurrection, and that gentle treatment of that unhappy race is as eſſentially neceſſary to the ſecurity as to the opulence of the ſlave colonies.

II. Next to the bad treatment of the negroes, the greateſt defect in the Weſt Indian ſyſtem, is the large proportion which the imported Africans bear to the whole black population.

It requires no argument to prove that the newly imported ſlaves muſt be infinitely more dangerous to the peace of the community than thoſe who have been born in the iſlands. Whether the Africans, partly ſtolen, partly purchaſed

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chaſed (if there can be ſuch a thing as buying human beings with a price), were originally free or enſlaved in their own country, it is manifeſt that the forcible tranſportation of thoſe men is a miſery not eaſily deſcribed, and their exile an affliction which muſt embitter the reſt of their lives; and ſurely the difference of climate, and the exchange of a life of indolence for one of moſt ſevere labour, is a ſufficient grievance in itſelf to inſpire them with the utmoſt averſion for their new ſituation, even if their baniſhment had been voluntary. Although we ſhould admit every abſurd aſſertion which has been made with reſpect to the entire felicity of the ſlaves in the Weſt Indies, we muſt be convinced that this picture of happineſs can only apply to the lot of Creoles; for the bliſs of a ſtate of Paradiſe or Elyſium forced upon a ſentient being againſt his will, amounts exactly to a contradiction in terms.

Accordingly, what we might expect has uniformly happened; the imported negroes have been the firſt to promote rebellion, and at all times the moſt refractory and diſcontented ſlaves. To keep them in order, as well as to teach them work, all the reſources of the cruelty that forms the main ſpring of the ſlave ſyſtem, have been exhauſted. And even this ſeverity of itſelf is inſufficient; for it has been found neceſſary to incorporate the newly arrived Africans with

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the old ſtock by degrees; never filling a plantation with too great a number of the former, and diſperſing them carefully among the latter, for ſecurity and diſcipline. Notwithſtanding all theſe precautions, the ſpirit of adventure has always proved ſufficiently ſtrong to increaſe very rapidly the numbers of the new hands. In proportion as the facilities of the African trade have been great, and the capital turned to the colonial agriculture extenſive, the iſlands have been filled with hordes of native Africans, until, in ſome caſes, the numbers of bad ſubjects were ſo much and ſo quickly augmented, while the neceſſary proportion of the Creoles was of courſe decreaſing, that extenſive and fatal rebellion has been the lamentable conſequence. As the large ſtocks, ſmall profits, and pecuniary incumbrances of the Dutch planters, have rendered their ſlaves remarkable for bad treatment, and continual though partial inſurrection or deſertion, the unexampled rapidity with which the French colonies were peopled during the ten years previous to the Revolution, produced, in all the fineſt parts of thoſe ſettlements, ſo fatal a diſproportion between the two kinds of negroes, as has ſhaken the whole Weſt Indian ſyſtem from its foundation, and rendered its exiſtence a matter which many enlightened men rather wiſh for than expect. The hiſtory of the French colonies furniſhes as fatal a leſſon of

of the evils arifing from the difproportion of Creoles to imported flaves, as the hiftory of the Dutch fettlements exhibits a picture of the evils arifing from the habitual feverity and oppreffion of the maflers.

The effects of the rapid importation are certainly more extenfively fatal to the fecurity of the community which is thus peopled, than the confequences of cruel treatment. But I have mentioned the latter as the greater imperfection of the two, from its prejudicial tendency to the wealth as well as to the fafety of the colonies. The difproportion of Creoles cannot be faid to injure the opulence of the planters. The work performed by new flaves, is no doubt much lefs conflderable than that which is performed by Creoles or feafoned flaves: their numbers, too, are more rapidly thinned, both from the neceffary ill ufage they receive, from the change of climate, and from the influence of mental diftrefs, as well as unufual bodily fatigue. But thofe loffes are only comparative; they only prevent the total amount or produce of fervile labour from being fo great as it would be were the negro population equally extenfive, and all compofed of natives. The rapid importation of flaves, with all its dangers to the fecurity of the colonies, is, on the whole, beneficial to their wealth, by enabling all the

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capital of the planters to find an immediate and profitable employment, although, certainly, the profit would be greater were it poſſible to employ the ſame capital in purchaſing a ſtock of Creoles. It may, however, be obſerved, that, in the long-run, the ſecurity of the iſlands muſt furniſh the ſureſt meaſure of their opulence, and that, in a conſiderable number of years, the cauſes which moſt endanger the internal peace of the community, may be reckoned the moſt detrimental even to the wealth of the proprietors. In the mean time, the ſecurity of the ſyſtem is of ſo much more conſequence to both the mother country and the body of the colonies, in compariſon with the increaſe of wealth (however diſproportionate thoſe conſiderations may be in the eſtimation of individuals), that the commercial benefits ariſing from the rapid importation of new ſlaves, can in no ſenſe of the word compenſate for the grand evils which flow directly from the ſame ſource. And we may confidently ſtate this as one of the chief defects in the ſtructure of Weſt Indian ſociety.

Such, then, are the two great flaws in the preſent ſtructure of the American colonies. And to any one who ſhall conſider the matter with tolerable impartiality, it muſt appear manifeſt, that both of theſe evils have their origin in

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in the power which the Weſt Indian planters enjoy, of increaſing to any amount, and in any given time, their ſtock of hands.

The cruel treatment of the negroes ariſes evidently from the eaſe with which the ſtock can be kept up by purchaſe. If a man cannot buy cattle, either from want of money, or from the dearth or want of the article, he will breed. Although this plan muſt immediately diminiſh his profits, he will alſo be careful of the lives and health of thoſe beaſts which he already poſſeſſes. This change will be effected in the ordinary œconomy of live ſtock, by the failure of caſh, or the ſhutting up of the market. But a much greater change will be produced by the ſame circumſtances, upon that ſort of management, if management it can be called, which conſiſts in working out certain kinds of cattle, by ſcanty feeding and hard labour; upon the plan, for example, which certain poſtmaſters adopt, of purchaſing old horſes, and replacing the price with a tolerable profit, by feeding the wretched animals as cheaply as poſſible, and forcing them to run as long and as often as their limbs can ſupport them. The want of a market muſt either inſtantly put a ſtop to this iniquitous trade, or reduce its extent to a very narrow compaſs. And ſuch is preciſely the trade of the negro

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proprietors in the European colonies! We are informed, that ſo long as a ſlave market exiſts, men find their profit in working out a certain number of their ſlaves, and ſupplying the blank by purchaſe, rather than by breeding. If this deteſtable crime (I will not inſult Liverpool, Briſtol, and London by calling it a trade) is really attended with gain, as it certainly is but too congenial to the paſſions and habits of ſlave-drivers, we can never expect to ſee its termination, while the poſſibility of perpetrating it ſubſiſts. But it ſignifies little to our general argument, whether this iniquity is really gainful or not; nay, whether it exiſts or not. The general cruel treatment of the negroes cannot be denied. Even they who have moſt zealouſly defended the ſlave ſyſtem, have admitted, that the oppreſſions of the negroes call for redreſs, however much theſe men may have differed from their antagoniſts upon the nature of the remedy.

This cruelty of uſage, then, is an undeniable evil in the ſtructure of the colonial ſociety, and produces all thoſe conſequences which we have lately been contemplating. Nor can it ever be expected to diſappear, while the paſſions of men remain as blind as they hitherto have been; while their preſent intereſts, or the gratification of their caprices, prevents them from purſuing their

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real advantage; and while they retain the means of gratifying their paſſions or whims by throwing away a little money. SECT. II.

The evils of the oppreſſions, too common all over the colonies, are no doubt felt by thoſe very men who are guilty of them. The evils of the ſudden importations, ſo dangerous to the ſafety of the ſyſtem, are alſo ſuch as muſt in the long-run fall upon the importers. But although both thoſe lines of conduct affect the ſecurity of the colonies, and although the former affects alſo the wealth of the individual planters, it is evident that, according to a principle too extenſive in its operations upon the conduct of men, the apparent and immediate is preferred to the real and ſubſtantial good; and often the indulgence of ſuch bad paſſions as do not in the moment of excitement ſeem to be expenſive, is purſued at the riſk of deſtruction, and with the certainty of future loſs. It is unneceſſary to offer proofs that ſuch is the natural frailty of man; a frailty from which few of his plans are exempt, and which all moraliſts and divines have united in deploring. It is in vain to believe that the intereſt alone of Weſt Indian planters will ever lead them to that line of conduct which is really the moſt advantageous. It is abſurd to expect that men will ever be ſo much reformed as to ſeek

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the path to enjoyment or wealth which is moſt circuitous, becauſe it is moſt eaſy and beneficial in the long-run. But it is truly ridiculous to affect a belief, that this improvement will begin upon the ſpot where the evil has firſt originated, and has been confirmed by habit, and to twiſt our necks into groteſque and fantaſtic poſtures, by way of looking towards the Weſt Indian plantations for this viſionary reformation of the human character. 'Where it is 'mens intereſt to act in a certain manner, we 'may be aſſured they will follow that intereſt.' True—but it muſt be a near, a diſtinct proſpect of intereſt in which we ſhould confide. If the view is either dimmed by diſtance, or obſcured by paſſion, let us not reject the policy which enjoins that nothing ſhould be left to the acute viſion and prudent choice of the perverſe and ſhort-ſighted animal we have to deal with. In the caſe of the Weſt Indian ſlave-market, to recommend that things ſhould be left to their natural courſe; to maintain, that reſtrictive laws are unneceſſary for inducing men to purſue their own real good; and that interfering with their private plans may be detrimental to the public good, is a groſs and intolerable perverſion of the moſt liberal and enlightened principle in modern policy. It is as contemptible a ſophiſm as the argument of any

any enthuſiaſt who ſhould inſiſt upon the annihilation of all criminal juriſprudence, and recommend the method of reforming the world, by leaving every man to diſcover that his trueſt happineſs lies in the paths of virtue. Such arguments are ſurely as ridiculous, when applied to ſupport the freedom of negro importation in the Weſt Indies, as if they were uſed to bring the decalogue or the gallows into diſrepute.

The only effectual method of preventing the cruel treatment of ſlaves, and deſtroying the dangerous mixture of imported Africans, conſiſts in cutting off that ſource which truly feeds the paſſions, and caprices, and ſhort-ſighted wiſhes of the planters. A conſtant check muſt be found out, which ſhall at every inſtant arreſt the arm of the tormentor, by ſetting before his face, in diſtinct and near proſpect, the immediate and irreparable deſtruction of his ſtock, as the neceſſary conſequence of cruel treatment. An arrangement muſt be contrived, which ſhall habitually lead the ſlave-driver to reflect, that not the eventual, but the certain and inſtantaneous deſolation of his eſtate, muſt be the conſequence of oppreſſive and cruel deportment towards the ſole ſupporters of his wealth. The planter's habits of thinking may thus be, by ſome ſure means, moulded

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moulded into a ſteady form, and his conduct adapted to the intereſts, now rendered immediate, of his eſtate and live ſtock. Nothing muſt be entruſted to that fear of inſurrection, ſo natural to all the coloniſts, but ſo much divided and frittered down by being ſhared with the whole community, as to exert no perceptible influence on the actions of the individual, when oppoſed by paſſion, or caprice, or tempting views of perſonal advantage. The diſproportionate admixture of imported Africans muſt be prevented, by the only means which can prevent or in the leaſt degree check it, the poſitive and definite meaſure of cutting off the ſupplies of ſlaves, and thus forcibly reſtraining the avarice as well as the cruelty of ſlave-holders. The only plan, then, which can prevent the effects of the ſlave ſyſtem,—the only method which can be deviſed for ſtopping the cruelties that irritate the negroes to rebellion, ſtunt the growth of colonial opulence, and taint the body of colonial ſociety,—the only reſource which can be appealed to, for ſecuring the advances already made in cultivating the Weſt Indies, and for preventing the increaſe of the moſt fatal malady that ever threatened any political ſyſtem with ſudden diſſolution,—the meaſure formerly pointed out by every conſideration of ſound policy, and now enforced by the moſt obvious demands

demands of a menacing and awful neceſſity, is the Total Abolition of the Slave Trade. Every conſideration of ſound policy, every view of expediency, every call of urgent neceſſity, now concur in this recommendation.

The queſtion of abolition, though one of the moſt momentous that ever occupied the attention of men, is extremely ſhort and ſimple. The whole argument is confined to a very narrow compaſs. If we look to the nature of the traffic, its *unneceſſary* enormities are ſufficient to make us forget the firſt great and eſſential objection which may be urged, that it is not a trade, but a crime. We find that it is a crime of the worſt nature, radically planted in the depths of injuſtice, branching out into various new forms of guilt, prone to entwine with manifold acceſſory pollutions not inherent in the ſeed, terminating in every ſpecies of noxious produce which can blaſt the ſurrounding regions, and taint the winds of heaven. The men, then, who would perſuade us to cheriſh ſo monſtrous a production, becauſe they have given it a name borne by the moſt ſalutary and nutritious branches of the ſocial ſyſtem, are ſurely guilty of a mockery to our common ſenſe, ſtill more intolerable than any inſult to our feelings. We can never ſtop to argue with them, or to hear the prepoſterous applications which they make of principles peculiar

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culiar to things of a nature eſſentially different from this. We cannot allow ſo great an outrage upon the common forms of ſpeech, as the defence of a glaring iniquity, by an appeal to views that belong to the great ſource of wealth and virtue—the commercial intercourſe of mankind.

The arguments which have been engrafted on this moſt falſe view of the great queſtion, are if poſſible ſtill more abſurd. Many of them conſiſt in groſs miſtatements of facts, either completely proved by the evidence adduced on the ſide of the abolition, or ſo thoroughly well known, that no evidence of their exiſtence was deemed neceſſary by the enemies of the ſlave ſyſtem. Some of thoſe topics are drawn from the narroweſt views of mercantile policy, and the moſt inſulting appeals to the bad paſſions of mankind. Others are deduced from abſurd ideas of natural law or revealed religion, and ſupported by allegations which were inſtantaneouſly proved to be falſe. To enter into any analyſis of theſe arguments, or of the ſhort and ſatisfactory anſwers which they have received, would be very unneceſſary, after the ſhort and ſimple proceſs of reaſoning by which we have been led to conclude in favour of the abolition. Such a diſcuſſion of the queſtion is now no longer requiſite. All views of the expediency

pediency of the meaſure have yielded to the ſtrong and unanſwerable conviction of its neceſſity, with which the events of the laſt ten years have inſpired every impartial ſtateſman. It is upon this high ground that I wiſh to reſt the final diſcuſſion of the queſtion; without, however, preſuming to inſinuate that any reaſons whatever can be paramount to thoſe plain notions of juſtice (humanity is not an appropriate term), which muſt in all the councils of a great and honourable nation, be of themſelves the ruling principle of deciſion. The argument of neceſſity is only introduced to ſupply the place of the arguments formerly drawn from expediency. That which I muſt be bold to call the fundamental point, the ſolid and reſiſtleſs argument, is the appeal to the common principles of juſtice.

Although, however, I do not mean to enter into the diſcuſſions which formerly occupied mens minds upon this queſtion, before the teſt of experience had furniſhed us with unanſwerable arguments; yet may it not be ungrateful to record a very few of the aſſertions made by the ſupporters of the ſlave ſyſtem, as a ſpecimen, for the information of thoſe who are not accuſtomed to wade through the maſs of ephemeral matter, in which the diſcuſſion is to be found.

1. For

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1. For the moſt outrageous violation of moderation in this argument, the moſt ludicrous and hyperbolical extravagance in defence of the ſlave ſyſtem, we muſt look to the writings of the French coloniſts. They have actually maintained, that the negro trade is the only means of civilizing the interior of the great African continent; that the natural conſtitution of the negroes is utterly repugnant to the climate in which they are born; that they muſt be tranſplanted to the milder regions of the new world, and civilized by main force. The illuſtration or analogy by which this truly ſingular argument is elaborately ſupported, preſents us with an abſurdity if poſſible more flagrant. It is maintained, that if the Mexicans (who it ſeems were alſo born in a climate incompatible with their conſtitutions) had enjoyed the advantages of tranſplantation like the happy negroes, we ſhould not have witneſſed the total extinction of their numerous race: and this is called the evidence of experience in favour of the ſlave trade. I am confident that every reader will be aſtoniſhed, when he obſerves the name of Barré St Venant cited as the author of ſuch arguments. The above ſtatement is almoſt a literal tranſlation from his words; and although M. Malouet diſapproves of the extent to which the argument is puſhed, his approbation of the general principles of M. Barré is unqualified, and

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and he explicitly ſupports the other congenial theme of his countryman, the only part of this argument which has found its way into Great Britain, that the negroes in the Weſt Indies are much happier than the European peaſantry. * But will the reader believe that a ſtill more flagrant inſult has been offered to the common ſenſe of mankind in purſuing the ſame topics? Will it be conceived, without actually referring to M. Barré's words, † that he imputes the origin of the ſlave trade among the Spaniards, entirely to their liberal views of benefiting mankind, their rational plans of promoting the happineſs and civilization of Africa!

'*On auroit de la peine*' (ſays he) '*à croire* '*aujourd'hui, que ce fut par un motif d'huma-* '*nité que les Eſpagnols allerent, les premiers* '*en* 1503, *chercher des negres à la côte d'A-* '*frique, pour ſupplier les foibles Mexicains dans* '*le travail des colonies. Voyant que les peuples* '*conquis etoient trop foibles pour ſupporter le* '*travail dans leur pays natal—Voyant enſuite* '*que les negres, placés ſous un ciel brulant, reſide-* '*roient mieux ſous un climat temperé—Voyant* '*enfin que, de tems immemorial, l'eſclavage exiſtoit* '*en Afrique avec des caracteres plus hideux que* '*dans*

* Barré St Venant, Col. Mod. chap. V. VI. & VII. —Malouet, Mem. ſur les Colonies, tom. IV. p. 77. & 84. See alſo 'Memoire ſur l'eſclavage des Negres,' in tom. V.

† P. 40.

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'*dans aucune autre contrée, ils crurent leur rendre* '*un bon ſervice de les retirer de leurs repaires,* '*pour en faire des laboureurs.*'

After this, we are not ſurpriſed to find our author expreſs a ſort of regret that France was ſo long of following this glorious example, and then exultingly enumerate the bleſſings of the ſlave trade.

'*Ce n'eſt que cent vingt ans après que les* '*François les imiterent.*

'*Cette tentative a fertilisé une partie du nou-* '*veau monde; elle a donné de nouvelles jouiſſances* '*à l'ancien; bien conduite elle auroit aggrandi la* '*proſperité des deux hemiſpheres.*' *

He may doubtleſs derive ſome conſolation to his patriotic feelings of regret, from the conſideration that his countrymen, though late, have been ſuch ſtrenuous and ſucceſsful imitators of the Spaniſh philanthropy. †

2. The ſame men who have aſſerted that the negroes are happier in the Weſt Indies than in their own country, and enjoy more of the comforts of life than the peaſantry of Europe, might well be expected to deny all the allegations of bad treatment which have been ſo often brought againſt the planters, as well as the ſlave-traders.

* P. 40. † Note W w.

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traders. In Britain, where this queſtion underwent the moſt ſolemn and ample diſcuſſion, the friends of the ſlave ſyſtem had every opportunity of bringing forward all their proofs. The firſt debates which took place were introduced by the ſlave-carrying bill; and the moſt remarkable circumſtance attending this diſcuſſion, was the groſs prevarication of the witneſſes brought forward by the opponents of the meaſure. The ſlave trade abolition bill was oppoſed with equal zeal; and the difficulties under which its advocates laboured in adducing their proof, muſt be evident to every one who reflects that, from the very nature of the caſe, almoſt all the witneſſes had neceſſarily an intereſt in concealing, or modifying, or perverting the truth, in ſo far as it was unfavourable to the planters and ſlave-traders, while almoſt every one of the witneſſes brought forward in exculpation, were immediately concerned in the charges, being in fact the very parties accuſed. Notwithſtanding this, any perſon who ſtudies with tolerable attention that invaluable maſs of information which the Committee of 1789 have collected in their Report, muſt be convinced, as the Houſe of Commons were, that the whole caſe of the petitioners was clearly made out. As a ſpecimen of the manner in which their opponents attempted to vindicate the planters from all charge of cruelty,

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I ſhall tranſcribe a paſſage from Sir William Young's Tour to the Windward Iſlands. This tour appears to have been undertaken during the greateſt heats of the negro queſtions; and the account of it publiſhed by the traveller (who was one of the chief oppoſers of the abolition) ſeems to be given to the world, with the preciſe view of biaſſing the public mind, in favour of the gentle treatment of the Weſt Indian ſlaves. It is publiſhed in the ſame volume with Mr Edwards's Hiſtory of St Domingo, and to all appearance for the ſame purpoſe.

The very firſt day that the touriſt lands in the Weſt Indies, he delivers the reſult of his obſervations upon the ſtate of the ſlaves; denies that they appear to be abject and humble; aſcribes to them the greateſt pride and ſelf-importance; compares their manners and wit to thoſe of the Roman ſlaves, nay to thoſe of the ſlaves pourtrayed by the Roman dramatiſts, who were of courſe much more refined in their characters and converſation than the originals in real life *. Such accounts, to ſay the leaſt of them, ſurely prove a great deal too much; and the ſame remark might have been applied to the following paſſage, had we not poſſeſſed a more poſitive contradiction of the

* Young's Tour, *apud* Edwards's Weſt Indies, vol. III. p. 262.

the concluſion drawn from the facts contained in it.

'I particularly noticed every negro whom I 'met or overtook on the road. Of theſe I count-'ed eleven who were dreſſed as field negroes, with 'only trowſers on; and adverting to the evi-'dence on the ſlave trade, I particularly remark-'ed that not one of the eleven had a ſingle mark 'or ſcar of the whip. We met or overtook a 'great many other negroes, but they were dreſſ-'ed. Paſſing through Mr Greathead's large 'eſtate, I obſerved in the gang one well-look-'ing negro woman, who had two or three 'wheals on her ſhoulders, which ſeemed the 'effect of an old puniſhment.' * But even this ſolitary exception to the general good uſage of the ſlaves our touriſt explains away; for he afterwards ſays, †

'Never paſſing a ſlave without obſerving his 'back, either in the field, or on the road, or 'wenches waſhing in the rivers, I have ſeen not 'one back marked beſides that of the woman 'obſerved before on Mr Greathead's eſtate (in 'whom I may be miſtaken as to the cauſe), 'and one new negro unſold at Kingſton, who

* Young's Tour, *apud* Edwards's Weſt Indies, vol. III. p. 267.

† Ibid p. 280.

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'found means to explain to me that he was '*fumfumm'd* (flogged) by the ſurgeon of the 'ſhip, and he ſeemed to have had two or three 'ſtrokes with a cat.'

Now, unfortunately for all this induction of facts, we meet with the following note by Mr Edwards, upon the paſſage firſt quoted.*

'In the Weſt Indies, the puniſhment of 'whipping is commonly inflicted, not on the 'backs of negroes (as practiſed in the diſcipline 'of the Britiſh ſoldiers), but more humanely, 'and with much leſs danger, on *partes poſte-'riores*. It is therefore no proof that the ne-'groes whom Sir William Young inſpected had 'eſcaped flagellation becauſe their ſhoulders bore 'no impreſſion of the whip. This acknowledge-'ment I owe to truth and candour.'

The praiſe of candour we cannot award to this note, becauſe Mr Edwards was the firſt publiſher of this tract, and becauſe every man who knew any thing about a Weſt Indian plantation, would of himſelf have inſtantly perceived the unfairneſs of the inference from the facts—an inference which, on Sir William's part, may only have been ignorance, but on the part of Mr Edwards muſt have been falſehood. It is ſcarcely neceſſary to add,

* Young's Tour, *apud* Edwards's Weſt Indies, vol. III. p. 267.

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add, that the favourable account of the negro puniſhment in this note, is as falſe as the alluſion to Britiſh military diſcipline is inſidious. But the ſubſtance of the note is valuable, becauſe it furniſhes an authentic refutation of the Eſſay upon negro happineſs, which runs through Sir William's whole narrative. What truſt ſhall we repoſe in the portraits of this artiſt, when he paints to us the wit, honour, pride, contentment, gambols, mirth and comforts of the ſlaves, after we have found him ſo ſuperficially acquainted with the œconomy of Weſt Indian property? Nay, what confidence can we place in the negative evidence of the other great Weſt Indians, when we find one of the moſt wealthy, intelligent, and reſpectable members of this body, ſo ill informed, or ſo duped by his ſubordinate agents? It may farther be remarked as a ſingular circumſtance, that Sir William Young ſhould not have added ſome retractation of his general aſſertions in the laſt edition (1801) from which I quote. He is himſelf the editor after the death of Mr Edwards; and he publiſhes the text with his friend's notes, exactly as he had written it at a time when, it is to be hoped, he was utterly ignorant of the miſtatement he was giving to the world.

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3. It is ſcarcely credible, that men ſhould have been found abſurd enough to defend the ſyſtem of negro ſlavery upon abſtract principles. I have, however, given one ſpecimen of this mode of argument from the writings of the French planters. The Britiſh planters and their agents have fallen conſiderably ſhort of their foreign brethren in this line of abſurdity: but ſomething of the very ſame nature may be met with in the tenor of their reaſonings. They have maintained, that in all ages ſlavery has exiſted; that a worſe kind than that of the negroes was known to the moſt celebrated nations of antiquity; and that Chriſtianity itſelf approves of the inſtitution. If Parliamentary Reports may be truſted, thoſe arguments were brought forward in a very elaborate ſpeech, delivered by the agent for Jamaica in the Houſe of Commons, when the abolition was firſt debated. To all ſuch appeals it may be anſwered, that they are partly nugatory, partly falſe, and partly impious. The defence of negro ſlavery, by a reference to its antiquity, is nugatory; for what antiquity can juſtify a crime? The aſſertion, that the lot of the enſlaved negroes is leſs hard than that of the Roman and Greek ſlaves, is completely falſe. The appeal to the Goſpel in its behalf, is, I devoutly believe, moſt unauthoriſed by any *dictum* in that bleſſed diſpenſation. But

if

if ſuch a *dictum* ſhould be found in the Sacred Writings, its total repugnance to the whole ſpirit of the ſyſtem, is a ſufficient proof of its being interpolated. If, on the other hand, its interpolation be denied, I heſitate not to declare, that there is an end of all rational faith in Chriſtianity; for what can more deciſively diſprove the divine origin of any ſyſtem of belief, than its inculcating or ſanctioning the ſlavery of the Weſt Indies?

4. The ground which the advocates of the ſlave trade occupied, in order to meet the arguments of expediency, was in many reſpects as extravagantly high as that upon which they built their defence of its humanity and juſtice. A traffic, which at the utmoſt never employs more than five thouſand ſeamen, has been called the pillar of the Britiſh navy. A traffic which deſtroys more ſailors in one year, than all the other branches of trade put together deſtroy in two; a traffic which is in fact the grave of our ableſt ſeamen, has been extolled as their beſt nurſery. A commerce, in which a million and a half Sterling was never employed at any time, and which is, beyond any other, ſubject to vaſt riſk and unavoidable ſlowneſs of returns, has been deſcribed as the grand pillar of the Britiſh commerce. The moſt extravagant falſehoods have

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been blazoned forth to ſupport thoſe allegations. But for a full refutation of them, I refer my reader to the Report of the Committee 1788, if indeed any anſwer is neceſſary; for, admitting all that can be ſaid in favour of the traffic, either as a nurſery of ſeamen or a ſource of mercantile opulence, if the immediate conſequence of continuing the trade muſt be the loſs of the colonies, or their total derangement as a valuable poſſeſſion, ſurely every argument of this nature, in favour of the ſlave trade, turns with increaſed force againſt the end for which it was advanced, inaſmuch as the loſs of the African trade will fall with redoubled and fatal effect upon the national proſperity, when, by a ſhort delay, the traffic has grown in importance, and has drawn along with it another branch of commerce infinitely more valuable and extenſive. Although the abolition were not to prevent our total deſtruction in the Weſt Indies, it is evidently advantageous if it only divides the loſs, and prevents the ſhock from being felt all at once. The capital employed in the ſlave trade, will eaſily find other employment in the trade of African commodities, or, if that opening is inſufficient, in the other branches of foreign trade. It is a capital returned more ſlowly than any other, and with greater riſk: it is, therefore, peculiarly adapted to find its way into the diſtant

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diſtant branches of commerce, as, for inſtance, the Eaſt Indian trade, which we may be allowed to hope will ere long be opened. If the ſlave trade were to be aboliſhed only with the downfal of the colonial ſyſtem, (admitting that to be inevitable which would moſt probably be prevented by the immediate abolition), then two capitals would at once be thrown out of employment inſtead of one, and a much greater ſhock given to the national credit. It is unneceſſary to obſerve, that when a nation loſes any branch of commerce or manufacture, in which it has long been engaged, the neceſſity of ſhifting all the capital ſo employed, is only dangerous in proportion to the ſuddenneſs of its occurrence.

But we are told, that if the Britiſh were to aboliſh the ſlave trade, the French and Dutch would take it up. This is indeed a contemptible ſophiſm; and ſuch I will call it in ſpite of the high names which have ſanctioned it. For, in the *firſt* place, if Britain ſubſtantially aboliſhes the trade, ſhe muſt prevent the importation of ſlaves into her colonies from whatever quarter. The ſhare of the Britiſh ſlave trade, then, which can fall to France and Holland, will only be that part which Britain formerly carried on for the ſupply of the French and Dutch ſettlements; a part of no conſiderable magnitude, and liable every

every day to be diminiſhed by the increaſe of commerce, or the alteration of trade-laws in France and Holland. But, in the *next* place, may not the ſame argument be uſed in France and Holland to oppoſe the abolition? It has in fact been employed by the French and Dutch coloniſts exactly in the ſame terms:* So that a trade of iniquity and ſhame is to be ſupported to all eternity, becauſe each of the parties engaged in it may ſay, that the others might continue it! The uſe of the ſame argument at the ſame time by all the parties, is a complete demonſtration of its abſurdity. Surely in the ſeaſon of peace, ſome communication might be opened between the different powers engaged in colonial affairs, and union of views effected upon ſo important a ſubject.

We may alſo remark, that if the African traders of Britain were to give it up, and if part of the capital employed in other countries were to flow towards the blank ſpace left by Britain, as much of the Britiſh capital, transferred from the trade, would find immediate employment in ſupplying the demands of thoſe other countries, as could fill the blank occaſioned there by the new arrangement. But all fears of our ſtanding alone in this great meaſure are groundleſs. We have been the chief traders, I mean, the

* Malouet, Barré St Venant, &c. &c.

the ringleaders in the crime. Let us be the firſt to repent, and ſet an example of reformation. It becomes the dignity of Great Britain to take the lead, and to truſt that her example will be followed. No great reform has ever taken place in one part of the international and intercolonial ſyſtems, without a ſimilar change being ſoon effected in all the other parts; * and the meaſure which is adopted in order to prevent the ruin of the Britiſh colonies, will ſurely be imitated by the other ſtates, whoſe colonies are expoſed to ſtill more imminent dangers from the ſame quarter.

5. The laſt view of the queſtion, to which I ſhall allude is, that of the conſequences apprehended to the Weſt Indies from the abolition. It is ſaid, that the negro population cannot be kept up without importation. A full refutation of this aſſertion may be found in various parts of the preceding pages. But the matter reſts on plain and undeniable facts. The official Reports from the different iſlands, have clearly proved the poſſibility of breeding a ſufficient number to ſupply all the blanks occaſioned by deaths, and even to increaſe the ſtock in the natural way. † And he who would ſee

* Book II. Sect. III. & Book III. Sect. I.

† Report 1789.—Reſolutions laid before the Houſe of Commons 1791.

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a complete view of all this argument, founded upon facts of infinite variety, and unqueſtionable authenticity, may conſult the very diſtinct and comprehenſive ſtatement of Mr Clarkſon, in his '*Eſſay on the Impolicy of the Slave Trade*;' a work replete with ſound ſenſe, diſtinguiſhed by temperate views of a queſtion ſeldom diſcuſſed in ſo calm a ſpirit, and abounding with ample information upon the whole details of this extenſive ſubject. *

Let us, then, conſider to what the arguments of commercial expediency amount, admitting that the continuance of the traffic is not inconſiſtent with the exiſtence of the Weſt Indian ſyſtem. The only claſſes of men who can be affected by the meaſure, are the African traders in the mother country, and the proprietors of plantations which have been purchaſed with the view of extending their cultivation. The European traders may eaſily find employment, in the other branches of domeſtic and foreign commerce, for that capital which the

* It is unfortunate that we have no full account of the ſplendid oration delivered by Mr PITT, upon the great diſcuſſion of the ſlave trade. If we may judge from the ſpecimens publiſhed of that performance, it muſt have been one of the moſt maſterly efforts of his unrivalled genius, diſtinguiſhed at once by the higheſt perfection of eloquence, and by a clearneſs of reaſoning amounting to the preciſion and rigour of geometrical inveſtigation.

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the ordinary traffic with Africa does not abſorb. At any rate, their number and importance deſerves little conſideration; and the idea of indemnification to them for the loſs, would be as abſurd as if all the merchants of a country were to demand public aid, becauſe the public meaſures of juſtifiable hoſtility excluded them from foreign markets; or all the monopoliſts of a certain branch of traffic, were to require a compenſation for the loſs of that commerce which the wiſdom of the Legiſlature ſhould lay open to all.

The other claſs of perſons injured, are only ſubjected to the want of what they might otherwiſe have gained, or at the utmoſt to a trifling inconvenience. They ſtill poſſeſs an equivalent for their purchaſe-money. If they are not ſatisfied with the ſlow accumulation by means of natural increaſe, they may ſell again, and remove their ſtock to another channel. They cannot now fulfil their expectations of acquiring a rapid fortune by clearing the land, becauſe the price of negroes will riſe, or rather, for ſome years, there will be no poſſibility of purchaſing ſlaves. But this is no real or abſolute loſs which can juſtify their demands of an equivalent. Suppoſe that the Britiſh Cabinet were diſpoſed to annul the Methuen treaty; would it be neceſſary firſt to conſult all thoſe merchants who, on the faith

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faith of it, had removed to Portugal, or ſettled a correſpondence with that country, or veſted their ſtock in French wines, or bought woollens to ſupply the market of Liſbon? Or, ſuppoſe that the Eaſt Indian monopoly were aboliſhed, would the holders of India ſtock have a claim for indemnification; or would the capitaliſts, who had laid out their money in ſhares of Eaſt India veſſels, or in loans to captains and traders, have a right to demand compenſation? But theſe caſes are much more favourable to ſuch claims than the one which we are conſidering. Suppoſe that a number of capitaliſts have veſted their ſtock in the three *per cents.* at the end of a long war, from the full confidence that the value of the funded property will in a few months riſe twenty or thirty *per cent.*; if the national honour is inſulted, muſt all thoſe ſtockholders be indemnified for their probable diſappointment, before a war can be proclaimed? Or muſt the King's crown be endangered, his people deſpiſed, his flag buffeted, his ambaſſadors ſpit upon in every court or Jacobin *coterie* throughout Europe, becauſe the proclamation of a juſt and neceſſary war would prevent the ſtockholders from realizing all their golden dreams, founded upon the laſt treaty of peace? And can any ſtain be ſo deep on the honour and the character

character of the country, as the ſupporting of a traffic founded in treachery and blood? Can any meaſure attended with partial loſs or diſappointment, be in its eſſence more juſt and neceſſary than the immediate wiping out of ſo foul a pollution? Can any policy be more contemptible than that which would refuſe its ſanction to ſuch a meaſure, for fear of diſappointing thoſe men who had arranged their plans with the hopes of fattening upon the plunder of the public character and virtue? —'*Habet aliquid ex iniquo omne magnum exemplum, quod contrà ſingulos utilitate publicâ rependitur.*' *

We have already ſeen how neceſſary for the preſervation, as well as the improvement of the American colonies, the great meaſure of abolition is proved to be by the whole hiſtory of the Weſt Indies, and more particularly by the events of the laſt twelve years. But the immediate advantages, in point of wealth, which muſt flow from that meaſure to the proprietors of ſlaves, deſerve alſo to be noticed. They form a ſufficient counterpoiſe to the diſappointment, which thoſe planters may experience from being deprived of the power to extend their cultivation at pleaſure. The value of every ſlave already

* Tacitus, Annal. XIV. cap. 44.

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already in the iſlands will of courſe riſe incalculably, as ſoon as the line is drawn and the farther ſupply ſtopped. The abolition of the African trade will produce the ſame augmentation in the value of the ſtock on hand, that the deſtruction of the Golconda mines would upon the value of the diamonds already in the European market. This will be the natural recompenſe to the planters for the inconvenience ariſing from a limitation of the ſupply. Particularly, it will be favourable to thoſe iſlands or plantations which have for ſome time ceaſed to import, and have wiſely kept up their ſtock by breeding.

Such are the chief arguments that have been brought forward by the advocates of the ſlave ſyſtem, and ſuch are the anſwers to which they eaſily yield. I muſt repeat once more, that the plea of neceſſity is now the ſtrongeſt ſupport of the meaſure, next to the paramount conſideration of its juſtice. The arguments above detailed and anſwered, only deſerve our attention as tending if poſſible to ſtrengthen concluſions to which we have been led by a more ſhort and eaſy proceſs. They furniſh, too, a curious ſpecimen of the fundamental weakneſs of the cauſe which they are employed to uphold; while the ſucceſs of ſuch reaſonings, in ſuch a cauſe, evinces how lamentably eaſy it is to perſuade mankind, by the moſt ridiculous and extravagant

gant topics, of propoſitions the moſt outrageous to every natural feeling of humanity and juſtice, when thoſe propoſitions are connected with an apparent intereſt.

From this unſatisfactory view, let us turn to a more pleaſing proſpect, and figure to ourſelves the probable conſequences of that great meaſure which ſo many reaſons of juſtice, of expediency, of overruling neceſſity, concur in preſcribing to the European powers. The landſcape it is true exiſts but in fancy; yet is it not ungrateful ſometimes to refreſh the mind by the relief of contemplating thoſe pictures which depart from nature only in the too favourable colouring of the human figures, and the Arcadian beauties of the ſcene wherein they are pourtrayed. Before indulging in this view, let us ſtop for a little to conſider in what manner the fundamental change of colonial policy muſt be effected.

It appears very manifeſt that the mother country alone is competent to effect the abolition of the ſlave trade. No aſſembly compoſed of planters, and ſitting in a ſlave colony, will ever, to the end of time, think for one moment of aboliſhing the trade. Can we expect it? Can we blame the perſons compoſing ſuch bodies for their obſtinate adherence to that ſyſtem which ancient habits and prejudices, and the

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zeal of ſome worthy but intemperate men in attacking them, and the conduct of others ſignalized by a mad and unprincipled love of change, have all conſpired to render venerable in the eyes of every Weſt Indian? We might as reaſonably hope to ſee the poor-laws of England amended by a pariſh veſtry, or a profitable war terminated by a board of commiſſaries and general officers, as to obtain the abolition of the ſlave trade from the colonial aſſemblies. If every ſound reaſon did not concur to teach us the folly of entertaining ſuch hopes, we might be at once convinced by a ſingle conſideration. How many independent legiſlatures are there in the Weſt Indies? Let it be admitted that a few colonies relinquiſh the trade; can it be ſuppoſed that every other will join them, when the partial abolition in one quarter renders the continuance of it more profitable to the reſt? Yet if any one refuſe to concur, the ſame doctrines of colonial ſupremacy muſt render the forcing of the meaſure upon that one, as unjuſtifiable as the univerſal violation of the colonial rights. In fact, the colonial aſſemblies and the planters have ſpoken very plainly upon theſe matters, and given us a full view of what may be expected from their deliberations on the abolition. To go no farther back than the year 1799, the petitions of the Britiſh Weſt Indian iſlands to Parliament,

Parliament, contain the moſt open and explicit avowal of the rooted determination of the planters and aſſemblies to ſupport the ſlave trade for ever, as an integral part of the colonial ſyſtem. The tenor of theſe addreſſes, whilſt it ſhews the duplicity of many previous declarations and arguments, at once evinces the abſurdity of truſting the moſt trivial branch of the diſcuſſion to the colonies; and, that any one ſhould have been found thoughtleſs enough, after thoſe declarations, to propoſe leaving the whole matter to the deciſion of the planters, would be aſtoniſhing, upon any other queſtion than the preſent.

It is not my intention at preſent to touch the ſubject of colonial government. But, to thoſe who maintain the rights of colonies in ſuch queſtions as that of abolition, let it be a ſufficient anſwer to ſtate the eſſential ſubordination of all colonial eſtabliſhments in the diſcuſſion of the moſt important imperial affairs. We have formerly noticed this diſtinguiſhing feature in the conſtitution of all ſeparate and diſtant provinces *. Does the ſlave trade intereſt the colonies more than the queſtion of peace and war, which ſo often recurs? and is any colony ever conſulted on ſuch a diſcuſſion? When we hear the friends of the ſlave trade maintain that the

* Book II. Sect. I.

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abolition can only be determined by the coloniſts, and then recommend to the colonial governments this meaſure which they oppoſed at home, we plainly perceive a groſs inconſiſtency. They do not confine their oppoſition in the mother country to a denial of her juriſdiction; they oppoſe the abolition upon the merits of the caſe: yet, in the colonies, they affect to ſupport the meaſure alſo upon the merits. * This is a fair acknowledgement that they are inſincere, either in their defence of the ſyſtem at home, or in their defence of the abolition in America. When we conſider that they are themſelves coloniſts, it is not difficult to determine from which of their ſpeeches their real opinions and wiſhes muſt be taken. They do not wiſh to ſucceed in their defence of the abolition; they do not expect it. The compoſition of the colonial aſſemblies is a ſufficient ſecurity to them againſt all the effects of their mock efforts. They are only oppoſing the whole meaſure of abolition in a roundabout, uncandid, and treacherous manner.

1. The abolition of the ſlave trade muſt, as we have already ſeen, greatly ameliorate the ſtructure of ſociety in the Weſt Indian colonies. Every man may now be left to purſue his own intereſt

* Edwards, vol. II. & Hiſt. of War in St Domingo: Concluſion.

intereſt in his own way. Few will continue ſo inſane as to maltreat and work out their ſtock, when they can no longer fill up the blanks occaſioned by their cruelty, or their inhuman and ſhort-ſighted policy. A great increaſe of wealth, and a rapid augmentation of the negro population, will be the conſequence of this milder ſyſtem; for every proprietor of ſlaves will attend to the breeding, as the only method by which his ſtock can be recruited, or his cultivation extended. The fecundity of the negroes may be gathered, not only from their hiſtory in Africa, but ſtill more ſtrikingly from the eſtimates given in the Report of 1787, by which it appears, that, under all ſorts of bad treatment, their numbers were kept up naturally in almoſt all the iſlands. * The effects of a milder treatment may eaſily be ſuppoſed; and if facts are neceſſary to deſcribe thoſe effects, we may refer to the ſtatements of Mr Jefferſon, in his celebrated work on Virginia. The experience of the United States has diſtinctly proved that the rapid multiplication of the Blacks in a natural way, will inevitably be occaſioned by prohibiting their importation. †

* See a ſuccinct ſtatement of this fact in the Reſolutions of 1791.

† Notes on Virginia, Query 8.

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In a very few years, all the negroes in America will be Creoles, and all the maſters will treat them with kind indulgence for their own ſakes. The two great dangers ariſing from bad ſpirits will be removed; the labour of the negroes will be more productive, and will reſemble in ſome degree the induſtry of free men; the negro character will be improved; the manners of the other claſſes will alſo be ameliorated; the non-reſidence, ſo much to be lamented at preſent, and the want of women, ſo fatal to the colonial character, will gradually wear out; the ſtructure of Weſt Indian ſociety will more and more reſemble that of the compact, firm, and reſpectable communities which compoſe the North American ſtates.

2. It will now only be neceſſary that the legiſlature ſhould farther interfere with the plans and actions of the people, in ſo far as certain topical irregularities may ſtill ariſe from the bad paſſions of individuals, and in ſo far as indirect encouragement may be given to operations or ſchemes evidently beneficial to the whole ſociety.

All thoſe ſubordinate arrangements are better left to the colonial legiſlatures. After the government of the mother country has aboliſhed the African trade, they are fully competent to take all the ſteps that may be neceſſary for improving

proving the ſyſtem. They are preciſely in the ſituation which inſures the adoption of wiſe meaſures; they are compoſed of men immediately intereſted in the purſuit of that very conduct which the good of the ſyſtem requires. All the individuals who form the aſſemblies, are concerned in the preſervation and increaſe of the negro ſtock; in the improvement of the whole colonial ſociety; in the gradual reformation of the general ſyſtem. They are ſeparated from their brother coloniſts only by that election which confers upon them the power of watching over the common good, and impoſes on them the duty of inveſtigating the means whereby it may beſt be attained. For the ſame reaſon that it would be in vain to expect from ſuch men the great meaſure of abolition, it would be fooliſh to deſpair of obtaining from them every aſſiſtance, in promoting thoſe ſubordinate ſchemes, which may conduce to the amelioration of the colonial policy. Of their ſuperior ability to deviſe and execute ſuch meaſures, we cannot entertain the ſmalleſt doubt. They are men intimately acquainted with every minute branch of colonial affairs, and accuſtomed, from their earlieſt years, to meditate upon no other ſubjects. They reſide in the heart of the ſyſtem for which their plans are to be laid, and on which the ſucceſs of every experiment is to be tried.

The general queſtion of abolition may eaſily be examined at a diſtance. All the information that is neceſſary for the full diſcuſſion of it has already been procured by the mother countries of the different European colonies. Its connexion with various intereſts not colonial, renders the provincial governments incompetent to examine it, even if their intereſts and prejudices left them at liberty to enter upon a fair inveſtigation.

But the details of the ſlave laws require more minute and accurate acquaintance with an infinite variety of particulars, which can only be known to thoſe who reſide upon the ſpot. To reviſe the domeſtic codes of the colonies, would be a taſk which no European government could undertake, for want of information, and for want of time. Any Parliament, Council, or Senate, which ſhould begin ſuch a work, would find it neceſſary to give up legiſlating for the mother country, in order partly to mar, and partly to neglect the legiſlation of the colonies. Let this branch of the imperial adminiſtration, then, be left to the care of thoſe who are themſelves moſt immediately intereſted in the good order and government of the diſtant provinces, and whoſe knowledge of local circumſtances, of thoſe things which cannot be written down in reports, nor told by witneſſes, is more full and practical.

The

The queſtion of abolition is one, and ſimple; it is anſwered by a yea or a nay; its ſolution requires no exerciſe of invention. The queſtions of regulation are many and complex; they are ſtated by a '*quomodo*;' they lead to the diſcovery of means, and the compariſon of meaſures propoſed. Without pretending to diſpute the ſupremacy of the mother country, we may be allowed to doubt her omniſcience; and the colonial hiſtory of modern Europe may well change our doubts into diſbelief. Without ſtanding up for the privileges of the colonies, we may ſuggeſt their more intimate acquaintance with the details of the queſtion, and maintain, that the intereſt both of the mother country and of the colonies, requires a ſubdiviſion of the labour of legiſlation; a delegation of certain duties and inquiries to thoſe who are moſt nearly connected with the reſult, and ſituated within the reach of the materials. When the abolition ſhall have rendered all the planters more careful of their ſtock, and more diſpoſed to encourage breeding, the only taſk for the colonial governments will be, to regulate the relative rights of the two claſſes, to prepare the civilization of the ſubordinate race, and to check thoſe cruelties which may ſtill appear in a few inſtances of individual inhumanity and impolicy.

3. The

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3. The great object of the colonial governments as a body, and of their members as individuals, will be the encouragement of ſomething like voluntary induſtry. The humane treatment of the ſlave; the granting him conſiderable latitude of indulgence by ſlow degrees; and, above all, the encouragement of breeding, will probably effect this great object. With the rearing of a family may be coupled ſome of thoſe liberties which the proſperity of the children requires, and which the ſtrength of parental feeling renders ſafe. The admiſſion of the ſlave to certain privileges of property, has produced the happieſt effects in our colonies, even under the ancient policy. But I have already pointed out the effects of the rigorous ſlave ſyſtem, in preventing many of the good conſequences which would otherwiſe reſult from this cuſtomary indulgence, equally politic and humane. Little voluntary labour is in fact performed by the ſlaves during their days of reſt, even on their own grounds, in conſequence of the hard treatment which they experience all the reſt of the week in working for their drivers. * But the new ſyſtem will draw from this, and other ſources, the moſt ſalutary conſequences. In order to appreciate the probable effects of the great and fundamental meaſure

* Book IV. Sect. I.

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ſure in this point of view, let us for a moment caſt our eyes over the ancient hiſtory of that quarter of the world in which we live, and contemplate the origin of that ſociety which is now ſettled in ſuch a compact, regular, and beautiful fabric.

In ancient times, a great part of the population of the moſt poliſhed ſtates was the perſonal property of the reſt. Thoſe ſlaves were chiefly captives taken directly in war, or purchaſed from other warlike nations who had obtained them in this way. The conſtant hoſtilities which at that time divided the people of all countries, rendered this a very fruitful ſource of ſupply. During the riſe of Athens and Rome, accordingly, when many foreign nations were by rapid ſteps conquered, and when others, ſtill unſubdued, could ſell the perſons of their weaker neighbours, there was never any ſcarcity of men in the great ſlave markets. The cruelty of the treatment which thoſe unhappy men experienced, was proportioned to the eaſe with which they were procured; and we have already remarked how intolerable their lot was among the very people who called every foreigner a Barbarian. As war became leſs common, and the arts of peace were more cultivated, this ſupply of ſlaves of courſe decreaſed; and when the Roman empire, tottering under its own weight, could think of nothing leſs than new conqueſts, there

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there was an end of importing ſlaves. Accordingly, with the progreſs of real civilization, but ſtill more with the diminution of wars and conqueſts, was introduced a milder ſyſtem of domeſtic government, a greater humanity towards the ſlaves, and a more careful attention to breeding, when the ſtock could neither be kept up nor increaſed by other means. The laws added their ſanction to this ſalutary change, which no laws could of themſelves have wrought. The rights of ſlaves came to be recognized, the conduct of the maſter to be watched, and the practice of emancipation to be encouraged. By degrees, the ſlaves were incorporated with their maſters, and formed part of the great free population, which was rather mixed with, than ſubdued by, the Goths.

The conqueſts of the great ancient ſtates, and the purchaſes which they made from petty tribes always at war, may be compared with the ſlave trade carried on by the modern ſtates of Europe: and the pacification of the Greek and Roman commonwealths—their inability either to conquer or buy—may be compared with the abolition of the African trade; or (if ſuch a thing were poſſible without the abolition) with the civilization of the great theatre upon which this trade is carried on. Making allowance for the difference of race, the conſequences of the abolition

abolition upon the manners of the planters and condition of the ſlaves, aided by the regulations which the colonial legiſlatures will adopt, but which they never either would or could effect without the abolition, will form exactly the counterpart of the change introduced, by the ceſſation of conqueſts, into the domeſtic manners and œconomy of the ancients, aſſiſted and enforced by the alterations of their poſitive laws.

To the ſlavery of the ancients ſucceeded the bondage and villenage of their Gothic conquerors. But the difference between the two was marked and important. The Greek and Roman ſlaves were imported; the Gothic ſlaves were the peaſantry of the country, and born on the ſpot, unleſs during the wars which accompanied the firſt inroads of the northern tribes. Accordingly, we find no parallel between the rigour of the ancient and of the modern ſlave ſyſtem; and a foundation was laid in this eſſential difference, for a much more rapid improvement of the whole ſociety than took place in Greece or Rome, notwithſtanding the ſuperior refinements of the claſſic times. The ſlave firſt became attached to his maſter, not as his perſonal property, but as part of his ſtock, and aſtricted to the ſoil, to uſe the language of the feudal ages. By degrees, the mutual intereſts of the lord and his villeins, in the progreſs of national

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national improvement, operated that important change in the ſtate of manners, out of which the modern diviſion of ranks, and the privileges of the lower orders, have ariſen in the civilized quarters of the European community. Firſt, the villein obtained the uſe of the land to which he had been annexed, and of the ſtock in which he had been comprehended, on condition that a certain proportion (generally one half) of the produce ſhould belong to the lord of the land and proprietor of the ſtock. This great change, one of the moſt ſignal of thoſe events which have laid the foundation of human improvement by degrees too ſlow for the obſervation of hiſtorians, was owing entirely to the maſter diſcovering how much his intereſt was connected with the comfort of his ſlaves; how neceſſary it was to treat well that race whoſe toils ſupported the community in eaſe, and whoſe loſs could not be repaired; how much more profitable it was to divide with the vaſſal the fruits of his free and ſtrenuous exertions, than to monopolize the ſcanty produce of his compulſory toil. As ſoon as the right of property, and the ſecure enjoyment of the fruits of labour were extended to the vaſſals, the progreſs of improvement became conſtant and viſible. The proportion of the fruits paid to the lord was diminiſhed according to an indefinite ſtandard; the peaſant,

peaſant, having been permitted to acquire property, provided his own ſtock, and obtained the power of changing his reſidence, and commuting the nature of his ſervices. By degrees, the rent came to be paid in money, according to the number of competitors for a farm; and they who could not farm land themſelves, ſold their labour to others for a certain price or maintenance. Laſtly, the legiſlature ſecured the leaſe of the farmer with the ſame certainty that it ſecured the property of the landlord, and recognized the one as well as the other for uſeful and independent ſubjects.

A ſimilar progreſs will moſt probably be the reſult of that abolition, in the ſuppoſition of which we are indulging. That this idea is not chimerical, the conſideration of a few facts, very little known, in the hiſtory of America, may convince us.

The peculiar circumſtances in the ſituation of the Spaniſh and Portugueze colonies of South America, have already partially operated ſome of thoſe happy effects which we may expect from the abolition of the ſlave trade. The high price of the negroes in the Spaniſh ſettlements, partly from abſurd regulations of trade, partly from the deficiency of the Spaniards in the practice of commerce and naval affairs, cauſes that want of hands which would prevail in its full extent, were the African

trade

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trade ſtopt. Both in the Spaniſh and Portugueze colonies, the great proportion of the Indians to the whole population, has inculcated (as we have already ſeen *) the policy of gaining over the negroes, by all means, to the White cauſe, in caſe of any ſtruggle with the more powerful claſs. From theſe circumſtances, and partly no doubt from the peculiarly indolent character of the coloniſts in thoſe parts, there has ariſen a much better ſyſtem of treatment than any other European colony can boaſt of. The firſt conſequence of this ſtate of things has been, the conſtant ſecurity of the Spaniſh and Portugueze ſettlements from all riſks of negro rebellion. Other views of intereſt have conſpired to confirm and extend this ſyſtem of mildneſs and equity towards the ſlaves; and the Legiſlature has not failed, by every prudent interference, to aſſiſt the inferior race in the acquiſition of rights and privileges.

Thus we meet with many very ſingular analogies between the hiſtory of the negroes in South America, and that of the villeins or bondſmen of Europe, in the earlier feudal times. All the gold and jewels in Brazil have, for many years, been collected according to the ſame plan that the feudal lords adopted for the purpoſe of quickening the induſtry of their vaſſals.

* Book I. Sect. III.

vaſſals. The maſter ſupplies the ſlave daily with a certain quantity of proviſions and tools, and the ſlave is obliged to return a certain quantity of gold or jewels, according to the nature of the ground. Every thing that remains over this ration, the negro keeps to himſelf, were the balance to be millions. The gold mines of Popayan and Choco in Spaniſh America, are wrought in the very ſame way. The fineſt pearl fiſheries in South America, thoſe of Panama for example, are in the hands of negro tenants as it were. Theſe are bound to give a certain number of pearls every week. The negroes in the towns are allowed to hire themſelves out to ſervices of different kinds, on condition of returning to their maſters a certain portion of their wages: the reſt they may ſpend or hoard up for their own uſe. The profligate avarice of the Spaniſh women, in ſome parts of the continent, has imitated this ſpecies of trade. The negreſſes are permitted to proſtitute themſelves, and acquire money from their paramours or keepers, provided they pay to their miſtreſſes a certain part of their infamous gains, for having the uſe of their own bodies. *

After a ſlave has in any of theſe various ways acquired property, he endeavours to purchaſe

* We are told that the ſame diſgraceful practice prevailed alſo in the French iſlands.—Wimpffen, Let. XXX.

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his freedom. If the maſter is exorbitant in his demands, he may apply to a magiſtrate, who appoints ſworn appraiſers to fix the price at which the ſlave ſhall be allowed to buy his freedom. Even during his ſlavery the behaviour of the maſter towards him is ſtrictly watched: he may complain to the magiſtrate, and obtain redreſs, which generally conſiſts in a decree, obliging the maſter to ſell him at a certain rate. The conſequences of all theſe laws and cuſtoms are extremely beneficial to the Spaniſh and Portugueze power in America. While the ſlaves are faithful and laborious, the free negroes are numerous, and in general much more quiet, uſeful, and induſtrious, than in the other colonies. Moſt of the artificers are of this claſs; and ſome of the beſt troops in the New World are compoſed entirely of negroes, who by their own labour and frugality have acquired their liberty.*

It is hardly neceſſary to remark the ſtriking analogy between the ſtate of the Spaniſh and Portugueze negroes, and that of the European bondſmen, at a certain period of their progreſs towards liberty. We find the ſame gentleneſs

* Report of Committee 1789, part VI.—Townſend's Travels, vol. II. p. 382.—Ricard, III. 635.—Hiſtory of Brazil, *apud* Harris's Collection, vol. I.—Campomanes, Educaçion Popular. tom. II. p. 172. & note.—Raynal, Hiſt. Philoſ. III. 270.—D'Ulloa's Voyages, tom. I. p. 31. & 129.

tleneſs of treatment, the ſame protection from the laws, the ſame acknowledgement of rights, the ſame power of acquiring property, granted to the American ſlave, which prepared the complete emancipation of the European vaſſal. In ſome particulars we obſerve another ſtep of the ſame progreſs; for in many parts the negroes are preciſely in the ſituation of the *coloni partiarii*, or *metayers*, of the feudal times. In one reſpect the negro is even in a more favourable ſituation: his *reddendo*, (if I may uſe the expreſſion), is fixed and definite: all the overplus of his induſtry belongs to himſelf. The metayer was bound to divide every gain with his lord. The former, then, has a much ſtronger incentive to induſtry than the latter had. As this difference, however, ariſes, not from the progreſs of ſociety, but from the nature of the returns themſelves, eaſily concealed, and with difficulty procured: ſo, in ſome other reſpects the negro is not in ſuch favourable circumſtances. But the great ſteps of the proceſs of improvement are materially the ſame in both caſes. Both have, in common, the great points of a bargain between the maſter and ſlave; privileges poſſeſſed by the ſlave, independent of, nay in oppoſition to his maſter; the rights of property enjoyed by the ſlave, and the power of purchaſing his freedom at a juſt price. This reſemblance, in

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circumſtances ſo important, may fairly be expected to render the progreſs of the two orders alſo ſimilar. In the negro, as in the feudal ſyſtem, we may look for the conſequences of thoſe great improvements in voluntary induſtry, more productive labour, and the mitigation and final abolition of ſlavery, when the ſlave ſhall have been gradually prepared to become a free ſubject.

Some of the good effects that have flowed from the national character, and peculiar circumſtances of the Spaniſh and Portugueze, have been produced alſo in Dutch America, by that great competition of capitals, and thoſe complicated difficulties, which lay the Dutch coloniſts under the neceſſity of attending to the ſmalleſt ſavings. If from this ſource, combined with the facility of importation, has ariſen a cruelty unknown in other colonies, it may be doubted whether a compenſation for the evil is not afforded by another effect of the ſame circumſtances, the general introduction of taſk-work, which the keen-ſighted ſpirit of a neceſſary avarice, has taught the planter of Dutch Guiana to view as the moſt profitable manner of working his ſlaves.* Nothing, indeed, can conduce more immediately to the excitement of induſtry than the introduction of taſk-work. It ſeems the natural and eaſy tranſition from labour to induſtry; it forms in the mind of the ſlave thoſe habits which are neceſſary

* Malouet, Mem. ſur les Col. III. 133.

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neceſſary for character of the free man: it thus prepares him for enjoying, by a gradual change, thoſe rights and privileges which belong to freedom. But this manner of employing the negroes muſt be coupled with mildneſs of treatment, and with the entire abolition of all other labour, in order to produce its good effects. Taſk-work is known in the windward iſlands of France and Britain, without bringing any relief or improvement whatever. The toil of graſs-picking is, indeed, the moſt intolerable nuiſance to which thoſe unhappy men are ſubjected. But that is a work impoſed upon them in addition to all their other toils, during the intervals of the field work: it is made to interfere with their hours of reſt and relaxation. In the Dutch colonies, the cruelty of the ſlave ſyſtem prevents even the complete adoption of taſk-work from producing all its natural conſequences; for the toil impoſed, and the puniſhments with which the neglect is attended, are infinitely too ſevere. The odious plan of working out the negroes, prevails both in the iſlands and on the continent; and while a ſupply of ſlaves is eaſily procured, the good effects produced by the ſyſtem of management peculiar to Peru and Brazil, can never be expected to take place in the colonies of France, Britain, and Holland—until either the manners of the nations ſhall be changed, ſo as to

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reſemble thoſe of the indolent Spaniards and Portugueze, or the views of the planters ſhall be ſo enlightened, as to impreſs them with a conviction that humane treatment is the moſt beneficial to their intereſts. Such a change of character is not to be wiſhed, and ſuch an enlargement of views is ſurely not to be expected.

We are, therefore, again led to the ſame concluſion, in which every view of this large ſubject ends—that the only means of improving the negro ſyſtem is the abolition of the ſlave trade. This great meaſure, aſſiſted by ſubordinate arrangements, ſimilar to thoſe adopted in the ancient ſtates, in the feudal kingdoms, and in the South American colonies, will moſt undoubtedly alter the whole face of things in the New World. The negroes, placed in almoſt the ſame circumſtances with the bondſmen of ancient Europe, and the ſlaves of the claſſic times, will begin the ſame career of improvement. The ſociety of the Weſt Indies will no longer be that anomalous, defective, and diſguſting monſter of political exiſtence, which we have ſo often been forced to contemplate in the courſe of this Inquiry. The foundation of rapid improvement will be ſecurely laid, both for the Whites, the Negroes, and the mixed race, out of the materials which force and cruelty and fraud have collected.

A

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A ſtrong and compact political ſtructure will ariſe, under the influence of a mild, civilized, and enlightened ſyſtem. The vaſt continent of Africa will keep pace with the quick improvement of the world which ſhe has peopled; and in thoſe regions where, as yet, only the warhoop, the laſh, and the cries of miſery, have divided with the beaſts the ſilence of the deſert, our children, and the children of our ſlaves, may enjoy the delightful proſpect of that benign and ſplendid reign, which is exerciſed by the Arts, the Sciences, and the Virtues of modern Europe.

That this view of the future is altogether viſionary, I am ready to admit; but it is viſionary, only becauſe there is little chance of that great meaſure being adopted, which every argument of neceſſity, and every temptation of expediency concurs to enforce. All conſiderations of juſtice being kept out of view, it might be thought that the evident dangers of the preſent ſyſtem, as exhibited to us, firſt in Dutch, and afterwards in French America, would awaken men to a right feeling upon their critical ſituation; that the melancholy example of a noble province, ſacrificed to the riſks which every other ſlave colony runs, almoſt within the viſible horizon of the remaining ſettlements, would inſpire the European powers with an anxiety to ſearch for that internal diſ-

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order which is rapidly working the diſſolution of the colonial ſyſtem, and a diſtruſt of thoſe raſh or intereſted counſellors, whoſe advice has in other countries been attended with ruin.

'*Multa ſunt occulta reipublicæ vulnera, mul-*
'*ta nefariorum civium perniciosa conſilia : nullum*
'*externum periculum eſt, non rex, non gens ulla,*
'*non natio pertimeſcenda eſt : incluſum malum,*
'*inteſtinum ac domeſticum eſt. huic pro ſe quiſque*
'*noſtrûm mederi, atque hoc omnes ſanare velle*
'*debemus.*' *

But it ſeems to be the lot of nations to derive inſtruction from experience, rather than example; and however acutely they may diſcern the conſequences of folly in the conduct of their neighbours, no ſooner has the caſe become their own, than indolence, or timidity, or a ſenſeleſs confidence in good fortune, blinds them to the moſt obvious applications of the leſſons before their eyes diſcourages all ideas of reformation; and gives birth to the ſame ſtrange delu ion, ſo often fatal to individuals, that the cir u. ſtances and the conduct which have ru i others, may prove harmleſs or beneficial to themſelves.

NOTES

* Cicero, Orat. I. de Lege Agraria.

NOTES AND ILLUSTRATIONS.

NOTE A a. *p.* 22.

THE tenor of the two laws laſt referred to in the text, is ſufficiently ſingular to deſerve more minute attention.

The ordinance of Valentinius and Valens is conceived in the following terms:

'Univerſi fiduciam gerant, ut, ſi quis eorum ab actore 'rerum privatarum noſtrarum, ſive à procuratore vexatus 'fuerit injuriis, ſuper ejus contumeliis vel deprædationibus 'deferri quærimoniam ſinceritati tuæ, vel rectori provinciæ, 'non dubitet, et ad publicæ ſententiam vindictæ ſine ali-'quâ trepidatione convolare: quæ res cum fuerit certis pro-'bationibus declarata, ſancimus, et edicimus, ut ſi in pro-'vincialem hanc audaciam quiſquam moliri auſus fuerit, 'publice vivus concremetur.' *Cod. lib. III. tit.* 26. *leg.* 9. I would here take the liberty of ſuggeſting an emendation of the laſt clauſe. Inſtead of '*in provincialem hanc auda-'ciam*,' I would ſubmit the following reading: '*in pro-'vinciâ talem hanc audaciam.*' The preamble is ſo general, that we cannot by any means conceive the reaſon for the reſtraining enactment in the end. Why ſhould the provincial ſubjects alone have the benefit of this law? Is it probable that the Roman citizens, reſident in the provinces, would have leſs regard paid to the violation of their privileges? But whichever reading we may adopt, the ſpirit of the enactment is equally plain and deciſive. The edict of Conſtantine is as follows:

'Præſides

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'Præſides provinciarum oportet, ſi quis potentiorum extiterit inſolentior, et ipſi vindicare non poſſunt, aut examinare, aut pronuntiare nequeunt; de ejus nomine ad nos, aut certe ad Prætorianæ Præfecturæ ſcientiam referre: quo provideatur, qualiter publicæ diſciplinæ, et læſis tenuioribus conſulatur.' *Cod. lib. I. tit. XL. leg.* 2.

Theſe two laws preſent us with a ſtriking illuſtration of the wide difference between the ſkill, or the taſte, of the ancients and moderns, in the great arts of adminiſtration. The ſanguinary puniſhment awarded to ſo high an officer as the Emperor's repreſentative, for an offence extremely common in all the provinces of the Roman dominion, would never have been thought of in the preſent times, although enormities much greater called for vengeance: and the open, direct, and plain terms in which the edict of Conſtantine preſcribes the performance of what is always a matter of much nicety—the reſtraining of perſonal influence—clearly prove how little the moſt enlightened ſtates of antiquity knew or valued the grand ſecrets of adminiſtration, particularly the method of ruling by influence, ſo much and ſo juſtly valued in modern times.

NOTE B b. *p.* 36.

ONUPHRIUS PANVINIUS has given a very elaborate enumeration of all the Italian colonies. It is to be found in *Grævii Theſaurus, tom. I.* The *Treatiſe of Robortellus* on the Roman provinces deſerves alſo to be conſulted.

The number of the colonies planted in Italy, amounted to one hundred and ſixty-four; while thoſe planted in all the provinces were only one hundred and ninety-nine.—*Onuph. Panv. cap. XXI.* It appears from this conſideration alone, that the Italian colonies were materially different, in their conſtitution and uſes, from the colonies of the provinces.

The

The firſt foreign colony which the Romans planted was in Carthage, A. U. C. 710, when Julius Cæſar formed the plan of reſtoring that deſerted city by means of a colonial eſtabliſhment. The firſt colony planted in Italy was that of Cænnia, A. U. C. 4.—*Dion. Caſſ. lib. XLIII. cap.* 50.

The practice of ſending Roman colonies to the provinces (where they did not enjoy all the privileges of the Italian coloniſts, *Onuph. Panvin. cap. I.*), was very common after the experiment of Julius Cæſar. He himſelf tranſplanted eighty thouſand citizens in this manner, *Sueton. in Jul. Cæſ. cap. XLII.* After the time of Auguſtus, who planted twenty-eight colonies in Italy (*Sueton. in Octav. cap. XLVI.*) the cuſtom of planting Italian colonies ſeems to have been abandoned. His ſucceſſors did not plant ſo many as twenty; and preferred forming thoſe ſettlements beyond ſeas. Livy does not once mention a tranſmarine or tranſalpine colony; although he conſtantly relates the foundation of thoſe in Italy.

Dacia and Britain, the moſt difficult and inſecure of the Roman conqueſts, had only, the former four, the latter five Roman colonies. Africa (the moſt peaceable of all the Roman poſſeſſions long before the downfal of the Commonwealth) received, after the uſurpation of Julius Cæſar, no leſs than fifty-ſeven colonies, excluſive of Egypt.

We may therefore conclude, that the Italian eſtabliſhments were founded with different views, and in a different age of the Roman hiſtory, from the ſettlements in the provinces.

NOTE C c. *p.* 52.

THE plan of removing the ſeat of the Portugueſe government from Europe to South America, is not altogether imaginary.

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ginary. It has on ſeveral occaſions (I believe as recently as during the late war) been entertained by the regency of Liſbon; *Dumouriez, Etat preſent de Portugal, liv. II. c. 6.* The Portugueſe character and habits are peculiarly favourable to the conception and execution of ſuch a project. Placed in a corner of Europe in which their political importance is extremely trifling, they are fond of contemplating the magnitude and natural wealth of their foreign dominions. Diſtinguiſhed by their manners and turn of mind, as well as by their blood, from all the other European nations, they have little intercourſe with, or knowledge, of foreign countries, and ſeem to regard the affairs of Aſia and America with more intereſt than thoſe of France and Germany. *Murphy's Travels in Portugal, p. 206. 4to—Murphy's State of Portugal, chap. XXIV.*

In mentioning the weakneſs of Portugal, as ſhe is ſituated with reſpect to Spain, I have not alluded to the advantages which ſhe derived from the unaccountable weakneſs of the Spaniſh generals, and the bad condition of the troops during the war 1762; becauſe, at that period, the armies of Portugal were in a condition ſtill more wretched, and as little provided for the operations of the field as in the war of the '*Acclamaçion.*' Soon after the invaſion of 1762, the military talents of La Lippe, and the bold political genius of Pombal, reformed a multitude of abuſes in all the departments of government, and greatly augmented the reſources of the nation—its army, navy, and revenues. But ſuch improvements, in a comparative view of two European nations, placed in the relative ſituations of Portugal and Spain, may almoſt always be diſregarded; for, unleſs circumſtances exiſt in the one ſtate eſſentially different from thoſe of the other, any material augmentation in the force of the one will be attended with a proportionate increaſe in that of the other. Accordingly, during the period of which we are ſpeaking, Spain did not ſit an idle ſpectator

of

of the ſalutary meaſures purſued in Portugal. The various domeſtic improvements, the freedom of the colonial trade, and the increaſe of the navy, are proofs of this poſition. The number of guns in the Spaniſh line in 1776 was only three thouſand nine hundred and ninety-eight; in 1788, it had increaſed to five thouſand four hundred and ten.—*Townſend's Trav. II.* 397. NOTES AND ILLUST.

Where ſome extraordinary event, indeed, places one nation in circumſtances which another cannot emulate, we may argue from the ſuperiority which this difference will confer; as, for inſtance, the emancipation of a colony, a ſudden revolution in the mother country, or the transference of a ſeat of empire. But even theſe events tend generally to operate ſome change on neighbouring ſtates, and they are commonly attended with ſuch a change, even if they do not influence it; becauſe, as we have ſeen elſewhere, (Book III. Sect. I.) in nations forming one community, like the European kingdoms, or the American colonies, the ſame circumſtances which prediſpoſe to extraordinary events in any one member of the body, tend to operate ſome ſimilar effect in all the neighbouring parts.

In eſtimating the relative ſtrength of Spain and Portugal in South America, we ought always to recollect, that the province of Chili has never been completely ſubdued, and that the natives would be ready to join any foreign power againſt the Spaniards; that Portugal poſſeſſes the coaſt next to Europe, commands the navigation of the Amazons, and may eaſily ſeize the keys alſo of the Plata; and that Peru is ſeparated from the Atlantic by a vaſt ridge of mountains, and an extenſive tract of country, level indeed, but neither drained of its moraſſes nor cleared of its foreſts.

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The authority which I have cited for this fact is indeed anonymous, and the work is, in this country, very little known. But, beſides that a ſimilar circumſtance has occurred in other inſtances which might be enumerated, great confidence may be repoſed in the ſtatements of the two travellers. Their work abounds in plain and ſober narrative, delivered with a minuteneſs bordering upon prolixity. The information contained in it is full, various, and explicit, even to tedioufneſs. Of its accuracy in all particulars, I am inclined to form the moſt favourable opinion, from finding it completely ſo in thoſe parts which I have had an opportunity of verifying by perſonal obſervation. The title of the book is, *Voyage de deux François au nord de l'Europe*, 1791 & 1792. The route lay through Denmark, Sweden, Ruſſia, Poland, Auſtria, and part of the north of Germany.

NOTE E e. *p.* 71.

No ſmall diverſity of opinion exiſts among the authors who have expreſsly written upon, or only occaſionally referred to the ſubject of the Attican population. As the inquiry is curious, and as ſome errors ſeem to have prevailed in the writings of thoſe who are in general moſt correct upon claſſical ſubjects, I ſhall offer a few ſtatements, which may perhaps ſet the matter in a true light.

Mr Hume, in his admirable eſſay on the populouſneſs of ancient nations, (a rare ſpecimen of a branch of ſcience almoſt wholly new—the application of philoſophy to claſſical antiquities),

quities), has ſtated that Athenæus gives the population of Athens at twenty-one thouſand citizens, ten thouſand ſtrangers, and four hundred thouſand ſlaves, (*Eſſays, vol. I. p.* 416. *edit.* 1793.) He then proceeds to argue againſt this ſtatement, as if Athenæus meant to enumerate only the population of the city. The ſtrongeſt of his reaſons proceed upon the idea that this was the author's ſenſe; and it muſt be acknowledged that they are ſufficiently concluſive. But afterwards he infers, rather inconſiſtently, that Athenæus muſt have meant to give the population of all Attica. 'Beſides,' ſays he, 'we are to conſider that the number aſſigned by Athenæus, whatever it is, comprehends all 'the inhabitants of Attica, as well as thoſe of Athens,' (*p.* 419.) His opinion, upon the whole, then, is, that Athenæus muſt be underſtood to ſpeak of Attica; but that, even for Attica, the number is too great; and Mr Hume ſuppoſes the error of one cypher.

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Now, in the *firſt* place, let us attend to the words of Athenæus, which Mr Hume appears not to have examined with his uſual accuracy.

Αθηνησιν εξετασμον γενεσθαι απο Δημετριε τε φαληρεως των κατοικεντων την Αττικην· και ευρεθηναι Αθηναιες μεν δυσμυριας ωρος τοις χιλιοις, μετοικες δε μυριες, οικετων δε μυριαδας τεσσαρακοντα.—*Deipnoſophiſt. lib. VI. cap.* 20. *edit. Caſaubon. Lugdun.* 1657.

This paſſage is preciſely a ſtatement of that which Mr Hume infers from circumſtances to be the author's meaning. It is a ſtatement of the whole *Attican* population, while Mr Hume's arguments apply chiefly, if not entirely to the poſition, never made by Athenæus, that the *Athenian* ſlave population was four hundred thouſand. The term Αθηναιες, is evidently introduced to denote free and native citizens, in oppoſition to foreigners and ſlaves; the ſtatement obviouſly applies to the word Αττικην uſed immediately before.

Such,

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Such, accordingly, is the interpretation of it given not only by Caſaubon and the beſt editors, but by the Abbé Barthelemy, in his *Voyage du Jeune Anacharſis, tom. II. p.* 97. *edit.* 12*mo. Deux-ponts,* 1791.

Mr Millar adopts the error of Mr Hume, *Diſtinction of Ranks, Part V. Sect. IV. ſecond edit.*

We may obſerve, in the *ſecond* place, that the emendation ſuggeſted by Mr Hume is not ſatisfactory. How the error of a cypher ſhould have crept into a Greek text, where the Arabic numerals were not uſed, it does not ſeem eaſy to conceive. Neither is it fair to conclude, that the number of ſlaves fit to bear arms is alone meant to be ſtated in this enumeration. The term Ἀθηναίους obviouſly applies to the number of citizens fit to bear arms, and it is probable that the word μετοίκους means the ſtrangers fit to bear arms. So far Mr Hume's arguments muſt be admitted. But why, after reducing the four hundred thouſand ſlaves to forty thouſand, ſhould he conceive that this forty thouſand means ſlaves capable of bearing arms? It is evident that all enumerations of ancient population had but two objects in view, the wealth and force of the community. The ſtatement of free males come to the years of puberty, affords a criterion of the one: the ſtatement of all the ſlaves (the labouring part of the people) captured or purchaſed, and ſaleable, is neceſſary to furniſh a meaſure of the other.

We may conclude, that the enumeration of Demetrius, as given by Athenæus, made the free males of ripe years amount to thirty-one thouſand, and the whole ſlaves to forty thouſand. The total population of Attica, then, was one hundred and twenty-four thouſand free inhabitants, and four hundred thouſand ſlaves. This is ſurely neither ſo great a proportion of ſlaves to free people, nor of inhabitants to extent of territory, as to render the plain ſtatement of the ancient author incredible.

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Mr Hume, it may be added, ſeems again to miſtake Athenæus in talking of Corinth. He tells us, that the account of the city of Corinth having four hundred and ſixty thouſand ſlaves, is entirely abſurd and impoſſible, (*Eſſays, I.* 419.) Athenæus ſays that the Corinthian cities had altogether forty-ſix myriads of ſlaves.

NOTE F f. *p.* 92.

THE recital of the many commercial privileges which have been extorted by force, or obtained by diplomatic addreſs, or procured in exchange for temporary aids of various ſorts, from the trading nations of modern times, would occupy a large ſpace in the annals of mercantile policy. The hiſtory of the Dutch trade, and that of the Hans Towns, afford many of the moſt remarkable inſtances of this ſpecies of national munificence.

The readineſs of Pruſſia and Ruſſia to accept of ſuch boons as thoſe which the new Weſt Indian ſtate could eaſily offer, ſcarcely requires any proof. Perhaps, however, it is not generally known how near thoſe two powers have ſometimes been brought to the accompliſhment of their commercial ſchemes, by the acquiſition of diſtant territories. Not to mention the various voyages of diſcovery projected, and the reſpectable number actually fitted out by Ruſſia, during the laſt half century, we know that the acquiring of territory in the Mediterranean has always been a favourite object with the Cabinet of St Peterſburgh. Beſides different ſchemes more immediately connected with views of conqueſt, we have obtained undoubted information, ſince the death of Katharine, that a project had actually been conceived, of a nature entirely commercial, and not the leaſt ſingular, of the various plans which diverſified the noble and dignified ambition of that renowned Prin-

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ceſs. It was in contemplation of the Empreſs, at the ſuggeſtion of Prince Polemkin, to purchaſe from a private proprietor the ſmall iſlands of Lampedoſa and Linoſa, ſituated on the African coaſt, and to obtain the ſovereignty from the Court of Naples. The reader may ſee a copy of the Prince's project in the Appendix to *Eton's Survey of the Turkiſh Empire, p.* 505. The propoſed regulations are minute, and conceived with conſiderable ſkill.

The Cabinet of Verſailles in 1756 endeavoured to engage Frederic II. in an alliance againſt the Elector of Hanover, by making him an offer of the iſland of Tobago. The Duke de Nivernois was entruſted with the management of this intrigue; and it is worth while to obſerve the terms in which Frederic ſpeaks of it. He begins by calling this offer, '*l'argument le plus fort qu'employa le Duc de Niver-nois.*' He then mentions ſome circumſtances which oppoſed obſtacles to its being accepted. He adds, that it appeared '*trop ſinguliere pour etre recue.*' He then condeſcends to tell us, that he was pleaſant upon the occaſion, and that he compared the propoſed acceſſion of territory to the iſland of Barataria. But he adds a very material reaſon for all his coyneſs and pleaſantry. The treaty with London, which was the means of preſerving his exiſtence, had been ſigned ſome weeks before theſe overtures came from Verſailles; and he lays down, with much preciſion, the reaſons which induced him to prefer the Britiſh to the French alliance; (*Hiſt. de la Guerre de Sept-ans, chap. II. Oeuv. tom. III. p.* 69. *edit. Berlin,* 1788.) In arguing from this fact to the probable views of a Berlin cabinet, if placed in ſimilar temptations at the preſent day, we ſhould remember that the intrigue alluded to was planned by France, then in a ſtate of extreme weakneſs, againſt the intereſts of Britain, at that time the undiſputed arbitreſs of Europe, and rejected by Pruſſia, when her European exiſtence was at ſtake.

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THE opinion of Dr Smith upon the ſubject of the French and Engliſh ſlaves, appears to have been raſhly adopted by him, in order to ſupport a theory more plauſible than conſiſtent with the facts, that ſlaves under deſpotic governments are neceſſarily more protected by the laws than thoſe of free ſtates; becauſe the protection of a ſlave is an interference with private property.—*Wealth of Nations, vol. II. p.* 395. *edit.* 1799. If this reaſon is of any weight, it muſt be confined to the pure deſpotiſms of the Eaſt, or of ſavage communities where the right of property is not regarded. It cannot ſurely apply to ſuch governments as that of France before the Revolution—a government as remarkable for ſacred regard to the property of individuals as the Britiſh conſtitution itſelf. To ſuppoſe any ſuch difference between the effects of the French and thoſe of the Britiſh forms of government, is in the higheſt degree chimerical. M. Laborie has eagerly laid hold of Dr Smith's admiſſion, and given it as an indiſputable teſtimony in favour of his countrymen.—*Appendix to the Coffee-Planter of St Domingo, Art. IV.*

Baron Wimpffen tells us, that in St Domingo the women arepeculiarly cruel miſtreſſes; a circumſtance which generally takes place where the treatment of the ſlaves is upon the whole cruel, as in the Dutch ſettlements both of Aſia and America.—*Lett. XXXI.* The ſame author ſtates, that even reputable miſtreſſes hire out their negreſſes to proſtitution, and ſhare their gains. A ſimilar accuſation has never been brought againſt our countrywomen in the Weſt Indies.—*Lett. XXX.* It is well known that the regulations of the *Code Noire*, ſo humane towards the negroes, were altogether prevented from being executed, or even thought of, by the determined oppoſition of the conſtituted authorities, and ſtill

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more by their incongruity with the ſtate of manners.—*Wimpffen, Lett. VII.; Edwards's St Domingo, chap. I.*

The privileges of the inferior claſſes, which in all the other colonies have been gradually on the increaſe, were continually diminiſhing in the French iſlands previous to the Revolution. Thus, until 1674, all Mulattoes were free at the age of twenty-four, by the common law of the iſlands. In that year an edict was made, introducing the maxim of the Roman law, '*Partus ſequitur ventrem.*' The edict of 1776 abridged many of the moſt important privileges which the *Code Noire* had nominally ſecured to the people of colour.

The evidence contained in the Report of the Committee 1798, proves clearly that the treatment of the negroes in the French iſlands was ſuch as to render their mortality greater than in the Britiſh ſettlements.—*Part V.*

NOTE H h. *p.* 101.

OUR information with reſpect to the progreſs of the importation and of the population in the French Weſt Indies, is by no means very full or correct. Even the hiſtory of St Domingo, in this point of view, does not begin to be ſatisfactory, until a ſhort time before the Revolution. We are, however, furniſhed with ſufficient *data* upon theſe ſubjects, to authoriſe a very poſitive concluſion, that the treatment of ſlaves muſt have been bad; and that, among the various cauſes of the revolt, ill treatment deſerves to be mentioned.

The authors of the *Encyclopedie Methodique* eſtimate the negro population of St Domingo in 1775 at three hundred thouſand, after making allowance for the falſity of the returns, which were only two hundred and forty

thouſand

thouſand and ninety-five.—*Econ. Polit. et Diplom. tom. II. p.* 140.

The whole of the article of St Domingo is to be found in *Ricard, Traite du Commerce, tom. III. p.* 692; ſo that either he is the author mentioned in the Encyc. Method. or he has borrowed from that author, or from the Encyclopedie.

Jeffreys, in his Weſt Indian Atlas, gives the negro population in 1764 at two hundred and ſix thouſand.

Malouet ſtates the numbers in 1775 at three hundred thouſand. *Mem. ſur les Colonies, IV.* 117.; evidently making allowance for concealments.

Neckar ſtates the number in 1779 at two hundred and forty-nine thouſand and ninety-eight. *Finances, tom. III. chap.* 13.

It is fair to conclude, from theſe authorities, that in 1775 the official returns of negroes in St Domingo made the number amount to two hundred and fifty thouſand. It was about four or five years after this period that the great importation began, which continued till the Revolution.

According to the official returns, the importation for the year 1787 was thirty thouſand eight hundred and thirty-nine; and in 1788 twenty-nine thouſand five hundred and ſix.—*Rapport à l'Aſſemblée Legiſlative*, 1790; and *Edwards's St Domingo, Appendix.*

The average export from Africa in French veſſels, about the ſame time, was reckoned at twenty thouſand.—*Edwards' Weſt Indies, Book IV. chap.* 2.; *Report of Com.* 1789, *Part IV.* But the French ſtate themſelves, that of the forty thouſand exported from Africa by Britain, only thirteen thouſand three hundred are retained in the Britiſh Weſt Indies.—*Report of Com.* 1789, *Part VI.* If this is accurate, the greater part of the remaining twenty-ſix thouſand ſeven hundred muſt go to the French iſlands.

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Malouet ſtates the annual importation of negroes into St Domingo in French veſſels at above eighteen thouſand; and the importation by the Britiſh traders at twelve hundred and fifty. This ſtatement was written in 1775, and republiſhed in 1802; but no alteration appears to have been made on this paſſage.—*Mem. ſur les Col. IV.* 150. The average export of France from Africa, is given at thirty thouſand for 1786, 1787, and 1788, by Arnould.—*Balance de Commerce, Part II. Sect. III.* And Barré St Venant gives the importation between 1788 and 1791 (that is, in two years) at ſixty thouſand.—*Colonies Modernes, p.* 81.

If, then, we conſider the period from 1775 to 1790 as divided into two periods, one ending 1780, and the other ending 1790, we may reckon the average importation of the firſt period at fifteen thouſand, on the loweſt computation, and the average importation of the ſecond period at about twenty-ſix thouſand. The numbers in 1784 had only increaſed to two hundred and ninety-ſeven thouſand and ſeventy-nine, according to the official return.—*Laborie, Coffee-planter, Appendix, Art. IV.* The returns for 1789 give this number at four hundred and thirty-four thouſand four hundred and twenty-nine. But this is fairly aſcribed by Laborie to the alterations in the mode of obtaining theſe. It is utterly impoſſible to conceive that there could have been in five years an increaſe of a hundred and forty thouſand. Yet ſome have raſhly aſſerted, that the numbers of the St Domingo negroes were increaſed by a hundred and fifty thouſand during the five years ending 1790, evidently comparing the looſe returns of 1784 and 1785 with the more accurate enumerations of 1789 and 1790.—*Wimpffen, Let. XXVII.*

Let us, however, in the firſt place, admit this inſpection of the returns to be always an equally fair criterion. The returns for 1790 give four hundred and fifty-five thouſand as the total number of the ſlaves.—*Laborie, Appen.; Wimpffen, Let. XXVIII.; Edwards's*

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St Domingo, Appen. and chap. I.; Barré St Venant, Col. Mod. p. 102.; *Malouet, &c. &c.* Morſe has indeed (*American Geography*) ſtated this number at ſix hundred thouſand, and Laborie at five hundred thouſand; but theſe ſtatements proceed upon rough calculation of the numbers probably omitted even in the moſt accurate returns; and that of Morſe is in all probability much exaggerated. We are therefore to confine ourſelves entirely to the official number of four hundred and fifty-five thouſand, and to compare this with the official number, two hundred and fifty thouſand, of the year 1775.

We have here, then, a total increaſe of two hundred and five thouſand negroes in ſixteen years. But according to the progreſs of the importation, and the natural progreſs of the population, the natural and forced increaſe combined ought to have been much greater. Suppoſe that, by the natural mode, no increaſe ought to have taken place, and that the propagation only balanced the mortality, both in the original ſtock of 1775, and in every ſubſequent increaſe by importation; the total increaſe of the firſt ſix years, admitting that there were two males to every female imported, and that no account of the odd males is to be kept, ſhould have been ſixty thouſand; and of the ſecond period, (ten years), on the ſame ſuppoſitions, about a hundred and ſeventy-four thouſand; and the whole increaſe ſhould have been about two hundred and thirty-four thouſand, or above twenty-nine thouſand more than the actual increaſe.

But this difference is evidently much leſs than the truth; for no account has been taken of five thouſand male negroes annually imported during the firſt ſix years, and eight thouſand ſix hundred and ſixty-four during the laſt ten. In order to correct the calculation, we ſhall ſuppoſe that one death in twenty of the population is a fair eſtimate for the Weſt Indian climate, being much more than in the worſt climates of Europe. It may eaſily be computed, that at the

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end of the ſixteen years, there would remain, of the odd males imported during that period, above eighty thouſand.

Beſides, no account has been taken of the ſuperior accuracy with which the returns were made at the end of the period under conſideration. This circumſtance muſt evidently increaſe the difference ſtill farther. For we find, that during nine years ending 1784, the total numbers had only increaſed from two hundred and fifty thouſand to two hundred and ninety-ſeven thouſand: whereas, ſuppoſing the propagation only to have kept up the ſtock, the importation during that period ſhould have produced an augmentation of a hundred and twelve thouſand at leaſt. Inſtead, therefore, of a difference of a hundred and nine thouſand, in the whole period of ſixteen years, we may ſafely conclude, that there was a difference of nearly a hundred and forty, or that the common good treatment experienced by the lower orders of the moſt unhealthy countries in the world would have produced on the population of St Domingo an increaſe greater, in the proportion of ſeven to four, than the increaſe which actually took place during the ſixteen years of great importation.

The nature of the treatment experienced by the negroes in that iſland, may from this ſtatement eaſily be eſtimated. But ſeveral calculations have been preſented to us, directly confirming the ſame poſition, and demonſtrating, that the cruelty or hard uſage of the French coloniſts was extreme. I have mentioned, in the text, the general ſtatements of the Report of 1789 upon the treatment experienced by the ſlaves in all the French iſlands. I ſhall now add the particular teſtimony of two able men, who drew their obſervations from perſonal knowledge. Baron Wimpffen (*Lettres, No. XXV.*) ſtates, that of the negroes imported into St Domingo, twenty *per cent.* die during the firſt year, while only five *per cent.* are born; and of theſe five, one infant dies of the tetanus in the firſt fortnight. M. Malouet ſays that it requires from four

four to five thouſand births, beſides the annual importation of eighteen thouſand ſlaves to keep up the ſtock; and that the only total addition is the contraband with the Engliſh iſlands.—*Eſſai ſur St Domingue, p.* 148. *& ſeqq.* Thus, according to Wimpffen, the deaths among the imported negroes are above five times more numerous than among the people of any other country, and the births five times leſs numerous; and according to Malouet, the mortality of the whole ſtock is between two and three times greater than that of the natives of any other country on earth—a ſufficient commentary upon the boaſted humanity of the planters in the French iſlands, and a uſeful leſſon upon the profits of the ſlave ſyſtem.

NOTE I i. *p.* 194.

As a ſpecimen of the inconſiſtencies and miſrepreſentations which diſtinguiſh the cavillers upon this ſubject, I ſhall advert to the remarks of a very celebrated author, whoſe truly philoſophical ſpeculations have done much to introduce plain and ſound ſenſe into political inquiries, and to aſſiſt us in forming large and extenſive views of the hiſtory of nations. After taking notice of the policy which induced Vortigern king of the Britons to call in the aſſiſtance of the Saxons againſt the Romans, Mr Millar obſerves, that this meaſure has been univerſally blamed as weak and fooliſh; and he adds, that Vortigern acted exactly upon the principles of the balancing ſyſtem.—*Hiſtorical View of the Engliſh Government, p.* 25, *4to edit.* Now, it muſt be evident to every one, that this conduct of Vortigern was not juſtified by the principles of the balancing ſyſtem; for, of all events, that ſyſtem holds an invaſion to be the leaſt deſirable; and, inſtead of demanding the aid of allies on your own ground, it preſcribes

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prescribes the granting of aid to allies upon their ground, in order to prevent invasion. In fact, nothing could be less politic than Vortigern's conduct, upon the plainest principles of common sense. He actually called in a conqueror, whom he armed with the power of destroying his kingdom. He imitated exactly the policy of the horse in the fable. The reader will find many good ideas upon the general subject of the European community, mingled with several obvious misconceptions and puerilities, in Voltaire's '*Histoire de la Guerre de* 1740,' *Part I. chap.* 1.

NOTE K k. *p.* 276.

THE subject of the Austrian alliance was one of the most interesting discussions, in the politics of the eighteenth century previous to the French revolution, and perhaps not a little connected with that great and deplorable event. Those who wish to study this question of foreign policy, may consult, in the first place, the very interesting collection of state papers, published in two volumes octavo by the French government soon after the King's flight, and republished lately in three volumes, with some additions and notes by M. Segur, a gentleman well known in the diplomatic circles of the Continent, as the able negotiator who concluded the commercial treaty between France and Russia. This publication consists, chiefly, of a '*Tableau speculatif*,' or '*Raisonne*' of the foreign relations of France, drawn up by the Sieur Favier, under the direction, and with the assistance of the ministry. The object of the treatise is evidently to decry the Austrian alliance, as the cause of every calamity that befel France during the remainder of Louis XV.'s reign. The notes of M. Segur contain the chief arguments on the other side of the question. While Favier ascribes every

every evil to the Auſtrian ſyſtem, Segur, without denying the calamitous ſtate of affairs ſubſequent to 1756, both in Poland and Germany, attributes all to the mal-adminiſtration of French affairs in the Seven-years war, and during the whole interval between the peace of Hubertſburgh and the Revolution. He argues the queſtion rather upon ſpecialties; Favier adopts the more general views of the ſubject, which his antagoniſt condemns as unſound. As Favier perpetually recurs to the ſame text, endeavouring, like moſt theoriſts, to reduce every thing under one head, and twiſting all facts to humour his main poſition: ſo, the new editor follows him through his whole courſe, and, under the head of each power whoſe relations to France are diſcuſſed by Favier in the text, we meet with a ſeparate argument in Segur's notes, tending either to modify or overthrow the favourite concluſions of the former politician. In general, Favier, though a practical ſtateſman, and writing for a ſpecial purpoſe, ſeems to be an advocate for thoſe enlarged ſpeculations which I have attempted to defend in the Second Section of the Third Book. Segur is very decidedly an advocate for the minute and detailed views of foreign policy into which diplomatiſts ſo naturally fall. His talents in this line are, however, unqueſtioned; and it affords no ſmall proof of his liberality in political matters, that he whoſe fame in the diplomatic world reſts on the negotiation of a commercial treaty, ſhould be the loudeſt in condemning all ſuch conventions as abſurd and impolitic.

The hiſtorical writings of Frederic II, by far the moſt valuable of all that lively and clever Prince's works, afford much inſtruction upon the ſubject of this controverſy, beſides exhibiting to us a conciſe and connected view of the relative poſitions of different powers at the moſt important periods of his reign. He has left us, in the '*Hiſtoire de la Guerre de Sept-ans*,' a very valuable, and apparently a very authentic narrative of that moſt important conteſt, which

was

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was the firſt fruit of the new alliance. This treatiſe is, indeed, a model of compoſition in the branch of hiſtory to which it belongs—the mere detail of military tranſactions. It is full and minute, without being tedious; it is ſufficiently profeſſional and even deep, without any obſcurity or dryneſs; it is written by one who could really ſay, '*pars magna fui:*' yet in the whole courſe of the performance, we are never offended with the ſlighteſt violation of modeſty or coolneſs, while we read the tale of the hero with all the intereſt natural to ſo rare an occaſion. Laſtly, as the '*Hiſtoire*' is compoſed by one who was a ſtateſman, as well as a general and an author, although politics bear a very ſubordinate part in this book, the narrative is ſo drawn up, as to throw a full and ſatisfactory light upon the whole political tranſactions of the day, and, as it were, to fit any hiſtory which ſhall comprehend the politics, in the ſame manner that it embraces the military affairs of the war.

The introduction to this work contains ſome general remarks upon the ſtudy of hiſtory, and the importance of rightly uſing collections of facts. Theſe opinions of the Royal author countenance many of the ſpeculations in which I have indulged in the text, and are well worthy of the attention of thoſe men of detail who laugh at all general views of policy, as the effuſions of theoriſts, and productions of the cloſet. For it can hardly be aſſerted that the King of Pruſſia was, what Auſtria and Poland would indeed have wiſhed he had been, a viſionary and ſpeculative man.

Some anecdotes and intereſting facts with reſpect to the ſecret hiſtory of the Auſtrian alliance, may be found in Soulavie's Memoirs of the reign of Louis XVI., and may tend to complete the knowledge of the ſubject which the reader has acquired from Favier, Segur, and Frederic II. I am confident, that the reſult of the whole inquiry will lead him to adopt the opinion which I have curſorily ſtated upon this affair in the text.

THE Methuen Treaty has been held up by all French writers, down to the Abbé Raynal (who affects to write upon political as well as ſentimental topics), as the *chef-d'œuvre* of Britiſh policy, and the pitch of Portugueſe dependence. Moſt of our Engliſh ſtateſmen were of the ſame opinion before the days of Smith and Hume. The former of theſe celebrated writers has fully diſcuſſed the ſubject, and endeavoured to ſhew that this treaty was highly diſadvantageous to England, even upon the principles of the mercantile ſyſtem. In his general reaſonings againſtall ſuch treaties, it would be impoſſible to find any weakneſs or difficulty; but he ſeems to have miſapprehended the ſtate of things which led to the Methuen Treaty; and his arguments againſt it, on this ſpecial view, are not ſatisfactory. In fact, it muſt ſtrike every one who ſees his ſtatement, that it proves too much; for ſurely, if the ſtipulations of the contract are ſo leonine as he deſcribes them, it is impoſſible to ſuppoſe that any man of common underſtanding, I mean any perſon endowed with the faculty of counting his ten fingers, could for one moment have miſtaken the nature of the bargain.

The ſtatements of Dr Smith (*Wealth of Nations*, *Book IV. chap. VI.*) are the more impoſing, that he prefaces them with a literal tranſlation of the treaty, the ſtipulations of which are ſhort and ſimple. He then proceeds to obſerve, that, by this bargain, Engliſh woollens are admitted on no better terms than before the prohibition which is thus repealed; but that they are admitted on no better terms than that of other nations, while the Portugueſe wines are admitted into England with a great preference. 'So far, 'therefore,' (ſays he) 'the treaty is evidently advanta-'geous to Portugal, and diſadvantageous to Great Britain.' —*Vol. II. p.* 327. *edit.* 1799.

This

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This ſtatement, however, is fundamentally erroneous, inaſmuch as it omits to conſider the extent and nature of the prohibition repealed in the treaty. In 1644, (the jealous ſpirit of the French cabinet having a ſhort time before prohibited Brazil goods), Portugal prohibited the entry of all French goods. The hands of the nation were, during the remainder of the ſeventeenth century, turned to manufactures, particularly thoſe of wool; and with ſo much ſucceſs, that in 1684 the government under Erricira's adminiſtration prohibited all importation, either of the raw material or of woollen goods. This occaſioned great murmurs, chiefly on account of the diminution ſuſtained by the revenue; and at the ſame time Britain was endeavouring to ſupplant the French wines in her home market, by the introduction of the Portugueze. Both governments, therefore, were ſoon diſpoſed to conclude a bargain, which ſhould again open the Portugueze market to Britiſh woollens, and ſhould promote in Britain the uſe of Portugueze wines. This gave riſe to the arrangements which terminated in the Methuen treaty. The paction, then, is ſhort and ſimple; it is, that Portugal ſhall repeal the law of 1684, in favour of Britain, and that Britain, in return, ſhall admit Portugueze wines at two thirds of the duties paid by French wines. The preference is mutual. The prohibition of 1644 againſt French goods remains in full force: the prohibition of 1684 remains alſo in full force againſt French and all other woollens, except Britiſh woollens. Britiſh woollens alone are admitted; all others excluded. Here, then, is a monopoly of the Portugueze market granted to Britiſh goods, in return for a preference given to Portugueze wines over thoſe of France. Wherefore, the advantage granted to Britiſh woollens is much more general than that given to Portugueze wines. Dr Smith's objection proceeds entirely from confining his view to the terms of the treaty, which do not expreſsly ſay that the laws of 1644 and 1684 are to remain

main in force, unleſs in ſo far as the latter is repealed by the treaty. NOTES AND ILLUST.

I ſhall only add, that the French wines having before the treaty been heavily loaded in England, and the Portugueze wines encouraged, the Methuen treaty produced a very trifling effect in favour of Portugal; not much above a thirty-ſecond part being for ſome years added to the former importation by the diminution of duty; while the repeal of the law 1684, in favour of England, gave her woollens an immediate monopoly of the Portugeze importation market, from which they had been totally excluded ſince that law was enacted. Whatever truth, then, there may be in all Dr Smith's reaſonings againſt commercial treaties, (and no one can for one moment doubt their accuracy), we muſt admit, that by the Methuen treaty Britain gains more than Portugal; that the mutual advantages are exactly of the kind propoſed by the lovers of the mercantile ſyſtem; and that the bargain, upon the principles of thoſe men, is mutually advantageous, but more ſo to Britain than to Portugal. The law of 1644 might indeed have been repealed next year (in 1704), and that of 1684 might have been repealed in favour of France, or any other country. But this would evidently have annulled the Methuen treaty, as much as if a preference had been granted to French wines by Britain, in direct violation of the compact; or as if Portugal had inſtantly renewed the excluſion of Britiſh goods.

Although, therefore, the letter of the treaty is certainly a little defective from extreme conciſeneſs, the ſpirit and intention of it is clear, and, on the principles of the mercantile ſyſtem, unexceptionable.

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THE ſubſtance of the general reaſonings and views detailed in this Section, was publiſhed in the Second Number of a periodical work, conducted by a ſociety of Literary Gentlemen in Edinburgh, entitled the '*Edinburgh Review.*'

NOTE N n. *p.* 295.

THE confidence with which I have termed the conduct of France, during the American war, a blunder, is fully juſtified by the addition of '*acknowledged,*' which we are entitled to make, from attending to the ſentiments uniformly expreſſed by the ableſt ſtateſmen of France, both at the time and ſince the American revolution. Such views are extremely intereſting in diſcuſſing the American colonial politics of the preſent day; becauſe they ſhew us clearly what would have been the advice of thoſe enlightened men upon the great ſubjects of Weſt Indian policy. To us who have, on many points of the ſubject, the benefit of twenty-ſeven years experience, the errors of ſuch men are no leſs inſtructive than their happieſt conjectures. They may teach us what meaſure of modeſty is becoming in political diſcuſſions, and guard us againſt raſhly founding our practical deductions upon the moſt plauſible general theories.

M. de Vergennes having, about the beginning of the American troubles, laid before the cabinet a memorial upon the conduct ſuggeſted to France and Spain, by the ſtate of the colonial affairs of England, M. Turgôt drew up a long memorial upon this ſubject. The original paper of Vergennes is loſt; but the memorial of Turgôt was found among

among Lewis XVI.'s papers; and ſeveral long extracts from it are inſerted in the publication formerly referred to, '*Politique de tous les Cabinets de l'Europe.*' The excellence and importance of theſe ſpecimens leave the greateſt room to lament, that the whole of this intereſting ſtate paper was not laid before the public. NOTES AND ILLUST.

The firſt extract contains the concluſion of the whole eſſay; in which the author recapitulates, with his uſual accuracy, the inferences deduced from all the former parts; and probably adds new force to his previous arguments, by again placing the reſults before his reader in a varied arrangement and more luminous concentration.

The general opinion to which all M. Turgôt's reaſonings lead him, is, that the ſucceſs of England in her colonial ſtruggles, would be the iſſue moſt advantageous both to France and Spain. Some of the views upon which this juſt and philoſophical concluſion is founded, ſeem not to be marked with the liberality that formed ſo diſtinguiſhing a feature in almoſt all the opinions of this enlightened ſtateſman. Thus, he ſays, *(Vol. II. p.* 395. *edit.* 1793.) that if the colonies are not reduced without a ſevere effort, it is ſo much the better for France; becauſe the ſtruggle will leave them completely exhauſted, and in no condition to aſſiſt the wealth and power of the mother country for many years; and if the ſtruggle is ſhort, the flouriſhing ſtate in which it leaves America muſt be a ſufficient diverſion to the force of England. The latter view is analogous to thoſe poſitions which I attempted to lay down in the Second Book of this Inquiry. The former view is in ſome reſpects illiberal and inaccurate. The commercial advantage of England, whether derived from her colonies, or the other branches of her dominion, or her foreign trade, is evidently an advantage to the commerce of France alſo; and this benefit reaped by France muſt improve her reſour-

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ces, while the direct advantages of the colonial trade are promoting those of Britain.

M. Turgôt expresses himself in a tone of considerable confidence with respect to the event of the American war, then only begun. 'La supposition de la separation absolue des 'colonies de la metropole, me paroît infiniment probable.'—*p.* 395. He then states his opinion upon the general question—'Je crois fermement que toutes les metropoles seront 'forcées d'abandonner tout empire sur leur colonies.'—*p.* 396. The views which lead him to form this and other similar conclusions, are apparently dictated, in some degree, by his confidence in the principles of national progressive improvement, which he deems to be connected with the abolition of colonial relations, in the true spirit of the œconomists, a sect whose tenets he appears greatly to have favoured.—See, particularly, p. 396.

In the rest of the first extract, we meet with many forcible arguments against the interference of either France or Spain in the affairs of North America. He also observes, that a reunion of England with America, if prompt and sudden, might menace France and Spain with danger.—*p.* 397.

In another extract from the same memorial, we meet with the following singular opinion, introduced at the end of an invective somewhat declamatory against colonies in general, formerly quoted (Book I. Sect. 1.) 'Il n'est pas 'vraisemblable que les Anglois soient les premiers à quitter 'des prejugés qu'ils ont long-tems regardés comme la source 'de leur grandeur. En ce cas, *il n'est pas possible de douter* '*que leur obstination n'entraine l'union de leurs colonies à sucre* '*avec celles du continent septentrional.*'—*p.* 415.

The opinion of Vergennes appears to have been in all material respects the same with that of Turgôt, upon the conduct which France should pursue with regard to American affairs. His memorial is lost; but reference is constantly

ly made to it by Turgôt. Malouet, an author well verſed in colonial affairs, was of the ſame way of thinking; and drew up two memorials in ſupport of this opinion, at the deſire of Sartine, then miniſter of the marine and colonies. Sartine was decidedly againſt the interference, and wiſhed to lay the arguments forcibly before the King, who yielded with great difficulty to weaker counſels.—*Mem. ſur les Col. tom. III.*

NOTE N n. *p.* 332. *

THE plan of an invaſion, ſuch as we have been conſidering, was actually entertained at one time by the late Empreſs of Ruſſia. At the period of the dreaded rupture with England on account of Oczacow, a plan was preſented to her Majeſty by Prince Naſſau, minutely detailing all the particulars of the route by which a Ruſſian force might paſs through Bochara to Caſhmir, and thence to Bengal. The avowed object of the expedition was to be the re-eſtabliſhment of the Mogul; a trick by which the good will of the Bocharians was expected to be gained. But as little could be apprehended from that weak and diſunited people, we are naturally diſpoſed to look upon the invention as a very ignorant one; for it would enſure the enmity of the much more powerful Mahometan princes in the Peninſula. Be this as it may, the Empreſs highly approved of the plan; and counted on the junction of the diſcontented from all parts with her forces in the north of India. Potemkin turned the ſcheme into ridicule; and the pacification that immediately

* The letter N n is repeated in this reference by an error of the preſs.

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immediately followed prevented any farther ſteps from being taken.—*Eton's Survey, p.* 501. *(Appendix.)*

The direct attack of India ſeems not to be the only mode of annoying the Engliſh power which the Ruſſian court has thought of. Plans appear to have been entertained hoſtile to Japan, and even to China, for many years.—*Ibidem, p.* 504. (*Appendix.*)

NOTE Oo. *p.* 334.

IT is ridiculous to think that the late exertions which have been made, and the new exertions which it is to be feared may ſoon be neceſſary againſt France in Egypt, are at all connected with the intereſts of Turkey. To that weak power it ſignifies indeed little how many of her nominal provinces ſhe ceaſes to call her own. That Egypt was of no manner of uſe to Turkey, for many years before the French invaſion, is an undeniable fact. So long ago as when Norden travelled there, the Baſhaw ruled, or rather obtained the tribute only by intrigue.—*Norden's Travels, I.* 63. But in the ſubſequent part of the century, the dependence of the Beys and their ſubjects was reduced ſtill lower.—*Irwine's Travels up the Red Sea, p.* 340-392. *4to edit.—Brown's Travels, chap. V.* We are informed by Bruce, that at one time there have been in Cairo alone four hundred perſons poſſeſſing abſolute power, and dependent only on the Beys, unleſs when one of them uſurped the chief dominion.—*Travels, vol. I. p.* 27.—a clear proof of the anarchy which ſubſiſted there at that time, and of the little power which the Porte could exerciſe over the province by any means. At a ſtill later period, the very acknowledgment of ſubjection was almoſt withheld, the Pacha's authority

authority openly denied, and the tribute ſent or refuſed at pleaſure, until it became a mock ceremony, conſiſting in the annual departure of mules ſuppoſed to be laden with money for the Porte, but in reality carrying rice bags, or ſtones.—*Eton's Survey, p.* 287. 8*vo edit.*

NOTE P p. *p.* 336.

SOME authors have alleged that the navigation of the Red Sea is only dangerous to the unſkilful ſeamen who at preſent frequent its coaſts in badly conſtructed veſſels.—*Ricard, Traité de Commerce, tom. III. p.* 439. M. Niebuhr, too, in every reſpect a better authority, tells us, that though the eaſt coaſt is very dangerous (on account of ſhoals) for coaſting, yet it is ſtudded with good harbours; and that clear ſailing is as eaſily performed from Djidda to Suez, as from Djidda to the Straights of Babelmandeb; a run which Europeans make without a pilot.—*Deſcript. de l'Arabie, p.* 303.

If, however, we may credit the accounts of various other perſons, particularly of Mr Bruce, *(Travels, vol. I. paſſim)*, there are in the Red Sea natural impediments to a tolerably ſafe navigation. Not to mention the violent ſtorms and the currents (particularly in the Straights) which all authors admit, and the ſhifting ſands produced by thoſe currents and ſtorms, it appears that this channel, perhaps more than any other, is ſtudded with ſunken rocks; and, what is almoſt as bad, with ſolitary rocks in every quarter; in ſuch a manner that, to uſe the language of Mr Bruce, the ſtem of the veſſel may be ſtriking, while the ſtern is in good anchorage, or in a hundred fathoms of water. In ſuch a ſea it is vain to think of ſafety even from the beſt

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charts; at leaſt, to a perſon unacquainted with practical navigation, it muſt appear very ſtrange, if the moſt accurate delineation of thoſe rocks could enable the moſt ſkilful ſeaman to avoid them, when we know how wide an approximation is given by all the operations of the compaſs and quadrant.

The force of the currents and winds appears to be conſtantly driving ſand up the Red Sea, ſo that veſſels of ſome bulk cannot now approach ſo near Suez as formerly.—*Niebuhr's Voyage, I.* 175.

NOTE Q q. *p.* 337.

MR CAPPER, in his work on winds and monſoons, (a work much more valuable for the number of facts which it contains, than for the illuſtrations afforded by theſe to his general theory), ſeems, from the flat contradiction which one page gives to another in ſeveral inſtances, to have fallen into ſome material errors. In p. 45. & 68. we are informed, that the S. W. monſoon blows on the Malabar coaſt from April to November; and the N. E. from November to April. In page 72. Mr Capper tells us, on the authority of M. D'Après, that the ſoutherly monſoons blow in the Red Sea from the end of Auguſt to the middle or end of May; and the northerly monſoons the reſt of the year. In the very next page he ſays, that the ſoutherly monſoon blows from the Straights to Yambo, at the ſame ſeaſon that it blows in the Gulf of Said, (commonly called the Indian Sea), or, he adds, from April to September; and that, from the middle of May to Auguſt, the ſoutherly monſoon extends from Yambo to Suez. Here are two flat contradictions; firſt, in the duration of the Malabar monſoon; and next, in the time of the Red Sea monſoon. Our confidence in Mr C.'s

C.s acuracy is certainly ſo newhat ſhaken by ſuch a circumſtance; and perhaps its effect may be ſomewhat increaſed by the manifeſt inſtances of careleſſneſs or error which one is ſurpriſed to meet with upon other matters. NOTES AND ILLUST.

In Mr C.'s very ſtrange diſſertation *(p. 217-222.)* upon the omnipreſence of the Tartars, (if I may uſe the expreſſion), we find a compariſon between the Perſic and Saxon languages introduced as deciſive of the author's hypotheſis—not that the Perſians and Saxons were radically the ſame people, but that the Tartars and Saxons were one nation. The final and ſtrongeſt inſtance of ſimilarity is taken from the famous word Wittenagamote, *(Wittenagemote)*, 'a compound word (ſays 'Mr C.) of high political import, that has the ſame ſound 'both in Perſic and Saxon. In the former, it is derived from '*Welten*, a native country, and *Gemmaiet*, an aſſembly.—'According to Blackſtone and Hume, it is the aſſembly of 'of Wiſe men; but in both languages it literally means 'the National Aſſembly'—*p.* 221. Now, not to mention that the ſimilarity is entirely confined to the latter part of the compound word, by the author's virtual admiſſion, it is a little ſingular that he ſhould have quoted the two terms, *Wetten* and *Gemmaiet*, as *Perſic*, when they are in fact preciſely *Arabic*. In like manner we find him, in one page, carefully inſerting vocables in the Oriental characters, and in another ſo completely miſpelling Eaſtern names, of known etymology, as to make us ſuſpect his accuracy, if not his proficiency in thoſe languages; for inſtance, *Irang* and *Turang*, for *Irany* and *Turany*; *Guardafui*, for *Gardefan*; *Babelmandel*, for *Babelmandeb.*—*pages* 218. 41. & 73. For ſuch reaſons as theſe, I have been inclined to queſtion Mr Capper's general accuracy in minute particulars, and to prefer the authority of other writers upon the ſubject of the monſoons, where he happens to differ from them in his ſtatements.

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ALMOST all the authors who have diſcuſſed the ſubject of a communication with India by Egypt, have founded their reaſonings rather upon the political than the phyſical obſtacles to ſuch an intercourſe. Thus Maillet, who diſcuſſes this point, contents himſelf with mentioning, that under Colbert's adminiſtration the ſcheme failed, from the prejudice of the natives and of the Turkiſh government, which he deſcribes.—*Edit. de Maſcrier, part. II. p.* 200. Niebuhr only diſputes the advantages which France would derive from a commerce with India, through Egypt, by enumerating the various difficulties ariſing from the political circumſtances of the country, as the taxes, extortions, and delays impoſed by the Arabians, the Porte, and the Beys.—*Voyage, tom. I. p.* 225. *& tom. II. p.* 10.

NOTE S s. *p.* 353.

IN the obſervations which I have been led to make upon the connexion between the Aſiatic colonies, and the improvement of Egypt, I have never expreſſed any doubt upon the advantages which would reſult both to the colonies and the mother countries, from the abolition of the company trade and government at preſent eſtabliſhed; nor have I taken at all into the conſideration of this ſubject the injurious conſequences of ſuch an event, to the perſons intereſted in the actual ſyſtem. It may, however, be obſerved, that any ſudden deſtruction, even of ſo ruinous a plan as the Aſiatic adminiſtration, would be attended with conſiderable inconvenience, and even with ſome danger to the credit of the mother country.

'Such,'

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'Such,' as Dr Smith well obſerves, 'are the unfortunate effects of all the regulations of the mercantile ſyſtem! They not only introduce very dangerous diſorders into the ſtate of the body politic, but diſorders which it is often difficult to remedy, without occaſioning, for a time at leaſt, ſtill greater diſorders.'—*Wealth of Nations, vol. II. p.* 427. *edit.* 1799.

It is not, however, to be ſuppoſed, that the cultivation of Egypt can at once ruin the preſent ſyſtem of colonial government in the Eaſt. Ample time will be given for making thoſe arrangements which may be requiſite to withſtand the ſhock, and when the downfal of the companies has been prepared, it will produce, to the whole commercial intereſts of each mother country, advantages amply ſufficient to counterbalance, even in the very beginning of the new arrangement, any inconvenience reſulting from the change. See alſo Book I. Sect. III. Part II. at the end.

In a political point of view, the ſame remark may be made. The trifling aſſiſtance received by the government from the companies, will be nothing compared with the vaſt increaſe of reſources which the free trade and reformed colonial government will place within reach of the ſtate. The naval force of the nations poſſeſſing Eaſt Indian territory, is indeed cloſely connected with the reſources of their Indian Companies. Thus, we have ſeen how very powerful the Dutch Eaſt India Company was in former times; and the Eaſt India Company of England is, I ſuppoſe, one of the firſt maritime powers in Europe—probably the third; that is to ſay, it could fit out a greater and better fleet of men of war than any power, except England and France. But this force would certainly not be loſt to the nation. The government, if occaſion required, would, after a few years, have the uſe of almoſt as many large ſhips from the open trade, as formerly from the Company. Large veſſels muſt always, as we have already ſeen, (Book I. Sect. II.

Part

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Part I.) be employed in the very diſtant branches of traffic; and the beſt way to multiply thoſe, is ſurely to extend that traffic which requires them.

NOTE T t. *p.* 377.

THERE is a conſiderable variation in the ſtatement of different authors upon the ſubject of the Egyptian population. That the reader may judge of the grounds on which I have ſuppoſed it to be four millions, I ſhall lay before him the different ſtatements, after premiſing that the falſehoods which have at different times been related about every thing connected with Egypt, and more particularly about the numbers of its inhabitants, ſeem to have made M. Volney wiſh rather to avoid exaggeration, by running into the oppoſite extreme; and that the accuracy of M. Savary is in general acknowledged by all writers—by none more than by M. Volney.

Maillet, after ſtating the ancient population of Egypt at ſeven millions five hundred thouſand, and remarking that the Arabian writers call it twenty millions, allows its preſent amount to be four millions, and that of Cairo to be five hundred thouſand.—*Edit. de Maſcrier, Part. I. p.* 24. Ricard, in one part of his work, ſays, 'On y compte cinq ou ſix 'millions d'habitans.'—*III.* 434.; and in another part he adds (after eſtimating the population of Cairo at ſeven or eight hundred thouſand), 'On ne craint pas de s'ecarter 'beaucoup de la vérité en ſuppoſant à l'Egypte ſix ou ſept 'millions d'habitans.'—*Ibid.* p. 443.

The treatiſe on Commerce in the *Encyclopedie Methodique*, mentions the number of towns to have been anciently twenty thouſand; and adds, that at preſent there are nine thouſand towns and twelve hundred villages.—*Tom. II. p.* 790.

Savary

Savary gives nine hundred thouſand for the population of Cairo, and four millions for that of all Egypt. The former ſum appears to be exaggerated.—*Tom. III. Let. I. & II.*

According to Volney, the population of Cairo is only two hundred and fifty thouſand, and that of all Egypt two millions three hundred thouſand.—*Egypt and Syria, vol. I. p.* 238. Eton follows him in his account of the latter, and confirms that of the former by a private interlineation.—*Survey, chap. VII.* And as Browne has given nearly the numbers mentioned by Volney, viz. three hundred thouſand, and two millions five hundred thouſand, it is probable he follows him too; but he ſpeaks with evident uncertainty.—*Travels in Africa, Egypt, and Syria, chap. V.*

It may be obſerved, that Volney founds his concluſion on a very rough eſtimate, from the number of towns and villages, which he ſays is only two thouſand three hundred, and the average of inhabitants only a thouſand to each, including the capital and Alexandria.

NOTE U u. *p.* 407.

THE valuable work of M. Malouet contains pretty full information upon this ſcheme (in the preparation of which he was employed) for introducing the free-negro ſyſtem into Guiana. The reader will particularly find this matter diſcuſſed in the ſecond ſection of the Memorial, (in vol. V.) entitled, '*Nouvelles Obſervations.*' He will alſo find in this, and in other parts of the collection, notices of the experiment actually tried (it is needleſs to ſay without any ſucceſs) for cultivating Guiana by a colony of peaſants from Alſace and Lorrain; an experiment never exceeded in coſtly abſurdity, except perhaps in the Spaniſh colony of the Sierra Morena.

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Morena. M. Malouet (*p.* 114. *et ſeqq.*) argues, though without much of his uſual acuteneſs, againſt the general plan of cultivation by free negroes. His reaſonings are applicable to a variety of plans, which appear at different times to have been propoſed by ſpeculative men, for the abolition of the ſlave ſyſtem, by providing ſubſtitutes in the colonial cultivation. This branch of his argument was written very lately; but in other parts of his collection we meet with ſimilar topics urged againſt plans of a like nature, which appear to have found advocates among French ſtateſmen at the beginning of Lewis XVI.'s reign.—*Vol. IV.*

In this country, various crude and ill-digeſted ſchemes have been propoſed at different times for the cultivation of the Weſt Indian territories. The ſyſtem of free blacks has been urged more lately, and with much greater ability, in a pamphlet entitled the '*Criſis of the Sugar Colonies*,' publiſhed about a year ago, by a gentleman who has not choſen to give his name to the public. Widely as the opinions contained in this Inquiry differ from many of thoſe delivered in the '*Criſis*,' it is impoſſible not to admit the merits, and to praiſe the motives of this performance, which, though very haſty, and written apparently under the warm impreſſions of the moment, diſplays ſufficient talents and acquaintance with the ſubject, to make us regret that profeſſional avocations have prevented the author from fully diſcuſſing the intereſting topics of negro ſlavery.

NOTE V v. *p.* 462.

OTHER inſtances are not wanting in Mr Edwards's writings, more particularly in his Hiſtory of St Domingo, which prove how very raſhly he was inclined to admit, upon the moſt ſuſpicious teſtimony, facts favourable to his opinions, or

or rather his intereſts, as a ſlave proprietor. The ſame raſhneſs, however, appears to have directed his belief, in other inſtances where he had not even that excuſe.

In the firſt edition (1796), he publiſhed, among a variety of facts obtained from 'perſonal converſation with a gentleman of St Domingo, on whoſe veracity and honour he could place the fulleſt dependence,' a charge of unparalleled atrocity, againſt a very worthy and reſpectable French planter, ſon of the celebrated Count de Graſſe. This gentleman was ſtated, in the moſt poſitive terms, to have been preſent at the deſtruction of the Cape, and to have warmly aſſiſted the negro inſurgents in their diabolical work of maſſacre and devaſtation.

During four years was the character of this unfortunate gentleman ruined in the eyes of all Mr Edwards's readers. And, in the next edition of 1800, appears a certificate from twenty reſpectable perſons, that M. de Graſſe had, during the whole time of the inſurrection, acted with the utmoſt vigour and fidelity, as Adjutant-General of the forces againſt the rebels, and that no part of his conduct had ever furniſhed the ſlighteſt grounds for a murmur of ſuſpicion againſt him, from the time of his arrival in St Domingo to the moment of his expulſion, when, after various miſeries, he ſhared in the univerſal ruin of his countrymen, and was driven pennyleſs from his home. In publiſhing this *reparation* of M. de Graſſe's injured character, Mr Edwards ſtates, that experience has convinced him that no great dependence can be placed on the accuſations raiſed 'by men againſt their fellow citizens in times of civil commotion, and amidſt the tumult of conflicting paſſions.'—*p.* 19. *edit.* 1801. and he omits the recital which he had publiſhed in 1796 againſt M. de Graſſe: yet, ſtrange to tell, ſo enamoured is he of every bit of private information he can ſcrape together, that he republiſhes every other fact in the liſt of thoſe which he had received from the ſame quarter; and repeats his atteſtation

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teſtation of the honour and veracity of the gentleman from whom theſe facts, together with the foul calumny againſt M. de Graſſe, were received !—*p.* 147.

The '*Teſtament de Mort d'Ogé*,' is alſo inſerted in both editions of this work.

This document is the foundation of a black charge againſt the Council of the Cape, and all the military chiefs of the colony under the ancient *regime*. They are indeed convicted, if this paper be authentic, of having been in league with the people of colour, and of having actually cauſed every one of the dreadful ſcenes which have, ſince the revolution, overwhelmed St Domingo in countleſs horrors. Now this paper was received by the author from an emigrant, to whom he acknowledges his obligations for the chief part of his information through the whole work. This gentleman had belonged to the revolutionary government; had been arreſted, perſecuted, and ſent over to France in chains; but had been captured by the Engliſh, and ſaved. At the time of publication he had returned to St Domingo to look after his property: he had again fallen into the hands of his enemies; and the laſt act of his liberty was to tranſmit the document in queſtion to Mr Edwards, with o-other valuable papers—*p.* 13. & 14.

Now, two circumſtances ſhould have unqueſtionably prevented Mr Edwards from giving credit or place to this teſtimony, even if we ſhould omit the previous and general conſideration of the high improbability of the charge.

In the *firſt* place, the anonymous informer did not communicate the document to Mr Edwards, when he ſaw him in England, and received from him many obligations, (*p.* 140.); but he ſent it after his return to St Domingo; Governor Blanchelande and all his aſſociates implicated in the charge, being then dead.

But, *ſecondly*, it is evident that the anonymous informer was a perſon of moſt ſuſpicious credibility. He was of the party

party diametrically oppoſite to the men whom he accuſes, and held a high office. He was one of the numerous coloniſts and partizans who believed, and firmly believed, that the counter-revolutioniſts were as much their enemies as the *amis des noirs*, and who heſitated not to impute, partly to their weak, and partly to their treacherous counſels, all the miſeries of the rebellion. If the furious diſputes of thoſe diſmal times could inſpire the contending factions with ſchemes ſo mad as an appeal to the inferior races, any accuſation brought by one party againſt the other, ſhould be received with the moſt ſcrupulous caution.

Although Mr Edwards did not receive the copy of Ogé's '*Teſtament de Mort*' until the year 1795, *(p. 242.)* the accuſation founded upon it was brought forward againſt Governor Blanchelande and the reſt of the ancient adminiſtration, nine months after Ogé's death, and before the fall of the perſons accuſed, *(p. 72.)* It had therefore an evident and important purpoſe to ſerve. It was meant to haſten the fate which ſoon afterwards overtook thoſe unhappy men. The ſpirit of the remarks made by the anonymous gentleman, in his letter to Mr Edwards ſent along with the paper, and inſerted in page 242. (*edit.* 1801), ought ſurely to have impreſſed Mr Edwards with ſome ſuſpicions of his partiality and rancour.

The raſhneſs of admitting this document as evidence, is greatly increaſed by the anecdote which I firſt related, concering the avowed error into which a ſimilar credulity in another inſtance led our author. It will be difficult, I apprehend, to prove that any circumſtances could prevent Mr Edwards's own obſervation upon the little faith due to accounts of partizans, from applying to the teſtimony of the anonymous informant.

In chapter V. we meet with a new and ſignal inſtance of raſhneſs in our *hiſtorian*. He ſays, after relating the mutiny of Colonel Mauduit's regiment (1791), that this unhappy man,

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man, on being desired to make unworthy concessions to his soldiers, 'started back with indignation, and offered his bosom to their swords: it was pierced with a hundred swords, 'all of them inflicted by his own men, while not a single 'hand was lifted up in his defence.'—*p.* 81. *edit.* 1801.

In a note (*p.* 254.) to this passage, we are informed that the circumstance of Mauduit falling undefended, is perfectly false; for that, after the preceding passage was printed, a detail of the whole transaction was sent him from St Domingo. This account, indeed, differs widely from the narrative given in the text. It reduces the hundred wounds to a single sabre-cut, and decapitation. It substitutes for the shocking description of unnatural excess upon the remains of Mauduit, given in page 82, the more ordinary proceedings of fixing his head on a bayonet, and dragging his body through the street; and it relates the generous efforts which were made to save his life, partly by his own officers, and partly by the citizens whom he had most harassed.

It may perhaps be thought that Mr Edwards, after receiving this information, should have been at the expence of cancelling pages 81. & 82. and reprinting a correct narrative from the authentic materials. But, at any rate, it is evident that this method of proceeding was clearly prescribed to him when called upon to revise his work for a new edition. Instead of altering his account, according to the authentic materials, he republishes the original story, with all its exaggerations and falsehoods, so positively contradicted in the note. If any effect is to be produced by the continuance of the narrative, it must be the effect of deceiving; and if any one person reads the text, without turning to the notes, (as may easily happen to many readers), Mr E. has been guilty of misleading and imposing upon this person, as completely as if the note had not been published.

The

The raſhneſs of Mr Edwards in admitting facts, is not greater than his raſhneſs in adopting opinions. What ſhall we ſay of the judgement of a man well verſed in Weſt Indian politics, who could account for the unnatural horrors of negro warfare by ſo extravagant an hypotheſis as the following, which he ſays is incontrovertibly proved by the ſtatements contained in his work?

'The rebellion of the negroes in St Domingo, and the 'inſurrection of the mulattoes, to whom Ogé was ſent as 'ambaſſador, had one and the ſame origin. It was not the 'ſtrong and irreſiſtible impulſe of human nature groaning 'under oppreſſion, that excited either of thoſe claſſes to 'plunge their daggers into the boſoms of unoffending wo'men and helpleſs infants. They were driven into thoſe 'exceſſes, reluctantly driven, by the vile machinations of 'men calling themſelves philoſophers (the proſelytes and 'imitators in France of the Old-Jewry aſſociates in Lon'don), whoſe pretences to philanthropy were as groſs a 'mockery of human reaſon, as their conduct was an out'rage on all the feelings of our nature, and the ties which 'hold ſociety together.' p. 16. (*Edit.* 1801.)

It muſt ſurely be no common meaſure of prejudice which can induce any one to go farther than the nature of untamed ſavages, in order to find out reaſons for their bloody proceedings. It is no ordinary degree of thoughtleſs violence which can ſo far blind this author, as to make him forget his conſtant topic of declamation againſt the civilized friends of the negroes, and aſcribe to their machinations, and not to the ferocious paſſions of the ſlaves, all the horrors of the inſurrection, after declaiming ſo often againſt their proceedings, merely becauſe they tended to awaken thoſe very paſſions in the negroes. In one page, the unnatural cruelties of the rebels are accounted for, by imputing them to the inſtigation of their European abettors; in another, thoſe abettors are accuſed of blind imprudence, for letting looſe

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uncivilized men, whoſe habits rendered ſuch enormities inevitable.

I have judged it neceſſary to enter into theſe details, that the reader may be maſter of the grounds upon which I venture to call in queſtion ſo reſpectable an authority as the very popular writer of the Hiſtory of the Weſt Indies. I truſt, that the circumſtances mentioned in the text, with thoſe contained in this note, will ſufficiently juſtify the caution which I have uniformly diſplayed in receiving his ſtatements, upon ſubjects immediately connected with the negro queſtions. When a work has for ſome time been known to the world under the name of a hiſtory, it is ſometimes not uſeleſs to examine its pretenſions to this important title—whether they are derived from right, or only admitted by courteſy. And when the ſubject of the performance is intereſting to a variety of paſſions and feelings; when, in ſhort, it forms one of the leading topics in the politics of the day, it is prudent to inquire, whether this hiſtory is the mature and deliberate work of a ſober-minded and impartial writer, or the effuſion of a partizan, who, if his ſubject had been leſs extenſive, and the ſize of his tract conſequently ſmaller, would have ranked, not among the hiſtorians, but the pamphleteers of the day.

The anecdote of Mr Edwards, with reſpect to Gallifet's ſlaves, which I have alluded to in the text, is not, ſo far as I know, related by any other writer in favour of the negro ſyſtem, except by M. Laborie, an author in many points guilty of conſiderable unfairneſs in his ſtatements. His work, however, was not publiſhed till after Mr Edwards's firſt edition (from which I quoted that anecdote) had appeared; and, at any rate, he differs materially from that author. He imputes the rebellion of Gallifet's ſlaves, not to the wiſe and indulgent treatment which they met with, but to the exceſſive laxity of their diſcipline, and their extravagant wealth. Some of them were poſſeſſed of above 300l. currency;

currency; almoſt all of them had excellent clothes, furniture, plate, &c. The plantation, according to Laborie, was a perpetual ſcene of feaſting and merriment. If we ſhould take this as the whole account of the fact, it would be ſufficient to account for the prevalence of licentiouſneſs, riot, and a rebellious ſpirit among Galliſet's ſlaves; for ſurely the poſſeſſion of ſo much property, perhaps the enjoyment of ſo great indulgence, is inconſiſtent with the condition of bondage. When conſiderable wealth is acquired by ſlaves, ſome proviſion ought always to be made for the purchaſe of their freedom; otherwiſe they are placed in a ſituation which, if it continues, muſt lead to licentiouſneſs and indiſcipline, or, if checked, muſt produce inſurrection. But the material circumſtance mentioned by Mr Clarkſon, and omitted by Laborie, who moſt probably knows it, is the change of management which had been introduced into Galliſet's plantation for ſome years previous to the revolution. This had the effect of rendering a ſupply of new and unſeaſoned hands neceſſary, and at the ſame time muſt have irritated to the higheſt pitch thoſe who remained, and felt the effects of the new regimen. If M. Laborie's account be combined with the ſtatement of Mr Clarkſon, (although it is very poſſible that the latter ſtatement may be complete in itſelf, and that Laborie's addition may contain an exaggerated picture), we ſhall have ample grounds upon which to explain the circumſtance ſo unfairly ſtated by Mr Edwards: for what materials could the wit of man have deviſed more prone to exploſion, than a mixture of new and unbroken ſlaves with wealthy and licentious creoles, who have been ſuddenly ſubjected to a vigorous ſyſtem of management, after a life of eaſe and indulgence?

NOTE Ww. *p.* 480.

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ONE argument has been repeatedly urged in favour of the ſlave trade, certainly too abſurd to merit a ſerious analyſis or refutation, had not many very reſpectable perſons lent it the ſanction of their names. It has been ſaid, that the African ſlave market is ſupplied almoſt entirely by the wars which diſtract that continent, and by the execution of certain judicial ſentences preſcribing ſlavery for ſome offences, as witchcraft and adultery. It is well known, that no man, according to the cuſtoms of moſt African nations, can ſell his home-born ſlave, unleſs in the caſe of famine. I ſhall for the preſent admit, that the ſlave market on the coaſt never furniſhes any temptations ſufficiently powerful to induce the breach of this African law; and I ſhall ſuppoſe that no ſlaves are ever brought to the traders, who have not been either taken in war, or ſold in conſequence of their crimes. It is evident that the argument for the traffic gains much by theſe gratuitous conceſſions; yet, in what ſtate do they leave it? If the ſlaves captured in war, and the criminals condemned for witchcraft, are ſold at a good price, is it not obvious that a premium is held out for the encouragement of wars, and of futile accuſations? It is ſaid, that if the ſlave market were ſhut up for ever, the ſame wars and accuſations would continue; with this difference, that captives would be butchered, and criminals put to death.

No doubt, the abolition of the ſlave trade would neither eradicate war, nor falſe accuſations from the ſtates of Africa. To a certain degree, both of theſe evils would continue in that barbarous quarter of the globe, becauſe both of

of them are produced by other cauſes, as well as by the ſlave trade; by other paſſions, as well as by avarice. It may, however, fairly be eſtimated, that more of the wars and falſe accuſations which keep Africa in a ſtate of diſcord and barbariſm, are engendered by the temptations of the ſlave market, than by any other cauſe. Does any one deny, that the common receivers of ſtolen goods encourage, beyond any other cauſe, the commiſſion of robberies and thefts? Yet the expulſion of every common receiver from a country (were ſuch a thing poſſible), would not aboliſh either of thoſe crimes. But ſurely nothing could be more abſurd, than to diſpute the propriety of taking all poſſible ſteps for rooting out ſuch peſts of ſociety, merely becauſe a complete cure of the evil would not be effected by this remedy.

As to the argument, that maſſacres and executions would be the conſequence of the abolition, we may be ſure that, for a few campaigns of African warfare, or a few terms of the African courts, victories and convictions would end in the death of ſome men, who would otherwiſe have been ſold. This would be exactly the conſequence of the previous demand for men occaſioned by the trade. It always takes ſome time before the ſupply can accommodate itſelf to the varied demands of any market, whether the variation be that of increaſe or of diminution.

No meaſure, ſurely, could be better calculated to preſerve the lives of wild beaſts in any well ſtocked country, than the prohibition of exportation to foreign menageries; yet, for a few ſeaſons, this law would certainly increaſe the number of animals devoted to death; becauſe thoſe whoſe habits had been formed by the old practice, would continue to hunt, and many would ſtill hunt for amuſement, or the gratification of cruel paſſions: and as the price of wild beaſts would fall in the home market, men would grow careleſs of preſerving their lives: nay, more being for ſome

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time caught than the ſupply of the home menageries required, many muſt of neceſſity be killed. But the ſupply would ſoon accommodate itſelf to the leſſer demand; and though ſome men continued to hunt for paſtime, an infinitely ſmaller number of beaſts would be taken and killed than formerly. This caſe is preciſely that of the African ſlave trade.

The abolition of this traffic will diminiſh the demand for ſlaves by ſeventy or a hundred thouſand. The ſlave trade carried on by the Eaſt, through Egypt, is extremely trifling. In Cairo, which is the ſlave market of Egypt, and the entrepôt of other countries, there are only ſold annually from fifteen hundred to two thouſand negroes; and the price never exceeds one hundred crowns, the average being about ten pounds Sterling; not above one fifth of the price in the Weſt Indies, and not one half of the price on the weſt coaſt.—*Sonnini's Voyage in Egypt, chap. XXXVI.* —*Report of Committee* 1789, *Part VI.—Edwards' Weſt Indies, B. IV. c.* 2.

Beſides, it is univerſally admitted, that no compariſon whatever can be drawn between the eaſtern and the weſtern ſlave traffic. The treatment of the negroes in thoſe Oriental nations which employ them as ſlaves, is mild and gentle: they are uſed entirely for domeſtic, and even honourable purpoſes: they ſoon acquire their freedom with the favour of their maſters, and partake as much of the refinement and comforts of the ſociety in which they reſide, as our menial negroes do in Europe.—*Sonnini, chap. XXXVI.—Bruce's Travels, vol. I. p.* 392.

It is maintained by ſome, that the ſlave trade both in the eaſt and weſt of Africa, has aboliſhed the uſe of human fleſh, and the practice of human ſacrifices.—*Bruce, I.* 392. But, beſides that this fact appears extremely repugnant to the character of the negroes, which the beſt and lateſt travellers have given, (*Park's Travels, chap. XX. XXI. XXII.*) admitting all the advantage juſt now ſtated to have been gained

gained from the ſlave traffic, do we by the inſtant abolition of this traffic, loſe any of the ſteps already gained in improving Africa? For who can be ſo fooliſh as to imagine that the Africans, in whatever manner they have been civilized, will ever return to their ancient habits of cannibaliſm and human ſacrifices? Let us, then, by aboliſhing the trade, ſecure and carry forward thoſe very improvements which the trade may have been the means of beginning.

The labours of the African Aſſociation cannot be mentioned with too much reſpect. An inſtitution more purely diſintereſted, more unqueſtionably influenced by the higheſt motives of utility, and the moſt exalted views of univerſal benevolence, has never yet ariſen among men. Their ſucceſſes have been proportioned to their deſerts; and the public are waiting with impatience for the annunciation of new and ſplendid achievements, planned by their wiſdom, and effected by their aſſiſtance. That Africa will probably owe much to the labours of the Society, we may ſafely aſſert; but while the great cauſe of barbariſm exiſts, and while thoſe who wiſh well to that quarter of the globe in the Aſſociation, yet cling to the root of the evil, we cannot expect any ſenſible effects to reſult from this very praiſeworthy Eſtabliſhment.

It is indeed a matter deeply to be regretted, that the Society ſhould, except at firſt, always have entruſted the important office of ſecretary and editor to perſons patrimonially intereſted in the negro ſlave trade. The narratives which have been publiſhed by Mr Edwards, for inſtance, are evidently influenced by his views of the negro ſyſtem. If we may credit common report, confirmed by the ſtatements of Sir William Young, in his edition of his friend's laſt volume, (*Policy of the Weſt Indies*, vol. III. *Prefatory advertiſement*, p. 8.), Mr Park's Narrative was the work of Mr Edwards. Our confidence in many of the traveller's ſtatements is by

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this circumſtance greatly diminiſhed ; yet enough is ſtill contained in Mr Park's work to juſtify ſtronger inferences than any of thoſe which I have drawn with reſpect to the connexion between the ſlave trade and the barbariſm of Africa. As this work is in the hands of every one, I ſhall only refer my readers to the various admiſſions made by the traveller and his *redacteur*, of the extent to which plunder is carried on in Africa, for the purpoſe of ſelling the captives. The whole account of the negroes, above referred to, and the previous ſtatements contained in chapter II. deſerve particular attention, as coming from perſons evidently inclined to favour the negro ſyſtem.

To Mr Edwards has ſucceeded in the office of ſecretary and editor, Sir William Young ; and he ſcruples not, in the laſt publication (*Horneman's Journal*), to augur moſt favourably of the effects of the Society's labours in civilizing the great African continent. This ſtrenuous advocate of the ſlave trade ſeriouſly imagines, that the efforts of a few learned men to explore the interior of the country, will be ſufficient to enlighten and humanize its barbarous inhabitants, whom the conſtant exertions of traders and factories are inciting to war and plunder, by the irreſiſtible temptation of ſetting a price upon their enemies taken alive. The men who can ſo eaſily conceive hopes of human improvement, muſt ſurely wonder how the premiums of our old Saxon king ſhould have extirpated the wolf from this country, when a few nobles and *virtuoſi* would every now and then deſire to obtain a living ſpecimen for ſport or ſhow.

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